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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 The Focus of This Study 
Housing  finance  is  a  significant  driver  of  economic  growth  in  developed  and 
developing  countries  alike.  Any  housing  market  includes  construction,  building 
materials,  equipment,  finance  and  labour  suppliers.  But  the  housing  market 
flourishes only where these suppliers and institutions are effective in the provision of 
housing and finance (Chiquier and Lea, 2009). In terms of housing finance, a well-
functioning mortgage market typically has a catalytic impact on the development of 
housing finance provision through several institutions, such as banking, contractual 
savings,  capital  markets  and  community  institutions,  that  are  channelling  funds 
between surplus and deficit agents in the housing and mortgage markets (Sunega 
and Lux, 2007).  
 
A well-functioning mortgage market should help increase access and affordability in 
the  housing  market.  Its  focus  should  include  enabling  adequate  supply  and 
sustainable resource mobilization and the provision of finance for housing supply 
and  demand  (World Bank,  2005).  Further,  it should  have  the  ability  to  overcome 
obstacles,  including  lending  restrictions,  lack  of  financial  infrastructure,  legal  and 
regulatory constraints, limited institutional capacity and lack of access to mortgage 
credit.  
 
1.2 Why Is This Thesis Important?  
While the recent reform in the Egyptian mortgage market is a positive step in the 
development of housing finance provision, mortgage credit should be considered a 
means  to  an  end.  The  focus  to  date  in  Egypt  has  been  on  stimulating  demand 
through extending mortgage credit (Eldin et al., 2004). But the Egyptian mortgage 2 
 
market  continues  to  be  limited  in  its  reach,  especially  in  the  low-  and moderate-
income housing market (CBE, 2010). By limited reach, we mean low- and moderate- 
income households who have no and/or limited access to mortgage products and 
services. In the absence of a well-regulated, professionalized and institutionalized 
network of mortgage credit intermediation to serve the high-risk consumer segments 
in  Egypt,  access  to  housing  and  mortgage  credit  for  low-  and  moderate-income 
households remains a major challenge.  
 
On the other hand, the long-term and fundamental imbalance between supply and 
demand in the housing market has resulted in a dramatic increase in house prices in 
recent  years,  driving  many  low-  and  moderate-income  households  into  the  hard-
pressed  public  housing  sector  or,  alternatively,  the  informal  sector  (Fahmi  and 
Sutton, 2008). Thus, more strategies are required to develop a well-functioning and 
effective system of housing finance provision in Egypt to improve access to housing 
for low- and moderate-income households. In this regard, many studies indicated 
that, in order to build an effective and inclusive network of financial intermediation 
that  reaches  the  under-served  households,  other  sectors  would  need  to  be 
integrated  into  the  network  (Torre  and  Schmukler,  2005,  Imboden,  2005,  CGAP, 
2006,  UNCDF,  2006,  Bond,  2004,  UNCHS-Habitat,  1984a).  Thus,  this  should 
improve the lives of these under-served households, in particular in the developing 
and transitional economies (UNCDF, 2006).  
 
This  thesis  responds  to  the  need  for  a  clear  strategy  in  the  Egyptian  mortgage 
market, especially on the supply side. Accordingly, the thesis reviews the issues that 
are central to the evaluation of mortgage supply models. This review includes the 
theoretical and empirical issues associated with this evaluation, identifying the reach 3 
 
of mortgage supply models and the limit of that reach and, implicitly, examining what 
needs to be done to close the gap on what would be a more accessible mortgage 
market.  
 
In 2004, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report highlighted the 
important role of the non-government and community-based institutions in Egypt and 
the need for more co-operation between these institutions and the other agents in 
the  housing  market  to  achieve  the  desired  objectives  (UNDP,  2004).  But  the 
economic history of Egypt in recent years appears to tell a rather different story. 
Over the past two decades, the Egyptian government has undertaken an economic 
reform  and  structural  adjustment  programme  that  has  achieved  a  remarkable 
transition  from  a  centrally  planned,  public  sector  dominated  economy  towards  a 
competitive, market-based economy in which the private sector, supported by the 
banking sector, is mainly playing the leading role (CBE, 2010). The objective of this 
transition is to achieve rapid, efficient and sustainable growth in the different sectors 
of the Egyptian economy. However, it appears that the role of the Egyptian housing 
co-operative societies as community-based institutions in the housing and mortgage 
markets does not remain equally well cited and supported (Rashad, 2008).  
 
In view of the above UNDP report, the thesis also highlights the need for improving 
our  understanding  of  the  effectiveness  of  institutions  and  their  role  in  and 
contribution to the development of the network of mortgage credit provision in Egypt. 
But why is there a need for such evaluation at all? The evaluation of institutions is 
neither simple nor without cost. Does Egypt really need a new strategy to extend the 
reach of mortgage credit through the development of certain institutions? And, if so, 
does it need to do it now? Could this strategy wait?  4 
 
1.3 The Arab Republic of Egypt  
Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the second-most populous 
on the African continent. Nearly all of the country's 80 million people live in Cairo and 
Alexandria or elsewhere on the banks of the Nile delta and along the Suez Canal. 
These  regions  are  among  the  world's  most  densely  populated,  containing  an 
average of over 3,820 persons per square mile (1,540 per sq. km.), as compared to 
about 200 persons per square mile for the country as a whole.  
 
Egypt is located on the north eastern coast of Africa, and borders the Mediterranean 
Sea between Libya and the Gaza Strip. The country has endured as a unified state 
for more than 5,000 years, and archaeological evidence indicates that a developed 
Egyptian society has existed for much longer. However, the fact that the country lies 
in the crossroads of three continents made Egypt an attractive target for many global 
superpowers that looked for strategic and trading advantages, hence a 5,000-year 
history of constant invasions, occupations and control.  
 
Figure 1.1 Map of the Arab Republic of Egypt 
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In about 3,100 BC, Egypt was united under a ruler known as Mena, or Menes, who 
inaugurated  the  thirty  pharaonic  dynasties  into  which  Egypt's  ancient  history  is 
divided  –  the  Old  and  the  Middle  Kingdoms  and  the  New  Empire.  In  525  BC, 
Cambyses, the son of Cyrus the Great, led a Persian invasion force that dethroned 
the last pharaoh of the 26th Dynasty. The country remained a Persian province until 
conquered by Alexander the Great in 322 BC, ushering in Ptolemaic rule in Egypt 
that lasted for nearly 300 years. Following a brief Persian re-conquest, Egypt was 
invaded  and  conquered  by  Arab  forces  in  642.  A  process  of  Arabization  and 
Islamization ensued. Although a Coptic Christian minority remained – and remains 
today,  constituting  about  10  per  cent  of  the  population  –  the  Arab  language 
inexorably  supplanted  the  indigenous  Coptic  tongue.  For  the  next  1,300  years  a 
succession of Arab, Mameluke, and Ottoman caliphs, beys, and sultans ruled the 
country. 
 
In 1882, British expeditionary forces crushed a revolt against the Ottoman rulers, 
marking the beginning of British occupation and the virtual inclusion of Egypt within 
the  British  Empire.  In  deference  to  growing  nationalism,  the  United  Kingdom 
unilaterally  declared  Egyptian  independence  in  1922.  British  influence,  however, 
continued to  dominate  Egypt's  political life  and  fostered fiscal, administrative  and 
governmental reforms. During World War II, British troops used Egypt as a base for 
Allied operations throughout the region. British troops were withdrawn to the Suez 
Canal area in 1947, but nationalist, anti-British feelings continued to grow after the 
war.  
 6 
 
On 22 and 23 July 1952, a group of disaffected army officers (the "free officers") 
overthrew King Farouk, whom the military blamed for Egypt's poor performance in 
the  1948  war  with  Israel.  Following  a  brief  experiment  with  civilian  rule,  the  free 
officers abrogated the 1923 Constitution and declared Egypt a republic on 19 June 
1953. Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser evolved into a charismatic leader, not only of 
Egypt  but  also  of  the  Arab  world,  promoting  and  implementing  "Arab  socialism" 
(Campbell and Despard, 1979). He nationalized Egypt's economy. When the United 
States and the World Bank withdrew their offer to help finance the Aswan High Dam 
in  mid-1956,  Nasser  nationalized  the  privately-owned  Suez  Canal  Company 
(Handoussa, 1993). The crisis that followed, exacerbated by growing tensions with 
Israel over guerrilla attacks from Gaza and Israeli reprisals, resulted in the invasion 
of Egypt that October by France, Britain, and Israel. The invasion was reversed by 
the United States political intervention, and the Canal remained nationalized. 
 
Nasser  helped  establish  the  Non-Aligned  Movement  of  developing  countries  in 
September 1961; and he continued to be a leading force in the movement until his 
death  in  1970.  After  Nasser's  death,  another  of  the  original  free  officers,  Vice 
President Anwar el-Sadat, was elected President. In a momentous change from the 
Nasser era, President Sadat shifted Egypt from a policy of confrontation with Israel 
to  one  of  peaceful  accommodation  through  negotiations.  Domestically,  he  also 
introduced greater political freedom and a new economic policy, the most important 
aspect of which was the “infitah” or "open door" (Handoussa, 1993). This relaxed 
government controls over the economy and encouraged private, including foreign 
investment. Liberalization also included the reinstatement of due process and the 
legal banning of torture. Sadat tried to expand participation in the political process in 7 
 
the mid-1970s but later abandoned this effort. In the last years of his life, Egypt was 
racked by violence arising from discontent with Sadat's rule and sectarian tensions, 
and it experienced a renewed measure of repression. 
 
On  6  October  1981,  Islamic  extremists  assassinated  President  Sadat.  Hosni 
Mubarak,  Vice  President  since  1975,  was  elected  President  later  that  month. 
Mubarak has maintained Egypt's commitment to the Camp David peace process, 
while at the same time re-establishing Egypt's position as a leader in the Arab world. 
Mubarak continued to adopt Sadat‟s free economic policy and oversaw a domestic 
economic reform programme to reduce the size of the public sector and expand the 
role of the private sector (Handoussa, 1992). 
 
Emphasis  on  import  substitution  rather  than  exports,  combined  with  a  growing 
population,  rising  food  subsidy  costs,  the  inefficiencies  of  a  centrally  controlled 
economy  and  the  collapse  of  oil  prices  in  the  mid-1980s,  led  to  the  rapid 
accumulation of external debt, which Egypt found increasingly difficult to service. The 
budget deficit, inflation and unemployment grew rapidly, while the economic growth 
rate declined (Galal, 2002). By the end of 1986, Egypt‟s external debt had risen to 
over US$46 billion, inflation reached 25.2 per cent and the budget deficit represented 
21  per  cent  of  GDP  (CAPMAS,  2007).  In  1987,  the  Government  entered  into  a 
stabilization agreement with the IMF; however, the agreement was not implemented 
due to concerns regarding the political and social consequences of the proposed 
measures (Handoussa, 1992).  
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Following Egypt‟s participation in the Gulf War, various Arab states provided Egypt 
with approximately US$5.5 billion in grants and wrote off approximately US$7 billion 
in debt owed to them (CBE, 2010). The United States also forgave approximately 
US$7.1 billion in military and other debt. In May 1991, a Paris Club agreement was 
concluded pursuant to which approximately US$20.6 billion principal amount of debt 
was rescheduled, and a two year special drawing rights (SDR) 234.4 million standby 
agreement was entered into with the IMF, followed by a US$300 million structural 
adjustment  loan  from  the  World  Bank  (CAPMAS,  2007).  Simultaneously,  the 
government  adopted  in  1991  a  comprehensive  stabilization  and economic reform 
program,  which  it  has  been  reviewing  and  updating  since  that  time  (Handoussa, 
1992). The stabilization program is broadly divided into four overlapping phases, with 
the  implementation  of  the first  three  phases  having  been  substantially  completed 
(CBE, 2010):  
 
  Phase  1  of  the  program  focused  on  stabilizing  macroeconomic  conditions  in 
Egypt, adopting an exchange rate anchor as a framework for its monetary policy 
and  improving  Egypt‟s  external  position.  Specific  aspects  of  Phase  1  included 
expenditure reduction, rationalization of subsidies, improvements in administration 
and tax collection, the adoption of revenue enhancement measures and reducing 
inflation (Inflation declined from 14.7 per cent in fiscal year 1990/91 to 2.8 per cent 
in fiscal year 1999/2000).  
 
  Phase  2  focused  on  further  liberalizing  the  economy  and  reducing  barriers  to 
external trade as well as modernizing the financial system. Specific aspects of 
Phase  2  included  Liberalizing  Trade  and  Investment,  Developing  the  Private 
Sector and Reforming the Financial Sector.  9 
 
  Phase  3  focused  on  the  implementation  of  institutional  reforms.  Some  of  the 
initiatives are still being undertaken by the government including the acceleration 
of  privatization  activities,  continuing  to  promote  investments  and  savings, 
developing capital markets and implementing legal reforms (the Government has 
submitted to Parliament a draft mortgage law, which has been adopted in June 
2001).  
 
  The goals of phase 4 include continued fiscal reform, enhancing the instruments 
of monetary policy available to the Central Bank of Egypt, increasing the pace of 
structural reform and enhancing transparency in the regulatory framework. The 
goals coincide with the economic program and priorities of the Government. The 
Government also intends to foster export-led economic growth and development. 
Other goals include promoting human development, improving living conditions for 
low income groups and developing high skill-based industries. 
 
The 2011 Egyptian revolution and fall of Mubarak‟s administration, after 30 years in 
power,  ambitious  economic  reforms  and  billions  of  US  Dollars  of  foreign  aid, 
highlighted the shortcoming of the old administration‟s political system. The survival 
of  Mubarak‟s  administration  depended  largely  on  governing  Egypt  a  police  state, 
inefficient  and  underpaid  civil  service  with  weak  professional  incentives  and 
performance. The civil service not only stands out for its enormous over-staffing (the 
government employs roughly one-quarter of the total labour force of about 22 million) 
and weak productivity, but also for its immense political influence in resisting efforts 
to reform it.  
  10 
 
The political status of Egypt at the present time is one of confusion and an unclear 
future. As a result, the Egyptian economy is going through a critical period as the 
country transitions to civilian led democracy. GDP has declined by almost 4 per cent 
and  manufacturing  12  per  cent.  Revenue  from  tourism  has  collapsed,  putting 
pressure on the balance of payments, which in turn has sparked a slide in foreign 
reserves. Spending in excess of revenue requires the state to  borrow from either 
domestic or foreign sources. The fiscal 2013 draft budget estimates that government 
revenue  will  total  350.3  billion  Egyptian  pounds,  with  514.4  billion  in  expenses. 
Addressing these problems to improve the economic performance and the economic 
well-being of citizens can facilitate a successful transition.  
 
A positive development following the revolution is that Egyptian officials started to 
adopt  a  more  participatory  and  transparent  approach  in  the  decision-making 
process. The transitional government is more open to the idea of the involvement of 
civil  society--service  users,  think-tanks,  private  sector,  women's  groups,  non-
governmental  organizations  (NGOs)  and  other  groups  of  citizens-in  planning  and 
decision-making. There is, however, a great deal more to be done in this whole area, 
especially in terms of effective decentralization of decision-making, and facilitating 
the role of the more than 14,000 NGOs in Egypt in providing social services and 
serving as a part of the country's social safety net.   
 
The transitional government needs to support community development programmes 
to  eradicate  poverty,  extend  access  to  housing  and  replace  the  crumbling 
shantytowns  with  decent  housing,  sanitation,  schools,  and  clinics.  In  the  housing 
sector, given the current lack of effective and sustainable mortgage credit system for 
low- and moderate-income households, it is important to consider the role of the 11 
 
community  sector  in  implementing  a  well  designed  mortgage  system  to  facilitate 
better  housing  finance;  introducing  new  financial  services;  introducing  new 
instruments;  and  assuring  more  community-based  credit  (Li,  2010).  The 
establishment  of  a  community  support  system  can  help  in  development  of 
community savings programs and improvement of the credit risk profile of low- and 
moderate-income  households  (United  Nations  Economic  Commission  for  Europe 
Committee on Human Settlements, 2005). This proposition requires the transitional 
government to select community-based organisations and financial institutions with 
proven track records that may improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the 
mortgage credit system for low- and moderate-income households.  
 
Based on the above, it is timely and opportune for this study to explore some of 
these issues and ways to increase access to mortgage credit and to expand access 
to savings in Egypt through community-based organisations, such as the housing co-
operative societies. In over 60 years, around 3000 housing co-operative societies 
have been established for half million dwelling units. Almost one third of the Egyptian 
population are members of housing co-operatives. In 2008, the members‟ housing 
investment  exceeded  17  billion  Egyptian  pounds.  Thus,  studying  the  strengths, 
weakness,  challenges  and  opportunities  of  the  Egyptian  housing  co-operative 
societies would provide lessons and conclusions drawn on the Egyptian experience 
to the other countries still in transition. As is clear, Egypt passed rapidly through 
several  stages  of  economic  and  political  transitions  based  on  which  it  offers  the 
opportunity  to  draw  conclusions  on  the  effectiveness  and  sustainability  of  co-
operation as a tool of socio-economic development. 
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1.4 The Objectives of This Thesis  
The  overall  research  objective  is  to  evaluate  and  explain  the  effectiveness  of 
community and financial institutions in the provision of mortgage credit in Egypt. This 
objective helped structure the research questions with the following purposes: The 
key  research  objectives  are  as  follows:  1)  to  address  why  Egyptian  housing  co-
operative societies can be seen as important policy agents to expand the mortgage 
credit beneficiaries base in Egypt; 2) to evaluate the effectiveness of the Egyptian 
housing co-operative societies as community based organisations and policy agents; 
3)  to  identify  and  analyse  the  various  economic,  social  and  political  factors 
influencing this effectiveness; 4) to assess the role of the banking institutions (as 
contextual stakeholders in the immediate environment of the Egyptian housing co-
operative societies) in expanding access to mortgage credit and savings in Egypt; 
and 5) to identify which institutions constrain most the development of an effective 
and sustainable level of mortgage credit for low- and moderate-income households.   
 
In  addressing  the  research  questions,  the  thesis  evaluates  and  explains  the 
effectiveness of the current network of institutions in the provision of housing finance 
in Egypt. The thesis assesses the role of banking and co-operative institutions in 
extending the reach of mortgage credit and improving access to housing finance for 
Egyptian  low-  and  moderate-income  households.  This  is  in  line  with  the  Habitat 
Agenda – the goals, principles, commitments and global plan of action adopted at 
the  Second  United  Nations  Conference  on  Human  Settlements  (Habitat  II), 
convened in Istanbul, Turkey, 3-14 June 1996, which contains extensive references 
to the role of co-operative institutions: 
 13 
 
„Governments should take appropriate action in order to promote, protect 
and ensure the full and progressive realization of the right to adequate 
housing. These actions include, … (c) Adopting policies aimed at making 
housing habitable, affordable and accessible, including for those who are 
unable to secure adequate housing through their own means, by, … (iii) 
Supporting  community-based,  co-operative  and  non-profit  rental  and 
owner-occupied housing programmes‟ (Habitat Agenda, paragraph 61). 
 
Furthermore, the Agenda notes that co-operative institutions have an important role 
in terms of promoting social integration and removing barriers in the provision of 
housing. These concerns are highlighted in the theme of the 80
th International Co-
operative Day / 8
th United Nations International Day of Co-operatives (6 July 2002) – 
“Society and Co-operatives: Concern for Community”. In his message on this day, 
the then United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that: 
 „Co-operatives support social cohesion and stability and give life to the 
concepts  of  corporate  responsibility  and  citizenship.  They  provide 
essential services, ranging from housing to health care, that strengthen 
community development‟. 
 
The message of the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) on this day reflected 
these views, and went on to state that: 
 „If co-operatives are able to be concerned with and have an impact on the 
community, it is because they are competitive and effective enterprises. 
Their success in the market allows them to make a difference in people‟s 
economic, social and cultural lives. It is for this reason too that it is in the 14 
 
interest  of  governments  to  provide  an  enabling  environment  for  the 
development of co-operatives‟. 
 
As is clear, another objective of this thesis is to draw on the capacities and mandates 
of  relevant  organizations,  such  as  the  United  Nations  Human  Settlements 
Programme (UN-HABITAT) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
but most of all, on the various practitioners in the field and researchers – in terms of 
their experiences with implementing a co-operative approach based on the principles 
of  partnerships,  participation  and  transparency.  For  this  reason,  the  thesis  also 
considers  the  effectiveness  of  banking  institutions  and  their  interest  in  what  the 
Egyptian co-operative institutions can do to extend the reach of mortgage credit in 
Egypt. Thus, the thesis attempts to identify and analyse the various economic, social 
and  political  factors  influencing  the  effectiveness  of  banking  and  co-operative 
institutions in the provision of mortgage credit in Egypt.  
 
In Egypt, the research on mortgage market development has so far overlooked the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of banking and co-operative institutions as surplus 
and deficit institutions and the role of these institutions after the mortgage market 
has reached a certain stage of development. Accordingly, the thesis addresses this 
gap  in  knowledge  to  reach  an  understanding  of  the  current  level  of  institutional 
development in Egypt‟s  housing and mortgage markets. This will also lead to an 
understanding of which institutions constrain most the development of a sustainable 
level of mortgage credit provision in Egypt.  
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1.5 Research Method 
The  research  method  adopted  to  achieve  the  research  objectives  includes  both 
analysis of existing data and the collection of new data through a survey of banking 
and co-operative institutions. Also, the researcher makes extensive use of his own 
experience  as  a  corporate  banker/financier  in  Egypt  for  a  number  of  years.  The 
detailed methods used are outlined below.  
 
1.5.1 Research Development  
A  review  of  the  literature  highlighted  that  the  Egyptian  constitution  has  always 
recognized  the  important  role  of  the  co-operative  sector  in  social  and  economic 
development. Although the co-operative housing sector remains a key component of 
today‟s affordable housing supply system in Egypt, the sector lacks the necessary 
support from the other actors within the housing market. This is in spite of the long 
and major role played by the housing co-operative societies in the development of 
both affordable housing and financial intermediation (through the contract savings 
scheme) in Egypt.  
 
A strategy to integrate the housing co-operative societies into the financial sector 
could  improve  access  to  housing  for  Egyptian  low-  and  moderate-income 
households. Such a strategy can achieve a breakthrough. Direct savings from the 
housing  co-operative  societies‟  members  can  be  matched  with  other  sources  of 
funding such as mortgage credit from socially responsible financial institutions, bank 
or  non-bank,  as  well  as  the  broader  secondary  mortgage  markets  to  develop  a 
sustainable financing system to support affordable housing programmes for low- and 
moderate-income households; for example building and operating halls of residence; 
transferring all or some public housing stocks in Egypt to newly created or existing 16 
 
housing  co-operative  societies;  or  providing  microfinance  through  housing  co-
operative societies to support schemes for self-build and/or upgrading dwellings.  
 
In practice, this strategy of investing in a handful of housing co-operative societies to 
improve access to housing is easier than making thousands of mortgage loans to 
untested low- and moderate-income households. It is also safer and more profitable. 
It can bolster the mortgage lenders‟ own balance sheets and also strengthens their 
case whenever they want to raise funds. What stands in the way is the lack of an 
understanding of how such an initiative can develop to fill the current gap in the 
provision of mortgage credit.  
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  great  number  of  failures  recorded  in  the  Egyptian  co-
operative housing sector in modern history has cast doubts on the appropriateness 
of  co-operative  housing  as  an  effective  policy  option.  These  doubts  were  also 
supported by some international research and empirical evidence on the problems of 
housing  in  the  developing  countries.  In  Egypt,  however,  there  appears  to  be  a 
general  absence  of  any  research  attempting  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  the 
housing co-operative societies‟ role in improving access to housing and finance. This 
absence may be due to the co-operative housing sector appearing not to be seen as 
an alternative response to the housing problem in Egypt. Further, the widely held 
assumption  that  the  sector  can  help  to  build  a  sustainable  financing  system  to 
support affordable housing programmes for low- and moderate-income households 
does not appear to be supported by whatever limited empirical evidence there is 
available. And yet the essence of co-operative housing, from a policy maker‟s point 
of view, should be its potential and resulting socio-political impact.  17 
 
Failure to understand and take seriously such potential led many Egyptian policy 
makers to ignore housing co-operative societies as intermediaries that can improve 
access to housing and finance for low- and moderate-income households. Others 
see housing co-operative societies as important political instruments through which 
funds  are  channelled  to  government  or  party  supporters  only.  In  both  cases  the 
criterion  for  mobilizing  low-cost  funding  for  efficient  and  sustainable  financing 
mechanism has failed.  
 
1.5.2 Developing the Study Approach  
The above background research set the banking and co-operative institutions in the 
context of wider housing policy, finance and institutional development. In order to 
analyse these issues, the researcher had to undertake a study on the effectiveness 
of both banking and co-operative institutions in the housing and mortgage markets in 
Egypt. The study provided an opportunity to examine the financial, legal and political 
implications of bank credit for co-operative housing purposes and the impact upon 
co-operative  institutions,  on  the  basis  of  a  survey  of  30  co-operative  institutions 
drawn from a list of 75 initially approached and tracked over one year.  
 
The  study  examined  government  documentation  regulating  the  banking  and  co-
operative  institutions  in  Egypt  as  well  as  other  documentation  on  their  funding 
problems and how innovative bank credit and capital market funding models might 
help  to  address  these  problems  and  the  role  of  co-operative  institutions  in  the 
financial intermediation process, and it included interviews with the regulators. Board 
members, senior bankers and consultants involved in the management and funding 
of co-operative institutions were also interviewed, to have a better understanding of 18 
 
their  business  performance,  funding  sources,  access  to  mortgage  credit,  and 
perception of housing finance provision in Egypt.  
 
It  is  important  to  note,  however,  that  there  are  many  factors  affecting  the 
effectiveness  of  banking  and  co-operative  institutions  which  cannot  easily  be 
comprehended by a pure research student or a banker. This is evident in many of 
the  propositions  put  forward  regarding  the  role  of  banking  and  co-operative 
institutions in the provision of housing finance in general and extending the reach of 
mortgage credit for low- and moderate-income households in particular. So much of 
the same kind of advice has been offered without much success that it should, by 
now,  have  become  obvious  that  perhaps  some  of  the  fundamental  assumptions 
underlying the various studies are incorrect (El Demery, 2002, Weis et al., 2002, El 
Demery, 2004, Eldin et al., 2004, Askar, 2005, Everhart et al., 2006, UNDP, 2004).  
 
The main conclusions are as follows. First, in the same way that private corporations 
are reluctant to part with what they consider a high-risk line of business, banking and 
co-operative  institutions  showed  that  they  can  also  be  reluctant  to  be  voluntarily 
involved in housing finance provision. Second, unlike profit-based corporations, co-
operative institutions do not operate according to profit-making objectives but, rather, 
for various other motives, some of which are social and political. Not only do such 
motives remain unrecorded but hardly anyone has talked about the intermediary role 
that co-operative institutions can play in the provision of housing finance (UNDP, 
2004).  Third,  both  banking  and  co-operative  institutions  see  themselves  as 
incompatible  partners  and  representatives of  two  different  ideologies  –  capitalism 
and communism respectively. This created a mistrust of the actual motives of each 19 
 
other as often expressed during this study. This mistrust is a result of misconception 
that co-operation as a communist proposal has to be stopped from spreading in a 
transitional economy like Egypt (Moharam, 2006).  
 
1.6 Thesis Structure  
This  thesis  is  organized  in  three  main  parts.  The  first  part  (chapters  2  and  3) 
provides the literature review. The broad subjects addressed include the anatomy of 
the Egyptian housing and mortgage markets and the international literature (and the 
agencies that prompt much of the literature). The second part (chapters 4, 5 and 6) 
explains  the  methodology  and  presents  the  results  and  analysis.  The  final  part 
(chapter 7) brings together and integrates the conclusions from the core chapters 
and discusses the contributions of the thesis, highlights drawbacks to the research 
and makes suggestions for future research.  
 
Chapter 2 presents an evaluation of the Egyptian housing and mortgage markets as 
a whole based on a literature review of these markets‟ strengths and weaknesses, 
and the policies required if one is to understand either individual component of the 
structural challenges that impede the establishment of an effective and sustainable 
housing  and  mortgage  markets  in Egypt.  The  chapter  provides  an  early  context-
setting account of the extent of the current housing shortage, of unmet need, and the 
scope and scale of mortgage credit provision. The chapter concludes that mortgage 
credit in Egypt is currently of little support to Egyptian low- and moderate-income 
households who wish to access housing. Therefore, the relative importance of the 
purposes of mortgage credit in Egypt needs to be redefined. There is also a need to 
explore  ways  to  extend  the  reach  of  mortgage  credit  to  support  the  low-  and 20 
 
moderate-income households, for example through community-based organizations. 
Thus, this requires an assessment of the stakeholder relations and the role of each 
participating agent in the housing and mortgage markets. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the international literature and agencies that prompt much of it, 
with  particular  reference  to  improving  mortgage  credit  system  efficiency  and 
extending the system‟s reach to increase access to housing for the under-served 
households in developing countries. The analysis and experiences discussed in this 
chapter  suggest  that  the  development  of  mortgage  systems  in  many  developing 
countries is strikingly similar in their starting point. But, some developing countries 
appear  relatively  to  have  made  major  progress  in  extending  the  reach  of  their 
mortgage  systems  to  support  access  to  housing  for  low-  and  moderate-income 
households.  Some  of  the  proposed  solutions  based  on  these  experiences  are 
inapplicable  to  the  context  of  Egypt  at  present.  On  the  other  hand,  the  analysis 
highlighted the important role of community-based organizations in improving access 
to housing and mortgage credit for low- and moderate-income households. Thus, the 
chapter  concludes  that  the  role  of  community-based  organizations  needs  to  be 
evaluated in the context of Egypt where housing co-operative societies have already 
been considered as a response to the housing problem in the country.  This is in 
order  to  fill  the  gap  in  Egyptian  literature  in  relation  to  why  community-based 
organizations in Egypt can be seen as important policy agents to improve access to 
housing,  the  effectiveness  of  the  existing  organizations,  the  various  factors 
influencing this effectiveness, and which institutions constrain most the development 
of these organizations. 
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Chapter 4 clearly states and substantiates the main objectives of the thesis in terms 
of  understanding  the  nature  and  scale  of  housing  co-operative  societies‟  role  as 
community  based  organizations  in  the  Egyptian  housing  market  and  their 
contribution  to  increasing  access  for  low-  and moderate-income  households. The 
chapter also considers the contextual stakeholders in the immediate environment of 
the  Egyptian  housing  co-operative  societies  and  selects  banking  institutions  as 
important stakeholders who can provide different perspectives on which institutions 
limit  most  the  development  of  an  effective  and  sustainable  solution.  Then,  the 
chapter  outlines  the  methodology  adopted  and  its  aims  to  address  the  research 
objectives and critically reviews the research approach and data collection methods. 
It also provides the analytical framework and step-by-step account of the field study.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the first part of the analysis. It begins with review of some key 
considerations in relation to evaluating the effectiveness of the Egyptian housing co-
operative societies. Then, the results of the field study are presented and analysed 
to examine the challenges and opportunities for the Egyptian housing co-operative 
societies to provide a response that can extend the reach of the mortgage market to 
improve access to housing. The chapter mainly concludes that Egyptian housing co-
operative  societies  generally  enjoy  stable  overall  financial  performance  when 
compared with other participants in the housing market. There is an opportunity for 
them  to  generate  surpluses  from  non-co-operative  housing  activities  that  can  be 
invested in expanding their core housing base. In addition, good relationships in the 
bank  credit  market  and  the  ability  to  tap  the  capital  markets  can  increase  the 
availability  of funds for business  expansion  needs. Thus,  a  significant  step  up  in 
reforming the co-operative housing sector is still required. 22 
 
Chapter 6 evaluates the mortgage credit market for co-operative housing purposes 
in  Egypt  and  the  factors  hindering  its  growth.  The  chapter  then  compares  and 
contrast the results in chapter 5 with the outcome of secondary data analysis as well 
as interviews with representatives from the Egyptian banking sector regarding their 
perception of and experiences with extending mortgage credit for Egyptian housing 
co-operative societies in Egypt. The chapter particularly explored whether demand or 
supply  factors  have  contributed  to  reducing  approved  credit  in  recent  years  for 
Egyptian housing co-operative societies. The main conclusions are as follows. The 
current  regulatory  environment,  lack  of  sufficient  information  about  housing  co-
operative  societies  and  their  ability  to  service  mortgages  and  to  provide  enough 
collateral, and the banking institutions‟ risk-averse attitude and preference for more 
liquid  assets,  such  as  government  securities,  are  all  factors behind  crowding  out 
Egyptian  housing  co-operative  societies  the  mortgage  market.  Thus,  much  still 
needs  to  be  done  in  order  to  increase  access  to  mortgage  credit  for  low-  and 
moderate-income households through their housing co-operative societies. 
 
Chapter 7 summarizes the results and conclusions of the thesis in relation to the 
relative importance of the purposes of mortgage credit in Egypt, the current level of 
mortgage  credit  provision  to  low-  and  moderate-income  households,  the 
effectiveness of the Egyptian banking and community based organisations; and the 
main institutions that constrain the development of an effective and sustainable level 
of  mortgage  credit  for  low-  and  moderate-income  households.  The  chapter  also 
highlights the main contributions and wider implications of the research.  23 
 
2. HOUSING POLICY AND FINANCE IN EGYPT  
2.1 Introduction 
As Egypt enters the 21st century, access to housing for many Egyptian low- and 
moderate-income households remains a major challenge (Aziz et al., 2007, Fahmi 
and  Sutton,  2008,  Struyk  and  Roman,  2008).  Despite  the  rapid  development  of 
housing policy and institutions in the recent period to address this problem, there is 
still only a small number of Egyptian households who are able to access housing. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the root causes of this problem, which, in 
turn, should help define the scope of the thesis.  
 
In view of the above, this chapter evaluates the Egyptian housing market as a whole, 
its strengths and weaknesses, and policies required if one is to understand either 
individual component.  This evaluation  is important in understanding the structural 
challenges in the system that prevent the implementation of a fully functioning and 
efficient mortgage credit system that can support access to housing for the majority 
of the country‟s population (Everhart et al., 2006). Accordingly, the discussion in this 
chapter is divided into two main sections.  
 
Section I provides a review and evaluation of the housing policy transition in Egypt 
since 1952 and the impact of this transition. Section I also highlights the different 
roles of the state, market and community in the Egyptian housing market, as these 
are the key institutions responsible for establishing the parameters of supply and 
demand in any housing market (World Bank, 1993, Angel and Mayo, 1996).  
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Section II provides an evaluation of the existing (though developing) mortgage credit 
system  in  Egypt,  both  policies  and  institutions.  The  evaluation  is  linked  to  the 
achievement of housing objectives, in terms of increasing access to housing for low- 
and moderate-income  households.  The  discussion  focuses  mainly  on  the  current 
level  of  efficiency  and  reach  of  the  recently  developed  mortgage  credit  system. 
Equally  important,  Section  II  addresses  what  is  the  relative  importance  of  the 
purpose of mortgage credit in Egypt. Is it to expand access to housing through direct 
lending to households (that is to support the demand side of the housing market)? Or 
is  it  to  support  the  supply  of  affordable  housing  for  low-  and  moderate-income 
households?  
 
2.2 Housing Market  
This section relates to the fact that understanding housing markets requires analysis 
of the broader political, economic and regulatory environment (Gibb, 1995, Malpezzi 
and Mayo, 1994). The Egyptian housing market is no exception. The section briefly 
attempts to follow the transition in housing policy in the modern history of Egypt. One 
way of doing so is to examine it according to the three administrations – Nasser, 
Sadat  and  Mubarak.  During  these  three  administrations  the  housing  market  has 
gone through a very dynamic and complex transition.  
 
2.2.1 Housing Policy under Nasser (1952-1970) 
Before  1952,  Egypt  was  a  cosmopolitan  country  with  a  very  ethnically  diverse 
population and free market economy led by foreign-born capitalists (Mabro, 1974). 
The housing market was mainly dominated by a private sector that was awarded 
concessions  in  the  form  of  large  plots  of  land  on  which  they  could  develop 25 
 
neighbourhoods  and  become  the  sole  provider  of  utilities  and  services  in  those 
areas,  such  as  Heliopolis  (Ministry  of  Housing,  1979).  The  main  objective  of  the 
private  sector  was  to  capitalize  on  the  growing  demand  in  the  middle  to  upper 
income housing market.  
 
Despite the nationalist sentiment, the Egyptian government was keen to maintain 
healthy  and  functional  housing  and  mortgage  markets.  Following  the  great 
depression in 1930, the government renegotiated with the foreign mortgage banks 
the terms and conditions for repayment of defaulted loans in foreclosure before the 
mixed  courts,  using  surplus  government  funds  as  well  as  transferring  the 
restructured loans into two new state-controlled mortgage banks, namely the Credit 
Hypothecaire Agricole and the Credit Agricole Egyptien, to relieve tenure insecurity 
(Peck, 2003).  
 
By  the  end  of  World  War  II,  almost  all  social  layers  in  Egypt  were  seeking 
independence.  A  military  coup  in  1952  against  King  Farouk  paved  the  way  for 
Colonel  Gamal  Abdul  Nasser  to  come  to  power  in  1954  after  a  two-year  interim 
government  presided  over  by  Mohamed  Naguib.  In  order  to  strengthen  his 
relationship  with  the  working  class,  Colonel  Nasser  carried  out  a  programme  of 
economic and social reform similar to the programme that emerged in the Soviet 
Union following the World War II (Campbell and Despard, 1979). 
 
Nasser‟s land reform policies aimed to redistribute the arable land in small parcels to 
the peasants who were tied into the state system and  were required to form co-
operatives  to  access  cheap  credit,  seeds  and  fertilizer  (Campbell  and  Despard, 26 
 
1979). This policy, however, led many peasants to become landless and to a rapid 
proletarianisation of the rural layers. This forced many peasants to move to the major 
urban  cities  in  search  of  work,  leading  to  an  increase  in  informal  housing 
developments, which contravened the building and land use regulations (El Gabaly, 
2004).  
 
In the housing sector, Nasser put the housing development and building materials 
industries under government control and used rent control laws to achieve social 
equity for the majority of the population, many of whom lived in rental dwellings. 
These laws made it illegal for landlords to evict tenants except under the strictest 
circumstances and allowed for the inheritance of rental agreements (Soliman, 1996). 
This policy led to the freezing of rents and therefore the withdrawal of the private 
sector from the rental housing market due to its limited profitability as well as the 
deterioration of housing stock (UNDP, 2004). 
 
Nasser‟s  socialism  was  defined  in  the  Charter  of  National  Action  (1964)  as  the 
pursuit  of  „sufficiency  and  equity‟.  By  sufficiency  he  meant  the  expansion  of  the 
nation‟s  total  production  of  wealth,  and  by  equity  he  meant  a  fairer  and  more 
equitable distribution of income in society (Mabro, 1974). Nasser‟s socialism sowed 
confusion for which the mortgage credit system has paid dearly ever since (Peck, 
2003,  Allam  et  al.,  2002).  The  link  made  between  mortgage  credit  and  tenure 
insecurity resulted in a significantly less favourable environment for the mortgage 
industry as the government imposed many restrictions on the mortgage activities to 
prevent foreclosures by foreign banks.   
 27 
 
2.2.2 Housing Policy under Sadat (1970-1981) 
Nasser was succeeded by President Anwar Sadat in 1970. After restoring Egypt‟s 
military creditability by scoring a victory in the 1973 War and then signing a peace 
accord with Israel in 1979, Sadat‟s next priority was to address Egypt‟s worsening 
economic and social conditions (Campbell and Despard, 1983). During his 11-year 
rule, Sadat proceeded to reverse almost all Nasser‟s socialist policies.  
 
Sadat‟s  so-called  „„Infitah’’  or  open  door  policy  was  enacted  in  1974.  This  policy 
called  for  the  revitalization  of  the  private  sector,  opening  the  door  for  foreign 
investment,  revoked  some  aspects  of  land  reform  policies  and  included  steps 
towards the devaluation of the Egyptian currency (Campbell and Despard, 1983). 
The introduction of these policies received the acclaim of the West and mainly of the 
upper middle class in Egypt. Although Sadat had promised to provide every Egyptian 
with economic prosperity, by the late 1970s it became obvious that „„Infitah‟‟ had not 
produced  the  general  prosperity  that  had  been  promised.  These  policies  left  the 
majority of the population disillusioned and dissatisfied.  
 
For two years (1975-1976) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and both Western 
and Arab creditors requested Egypt to make its economy even more accessible to 
the world market. After some resistance, Sadat announced in 1977 that certain food 
subsidies would be lifted. This announcement was received by angry demonstrations 
in major Egyptian cities. The „food riots‟, as they were later termed, led to several 
days  of  uncertainty  regarding  the  Sadat  administration‟s  stability  (Taher,  1997). 
Consequently the government had to go back on its decision and resorted in later 
times to cutting down on subsidies gradually and without official announcement.  28 
 
Other redistributive measures were also gradually withdrawn. The goal set in the 
1960s to extend basic services to all Egyptians was quietly abandoned. This was 
seen as a neglect of basic welfare programmes, a deterioration of social services 
and inequity in the distribution of income (Campbell and Despard, 1983). On the 
other hand, Sadat was in fact unable to dispense with all of the socialist policies. The 
fragile political situation of Egypt dictated that a sort of uncomfortable co-existence 
between capitalism and socialism continued. This was one of the major criticisms of 
Sadat‟s regime by right-wing Egyptians, international lending agencies and the West 
in general (Handoussa, 1992).  
 
The  housing  market  under  the  Sadat  administration  tells  another  story.  Major 
attention was first given to the reconstruction of those parts of the country destroyed 
during the war, as well as the restoration of Egypt‟s main infrastructure. Then, a 
national plan was developed to address the scarcity of affordable housing for low 
and middle income classes. The plan pledged an extensive range of technical and 
financial  resources  to  reform  and  upgrade  a  number  of  key  areas  (Ministry  of 
Housing, 1979) (see table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1 Sadat Administration‟s Housing Plan 
Key Areas   Objectives 
1) Land   Planning,  appraisal  and  classification  of  land  into  four  main 
categories:  tourism,  agriculture,  military  and  urban 
development.  
2) Infrastructure  Planning and development of the public physical facilities such 
as  power  supply  and  utility  networks  (water  and  sanitation), 
roads and streets, etc.  
3) Materials   Upgrade  the  existing  production  capacity  of  the  public  sector 
companies  and  promote  private  sector  production  of  key 
building  materials  (for  example  Cement,  Gypsum,  Iron  and 
Steel, etc.) 
4) Labour   Establishment  of  training  centres  to  increase  the  number  of 
skilled  workers  (for  example  building  workers,  plumbers, 
electricians, etc.) in the housing market.  
5) Finance  Expanding  access  and  affordability  of  mortgage  credit  by 
developing  a  network  of  mortgage  credit  institutions  and 
provision of subsidized loans for construction of housing units.  
6) Production   A. Institutional development: 
Restructuring the public sector companies as well as expanding 
the role of the private sector and co-operatives in the housing 
market. 
 
B. Regulations: 
Inauguration of new laws for Urban Development, Real Estate 
Investment,  Co-operative  Housing,  New  Communities,  Rental 
Properties, etc.  
Source: Egyptian Ministry of Housing (Ministry of Housing, 1979)  
 
The striking feature of the above plan is its success in increasing the habitable land 
and expanding the national economic sector to reduce the migration to the existing 
urban  settlements  (Allam  et  al.,  2002).  The  government  took  the  initiative  to 30 
 
implement an urban development programme to establish new communities in the 
arid  lands  to  counter-balance  existing  overcrowded  cities,  and  to  increase 
opportunities  for  the  national  economy,  while  preserving  the  country‟s  fertile 
agricultural land. The programme was basically designed on three principles: 1) to 
curb overcrowding in the Nile Valley and the Delta, with their already overloaded and 
mostly depleted infrastructure and services; 2)  to create new, self-serviced urban 
centres  on  arid  lands,  with  infrastructure  incorporated,  to  alleviate  pressure  on 
existing urban areas, and abate encroachment on scarce agricultural land; and 3) to 
strengthen the national economy through creating job opportunities in the new urban 
centres.  The  programme  was  successful  in  establishing  around  seventeen  new 
communities, some of which emerged later to become key national economic and 
industrial  zones  such  as  10th  of  Ramadan,  El  Sadat,  New  Borg  El  Arab,  6th  of 
October, and New Damietta (Allam et al., 2004, Ministry of Housing, 1991, UNDP, 
2004) (see table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2 New Communities and the Labour Market 
Number of Workers as at 30/06/2002 
10th of Ramadan   76,568 
6th of October  74,112 
New Borg El Arab  74,396 
El Sadat   16,531 
El Salhya  4,249 
Badr  8,783 
El Obour  31,614 
Others   4,327 
Total   290,580 
Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS, 2007) 
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2.2.3 Housing Policy under Mubarak (1981- 2011) 
Mubarak‟s administration has been devoted to continuing Sadat‟s economic agenda 
and  implementing  policies  that  favour  the  private  sector  and  foreign  direct 
investments (Tesche and Tohamy, 1994). Mubarak gradually eliminated government 
monopolies,  reduced  subsidies  for  almost  all  economic  activities,  abolished  price 
controls, cut corporate taxes and expanded the role of the private sector. But this led 
to a number of economic shocks resulting from a high inflation rate, with a negative 
impact  on  the  housing  market  in  terms  of  an  increase  in  housing  prices  to 
unaffordable levels for many Egyptian households, especially those at the lower- and 
moderate-income end of the market. As a result, a number of negative outcomes 
started  to  dominate  the  housing  market,  including  further  expansion  of  informal 
housing  in  unauthorized  or  squatter  settlements  and  increased  space  sharing, 
thereby  leading  to  overcrowded  conditions  (El  Batran  and  Arandel,  1998,  Taher, 
1997). A number of initiatives were taken to address these problems, most notably 
those described below.  
 
A) Production  
Since 1982, the Government of Egypt (GOE) has considered that the right to shelter 
is an explicit part of an Egyptian‟s social contract with the state.  Thus, the GOE 
played a strong role in the production and regulation of housing, establishing and 
enforcing  zoning  restrictions,  offering  incentives  to  developers  to  build  affordable 
housing for low- and moderate-income households, and providing subsidized loans 
to homebuyers (Ministry of Housing, 1991). By the end of 1990, Egypt had managed 
to increase housing production from 1.33 units per 1000 inhabitants in 1976 to 11 
units per 1000 inhabitants in 1990 (see table 2.3). 32 
 
 
Table 2.3 Key Comparative Housing Indicators 
  House 
price to 
income
1 
Housing 
credit
2 
Owner 
occupancy
3 
% 
Public 
housing
4 
Informal 
housing
5 
Persons 
per room 
Housing 
production
6 
(per 1,000 
persons) 
Import 
share of 
construction
7 
Construction 
cost
8 
(US$/m2) 
Egypt (Cairo)   7  7  32  29  65  1.5  11  19  67 
Algeria (Algiers)   12  0  45  25  4  2.6  3  25  500 
United States 
(Washington) 
4  44  61  1  5  0.4  7  2  500 
Turkey 
(Istanbul) 
5  3  60  5  51  2  7  10  110 
Mexico 
(Monterrey)  
4  18  83  54  16  1.2  6  ---  267 
Source: (Erba and Nothaft, 2002) 
                                                 
1 Ratio of median free-market prices of a dwelling unit and the median household income.  
2 Ratio of total mortgage loans to total loans in commercial and government financial institutions.  
3 Percentage in total of dwellings owned by occupants.  
4 Percentage in total of dwellings owned, managed, and controlled by the public sector.  
5 Percentage in total of dwellings not in compliance with current regulations and those that occupy land illegally.  
6 Net number of units (units produced less units demolished) in both the formal and informal sector.  
7 Percentage share of residential construction materials which are imported.  
8 Present replacement cost (labour, materials, on-site infrastructure, management and contractor profits) per square metre of a median-priced unit.  33 
 
About 90 per cent of the units built during this period were low and middle income 
dwellings. The total subsidized loans granted by the government and state-owned 
institutions for the development of the low-income dwellings throughout the same 
period reached around 6 per cent of GDP by the fiscal year end 1991 (Planning, 
1991). As a result, some local governments were able to develop a sufficient stock of 
low-income dwellings  to  reduce  the  long  waiting  lists  for affordable  local housing 
(UNDP, 2004).  
 
However, the government remained under pressure to intensify and deploy public 
and  private  resources  to  increase  the  housing  production  to  match  the  rapid 
population  growth.  Even  though  the  government  was  able  to  slow  down  the 
population  growth  in  the  country from  3  per cent per annum  to 1.9 per cent  per 
annum (CAPMAS, 2007), the latter rate indicated that the population continued to 
grow, increasing the future demand for housing. In 1991, the population reached 57 
million  while  the  required  number  of  new  dwellings  to  the  year  2000  was  about 
300,000  units  per  annum.  This  is  in  addition  to  the  required  dwellings  to 
accommodate the population of the informal sector that continued to grow at a rate 
considered  by  the  national  and  international  development  agencies  as  an  urban 
crisis (Fahmi and Sutton, 2008, Fahmi and Sutton, 2006). All this was during a time 
when the government had to respond to other challenges.  
 
As a condition of giving further financial support, the World Bank and IMF demanded 
the implementation of a Structural Economic Adjustment Programme that included 
the devaluation of the  Egyptian  currency,  reduction of  subsidies and  privatization 
(Handoussa, 1992, Taher, 1997). Moreover, the government had to respond to the 34 
 
recommendations made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Global 
Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, which urged governments to shift their housing 
policies in order to adopt enabling policies and strategies for improving the housing 
delivery  process  instead  of  direct  housing  provision  (UN-HABITAT,  1988).  This 
called for a new approach to reinvent the role of the state as an enabling institution in 
the  housing  market  (Handoussa,  1993,  Ministry  of  Housing,  1993,  Malpezzi  and 
Vandell, 1993). 
 
Based on the available capacity at that time, the government estimated that about 40 
per cent of the required 300,000 units  per annum, that is approximately 120,000 
units per annum, could be built by the public sector in the local government areas 
and new communities to provide access to housing for low- and moderate-income 
households (Hafiz, 2005). The remainder, that is approximately 180,000 units per 
annum, could be developed by the private sector. Based on these estimates, the 
government started to cut its production of new housing from the mid-1990s (see 
figure 2.1).  35 
 
Figure 2.1 Dwellings Built by the Public Sector (1994-2001) 
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From  the  above,  four  distinct  forms  of   affordable  housing  production  can  be 
distinguished  today  in  Egypt,  namely,  state -led  housing,  co-operative  housing, 
private sector housing, and self-help housing. 
 
State-led (Public) Housing 
 
State-led housing has been one of the main sources of affordable housing provision 
in  Egypt.  Under  this  scheme,  housing  provision  is  managed  by  the  central 
government that serves as building promoter, handling the whole process of housing 
construction, financing and distribution with support from local authorities (Ministry of 
Housing, 1979, Soliman, 1996, Taher, 1997). Since housing must be affordable for 
low-  and  moderate-income  households,  the  building  plots  are  made  available 
through access to publicly-owned land at a price below market value. Building design 
and construction work are commonly contracted out to public and private builders 
under certain building codes. The price of housing is based on the cost of building. 
Distribution is handled by the local authorities. The rules regarding eligibility to buy a 36 
 
housing unit include setting an income ceiling and excluding house buyers who buy 
housing for investment purposes.  
 
As far as financing is concerned, a house buyer has been able to enjoy a long-term 
mortgage  from  state-owned  financial  institutions  at  a  subsidized  interest  rate. 
Between 1982 and 1993, a mortgage covered up to 90 per cent of the house‟s price 
(Soliman, 1996). In addition, buyers of housing have also been entitled to benefit 
from  a  real  estate  tax  exemption  of  the  total  price  of  the  property  (Askar,  2005, 
Ministry of Housing, 1993). 
 
Under this model, the relationships  between agents involved in housing provision 
have  clearly  required  that  the  state,  as  an  active  housing  developer,  initiates, 
orchestrates and promotes the entire process of production from construction and 
financing to the distribution of housing (El Demery, 2002, El Gabaly, 2004, UNDP, 
2004, Askar, 2005).  
 
Co-operative Housing  
In  the  modern  history  of  Egypt,  the  co-operative  movement  has  developed  as  a 
reflection of the Nationalist sentiment in 1908, to build and modernize the society 
and  to  achieve  a  decent  standard  of  living  for  the  whole  Egyptian  population 
(Rashad,  2008).  This  is  clear  from  Articles  26,  28,  29  and  31  of  the  Egyptian 
Constitution that emphasized the important role of the state in the provision of the 
necessary  support  and  protection  for  all  types  of  co-operative  ownerships  and 
institutions as well as in guaranteeing their proper self-management (Egypt, 1996).  
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For more than half a century, the co-operative institutions have played a leading role 
in different social and economic sectors, including agriculture, rural and industrial 
development  and  consumer  protection,  to  mention  but  a  few.  The  co-operative 
movement  began  to be  active  in  the  housing  market  in  the  1940s  and  the  state 
actively addressed the funding needs for co-operative housing development, starting 
from  the  fiscal  budget  1953/54  with  a  government  loan  for  2.5  million  Egyptian 
pounds (EGP) at a low interest rate of 3 per cent (Moharam, 2006, Rashad, 2008).  
 
The first Egyptian housing co-operative society was established on 17 November 
1952 and it was named the Co-op Association for Housing Construction in Maadi 
(Shama-Shergy). Over the next 12 months, around twenty-one associations were 
established, with the majority located in Egypt‟s largest cities, namely Cairo (thirteen 
associations) and Giza (four associations), in addition to one association in each of 
Sharkiaha, Dakahlia, Port Said and Assuit cities (Rashad, 2008).  
 
Although the Egyptian co-operative housing sector has been in existence for more 
than 60 years the development of the sector became only a national priority in the 
1980s (Ministry of Housing, 1991). The then Egyptian administration considered that 
such a contribution was evidence of the deepening of democracy and human rights 
values and practice in the country (Habitat, 1989). This led to a rapid expansion of 
the sector under the supervision of a newly established government authority, The 
Public  Authority  for  Co-operative  Housing.  The  Authority  oversaw  a  development 
programme through which individual housing co-operatives were allocated land and 
public finance to develop new homes (Ministry of Housing, 1993).  
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In  the  late  1980s,  reflecting  the  continuing  desire  to  see  housing  co-operative 
societies playing the main role in the provision of social housing while at the same 
time recognizing the pressures this put upon the budget, the government introduced 
a mixed funding regime. Under this regime direct public finance was progressively to 
be reduced and replaced by housing co-operative societies borrowing directly from 
the credit market at subsidized interest rates to fund their development programmes 
(Ministry  of  Housing,  1993).  This  regime  was  then  completely  abolished  as  the 
government progressed with its economic restructuring and liberalization programme 
towards the end of 1990s (Egypt, 1996, El Gabaly, 2004, Moharam, 2006).  
 
Over the years, the co-operative housing sector rapidly developed to reach more 
than  3,000  associations  with  2.5  million  families,  comprised  of  around  15  million 
members from different parts of Egypt, serving mainly the low- and moderate-income 
segment  of  the  population  including  personnel  of  key  government  and  non-
government institutions such as the armed and police forces, law lords, university 
professors, members of professional syndicates, labour unions, as well as the wider 
urban and rural communities  (Rashad, 2008). However, the co-operative housing 
sector role has dramatically declined during the economic transition in recent years.  
 
Private Sector Affordable Housing  
As is noted earlier, the government previously used to estimate that about 40 per 
cent of the minimum required 300,000 units per annum could be built by the public 
sector while the rest of 60 per cent should be developed by the co-operative and 
private sectors. Table 2.4 shows the target number of affordable housing units to be 
developed by the private sector in the recent national plan. This new target estimates 39 
 
the percentage of units to be developed by the private sector at more than 86 per 
cent  alone.  This  increase  reflects  the  new  framework  of  liberal  economic  regime 
under which the Egyptian government is divesting itself of housing production role 
and trying to utilize the private sector resources to achieve housing policy goals.  
 
Table 2.4 Private Sector Affordable Housing Provision 
URBAN HOUSING 
2002-2004  2004-2007 
Number  %  Number  % 
Economy Level  125,600  50.1  131,000  50.4 
Medium Level  32,000  12.8  35,000  13.5 
Above Medium Level  9,000  3.6  10,000  3.8 
Total Urban  166,600  66.5  176,000  67.7 
Economy  Housing  at  Rural 
and Land Reclamation 
84,000  33.5  84,000  32.3 
Grand Total   250,600  100.0  260,000  100.0 
Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS, 2007) and 
Information and Decision Support Center (CAPMAS, 2007, IDSC, 2008) 
 
Unlike  other  housing  development  schemes,  private  builders  handle  the  whole 
process  of  housing  provision  (UNDP,  2004).  Private  promoters who  are  normally 
engaged in house construction for sale in the housing market can apply to the state 
housing  departments  and  local  authorities  for  permission  to  call  their  projects 
„affordable housing‟ (Moharam, 2006). Under this scheme, building plots are made 
available  by  the  state  and  all  building  activities  are  conducted  under  the  market 
mechanism orchestrated by the promoters. The price, size and building costs are set 
by the promoter with the approval of the state (Fahmi and Sutton, 2008).  
 
With  regard  to  financing,  promoters  have  a  relatively  beneficial  access  to 
development  finance  from  the  banking  sector  and  most  recently  from  the  newly 40 
 
established mortgage financing institutions (EMF, 2010, Tameer, 2010). To regulate 
the  demand  for  housing,  household  income  limits  for  purchasing  privatized 
affordable housing are set using the same conditions as those previously used for 
state-led housing, namely marital status and annual income. Eligible home buyers 
are  entitled  to  mortgage  loans  at  subsidized  interest  rates  in  addition  to  tax 
exemptions (EAL, 2010, EMF, 2010, HDB, 2010, Tameer, 2010). 
 
Under this model, the state housing departments and affiliated housing institutions 
regulate prices in accordance with the prevailing market prices in the vicinity, and set 
the price ceiling for private sector affordable housing. This means that, in contrast to 
the previously state-led housing, prices are not based on the cost of construction, but 
rather  are  set  at  a  market  price  level  by  private  promoters  with  profit-oriented 
concerns. 
 
Self-Help Housing  
Self-help housing is the most recent mode of affordable housing provision in Egypt. It 
has recently been introduced and is designed to serve low- and moderate-income 
households  (Taher,  1997,  El  Batran  and  Arandel,  1998).  It  provides  financial 
assistance to those who are eligible and have a land plot and who will be responsible 
for all aspects of the self-build development. The floor area, the building‟s cost and 
the available building loan for the self-help housing are regulated by the government 
(MFA, 2006). Under this scheme, the role of the state is relatively minimal as it only 
provides  households  with  subsidized  land  and  loans  for  building  purposes  (El 
Demery, 2002, MFA, 2006).  
 
 41 
 
The Characteristics of the Various Forms of Affordable Housing  
 
In describing the different affordable housing production schemes, the characteristics 
of the various forms of affordable housing, as well as the mechanisms used to make 
decisions, can be identified (see table 2.5).  
 
State-led  and  co-operative  housing  remain  the  most  affordable  forms,  although 
private firms are involved in the housing construction stage. With state control over 
land  acquisition,  building  construction  and  price  setting,  housing  is  provided  and 
consumed on a non-market-oriented basis. By contrast, private-sector-led housing is 
a rather profit-oriented commodity, not only because private firms handle the whole 
process  of  housing  provision  but  also  because  the  provision  is  based  on  quasi 
market exchange relationships with regard to access to land, finances, price setting 
and sales. 
 
Table 2.5 Characteristics and key actors in affordable housing provision 
Form  Initiator  Land  Construction  Price setting  Finance  
State-led  State  State  Public & Private 
Builders  
Cost-based  Mainly public 
sector  
Co-
operative 
Co-
operatives  
Co-
operatives 
Public & Private 
Builders 
Cost-based  Mainly public 
sector  
Self-help  Individuals   Individuals  Individuals  Not for 
exchange 
Self-funding  
Private   Private 
sector 
Private sector   Private Builders  Profit-oriented  Both public 
and private 
sectors 
Source: Literature review results 
 
The rules in relation to affordable housing provision are set and regulated by the 
state.  Except  for  those  rules  in  relation  to  production,  such  as  building  cost 42 
 
regulations,  the  rules  on  housing  finance  and  consumption  are  critical  for  those 
profit-oriented actors in the provision of affordable housing (Allam et al., 2004, Fahmi 
and  Sutton,  2008).  As  part  of  the  social  policy,  some  rules,  such  as  the  income 
ceiling restriction, have been enforced and applied to all affordable housing schemes 
to ensure that housing is made available to low- and moderate-income households in 
Egypt  (EMF,  2010).  In  addition,  price  setting  in  relation  to  the  private-sector-led 
housing  schemes  is  also  under  government  regulation,  which  is  critical  to  the 
distribution  effect  of  affordable  housing.  Such  rules  remain,  however,  subject  to 
change. 
 
B) Building Materials 
Although the building materials industry has recorded major development in terms of 
increased production capacity and improved quality, the industry is considered a key 
obstacle to housing affordability in Egypt (Moharam, 2006). The building materials 
industry  was  fully  liberalized  under  the  Mubarak  administration,  leading  to 
consolidation in some sub-sectors, namely steel and cements. The domestic steel 
industry is dominated by one group that controls over 70 per cent of the market. 
Similarly, the domestic cement industry is dominated by a few companies, including 
multinational companies that managed to seal a joint agreement to try to close the 
gap  between  local  and  international  prices  without  any  real  increase  in  the 
production  costs  (IDSC,  2008).  In  the  absence  of  well-established  anti-trust 
regulations,  these  monopolistic  practices  have  led  to  significant  increases  in 
construction  costs  and  ultimately  have  reduced  housing  affordability  (Nametalla, 
2005). 
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Table 2.6 shows the changes in the prices of building materials between 1990 and 
2006. As is clear, the prices of cement and steel increased by almost 18 per cent 
and 19.7 per cent respectively per annum. In the meantime, since the issuance of 
Labor  Law  number  53  in  1984,  the  minimum  wage  in  Egypt  has  increased  from 
EGP35  per  month  in  1984  to  EGP168  per  month  in  the  fiscal  year  2005/2006 
(Helmy, 2006).  
 
Table 2.6 Prices of Building Materials in Egypt 
EGP Per Ton   1990  2006  %  Change in  
GDP per capita 
(1990 – 2006), %   
Cement   90  354.7  294 
45.5 
Steel   700  2,906  315 
Source: Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC, 2008) 
 
C) Ownership and Management of Housing  
Since 1982, the government has issued a number of laws to regulate the ownership 
and management of housing, the first of which  was Law number 14 in 1981, as 
amended by Law number 15 in 1982, to organize and regulate co-operative housing 
and development in Egypt. This was in addition to the issuance of Law number 3 in 
1982  to  regulate  urban  planning  including  the  division  and  distribution  of  land 
(Ministry of Housing, 1991, Ministry of Housing, 1993).  
 
Over  many  years,  the  government  played  a  key  role  in  land  management  and 
allocation  to  regulate  land  use  and  housing  provision  (Allam  et  al.,  2002).  The 
government used to allocate plots of land at below market  value to public sector 
companies and housing co-operative societies to assist them in the production of 44 
 
affordable housing for low- and moderate-income households (Ministry of Housing, 
1993). Following the economic transition, the government changed this policy and 
started auctioning land (Rashad, 2008). In doing so, the government was hoping that 
the auction system would ensure transparency in the management and use of public 
land.  
 
Although  the  new  system  increased  government  revenues  that  can  be  used  to 
support  the  required  investment  in  affordable  housing  schemes,  auctions  have 
bolstered  land  prices  which  have  significantly  increased  the  cost  of  housing 
production. Selling through auctions has also made it difficult for other  affordable 
housing  developers,  such  as  the  housing  co-operative  societies,  to  acquire  new 
lands at affordable terms (Rashad, 2008, Moharam, 2006). 
 
D) Finance  
In 1982, the government took a business-like approach and established a new real 
estate bank, the Housing & Development Bank (Ministry of Housing, 1991, HDB, 
2010).  The  government  used  the  bank  as  a  vehicle  to  develop  a  system  of 
contractual savings for housing (CSH) in Egypt, similar to the Bausparkassen system 
in Western and Eastern Europe (Lea and Renaud, 1995). The government also used 
the bank to support the development of the demand side of the housing market so 
that a large-scale demand shift could be achieved, especially to the housing projects 
in  the  new  communities.  Further,  the  bank  acted  as  an  intermediary  for  cross-
subsidization schemes in order to avoid the inflexibility of the state‟s fiscal budget. In 
doing so, the bank used to channel part of the revenues from urban development 
projects in the upper housing market (for example Marina Resort in the Northern 45 
 
Coast) to the lower income end of the housing market (Ministry of Housing, 1993, El 
Gabaly, 2004).  
 
However, the growth of the bank‟s operation ever since has been mainly fuelled by 
lending in the supply side of the housing market that is to lend to housing developers 
rather  than  residential  mortgages  for  households.  This  fits  well  with  the  national 
statistics on loans and advances from the financial sector to housing developers, that 
registered an annual average growth rate of 136.8 per cent between 1997 and 2002 
(approximately 23 per cent year-on-year) (CAPMAS, 2007). The growth reflects the 
relative  long-standing  experience  of  the  housing  finance  institutions  in  housing 
development  finance,  extensive  knowledge  of  the  housing  developers  they  work 
with, and the continued high demand for housing. 
 
Further, since the late 1990s, many housing finance institutions (namely banks and 
insurance companies) have increased their exposure to the housing market through 
direct  equity  participations  in  housing  development  companies  according  to  the 
Middle  East  Rating  &  Investors  Service  (MERIS,  2004).  This  increase  in  the 
exposure to the housing market coincides with the then global trends and before the 
recent  financial  crisis.  Likewise,  the  aim  of  this  increase  is  to  benefit  from  the 
substantial profits that can be made at the inception stage of housing development 
projects. As a result, in the recent period, many Egyptian banks have rushed to fund 
new  housing  schemes  on  the  outskirts  of  the  major  urban  cities,  although  the 
effective demand is low.  
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There have been varying degrees of experience from one bank to another: some 
banks have developed well thought out strategies and have established specialized 
dedicated teams to control the risks which could be particularly harmful for asset 
quality and performance in the event of any sudden shock. In general, however, the 
high exposure of the Egyptian banking system to the housing market remained a 
major concern. To mitigate it, the CBE had to intervene during the recent past to 
regulate  housing  development  finance.  Accordingly,  a  bank  cannot  allocate  more 
than 5 per cent of its assets to mortgage lending (CBE, 2010).  
 
E) Rent Control  
Rent control in Egypt was introduced following the 1952 revolution and was gradually 
extended to cover all the Egyptian housing market (Everhart et al., 2006, Soliman, 
1996, Allam et al., 2002). The principle was to set rents throughout the lifetime of a 
dwelling  in  such  a  way  as  to  cover the  construction,  maintenance  and  operating 
costs of the dwelling so that the owner – a non-profit company or private owner – 
does  not  make  a  profit.  Thus,  rental  housing  became  a  large  component  of  the 
Egyptian  housing  stock  compared  to  the  other  formerly  socialist  economies 
(Stephens, 2005a) (see table 2.7). 47 
 
Table 2.7 Home ownership, Intermediate and Rental Housing Systems in 
selected transition economies 
Country (year)   Home Ownership % 
Super home ownership    
Armenia (2001)  96 
Hungary (1994)  96 
Albania (1998)  95 
Romania (1999)  95 
Bulgaria (1995)  93 
Slovenia (1994)  88 
Estonia (2000)  86 
Intermediate    
Slovakia (2001)  73 
Russia (c.2001)  68 
Rental   
Czech Republic (2001)  59 
Poland (2000)   55 
Egypt (2002)   32 
Source: (Stephens, 2005a), except for Egypt (CAPMAS, 2007). 
 
However, rent control led to a major distortion in both housing market signals and 
consumption patterns (Soliman, 1996). It had two main effects on housing provision 
in Egypt. First, it reduced the quality of housing as landlords embarked on a strategy 
of under-maintaining their properties. Secondly, it reduced the quantity of the rental 
dwellings in the market since the owners of vacant properties, as well as the housing 
investors,  had  no  incentive  to  offer  their  properties  in  the  rental  housing  market 
because of the rental housing regulations.  
 
Since the 1980s, there has been a movement to gradually eliminate rent control in 
the housing market through a new law to govern the landlord–tenant relationship 48 
 
regulation (Allam et al., 2004). The new law made it possible for the first time since 
1952  for  a  new  rental  housing  contract  to  be  entered  into  without  any  form  of 
government intervention as to the rental rate, the duration or eviction procedures. 
However, housing units rented prior to the issuance of the law, which represent the 
largest component of the rental housing stock, are still regulated by the old laws. 
 
F) Informal Housing 
The high level of poverty in Egypt and scarcity of affordable housing have resulted in 
a  massive  increase  in  the  informal  housing  sector  in  the  country  (Taher,  1997, 
Associates, 1982, El Batran and Arandel, 1998, Fahmi and Sutton, 2008, Fahmi and 
Sutton,  2006,  Soliman,  1996).  The  population  of  the  extended  informal 
neighbourhoods in Cairo (Egypt‟s capital city) make up to 50 per cent of the total 
Egyptian  population  living  in  slums  (Fahmi  and  Sutton,  2006,  Fahmi and  Sutton, 
2008). These neighbourhoods were built in a relatively short period of time to meet 
the housing needs of large population migrations (Soliman, 1996). Satellite photos of 
these  neighbourhoods  show  that  they  are  spreading  out  across  private  plots  of 
agricultural land, in contravention of laws meant to safeguard the fertile Nile valley 
(El  Batran  and  Arandel,  1998).  About  200,000  people  have  been  moving  into 
informal housing each year in Cairo (UNDP, 2004).  
 
The problem of informal housing can also be attributed to the regulatory environment 
in  Egypt.  Around  65  per  cent  of  the  total  housing  stock  in  the  country  is  not 
registered with the authorities and consequently not taxed, contributing to Egypt's 
fiscal challenges, and highlighting the need for property registration and tax reform 
(De Soto, 1997). For an Egyptian to follow legally established procedures to build 49 
 
and register a house would involve seventy-seven bureaucratic procedures in thirty-
one offices. The process would take between six and fourteen years. As a result, 
many  Egyptians  live  in  properties  that  have  never  been  registered  or  legally 
recognized. Such legal uncertainty of these properties decreases their values and 
the ability to lend or borrow against  them. This represents a lost form of values; 
hence these properties are considered dead capital. As much as US$241bn worth of 
properties is considered dead capital in Egypt as they are not legally recognized. 
Establishing a system that would bring this „dead capital‟ alive in Egypt would bring 
tangible benefits to the Egyptian economy as this would substantially increase the 
size of the national GDP. For such system to work properly, however, the imperative 
would  be  to  create  better  conditions  for  property  registration  in  Egypt  (De  Soto, 
1997). 
 
2.3 Mortgage Market  
2.3.1 Evolution of Mortgage Credit  
Mortgage financing in the modern history of Egypt has been rooted in the structure of 
the social security system, especially during the central planning era (1952 to 1990), 
which  pursued  „high  employment,  high  subsidies  and  high  welfare‟  (Weis  et  al., 
2002). In this system, the state secured low-cost funding lines for mortgage credit 
provision from state-owned financial intermediaries that made sure the basic needs 
of  low-  and  moderate-income  households  were  satisfied.  However,  mortgage 
financing  in  Egypt  faced  challenges  when  economic  transition  began  in  the  late 
1990s (El Gabaly, 2004). Non-government financial intermediaries started to thrive. 
All financial intermediaries had to compete in the market place for low-cost funding 
lines.  The  new  rule  within  the  government  is  that  the  state  cannot  guarantee  a 50 
 
certain  level  of  mortgage  subsidy  and  bail  out  all  poorly  performing  financial 
intermediaries by injecting more  public funds. In other words,  mortgage financing 
institutions can no longer count on the state subsidy and financial support to survive 
(IDSC, 2008, EMF, 2010).  
 
Thus,  there  was  a  need  to  transform  the  mortgage  market  to  improve  the 
intermediary  role  and  efficiency  of  the  participating  agents,  especially  non-
government institutions. In 2001 a new mortgage law was passed by the parliament 
to regulate mortgage financing in Egypt, as a way to address the challenges in the 
housing market in terms of access and affordability (Egypt, 2001, Boleat, 2002, Weis 
et  al., 2002). Without  mortgage financing,  low-  and moderate-income  households 
cannot afford to buy homes in the formal sector. Consequently, most of this segment 
of the population lives in public or informal housing sectors (Weis et al., 2002, Askar, 
2005). 
 
As a result, mortgage financing is sought to support access to housing for low- and 
moderate-income  households  who  can  turn  their  homes  into  a  source  of  wealth 
(Erba and Nothaft, 2002). Though the Egyptian Parliament passed the mortgage law 
in  2001,  there  has  been  only  limited  development  in  the  volume  of  mortgage 
financing in Egypt. The key important development, however, is the expansion of the 
network  of  mortgage  financing  intermediation  by  creating  non-bank  financial 
intermediaries specializing in mortgage lending (Struyk and Brown, 2006, Tameer, 
2010).  
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The housing market transition has little effect on mortgage financing intermediation 
in  Egypt.  First,  mortgage  financing  has  been  considered  by  many  financial 
intermediaries  as  an  objective  in  itself  rather  than  a  means  to  an  end.  Thus, 
mortgage products are offered at very high prices (EAL, 2010, Tameer, 2010). On 
the one hand, financial intermediaries need to use funding resources efficiently so 
they can only offer affordable mortgages under support from the government. On the 
other hand, low- and moderate-income households continue to be under-served in 
the mortgage market. Thus, access to housing continues to be a major expense to 
many low- and moderate-income households. 
 
2.3.2 Mortgage Credit Intermediation and Participating Agents  
The  number  of  mortgage  lenders  in  Egypt  has  increased  recently  to  twenty 
institutions. This includes the Egyptian Mortgage Refinance Company (EMRC) and 
nineteen  bank  and  non-bank  financial  institutions  that  started  to  offer  mortgage 
financing  services  to  their  customers  (EMF,  2009,  CBE,  2010,  EAL,  2010,  HDB, 
2010, Tameer, 2010). The bulk of the funds that are used by these mortgage lenders 
today comes primarily from the banking sector (CBE, 2010). However, many saving 
institutions,  such as  insurance  companies and  co-operative  societies, are not  yet 
directly participating in the mortgage market. Further, some of the existing financial 
intermediaries  started  to  show  no  interest  in  addressing  the  demand  at  the  low-
income  end  of  the  housing  market  (HDB,  2010).  Figure  2.2  reflects  the  current 
structure  of  the  Egyptian  mortgage  financing  intermediation  system  and  the  key 
participating agents.  52 
 
  
Figure 2.2 Structure of the Egyptian Mortgage System 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Literature review results 
 
A) Regulators  
Egypt‟s mortgage financing system is regulated as part of the non-banking financial 
sector,  which  recently  witnessed  the  unification  of  several  supervisory  authorities 
under  one  single  authority,  the  Egyptian  Financial  Supervisory  Authority  (EFSA) 
(CBE, 2010). EFSA was established by virtue of Law number 10 for 2009, regulating 
non-banking  financial  markets  and  instruments.  The  Authority  is  in  charge  of 
supervising  non-banking  financial  sectors  (capital  markets,  derivative  markets, 
insurance  businesses,  mortgage  finance,  financial  leasing,  factoring  and 
securitization). The law states that the Authority shall replace the Egyptian Insurance 
Supervision Authority (EISA), the Capital Market Authority (CMA), and the Mortgage 
Finance Authority (MFA) as of 1 July 2009. The Authority shall be responsible for 
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maintaining the soundness and stability of non-banking financial sectors, organizing 
and developing them and protecting the rights of market dealers on equal terms. In 
addition  to  guaranteeing  the  efficiency  of  non-banking  financial  markets  and  the 
transparency of their activities, the Authority shall introduce appropriate tools and 
systems, and set adequate rules and regulations (EFSA, 2010). 
 
As  is  clear,  the  regulation  of  the  mortgage  market  in  Egypt  is  still  evolving.  The 
unification of the supervisory authorities should ensure predictability with respect to 
mortgage  lending  and  facilitate  the  development  of  both  primary  and  secondary 
mortgage markets. However, this process will take time to implement and the roles 
of government and business will vary over time. The mortgage market still also faces 
other  challenges.  The  mortgage  law  changed  the  legal  framework  regarding 
residential  property  ownership.  It  permits  deeds  of  trust  and  appears  to  allow 
property  to  be  filed  in  the  name  of  an  independent  trustee.  According  to  the 
Mortgage  Finance  Authority  and  Egyptian  Stock  Exchange,  this  makes  the 
foreclosure on property easier and provides increased protection to originators and 
potential lenders (EMF, 2009, EGX, 2010). While this is a major step forward, there 
is  no  certainty  yet  that  the  courts,  administrative  systems  or  the  regulatory 
environment will be responsive. It is also not known if the political system will support 
efficient implementation of the new law. In practice, the law still needs a good test, 
particularly of the foreclosure provisions, to determine whether the courts are able to 
balance financial and social security interests.  
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B) Government  
The Egyptian government indirectly participates in the mortgage market through the 
following.  
 
Mandatory Saving Schemes  
In Egypt, there is a system requiring mandatory contributions from employers into a 
special  social  insurance  and  pension  fund  (Galal,  2002).  Each  employer  must 
allocate a percentage of total wages of its employees as a contribution to this fund. 
Such  funds  are  pooled  together  and  deposited  in  the  state-owned  National 
Investment Bank (NIB) for investment in different sectors of the national economy, 
including the housing and mortgage markets (Finance, 2008).  
 
In addition to the above, the government used to encourage the state-owned banks 
to develop contractual savings schemes oriented to home purchase (HDB, 2010). 
The first contractual scheme was introduced in 1980 in the form of a special savings 
bank  account  (El  Gabaly,  2004).  The  saver  agreed  to  make  a  series  of  regular 
deposits to that account for a certain period, and the bank agreed to lend a larger 
amount  than  the  contractual  amount  at  the  end  of  the  period  if  the  contractual 
amount has been saved (El Gabaly, 2004, HDB, 2010). The eventual cost of the 
mortgage loan to the saver is a percentage above the saving rate. As an incentive 
the  government  used  to  provide  a  bonus  up  to  the  amount  of  interest  earned, 
thereby doubling the effective rate. The effective rate used to be even higher since 
the total interest (including bonus) is tax free (Finance, 2008).  
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Another scheme was later introduced, known as the house savings plan. A contract 
is required between the saver and lender in which the saver agrees to save for at 
least  four  years and  to  accumulate  a  certain  sum  (HDB,  2010,  EAL,  2010).  The 
lender is then obliged to provide either a loan amount of 2.5 to 3 times the amount of 
savings or allocate a housing unit in one of the bank's funded housing projects. As in 
the case of the account, both the saving and borrowing rate were below comparable 
market rates.  
 
In both the savings account and savings plan, there is implicit agreement among 
savers and lenders. Savers accept a low rate on their savings for important reasons. 
First, the government subsidy and tax exemption increase the effective yield and 
secondly,  the  housing  loan  is  guaranteed  at  a  lower  rate.  Lenders,  on  the  other 
hand, have the advantage of receiving a steady stream of low-cost funding, which 
can be loaned at the market rate, offering a considerable profit opportunity. 
 
These state-sponsored contractual savings schemes used to be very popular in the 
1980s and 1990s until the government decided to follow the economic structural and 
adjustment programme in the late 1990s (El Gabaly, 2004). The most active savings 
schemes at present are those  offered by community-based organizations (CBOs) 
such  as  housing  co-operative  societies  (Moharam,  2006,  Rashad,  2008).  These 
schemes  are  offered  under  the  co-operative  sector  umbrella  that  continues  to 
provide significant incentives to save for a home purchase as an alternative source 
of capital for housing investment. However, these co-operative saving schemes have 
not been properly institutionalized, professionalized and supervised.  
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National Investment Bank (NIB)  
The National Investment Bank (NIB) is responsible for evaluating and financing the 
Egyptian government‟s investment programme (Finance, 2008). NIB uses pension 
funds  to  provide  long-term  financing  to  investment  projects  approved  by  the 
parliament,  and  charges  interest  to  recover  operating  costs  (CBE,  2010).  In  the 
1980s, interest rates charged to public projects and enterprises were negative in real 
terms, because the cost of funds available through the social insurance system is 
negligible (Planning, 1991). However, with the increase in interest rates on social 
insurance schemes to positive real rates since 1992, NIB has also increased interest 
rates  on  its  lending,  thus  raising  the  hurdle  rates  for  investment  projects  (CBE, 
2008).  
 
In  the  past,  NIB  also  supported  the  programmes  aimed  at  increasing  access  to 
housing  for  low-  and  moderate-income  households.  For  example,  NIB  used  to 
extend  cheap  credit  lines  to  a  number  of  state-owned  banks  on-lending  to  their 
clients,  whether  low-  and  moderate-income  households  or  community-based 
organizations  such  as  housing  co-operative  societies.  A  customer  interested  in 
purchasing or developing a residential property would pay around 60 per cent of the 
costs,  while  the  government  through  NIB  provided  a  credit  line  to  finance  the 
remaining percentage. The credit was usually in the form of a subsidized mortgage 
loan  payable  over  forty  years at  below  market  interest  rate  (Ministry  of  Housing, 
1993). Hence, the monthly instalments are affordable. Since the adoption of Law 
number  203,  NIB‟s  exposure  to  the  public  sector  entities  and  institutions  has 
declined to almost zero (El Gabaly, 2004, Moharam, 2006, Rashad, 2008).  
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The banking sector plays a crucial role in the development of the financial system in 
Egypt (El-Refaie, 1998). The banking sector consists of commercial banks, which 
are local banks, and non-local banks. It also includes specialized banks and financial 
institutions operating in the fields of investment and credit for industry, agriculture, 
real estate and rural development (see figure 2.3). In addition, there are branches 
affiliated to these banks and institutions all over the country with the objective of 
extending the reach of the banking sector (CBE, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Literature review results 
 
Discussing the role of the banking sector and its contribution in a certain market can 
easily become a jumble of technical terms and conflicting theories that can confuse 
the reader. So it helps to focus here on the key functions to be addressed in relation 
to  the  development  of  the  mortgage  market  in  Egypt,  that  is  the  mobilization  of 
savings and allocation of risk.  
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Mobilization of Savings  
In Egypt, households who have to pay for their own houses need to save or borrow 
money  (EAL,  2010,  EMF,  2010,  HDB,  2010).  During  the  transitional  period,  the 
households can buy houses at favourable terms and receive subsidies if they are 
eligible, but they have to make a contribution to the housing costs. To accumulate 
enough savings, households need to work hard and save to „earn‟ housing.  
 
A variety of saving institutions exist to support the high propensity of the Egyptian to 
save  (Boleat,  2002,  CAPMAS,  2007,  CBE,  2008,  Struyk  and  Brown,  2006). 
However,  the  banking  sector  is  the  dominant  player  and  offers  saving  and  time 
deposit  accounts for their  corporate  and  retail  customers  (CBE, 2010).  Non-bank 
financial institutions such as the post office have been especially popular in small 
villages not covered by the network of  the banking sector (Vittas, 1998). Further, 
many community-based organizations such as housing co-operative societies offer 
their  members  saving-only  services  under  the  sponsorship  of  the  Social  Security 
Department  (Rashad,  2008).  All  these  saving  institutions  ultimately  channel  the 
majority of their funds into the banking sector, which, in turn, is being used among 
other things for housing investment or mortgage financing.  
 
In the mortgage market, one important feature that stands out in this saving pattern 
is that the bank deposits are higher in relation to their mortgage lending business, 
while savings of housing co-operative societies are higher in relation to the mortgage 
credit. Thus, the mortgage market remains relatively small (Allam et al., 2002, Askar, 
2005,  El Demery,  2004,  UNDP,  2004, Weis  et  al.,  2002). Further,  if  savings  are 
channelled  properly  and  structural  adjustments  are  successful  in  increasing  the 59 
 
efficiency of risk allocation in the mortgage market, the mortgage market can enjoy 
sustainable growth.  
 
Allocation of Risk 
It is important to start exploring this function by first defining „allocation of risk‟ – what 
it is and what is involved. A basic tenet of economics maintains that people and 
institutions are willing to take higher risks only if the expected return for taking those 
risks is, on average, higher than the return they expect to get from taking a lower risk 
position  (Pagano,  2001).  A  bank,  by  allocating  funds,  is  implicitly,  or  sometimes 
explicitly,  allocating  risks.  Efficiency  demands  not  only  that  the  spreads  for  the 
process are as low as possible while allowing a reasonable profit, but also that the 
risks  of  the  activity  are  properly  assessed  and  priced.  Proper  risk  assessment 
requires timely, accurate and focused information about an institution, business or 
household (Green et al., 2007). With that information, a bank can then allocate funds 
to users according to its preferred risk profile (Tra and Lensink, 2007). 
 
To  better  understand  these  issues,  one  would  also  need  to  briefly  review  and 
examine these theories of financial intermediation within the Egyptian bank credit 
market and then focus on their impact on risk allocation and practices in the housing 
market, to determine what needs to be done to extend the reach of mortgage credit 
in the housing market.  
 
In the recent period, the bank credit conditions in Egypt have been stable. This is 
primarily underpinned by the considerable progress achieved in the banking sector 
reform  programme  implemented  by  the  Central  Bank  of  Egypt  (CBE)  –  including 60 
 
sector consolidation, upgrading the CBE‟s supervisory and monitoring capabilities, 
the financial and managerial restructuring of the state-owned banks, and addressing 
the problem of their high non-performing loans (NPLs) (CBE, 2008). As a result, the 
banking sector is now more resilient and better positioned to withstand pressures. 
The economy is also benefiting from strong economic growth (estimated at over 7 
per cent in 2009) (CBE, 2010), which has a positive impact on banks‟ loan growth 
and business generation. 
 
These  positive  factors  are,  however,  counterbalanced  by  a  challenging  operating 
environment,  characterized  by  low  per  capita  GDP,  high  unemployment,  soaring 
consumer  price  inflation  (despite  slowing  slightly)  and  the  effects  that  the  global 
economic  slowdown  may  have  on  the  Egyptian  economy  (Finance,  2008,  IDSC, 
2008). The latter may also delay the completion of certain aspects of the banking 
sector reform programme, including the repayment of all public sector NPLs and the 
recapitalization of the state-owned banks. 
 
In the mortgage market, the Egyptian banking sector still faces major challenges, 
including a high historic default rate, high cost of borrowing measured by the rate of 
interest  adjusted  for  tax  relief/subsidy,  and  high  loan-to-value  requirements  as  a 
result of soaring house prices (El Demery, 2004, El Gabaly, 2004, Eldin et al., 2004, 
MERIS, 2004, Struyk and Brown, 2006, Struyk and Roman, 2008). These challenges 
have resulted in a low level of credit appetite as well as a high degree of bank credit 
rationing in the mortgage market, as demonstrated by the restrictions on bank credit 
to the housing market in terms of the 5 per cent ceiling on mortgage lending imposed 61 
 
by the Central Bank (CBE, 2008) and from the decline in the available mortgage 
credit in some sub-sectors.  
 
As explained earlier, housing co-operative societies are considered key actors in the 
affordable housing sector in Egypt. They are community-based organizations that 
finance and build homes and then sell them at cost for their members. Historically, 
they  have  relied  on  low  interest  and  subsidized  mortgage  credit  from  the  state-
owned banks as an external source of finance to keep down the cost of housing and 
the prices they charge (Ministry of Housing, 1993, El Gabaly, 2004, Moharam, 2006, 
Rashad,  2008).  Low  interest  rate  mortgages  have  enabled  housing  co-operative 
societies to keep their financial cost relatively low (see figure 2.4).  62 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Mortgage Credit for Co-operative Housing Purpose 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Literature review results 
 
D) Capital/Secondary Mortgage Markets  
The recently enacted capital market and mortgage laws authorize the creation of 
securitization companies for the purpose of assembling portfolios of mortgage loans 
to issue mortgage-backed securities in the capital market (EMF, 2009). However, the 
capital  market  has  not  yet  played  a  prominent  role  in  the  development  of  the 
Egyptian mortgage market (El Gabaly, 2004, Struyk and Brown, 2006, EGX, 2010). 
The secondary mortgage market, as it is practised in developed economies, is still 
underdeveloped in Egypt.  
 
While the capital market and mortgage laws envision multiple companies, only one – 
the Egyptian Mortgage Refinance Company (EMRC) – has formed and is active thus 
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far  (EMF,  2009).  The  company  is  privately  chartered.  It  includes  among  its 
shareholders several government institutions and major participating agents in the 
mortgage market. One of the company‟s objectives is to help standardize mortgage 
instruments and underwriting criteria. Thus, it is working with relevant administrative 
and  judicial  bodies  to  ensure  fair  and  efficient  implementation  of  mortgage  law 
provisions,  particularly concerning  securitization  and  foreclosure.  The  company  is 
also  trying  to  define  strategies  to  improve  access  to  good  information.  However, 
economic and market conditions have prevented the company from reaching its full 
potential (EMF, 2010).  
 
2.3.3 Mortgage Market Efficiency 
While  the  Egyptian  government  has  recently  dedicated  a  lot  of  support  and 
resources to facing the challenging task of establishing a new mortgage market, the 
lack of a fully functioning and efficient mortgage financing intermediation continues to 
constrain access to housing for many low- and moderate-income households. The 
key challenges are discussed below. 
 
As is noted earlier, in relation to the problem of informal housing, one of the major 
challenges  is  the  ineffective  property  registration  system  in  Egypt  (Galal,  2001, 
Askar, 2005). Over 90 per cent of all properties in the country are not registered 
(Finance,  2008).  The  registration  system  is  characterized  as  burdensome,  time 
consuming and expensive for applicants. A landlord hoping to register a property 
would have to pay fees of between 12 per cent and 14 per cent of the property‟s 
value, in addition to spending months dealing with red tape (EMF, 2010). The system 
is vastly underutilized as the administrative processes are excessively bureaucratic 64 
 
and  complex.  Property  registration  is also  misunderstood  and  unpopular  with  the 
public. Until recently, the system was based on manual recording and usually the 
records were in poor condition.  
 
Recent reforms, however, have cut fees to just 3 per cent while the government is 
endeavouring to build a national registry of properties based on clearly defined titles 
to  privately  owned  property,  which  is  an  important  source  of  capital  for 
entrepreneurship at the grass roots level (Finance, 2008). Such reforms can help the 
low- and moderate-income households to access housing and enable them to turn 
their  homes  into  a  source  of  wealth,  which  is  an  important  element  in  the 
development of a dynamic market economy (Steele et al., 2008). 
 
Another  major  challenge  is  the  restriction  on  bank  credit  in  the  housing  and 
mortgage markets at present, as explained earlier (Boleat, 2002, Askar, 2005, Hafiz, 
2005). However, the 5 per cent ceiling on mortgage lending imposed by the Central 
Bank  of  Egypt  may  be  raised  in  the  future  (EMF,  2009).  This  limit  applies 
cumulatively to both the supply and demand side of the market: to residential and 
commercial mortgage lending as well as mortgage credit to individuals and housing 
developers (CBE, 2008). 
 
The  current  mismatch  between  supply  and  demand  represents  another  major 
challenge. On one hand, the majority of housing developers are not committed to the 
idea  of  building  sufficient  quantities  of  affordable  housing  aimed  at  low-  and 
moderate-income households (Aziz et al., 2007, Struyk and Roman, 2008). On the 
other  hand,  the  terms  and  conditions  for  mortgage  credit  available  to  these 65 
 
households  is  not  commensurate  with  reality.  For  example,  an  applicant  for 
mortgage  credit  must  have  a  fixed  and  stable  income.  The  purpose  of  obtaining 
mortgage credit is to purchase a property. The loan-to-value should not exceed 85 
per cent of the value of the property.  
 
Credit information is another challenge. The Egyptian Household Credit Bureau is 
still underdeveloped, raising the risk of extending mortgage credit to a household. 
Lack  of  household  credit  history  and  behaviour  towards  debt  make  it  difficult  to 
accurately  measure  risk  (Duca  and  Rosenthal,  1991).  As  a  result  the  credit 
underwriting decision on risk is overly conservative and households face an added 
penalty  charge  on  the  cost  of  mortgage  credit,  ultimately  increasing  the  cost  of 
housing.  
 
The inadequate legal structure in Egypt results in a lack of confidence that the courts 
will strictly apply and enforce judgments against households in case of default. The 
uncertainty  of  foreclosure  increases  the  risk  to  mortgage  lenders  (Askar,  2005, 
Struyk and Brown, 2006). Hence, many mortgage lenders in Egypt hesitate to take 
more risk by expanding their mortgage lending activities.  
 
Finally, the financing options provided by the current mortgage market in Egypt are 
very  limited.  Without  financing  options,  Egyptian  low-  and  moderate-income 
households  cannot afford  to  access  housing.  Since  a  house  is often  the  primary 
investment and savings vehicle for those households, a lack of alternative financing 
options  constrain  overall  saving  rates  (UNCHS-Habitat,  1989,  Borsch-Supan  and 
Stahl, 1991, Scholten, 2000, Struyk et al., 2004, Keynes, 2007). Low saving and 66 
 
investment rates restrict economic growth and limit economic development (Keynes, 
2007). 
 
2.3.4 How Far Does the Mortgage Credit System Reach in Egypt? 
In addition to the above, the final issue that requires special attention relates to the 
extent  the  mortgage  financing  system  in  Egypt  reaches  at  present.  Struyk  and 
Roman  (2008)  examined  the  broad  pattern  of  home  purchase  finance  in  Egypt‟s 
capital and largest city Cairo during the 2002– 2006 period, with a specific focus on 
understanding the determinants of the choice between all-cash payment at the time 
of  purchase  and  alternative  financing  arrangements  that  involved  borrowing 
(„instalments‟). Based on their findings, true mortgage lending appears to be still in 
its infancy and the circumstances of mortgage  financing are similar to those in a 
number of developing countries. Further, there is still a number of factors missing, 
such  as  proper  registration,  and  credit  assessment  and  scoring  to  ensure 
responsible loan underwriting in order to minimize default rates. Thus, the principal 
policy conclusion is the necessity to strengthen the quality of loan underwriting in 
Egypt by taking into account the previously mentioned factors (Struyk and Roman, 
2008). 
 
In order to address this issue, one needs to consider the Egyptian mortgage market 
from a broader perspective. Egypt remains an emerging economy. The challenges of 
unemployment,  poverty,  savings  and  investment  limit  the  size  of  the  current 
mortgage market. That is, the confidence level required for a household to apply for 
a mortgage depends on job security (Malpezzi and Vandell, 1993, Renaud, 1996, 
Feldstein, 2007, Gibb, 2003).  67 
 
At present, employment in Egypt grows at a slower rate than the population and the 
labour force, resulting in a worsening unemployment situation (Galal, 2002, Helmy, 
2006).  Thus,  more  measures  and  reforms  are  required  to  improve  the  socio-
economic condition in Egypt (Galal, 2002, Galal, 2001). However, one can classify 
the  Egyptian  population  at  present  into  a  number  of  socio-economic  household 
groups  that  are  rated  from  A  (upper  middle  class)  through  to  D  (lowest  level  of 
subsistence), as defined in table 2.8 below. 
 
Table 2.8 Classification of Egyptian Households into Socio-economic Groups 
Grade  Social Status   Occupation  
A  Upper Middle Class   Higher managerial, administrative, or 
professional  
B  Middle Class  Intermediate managerial, 
administrative or professional  
C  Lower Middle Class   Junior managerial, administrative or 
professional as well as skilled manual 
workers 
D  Lowest Level of 
Subsistence  
Elders, widows, casual or lowest grade 
workers  
Source: Literature review results 
 
Generally, households in the A and B socio-economic groups comprise the housing 
professional classes and as such tend to have less restricted access to mainstream 
sources of credit. However, it is worth noting that social groupings and strong credit 
profiles do not automatically correlate (Buckley et al., 2003). Households who fall 
into  the  C  and  D  categories  tend  to  have,  by  virtue  of  their  employment 
characteristics or personal circumstances, limited access to housing and mainstream 
credit in the form of mortgage credit etc., mainly because of their inability to achieve 
the necessary thresholds. They therefore comprise the target market for the informal 68 
 
financial  sector  (Tra  and  Lensink,  2007).  Based  on  this  classification  and  recent 
available statistics, Egyptian households can be distributed as follows: 
  
Figure 2.5 Egyptian Socio-economic Structure 
Source: (CAPMAS, 2007) 
 
As  is  clear,  around  68  per  cent  of  Egyptian  households  would  not  qualify  for 
mortgage credit without some form of support. The provision of government support 
is however uncertain in light of the recent economic transition and the boundaries to 
the national budget.  
 
2.3.5 Mortgage Credit Subsidy  
The state-sponsored mortgage credit schemes in Egypt were based on the social 
security system in which bank and non-bank financial intermediaries were chosen as 
agents to implement the schemes (El Demery, 2004, Askar, 2005). The bank and 
non-bank financial intermediaries were responsible for allocating mortgage credits to 
their clients. Moreover, these intermediaries could decide which clients were eligible 
for bank credit or mortgage loan allocation (El Gabaly, 2004). It appears that this 
arrangement  was  all  about  supporting  access  to  housing  for  low-  and moderate- 
income households. To the households, mortgage credit was a means to an end 
rather than an objective in itself.  
A, 10%
B, 22%
C, 44%
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Since the 1980s, the state-sponsored mortgage credit schemes have been the main 
mechanism for state supported home ownership in Egypt (Ministry of Housing, 1979, 
EMF,  2010).  The  government  established  the  Mortgage  Finance  Subsidy  and 
Guarantee Fund, which is equivalent to the Federal Housing Administration in the 
United States. It provides support to making mortgage credit available to low- and 
moderate-income households (Ministry of Housing, 1979, EMF, 2010). At present, 
the fund covers 15 per cent of the cost of a home purchase. It also allows for interest 
rate subsidy and covers mortgage loan repayments for up to two months in case of 
illness or job loss.  
 
There are some programmes that are designed for low-income households whose 
income  and  situation  meet  certain  conditions  and  who  are  buying  a  principal 
residence (EMF, 2010). Lenders under these programmes are the state-controlled 
institutions,  including  banks  and  mortgage  finance  companies.  Terms  offered  are 
quite favourable, and the interest is below market rate (see table 2.9).  
 
Table 2.9 General Conditions for Subsidized Mortgage Credit 
Marital Status   Yearly Income  Maximum 
Monthly 
Instalment 
Maximum 
Payment Period 
Single  Less than EGP12,000 
(lower income) 
25% of income  30 years 
Single  More than EGP12,000  40% of income   20 years 
Married   Less than EGP18,000 
(lower income) 
25% of income   30 years  
Married   More than EGP18,000  40% of income   20 years  
Source: (MFA, 2006, EMF, 2010) 70 
 
 
Eligibility  is  based  on  social  characteristics  and  is  thus  universal.  However,  the 
nominal value of the mortgage credit is relatively low while purchase of a dwelling 
requires financial resources mobilization from private sources. Thus, it is argued that, 
despite  government  support, mortgage  credit  in  Egypt  is more accessible for the 
socio-economically stronger household groups (Hafiz, 2005, Nametalla, 2005, Aziz 
et al., 2007, Struyk and Roman, 2008).  
 
2.3.6 Mortgage Credit Fundability  
An important question remains as to how closing the current gap in mortgage credit 
provision can be funded. It was recently noted that a new mortgage credit bill to be 
introduced to parliament in 2011 is expected to boost the housing market and make 
mortgage credit available to a wider number of Egyptians. It will overhaul existing 
mortgage  legislation, notably  by  easing  conservative  lending  rules  in the  banking 
sector and simplifying bureaucratic procedures.  
 
The  Mortgage  Finance  Subsidy  and  Guarantee  Fund,  part  of  the  key  mortgage 
market‟s regulatory authorities, is preparing for the new law by signing agreements 
with financial firms, including three banks that are setting up new mortgage credit 
arms. The reduction in red tape is intended to speed up the time it takes to register a 
mortgage  from  six  months  to  one  month.  In  an  interview  with  the  Fund‟s 
chairwoman, May Abdel Hamid, she reported that: 
„The new regulations should increase the number of mortgages by at least 
15,000 during 2011, taking the total to at least 90,000, and double that 
total  within  two  years  .  .  .  Mortgages  currently  amount  to  less  than 
EGP4.5bn  (US$785m,  0.5  per  cent  of  GDP),  much  less  than  in 71 
 
comparable countries such as Morocco, where they represent 14 per cent 
of  GDP.  The  main  obstacle  to  mortgages,  a  relatively  new  financial 
instrument on the Egyptian market, has been a banking sector that was 
shaken by a long liquidity crisis in 2000-03 and that remains reluctant to 
provide  long-term  credit.  Most  Egyptian  banks  that  provide  mortgages 
have been doing so for only two years, with interest rates set prohibitively 
high (currently over 12.5 per cent). Many homebuyers in Egypt still buy 
property with cash or obtain medium-term payment facilities, typically for 
no  more  than  seven  years,  from  home  finance  companies‟.  (1)  (see 
appendix 2)   
 
Access to housing is complex for many low- and moderate-income households in 
Egypt. In most cases, they are not entitled to the same level of state support offered 
to the low income households. At the same time, they do not qualify to access the 
mortgage  market  under  the  current  system.  So,  more  accessible,  long-term 
mortgages would enable more  low- and moderate-income households to become 
homeowners  and  stimulate  the  housing  market,  one  of  the  key  engines  of  the 
Egyptian  economy  in  recent  years.  As  noted  earlier,  an  estimated  200,000  to 
300,000 new housing units are being built annually. The easing of mortgage credit 
availability would provide a boost to the housing market at a time when, according to 
the  senior  research  analyst  Mr.  Walaa  Yassin  in  HC  Brokerage,  a  major  local 
Egyptian investment bank: 
„Both deliveries and prices are approaching all-time highs, while on the 
other side,  underlying fundamentals like  wage  growth  and  replacement 72 
 
costs  are  lagging  behind.  This  is  most  apparent  in  land  auctions  with 
appetite appearing increasingly more subdued‟. (2) (see appendix 2)   
 
2.4 An Evaluation of the Impact of Egypt’s National Housing Policy 
Initiatives  
In sections 2.2 and 2.3, we reviewed Egypt‟s national housing policy initiatives since 
1952. The main objective of this review is to examine what has been achieved on the 
ground in the Egyptian housing and mortgage markets in terms of what has been 
delivered and to whom. Following  2011 revolution, this section provides a formal 
evaluation of the success, or otherwise, of Egypt‟s national housing policy initiatives. 
The objective of the evaluation is to determine whether these initiatives: i) address a 
real need and are consistent with government priorities; ii) are effective in meeting 
their objectives within budget and without unwanted outcomes; and iii) have used the 
most appropriate and efficient means to achieve their objectives. The evaluation also 
aims  to  identify  blockages  and  problem  areas  experienced  by  different  parties 
involved  -  directly  or  indirectly  -  in  delivery  and  to  make  recommendations  with 
regard to their resolution.  
 
2.4.1 Rationale 
For  the  purposes  of  evaluation,  we  first  consolidate  and  summarize  the  key 
objectives  of  the  national  housing  policy  initiatives  (Ministry  of  Housing,  1979, 
Ministry of Housing, 1991, Ministry of Housing, 1993, El Batran and Arandel, 1998, 
El Demery, 2002, MFA, 2006, Fahmi and Sutton, 2008) in the establishment and 
maintenance of the following:  73 
 
I.  Viable  households  and  communities:  To  promote  progressive  access  to 
economic  opportunities,  health,  educational  and  social  amenities;  permanent 
residential  structures  with  secure  tenure  and  privacy  and  providing  adequate 
protection  against  the  elements;  and  potable  water,  adequate  facilities  and 
domestic energy supply. 
 
II. Economically, fiscally, financially and socially sustainable markets: To ensure 
economical  utilisation of  land and  services  and  to discourage  urban  sprawl,  in 
particular through the promotion of higher densities; to be based upon integrated 
development  planning,  promoting  integration  with  respect  to  social,  economic, 
physical and institutional aspects of development; and to contribute to redressing 
the historically distorted racial and spatial patterns of towns, cities and rural areas. 
 
While the national housing policy initiatives emphasise that the target group is all 
Egyptian  households,  the  priority  has  always  been  claimed  to  be  for  serving  the 
needs  of  the  low-  and  moderate-  income  households.  Based  on  the  earlier 
discussion, we understand that the national housing policy initiatives are meeting the 
objectives as set out above. The housing units are in an acceptable state of repair. 
There are enough housing units to meet most of the current need, although waiting 
lists  do  exist  at  some  times  in  some  communities.  The  process  for  accessing 
housing is fair and reasonable (Erba and Nothaft, 2002, CAPMAS, 2007).  
 
However, there is an ongoing need for adequate, suitable and affordable housing 
that will continue into the future as the population growth remains high (Taher, 1997, 
Fahmi and  Sutton,  2008).  So  there  will  be  need  to  increase  the  total number of 74 
 
housing units. Also, extending the reach of the mortgage credit will be required to 
meet the needs of low- and moderate- income households (El Demery, 2002, El 
Gabaly, 2004, Struyk and Roman, 2008). 
  
2.4.2 Strategies  
One  can  note  that  the  national  housing  policy  initiatives  are  still  based  upon  a 
system of subsidies for low- and moderate- income groups (MFA, 2006, Tameer, 
2010). In order to balance need with resource limitations the chosen focus of the 
initiatives  was  width  rather  than  depth.  As  such,  the  initiatives  can  be  seen  as 
incremental  approaches  to  housing  and  mortgage  markets  development  and  all 
policy initiatives documents stress the progressive nature of the policy initiatives and 
their strategies.  
 
Since  1978  the  housing  policy  was  transformed  into  legislation  in  the  form  of  a 
number  of  acts.  These  acts  define  what  is  meant  by  housing  and  mortgage 
development and define the role of the government, community and private sectors 
in  its  implementation  (Ministry  of  Housing,  1979,  Ministry  of  Housing,  1993, 
Moharam,  2006,  Rashad,  2008,  EFSA,  2010).  Acknowledging  the  existence  of 
legislation that complements housing and mortgage development, this section has, 
of  necessity,  concentrated  on  the  evaluation  of  policies  that focus  specifically  on 
housing and mortgage delivery. 
 
As  also  explained,  the  Egyptian  government  has used  a  number of  strategies  to 
implement the national housing policy initiatives. These can also be summarised as 
follows: 75 
 
I.  Subsidy:  
The cornerstone of these policy initiatives have always been a system of subsidy 
that usually takes two forms, individual subsidy and institutional subsidy (Ministry 
of Housing, 1979, Ministry of Housing, 1993, EFSA, 2010). The individual subsidy 
gives  low-  and  moderate-  income  households  access  to  a  housing  subsidy  to 
acquire ownership of or to purchase or build a new property. It can be used on a 
non-credit linked or a credit linked basis. Institutional Subsidies are allocated to an 
institution,  being  private  sector  and/or  community  sector  organisations,  as 
opposed to an individual and provide for low-priced land. 
   
II.  A partnership between the state and other parties:  
The implementation of the policy initiatives has evolved in the recent years to be 
based upon the concept of a partnership between the state and non-state sector 
to  facilitate  housing  developments  (El  Demery,  2004,  Rashad,  2008).  The 
strategy  calls  for  the  housing  challenge  to  be  met  through  mobilising  and 
harnessing the combined resources, efforts and initiatives of communities, the 
private,  commercial  sector  and  the  state.  The  strategy  encourages  the 
commitment  of  all  key  players  in  the  housing  and  mortgage  markets  –  from 
financial institutions and community organisations to private sector developers - 
to  play  their  part.  The  role  of  government  is  only  to  set  policy,  norms  and 
standards; set and monitor delivery goals; assist governorates  and municipalities 
to  carry  out  their  roles;  mobilise  and  distribute  funds  to  governorates    and 
municipalities for housing, land acquisition, and infrastructure development; and 
to  take  steps  to  create  an  environment  for  all  parties  to  realise  housing 
objectives. 76 
 
III. Mobilisation of savings, credit and private sector investment:  
Another central strategy of the policy initiatives is that additional resources be 
leveraged  to  supplement  the  government  subsidy.  It  is  stated  that  these 
resources should include private investment, formal credit, and the contributions 
of individuals, for example through contractual savings and pensions schemes (El 
Demery,  2004,  Everhart  et  al.,  2006,  EMF,  2010).  To  this  end,  a  variety  of 
initiatives  aimed  at  extending  the  reach  of  mortgage  credit  to  the  low-  and 
moderate-  income  households  from  the  formal  financial  sector  have  been 
established.  These  include  the  Mortgage  Finance  &  Guarantee  Fund,  the 
National Housing Program, and the latest initiative, Self-build Housing Project. 
 
IV. The allocation of low-priced and serviced land:  
In the national housing policy, facilitating access to land for housing is identified 
as a critical component of the housing supply process (Ministry of Housing, 1979, 
Ministry of Housing, 1993, Galal, 2001, EMF, 2010).  
 
2.4.3 Achievements  
Adequate, suitable and affordable housing units are not in excess supply (Moharam, 
2006, IDSC, 2008). The question remains as to whether the current supply meets 
the  demand.  Some  suggest  that  the  needs  of  low-  and  moderate-  income 
households are not being met in all cases, and the demographic projections suggest 
that the gap will continue to widen if changes are not made to better meet those 
needs  (El Gabaly,  2004,  Fahmi,  2008,  Rashad,  2008).  A  challenge  in  accurately 
assessing and meeting the need is that housing initiatives do not currently have a 77 
 
defined  standard  regarding  the  features  that  are  to  be  included  in  low-  and 
moderate- income households‟ housing (Allam et al., 2004, Nametalla, 2005). 
 
There is no comprehensive housing unit stock condition tracking system or ability to 
flag preventative maintenance and upgrades that are required based on the age and 
condition of the units (Fahmi, 2006). Due to the age of a significant proportion of the 
housing  units  in  Egypt,  the  projected  costs  for  renovation  and  rehabilitation  are 
substantial. In addition, a number of units are projected to require replacement within 
the  next  15  years  (Fahmi, 2008). These  consist  mainly  of homes  and  apartment 
buildings in old urban cities that are anticipated to require levels of renovation that 
instead suggest replacement. The general state of repair of the housing units is poor 
due to the age of the stock, so significant upgrades and replacements are projected 
over the next ten years. 
 
Despite the development of savings mobilisation, credit and private sector finance to 
supplement subsidy, the extent to which additional finance is being mobilised in the 
housing  market  remains  limited  (Eldin  et  al.,  2004,  El  Gabaly,  2004).  Securing 
additional  credit  from  financial  institutions  continues  to  be  extremely  difficult  and 
generally not taking place in some cases (for example, the non-profit/ housing co-
operative societies) (Moharam, 2006, Rashad, 2008). Many experiences are cited 
with a great deal of disappointment as a result of the reluctance of banks to serve 
the  lower  income  market  and  sometimes  those  in  the  higher  income  bands 
(Nametalla, 2005). When some banks agreed to come on board, the interest rates, 
administrative  and  insurance  costs  rendered  the  bank  credit  unaffordable  (Struyk 
and Brown, 2006).  78 
 
The  extent  to  which  land  is  being  released  for  housing  and  the  extent  to  which 
availability  of  well  located  and  affordable  land  continue  to  be  an  impediment  to 
housing delivery and the realisation of other key objectives of the national housing 
policy in Egypt (Nametalla, 2005, Fahmi and Sutton, 2008). The allocation of low-
priced and serviced land significantly diminished with a consequent negative impact 
on affordable housing delivery. For example, the housing co-operative societies have 
not been able to secure state land for their housing developments in the recent past 
(Moharam, 2006). Non-functioning bureaucratic systems and the high competition 
from the private sector for valuable urban land are cited as one of the main reasons 
for land release being a problem (Aziz et al., 2007, Fahmi and Sutton, 2008).  
 
As is discussed in detail later in this study, faced with the above challenges, NGOs 
and  community  sector  continue  to  play  a  relatively  small  role  in  housing  and 
mortgage delivery to the low- and moderate- income households in Egypt. They are 
unable  to  make  sufficient  effort  to  try  to  find  additional  resources  to  top  up  the 
subsidy.  Further,  there  is  a  lack  of  understanding  of  how  to  actually  provide  a 
supportive, enabling environment for the NGOs and community sector to operate.   
 
2.4.4 Impacts and Effects 
Overall, there are many areas of high importance that are receiving less than an 
adequate level of resources. Therefore, indications are that the resources are not 
well  aligned  with  the  areas  of  highest  importance  to  low-  and  moderate-  income 
households. However, the key issue is that 40% of the population are poor and living 
in either social or informal housing (CAPMAS, 2007, CBE, 2010). Further, low- and 
moderate- income households tend to have financial limitations that are generally 79 
 
getting worse, and therefore are unlikely to be able to find adequate, suitable and 
affordable accommodation in the formal housing sector (Aziz et al., 2007). So, the 
next step for the majority of low- and moderate- income households is into some 
level of support. 
 
While the impact and effect of the national housing policy initiatives is positive, the 
satisfaction is low as the needs for appropriate shelter are not being met yet. Based 
on objective studies, the initiatives have been successful in improving the quality of 
housing,  but  the  affordability  and  adequacy  of  housing  are  key  impediments  for 
meeting overall needs as many low- and moderate- income households have very 
limited  affordable  options  for  adequate  housing  (Allam  et  al.,  2004,  Fahmi  and 
Sutton, 2008, Struyk and Roman, 2008). For this reason, the key objectives of the 
national housing policy initiatives as stated earlier remain unfulfilled.    
 
It appears that while subsidies have been allocated, delivery is extremely slow, and 
in  some  projects,  especially  in  the  co-op  housing  sector,  delivery  is  actually  not 
taking place (Moharam, 2006, Rashad, 2008). One outcome of this is that problems 
are now being experienced in accessing subsidies for new housing projects. At this 
stage  of  the  study,  however,  we  note  that  subsidy  applications  in  general  have 
proved problematic in recent years. Several applications have been rejected as the 
government reduced its subsidy program to meet the national economic targets in 
terms of cutting the fiscal budget deficit. As is explained earlier, in order to avoid this 
blockage, the government provided a lot of concessions to the private sector, which 
resulted in many corruption charges in the recent  history that led to the ongoing 
revolution in the country.  80 
 
2.4.5 Cost-effectiveness and Alternatives  
If the national housing program continues to operate exactly as it does now, the 
shortfall in funding for the program will gradually increase in line with the decreasing 
value of the public funding. There is also significant risk of exposure to inflation. The 
annual funding shortfall will be very sensitive to the rate of inflation, because the 
public funding is not adjusted for inflation. Regardless of the rate of inflation, the 
annual funding shortfall would be significant due to other important factors, including 
the fast growing number of population in need of affordable and decent shelter. In 
addition, there is also the issue of the ongoing annual depreciation of the housing 
stock (Fahmi and Sutton, 2008). If this depreciation was to be recognized in the form 
of  an  equivalent  to  an  allowance  for  depreciation,  it  would  increase  the  annual 
funding shortfall. 
 
The effectiveness and sustainability of the national housing program has not been 
questioned and no substantial changes have been made. The processes for gaining 
interdepartmental and intergovernmental collaboration and partnerships with other 
agents in addition to the private sector remain not well explored (El Demery, 2002, 
Rashad,  2008).  Thus,  the  recommendations  arising  from  this  evaluation  focuses 
mainly  on  improving  the  effectiveness  and  sustainability  of  the  national  housing 
program  through  the  development  of  a  strategy  to  access  sustainable  funding 
sources for housing development and mortgage credit. 
 
Options should be explored with regard to re-profiling the current housing finance 
system  to  better  meet  the  current  and  future  funding  requirements.  A  related 
alternative is for the financial institutions to work in partnership with the community 81 
 
based organisations such as the housing cooperative societies. The importance of 
cooperative  societies  has  already  been  recognised  in  the  Egyptian  constitution, 
public  policy  in  general  and  the  Egyptian  Housing  Policy  in  particular.  The 
cooperative societies form part of the second tier of the financial and housing market 
structures. It is therefore imperative that the legal framework for their formation and 
how they can access the fund be made clear and popularised.  
 
This  appears  to  be  more  feasible  option  considering  the  existence  of  housing 
cooperative societies in the Egyptian traditional settings and their success story in 
housing sector. Membership of a recognised society can be considered enough to 
access mortgage credit. This then can help to eliminate the bottleneck of stringent 
obstacles  that  prevent  low-  and  moderate-  income  households  from  applying  for 
mortgage credit. Mortgage guarantee by co-operatives should be sufficient. It is clear 
from the ongoing revolution in Egypt that the danger of not adopting this cannot be 
over  emphasised.  Many  low-  and  moderate-  income  households  have  lost 
confidence in the government and private sector, and it will take time for the situation 
to be reversed. If mortgage credit continued to be not accessed, it will be a total loss 
to Egypt. It is better for the low- and moderate- income households to have their 
mortgage credit at the risk of defaulting, than for the mortgage credit to be lost to 
looters and embezzlers.         
 
Thus,  there  is  a  need  for  a  further  research  and  analysis  to  determine  the 
effectiveness  and  sustainability  of  the  existing  mortgage  credit  system  from  the 
perspectives  of  the  low-  and  moderate-  income  households  and  their  housing 
cooperative  societies.  Such  research  and  analysis  should  focus  on  the  current 82 
 
obstacles for extending the reach of mortgage credit within the Egyptian context, 
mainly: a) Macroeconomic obstacles (including inflation, slow economic growth and 
demand-side  handicaps);  b)  Socio-economic  obstacles  (including  unemployment, 
slow increase of real wages, poor affordability of mortgage credit); and c) Institutional 
obstacles  (including  the  lack  of  a  network  of  financial  intermediation  and  limited 
variety  of  distribution  channels  at  the  lower  income  end  of  the  housing  market). 
Addressing these obstacles to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the 
mortgage system would provide large external benefits to the national economy in 
terms  of  employment,  property  development,  labour  mobility,  capital  market 
development, efficient resources allocation and lower macroeconomic volatility. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
The above brief, and necessarily much simplified, review and evaluation of Egyptian 
housing policy initiatives show that it is only in this context that the development of 
housing and mortgage markets in a country can really be understood. The Egyptian 
housing and mortgage markets today are very different to thirty years ago, reflecting 
a significant transition in housing policy to produce, finance, manage and regulate 
housing. The most radical transformation is the shift in the government's role from 
being  a  direct  provider  of  housing  and  mortgage  credit  into  an  enabling  role  to 
support the other participating agents in the housing and mortgage markets, namely 
the private sector and community-based organizations.  
 
In view of this policy transition, the Egyptian government has recently committed to 
the development of a new mortgage system with the aim of promoting access to 
homeownership  in  the  country.  After  almost  a  decade,  to  suggest  that  this  new 
system is unique in achieving its objective or that it has problems more severe than 
in other countries is untrue. In general, mortgage credit in Egypt remains limited in its 
reach.  Thus,  access  to  housing,  especially  for  low-  and  moderate-income 
households, is still a complex public policy challenge. Strong demand and the limited 
reach of mortgage credit means the problem of informal housing is likely to get much 
worse in the country.  
 
There are several conclusions in relation to this issue that can be drawn from the 
discussion in this chapter. While the government has recently initiated major legal, 
administrative and regulatory reforms to facilitate the development of an effective 
and sustainable mortgage market, the state continues to secure the survival of the 84 
 
market rather than encouraging the participating agents to compete and to survive in 
the  marketplace  without  relying  on  state  support.  Mortgage  credit  in  Egypt  also 
remains ruled by the social security system set up during the central planning era, in 
terms of network of intermediation that still relies mainly on state departments and 
institutions. Mortgage lenders are still chosen by the state as agents for supporting 
access to housing for low- and moderate-income households. On the other hand, the 
majority of Egyptian households have very low incomes. Thus, they will not be able 
to access the mortgage market without support.  
  
From the above account, it appears that mortgage credit in Egypt is currently of little 
support  to  Egyptian  low-  and  moderate-income  households  who  wish  to  access 
housing. Therefore, the relative importance of the purposes of mortgage credit in 
Egypt needs to be redefined. There is also a need to explore ways to extend the 
reach of mortgage credit to support the low- and moderate-income households, for 
example through community-based organizations. This would require an assessment 
of the stakeholder relations and the role of each participating agent in the housing 
and mortgage markets.  
 
In this chapter, the role of the banking sector and housing co-operative societies as 
participating agents in the Egyptian housing and mortgage markets has already been 
acknowledged,  based  on  the  most  recent  literature  (UNDP,  2004).  It  appears, 
however, that this role has not made a major contribution in the recent period, in 
terms of smoothing housing consumption over time, mobilizing savings, allocating 
risk, promoting community-based housing, integrating the community-based housing 
sector into the mortgage market, privatization of municipal and state-owned housing 85 
 
stock  and,  last  but  not  least,  providing  an  alternative  to  the  inefficient  mortgage 
market. Accordingly, there is scope for further research to investigate these issues to 
fill a major gap in the Egyptian literature. This scope of research already fits well with 
the available international literature. 
 
A process should be developed for strategic planning and for possible alternatives or 
„add-ons‟ to ensure active involvement from within the financial sector. In addition, a 
method for responding  to  community  sector proposals  needs  to be  developed  to 
allow  more  latitude  for  working  out  partnership  arrangements  to  facilitate  the 
effective  functioning  of  the  housing  and  mortgage  markets  and  taking  steps  to 
achieve  equitable  access  for  all  to  that  market.  Such  partnership  arrangements 
should focus on the establishment and maintenance of a process that allows for 
options in the form of tenure and funding; be the outcome of choice; be carried out in 
consultation with communities affected; be a process that encourages and supports 
empowerment of the community sector. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1 Introduction  
Access to housing finance is a universal problem even in many countries that are 
termed  „developed‟.  Governments  around  the  world  have  been  addressing  this 
problem for many decades. Some progress has been made in some cases, while 
demographic  and  macroeconomic  challenges  have  made  it  almost  impossible  in 
other cases like Egypt as is explained in Chapter 2. In general part of the solution is 
to  seek  a  new  perspective,  a  new  policy  framework  and  a  new  institutional 
mechanism to extend the reach of mortgage market to improve the means by which 
low-  and  moderate-income households  are  able  to access  affordable and decent 
housing.  
 
As is clear from the Egyptian experience, while the early attempts to establish state-
run housing banks and mortgage programmes did increase the funding devoted to 
improving  access  to  housing,  most  schemes  operated  with  substantial  subsidies, 
targeted already privileged groups and failed to reach  even most of the low- and 
moderate-income households. One response has been to deregulate the mortgage 
market in order to increase the participation of the private sector and the amount of 
funds available for mortgage credit. Nevertheless it is apparent that most mortgage 
lenders have been mainly targeting the upper market and reluctant (or unable) to 
extend mortgage credit to low- and moderate-income households.  
 
The recent events, especially the global credit crunch and the subprime crisis in the 
United States and the demise of mortgage lending institutions in some other cases 
(for  example  Northern  Rock  in  the  United  Kingdom),  have  all  prompted  a  slow 87 
 
response by many governments across the globe to address the limited penetration 
of  their  mortgage  systems.  Yet  the  argument  remains  that  efficiently  operating 
mortgage markets and governments which adopt „enabling‟ strategies can improve 
access to housing. As a result, some observers have emphasized the importance of 
focusing  on  the  issues  of  macroeconomic  stability,  resource  mobilization  and 
institutional development, as well as access to mortgage credit. Others also argued 
that understanding the operation of, and potential for, mortgage credit is important 
since in many developing countries housing policy should be about establishing new 
and more innovative finance policies and strategies.  
 
In  view  of  the  above,  the  specific  objective  of  this  chapter  is  to  review  the 
international literature and the agencies that prompt much of the literature in relation 
to the creation of an effective and sustainable mortgage market that works better for 
low- and moderate-income households. The recent events have demonstrated that 
there  are  some  common  features  between  developed  and  developing  mortgage 
markets.  Governments  in  both  markets  are  still  faced  with  almost  the  same 
challenges of developing effective and sustainable mortgage systems in terms of the 
chronic  issues  they  face  and  the  limited  fiscal  resources  that  constrain  the 
government policy in addressing these issues for improving access to housing for 
low- and moderate-income households.  
 
The  development  of  an  effective  and  sustainable  mortgage  system  is a  complex 
issue  that  is  influenced  by  several  and  constantly  changing  local  features  and 
challenges.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  improve  the  understanding  of  the 
prerequisites for an effective and sustainable mortgage system. Thus, the chapter 88 
 
tries  to  lay  out  some  of  the  policy  alternatives  and  models  of  mortgage  credit 
intermediation  (institutional  network,  funding,  risk  management,  regulations, 
government  support).  The  chapter  is  focused  and  takes  into  account  only  key 
considerations and possible first best solutions that directly relates to increasing the 
penetration of mortgage credit in Egypt. The aim is to provide a road map tailored 
and sequenced to Egypt‟s situation.                 
 
3.2 General Problems of Housing  
The generic problem that eliminates a segment of the population in any country from 
the housing market is affordability. Access to affordable and decent housing is one of 
the most important challenges faced by any government around the world. The gap 
between  income and housing  cost  has  brought  a  number of  severe  social  ills  to 
many  countries,  including  overcrowding,  unsanitary  living  conditions,  alienation, 
social unrest and environmental pollution (UNDP, 2004, Nametalla, 2005, Fahmi and 
Sutton, 2006). Thus, many governments have been trying to address the affordability 
problem for a number of years, based on whatever limited resources are available to 
them. Some progress has been made in some cases, but the challenges remain 
complex in other cases.  
 
The living conditions of many low- and moderate-income households in developing 
countries  are  no  exception,  and  are  characterized  by  substandard  housing  and 
neighbourhoods.  Initially,  policies  dealt  with  ready-made  housing  and  the 
construction of houses based on  government-sponsored community-based and/or 
self-help programmes (Sengupta, 2006). Gradually the focus shifted to extending the 
reach  of  mortgage  credit,  or  in  other  words,  extending  credit  to  households  who 89 
 
would otherwise have limited access to the mortgage credit market. Efforts are made 
to reach low- and moderate-income households with mortgage credit but this is only 
achieved with great difficulty, if at all (Tra and Lensink, 2007). Even if the efforts 
appear to be successful, cost recovery remains problematic. 
 
It is well known that average household income in developing countries is usually 
low. If medium- and low-cost houses are meant for households earning less than the 
average, then affordability will become an issue. Further, if the financing cost is high, 
the monthly mortgage repayment is also high. This means that the minimum income 
is not sufficient in most cases. Even if it is sufficient, it might be difficult for many low- 
and moderate-income households to support their cost of living with the remaining 
income.  So,  housing  is  only  affordable  and  accessible  for  households  if,  after 
deduction of the housing costs such as rent or the repayment of a mortgage credit, 
sufficient means are left over to provide the necessities of life without falling below 
the poverty line (UNCHS-Habitat, 1984a). 
 
For this reason, a mortgage credit will only be provided if the lender is largely sure 
the credit will be repaid (Renaud, 2000). That is, the affordable size of a mortgage 
credit is generally determined by taking into account the capital costs required, its 
financing  terms,  the  size  and  regularity  of  the  household  income  and  physical 
possessions, and the propensity to consume housing. Thus, it is thought that if the 
capital costs, financing terms and household income are known, the propensity to 
buy  housing  or  the  willingness  to  invest  in  the  dwelling  will  follow  automatically 
(Chiquier and Lea, 2009). 
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3.3 Economic Transition and Market Failure  
The  early  stage  of  transition  in  the  former  socialist  economies  indicated  that 
macroeconomic reform and privatization, while necessary, would not alone create 
and  sustain  a  competitive  market  economy.  Both  internal resources  and external 
assistance are also required to focus on strengthening institutions and on expanding 
market participation. Otherwise, the transition to market-oriented systems is likely to 
be slow, fitful, uneven and disappointing, and could lead governments to turn away 
from the transition process (Malpezzi and Vandell, 1993, Behrman and Rondinelli, 
2000). 
 
The transition from a command economy into a free market economy has changed 
the rules of mortgage credit provision, which now depend mainly on the interplay of 
market forces, namely demand and supply (Mints, 2004, Stephens, 2005a). As a 
result, mortgage credit provision in many developing countries is now based on the 
concept  of  profit  maximization.  Under  these  circumstances,  if  the  provision  of 
mortgage  credit  is  left  entirely  to  the  private  sector,  low-  and  moderate-income 
households  will  continue  to  have  limited  access  to  the  housing  and  mortgage 
markets. 
 
Recognizing  the  social  and  economic  implications  of  this  access  problem, 
governments usually adopt a two-pronged strategy – direct intervention in the form of 
public  low-cost  housing  programmes  sponsored  by  state  governments  with 
mortgages provided by the treasury departments, and indirect measures in the form 
of  conditions  stipulated  in  the  approval  of  private  sector  and  community  housing 
projects and finance programmes (Van Order, 2007, Égert, 2009). The purpose of 91 
 
the latter approach is to ensure that the private sector and community play their role 
in the promotion of access to the housing and mortgage markets for the low- and 
moderate-income  households  and  at  the  same  time  supplement  the  efforts  of 
governments.  
 
However, rising costs in the housing and mortgage markets usually complicate the 
issue. Complaints and objections become increasingly loud from the private sector 
and the community. They can no longer keep up with the conditions stipulated by the 
government in the provision of low-cost houses and mortgage credit, especially in 
major urban centres (Sunega and Lux, 2007). Even the practice of cross-subsidy can 
no longer be carried out without inflating the price of houses and mortgage credit 
substantially (Le Blanc, 2005). This state of affairs affects the affordability of housing. 
Since the provision of low-cost housing and mortgage credit can no longer be carried 
out commercially with the prices fixed at a certain level, the private sector looks upon 
the provision of low-cost housing and mortgage credit as a social obligation.  
 
The interplay of market forces has not prevented market failures in both developed 
and developing countries in modern times (Hamm, 2008). Thus, the analysis of any 
housing and mortgage market failure needs to take into account economic, social 
and  political  factors  (Gibb,  2003).  It  is  also  important  to  analyse  the  institutional 
capacities within the market vis-à-vis policy and delivery, in order to propose best 
solutions based on a balanced contribution from the state, market and community. In 
general, the key institutional capacities responsible for establishing the parameters 
of  demand  and  supply  in  any  market  are  consumers,  producers,  financiers  and 92 
 
governments.  Each  of  these  institutions/actors  has  some  desired  outcomes  from 
well-functioning housing and mortgage markets (see table 3.1).  
 
The selection of policy instruments to achieve the above desired outcomes presents 
governments  with  a  choice  between  two  strategies  that  can  be  broadly  labelled 
„supply-side‟ and „demand-side‟. Under these strategies, policymakers can opt for 
supporting either housing producers (formal or informal, profit-making or non profit-
making) or consumers – or both. The balance between these two main strategies 
differs from one country to another.  
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Table 3.1 Desired Outcomes of a Well-Functioning Housing Market 
Perspective   Desired outcomes 
Housing consumers  Everyone  is  housed,  with  a  separate  unit  for  every 
household.  Housing  does  not  constitute  an  undue 
proportion  of  income.  Living  space  and  conditions  are 
adequate.  Location  provides  adequate  access  to 
employment and other service nodes. There is security of 
tenure and legal protection from eviction. Households are 
free to choose between renting and owning. Finance is 
available  to  smooth  expenses  over  time  and  allow 
households to save and invest. 
Housing producers  There is adequate supply of residential land at affordable 
prices.  Construction  materials,  equipment,  finance  and 
labour  are  available  at  reasonable  prices.  There  is  no 
discrimination against the residential sector in the form of 
special  tariffs  or  controls.  Regulations  concerning  land 
development,  land  use,  land  tenure,  building  codes, 
taxation  or  special  programmes  are  unambiguous,  and 
the government‟s application of these is efficient, timely 
and  uniform.  Rates  of  return  on  all  types  of  housing 
investment,  including  rental  housing,  are  sufficient  to 
maintain incentives for investment. 
Housing  finance 
institutions 
Housing finance institutions are permitted to compete for 
deposits on equal terms with other financial institutions; 
the role of directed credit is minimized. Housing finance 
institutions  are  not  forced  to  compete  unfairly  with 
subsidized  finance.  Lending  is  at  positive  interest  rates 
with  a  sufficient  margin  to  maintain  institutional  health. 
Systems  of  property  rights,  tenure  security  and 
foreclosure are such that the financial interest of lenders 
can be protected. 
Local governments  Housing  and  associated  infrastructure  are  of  adequate 
quality  to  maintain  public  health,  safety  standards  and 
environmental  quality.  Infrastructure  networks  and 
services are extended quickly to all communities. Land is 
productive and efficient. Housing provides a major source 
of  municipal  revenues  for  building  and  maintaining 
infrastructure services and neighbourhood amenities. 
Central governments  Adequate  affordable  housing  is  available  to  all.  The 
housing  sector  is  integrated  into  national,  social  and 
economic planning. The housing sector contributes to the 
following  objectives:  poverty  alleviation;  controlling 
inflation;  generating  employment  and  income  growth; 
reducing balance of payments deficits; and protecting the 
environment. 
Sources: (Angel et al., 1993, World Bank, 1993) 
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The two primary instruments for pursuing a supply-side strategy are: housing and 
mortgage  credit  programmes  in  which  the  government  builds  and  finance  public 
housing  stock  for  rent  or  sale;  and  subsidies  to  private  and  community  based 
organisations to do the same. Both instruments have been used extensively in most 
developing countries. The universal problem of these instruments is that housing and 
mortgage  services  are  at  too  high  a  standard  for  the  low-  and moderate-income 
households and without a clear understanding of the actual needs of these target 
groups. The result has been that these services have generally been too expensive 
and have offered very little flexibility in use. In most cases, it is also the public sector 
employees,  trade  union  members,  or  those  with  appropriate  political  links  who 
benefit mainly from these government-sponsored housing and mortgage credit. 
 
As  for  the  second  major  strategic  option  available  to  governments,  supporting 
consumers  in  the  housing  and  mortgage  markets,  the  objective  is  to  stimulate 
demand and access through either tax concessions, allocation of  cheap (or free) 
urban land or extending the reach of mortgage credit.  
 
3.4 Extending Access to Housing Finance    
In general, lack of finance is one of the major problems when it comes to housing 
delivery (Stephens, 2005a). Access to finance for housing purposes is a cornerstone 
in a sustainable housing delivery process (Lee, 1996). Many governments around 
the world have recognized this important relationship and managed to develop  a 
housing finance system that consists of three markets: the primary mortgage market, 
the secondary mortgage market, and the capital market. In the primary mortgage 
market, mortgages are created and funds are loaned directly to borrowers. In the 95 
 
secondary mortgage market, lenders and investors buy and sell existing mortgages. 
In the capital market, investors buy and sell long-term investment vehicles such as 
mortgage-backed  securities  (MBS),  stocks  and  bonds.  By  investing  in  mortgages 
and  MBS,  capital  market  investors  help  increase  the  flow  of  funds  available  for 
mortgage lending.  
 
It is quite common during the early stage of development that mortgage markets in 
developing countries are either not well developed or do not function efficiently in the 
same  way  as  described  above  (Buckley  and  Kalarickal,  2005,  Erba  and  Nothaft, 
2005). Thus, mortgage  credit  in  these  countries  has  had  little  impact  in terms of 
promoting access to housing. Traditionally, governments‟ approaches to address this 
problem include interest rate subsidies, special housing funds capitalized through 
employer/employee  taxes  or  mandatory  provident  fund  contributions,  voluntary 
contractual  savings  programmes  offering  below  market  saving  and  lending  rates, 
public  sector  mortgage  insurance  or  guaranties,  and/or  tax  deductions  for  home 
owners or certain investors (Van Order, 2007, Chiquier and Lea, 2009).  
 
In recent times, however, many governments, especially in transitional economies, 
have  been  trying  to  extend  the  reach  of  their  housing  finance  systems  without 
subsidies.  Their  approach  focuses  more  on  the  broader  issues  of  ensuring 
macroeconomic health, efficient housing systems and overall financial systems, and 
housing  finance  system  efficiency  (Gibb,  2003,  Stephens,  2003b,  Gibb  and 
Whitehead, 2007). In other words, the mortgage market is seen in the context of the 
national economy and more specifically the national financial system.  
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In  the  following  sections,  the  above  issues  and  approaches  are  reviewed  and 
evaluated  in  more  detail.  The  discussion  is  divided  into  three  sections.  The  first 
section is based on the assumption that extending the reach of the mortgage market 
without  subsidies  would  offer  first  best  solutions  that  are  more  applicable  to  the 
context  of  Egypt.  The  second  section  evaluates  the  traditional  approaches  as 
additional or alternative short-term solutions. Section three concludes with a clear 
statement of the objective of the thesis and proposed research questions.  
 
3.5 Mortgage Market, National Economy and Financial Systems  
A  sound  macroeconomic  policy  environment  is  needed  if  the  development  of  an 
effective and sustainable mortgage market is to succeed in Egypt. The maintenance 
of fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies that promote financial stability and an 
externally sustainable growth path are required. In addition, the efficient allocation of 
resources, furthered through the fostering of saving and credit, attainable through an 
efficient  intermediation  system,  is  also  required.  The  further  discussion  below 
touches on some areas which require particular attention.   
 
3.5.1 Macroeconomic Health  
The  recent  evidence  from  the  experience  of  many  developed  and  developing 
countries  suggests  that  there  is  a  need  to  achieve  low  inflation,  adopt  radical 
financial reforms, and seriously reform and liberalize their financial systems, if they 
are to develop stable and efficient mortgage systems (Mints, 2004, Stephens, 2005b, 
Sunega and Lux, 2007, Chiquier and Lea, 2009). Accordingly, any discussion related 
to extending the reach of mortgage credit to improve access to housing should start 
with explaining how macroeconomic health and mortgage system efficiency impact 
the role of mortgage credit. Recently, mortgage systems have failed in a number of 97 
 
countries to promote access to housing as a result of an adverse macroeconomic 
environment and poor housing policies (Loutskina and Strahan, 2009, Schmudde, 
2009, Solove and Richards, 2009, Hamm, 2008). On the other hand, the national 
economy and housing market have suffered in other cases as a result of inefficiently 
operating  mortgage  systems  (Enoch  and  Ötker,  2007,  Ben-Shahar  et  al.,  2008, 
Struyk, 2010).  
 
To  explain  this  circular  nature  of  the  relationship,  one  needs  first  to  explore  the 
relationship  between  macroeconomic  health  and  housing  system  efficiency  in 
general.  According  to  the  World  Bank,  the  housing  system  is  connected  to  the 
broader economy through three main circuits: real, fiscal and financial (World Bank, 
1993). Real circuits are those associated with investment, output, employment and 
prices.  Financial  circuits  are  those  associated  with  the  financing  of  housing  and 
related residential infrastructure through financial intermediaries. Fiscal circuits are 
those associated with taxation and subsidization of housing. The literature on these 
circuits is very wide-ranging (Maclennan and Gibb, 1993, Gibb, 1995, Maclennan 
and Gibb, 1989, Eerola and Määttänen, 2005, Englund et al., 1995, Le Blanc, 2005, 
Gibb,  2003,  Gibb,  2009).  Figure  3.1  re-groups  these  circuits  under  three  main 
headings: supply, demand and market equilibrium and link them to the mortgage 
market. 98 
 
Figure 3.1 Mortgage Market and the Broader Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Literature review results 
 
A) Demand  
 
Demand  for  housing  is  like  demand  for  most  commodities.  Housing  demand  is 
therefore quite resilient with almost the same fundamental drivers as for demand on 
commodities,  namely  income  growth,  inflation,  and  interest  rates  (Liang  and 
McLemore, 2004). Among the other key factors that influence demand for housing is 
access to the mortgage market.  
 
The  first  factor,  income  growth,  positively  contributes  to  house  price  changes. 
Income  growth  is relatively  predictable, and  has  a direct  and  stable  influence on 
house prices. Inflation increases or limits this influence. In general, an increase in the 
inflation  rate  above  a  certain  level can  be regarded  as  a  hindrance  to economic 
growth (Fischer et al., 1996). In the context of income growth, an increase in the 
inflation rate results in an increase in the cost of a mortgage credit, which, in turn, 
reduces  the  number  of  households  eligible  to  take  a  mortgage  credit  and  have 
access  to  housing.  So,  controlling  inflation  is  one  of  the  important  issues  in  the 
development of a stable and efficient macroeconomic environment for the mortgage 
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market  to  grow  (Sims,  2008,  Sargent,  2010).  There  are  many  approaches  a 
government can take to control inflation.  
 
As for interest rates, they are the most volatile driver of demand and an important 
factor behind any boom  and bust in a housing market (Albon and Piggott, 1982, 
Calvo, 1991). As interest rates decline, mortgage credit becomes affordable to more 
households, thus increasing housing demand. On the other hand, any expected rise 
in interest rates should put downward pressure on the mortgage market, and as a 
result  slow  down  housing  demand.  In  fact,  interest  rate  changes  have  a  direct 
influence on the average amount a household is willing to dedicate out of income 
towards mortgage payment.  
 
As is clear, access to mortgage credit is a key factor for ensuring macroeconomic 
health  and  housing  market  efficiency  (Gibb,  1996,  Maclennan  and  Gibb,  1989). 
Access  to  mortgage  credit  increases  the  ability  of  households  to accelerate  their 
purchase of housing, and permits a better allocation of personal resources between 
housing,  other goods  and  savings  over the  family  life  cycle.  However,  access  to 
mortgage credit in itself needs to be an efficient process. 
 
B) Supply 
  
Unlike  policies  to  support  demand,  supply  policies  in  the  housing  and  mortgage 
markets  often  offer  the  greatest  scope  for  reform  because  they  are  strongly 
influenced  by  the  government‟s  actions  in  the  provision  of  infrastructure  and  the 
regulation  of  housing  and  mortgage  markets  (Monk  and  Whitehead,  1996,  Zhu, 
1997,  Glaeser  et  al.,  2005,  Aura  and  Davidoff,  2006,  Glaeser  et  al.,  2008).  In 100 
 
general,  a  flexible  supply  policy  can  support  economic  recovery  from  a  deep 
recession, while a rigid supply policy can frustrate the attempt by the government to 
stimulate the housing and mortgage markets.  
 
The basic assumption of neo-classical economics is that markets, including those for 
housing and mortgages, are driven by demand for new property and that sufficient 
supply should be brought forward to meet this demand (Healey, 1991, Gibb, 2003). 
Poterba argues that the short run supply is relatively inelastic (Poterba, 1984), while 
in the medium to long term the supply is relatively elastic, that is in the long term 
housing  and  mortgage  markets  achieve  an  adjustment  of  housing  stock  and 
mortgages supplied to its long-term demanded level. Factors such as blockages in 
the  development  process,  constraints  through  planning,  physical  conditions, 
infrastructure provision, and valuation and ownership issues impinge upon the rate of 
response on the supply side (Adams, 1999, Ball et al., 1998, Healey, 1991, Monk 
and Whitehead, 1996).  
 
3.5.2 Financial System Efficiency 
A striking aspect of the early economic transition in most developing countries is the 
recurrence  of  a  strategic  gap  in  domestic  financial  reform  policies.  Typically, 
mortgage market development takes a back seat in the reform process (Renaud, 
1996). This is as a result of the absence of a well-articulated framework for mortgage 
credit  intermediation  to  operate  efficiently  in  the  developing  countries.  Thus,  it  is 
important  to  establish  reformed  and  liberalized  mortgage  markets  combined  with 
relatively quick foreclosure processes, market valuation systems, mechanisms for 
credit enhancement and favourable government policies (Stephens, 2003a). Such 
reformed and liberalized mortgage markets should also achieve high rates of saving, 101 
 
separate  subsidies  from  finance,  integrate  the  mortgage  market  into  the  various 
primary  and  secondary  funding  markets,  increasing  competition  and  innovation 
among a variety of financial intermediaries, and develop various financial services 
both at the primary and secondary market levels. The key objective of enhancing the 
efficiency  of  any  mortgage  market  should  be  enabling  more  low-  and  moderate- 
income households to benefit from the network of mortgage credit intermediation to 
gain access to the housing market. 
 
 
In  view  of  the  above,  unbundling  the  mortgage  supply  chain  has  been  widely 
debated as a key step for efficiency analysis (Chiquier and Lea, 2009, Erba and 
Nothaft, 2005, Ben-Shahar et al., 2008, Stephens, 2005a). Figure 3.3 provides a 
useful starting point for elaboration. As is clear, the world trend is to move away from 
the  role  of  government  as  direct  mortgage  lender  to  a  market-based  mortgage 
system in which the government plays a new role as an enabler and regulator to 
facilitate and encourage  private and community-based organizations to undertake 
mortgage credit activities.  102 
 
 
Figure 3.2 World Trends in Mortgage Finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: (Renaud, 2000) 
 
3.5.3 Mortgage Credit Intermediation  
Mortgage  intermediaries  (MIs)  can  be  defined  as  institutions  that  intermediate 
between providers and users of financial capital for housing purposes (FRBA, 2003, 
Frederiksen,  1894).  Generally,  there  are  many  different  types  of  MIs  and  many 
different ways of classifying them (Chiquier and Lea, 2009). One can classify them 
based on their legal structure, for example bank or non-bank (Bond, 2004). Another 
way is to classify them based on whether or not they finance their activities with 
savings. For example, MIs that finance their activities with savings are usually called 
saving-type or depository MIs, whereas those that do not finance with savings and 
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deposits  are  called  non-saving/non-depository  MIs.  Regardless  of  all  these 
classifications, and for the purpose of this study, the key point here is that all these 
MIs play an important role in the support of financial system and housing finance 
system efficiency through the management and allocation of credit.  
 
In any economy there are surplus and deficit sectors  (Kwast, 2007). The surplus 
sector comprises those households and firms that are cash-rich,  which they own 
more liquid assets than they currently wish to spend. They want to lend out their 
surplus funds to earn money. The deficit sector comprises those who own  fewer 
liquid assets than they wish to spend and they are prepared to pay money to anyone 
who will lend to them.  
 
In  this  context,  an  efficient  mortgage  system  is  expected  to  perform  several 
functions,  including  the  vital  function  of  facilitating  efficient  mortgage  credit 
intermediation through markets and institutions. The landscape of mortgage system 
is very similar to any housing finance system. It is usually dominated by the nature of 
financial intermediation (Kwast, 2007), in terms of how the function of intermediation 
is  performed,  who  intermediates  between  the  surplus  and  deficit  sectors  in  the 
housing and mortgage markets, and what role the intermediary plays in the savings 
investment process and in mortgage credit. Also at play are the issues in financial 
crises associated with financial intermediation, the  kind of risk management tools 
being offered, and the operation and regulation of  mortgage credit intermediaries 
(Farhi et al., 2009, Buckley et al., 2003, Stephens, 2007).  
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MIs  are  special  in  comparison  to  other  economic  agents.  The  acquisition  and 
processing of information about economic agents, the packaging and repackaging of 
financial claims and financial contracting are among the activities that differentiate 
MIs from other economic activities. MIs not only channel resources from the capital 
surplus  agents  (generally,  households)  to  capital  deficit  ones  (for  example 
homebuyers,  housing  developers,  small  businesses,  etc)  but  they  also  allow 
intertemporal smoothing of households‟ consumption and business expenditure and 
thus allow both firms and households to share risks. In recent years, the increased 
complexity and volatility of the financial systems have led MIs to innovate and offer 
products (for example residential mortgage-backed securities) to mitigate, transfer 
and share financial risks (Warnock and Warnock, 2008, Ben-Shahar et al., 2008, 
Rabenhorst and Ignatova, 2008).  
 
A) Basic functions of mortgage credit intermediation  
 
The mortgage market  is no  exception from  other financial  sectors.  One  can also 
consider a mortgage intermediary as an institution that raises funds from the surplus 
sector of the economy and lends them to the deficit sector, paying a lower rate of 
interest to the entity with the surplus and charging a higher rate of interest to the 
entity with the deficit (Rother, 2001, Bond, 2004). A mortgage intermediary‟s income 
is usually the difference between the two interest rates. Banks and non-bank saving 
and loan institutions and/or building societies are the best known examples.  
 
In carrying out their main functions, mortgage intermediaries need to undertake a 
number  of  other  functions  in  relation  to  asset  transformation,  conduct  of  orderly 
payments, brokerage and risk transformation. Asset transformation function entails 105 
 
the transformation of maturity, scale and place of the financial assets and liabilities of 
the  ultimate  borrowers  and  lenders  (for  example  savings,  equity,  mortgage  and 
insurance). The administrative function of an accounting and payments system (for 
example  electronic funds  transfer,  settlement  and  clearing) is considered another 
important intermediation function. 
 
The  functions  of  mortgage  intermediation  have  changed  drastically  over  the  last 
three decades due to the changes in macroeconomic policies, liberalization of capital 
markets, deregulation, advances in financial theory and breakthroughs in technology 
(Chiquier and Lea, 2009, Stephens, 2007). Mortgage intermediation in the form of 
traditional mortgage lending has declined considerably in developed countries where 
the  market-based  intermediation  has  become  dominant  (Sunega  and  Lux,  2007). 
Traditional operations of mortgage lending are being replaced by more fee-based 
services that bring lenders and borrowers directly into contact with each other. Some 
degree  of  disintermediation  has  also  taken  place  due  to  the  reduced  role  of  the 
traditional mortgage intermediary. However, irrespective of who performs mortgage 
intermediation, whether bank or non-bank financial institutions, the basic function of 
mortgage intermediation itself has not changed.  
 
B) Treasury and central bank interventions  
 
A general and sufficient requirement in any financial system is to ensure central bank 
independence  (Wagner,  1999).  This  is  also  important  for  maintaining  a  stable 
mortgage  intermediation  system.  Central  banks  need  to  choose  a  realizable  and 
efficient  nominal  anchor.  The  experience  or  advantages  of  exchange-rate-based 
stabilization have not been overwhelming. On the other hand, the success of money-106 
 
based stabilization is also usually assessed to be very uncertain. For this reason, 
other  nominal  anchors,  in  particular  inflation  targeting,  have  been  proposed  as 
possible  alternatives  for  transition  and  developing  countries.  In  fact,  inflation 
targeting  is  already  being  practised  in  the  Czech  Republic  (Janackova,  2001). 
Having lost the nominal anchor of a fixed exchange rate due to the currency crisis, 
the Czech Central Bank changed the strategy of their monetary policies to direct 
inflation targeting. One of the often-cited advantages of direct inflation targeting is 
supposed  to  be  increased  credibility.  Clearly-set  inflation  targets  supposedly 
influence  the  inflation  expectations  of  all  economic  subjects,  for  example  wage 
bargaining. Good predictions are, however, a necessary part of the inflation-targeting 
strategy and risk management.  
 
However,  one  has  to  admit  that  even  with  the  best  expert  knowledge  it  is  very 
difficult to predict, with the precision needed for inflation targeting, the behaviour of 
an emerging economy, which is undergoing rapid structural and institutional change, 
and, due to its small size and openness, is very vulnerable to external influences 
(Janackova, 2001, Masson et al., 1997). Another specific problem of direct inflation 
targeting  in  a  developing  market  is  the  high  vulnerability  of  inflation  to  external 
factors and to changes in the exchange rate (Masson et al., 1997). It is impossible to 
target inflation without, at the same time, having at least an implicit target for the 
exchange rate. The question is whether the central bank has the power to manage 
the exchange rate as desired against strong capital inflows or outflows, and whether 
it is willing to submit the exchange rate policy to the inflation target. 
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C) Mortgage Credit Intermediation Models  
 
Mortgage markets are dependent on the existence of a network of intermediation 
(Stephens, 2005a, Chiquier and Lea, 2009). This network underpins the funding and 
origination of the credit, the education of the market, the division of obligations and 
responsibilities, and the provision of support if there is default. In most developed 
countries, mortgage intermediation was initially performed by a specially regulated 
and privileged class of institution. In the United Kingdom, it was the building society 
that was so privileged. In the United States, it was primarily the Savings and Loans 
Associations  (S&Ls).  Notably  these  institutions  started  as  mutual  societies  or 
community-based  organizations,  since  this  was  an  activity  driven  by  concern  for 
housing  for  the  community  and  not  by  maximizing  profit  for  investors.  These 
societies,  organizations  or  institutions  were  given  special  tax  and  regulatory 
concessions on condition that they restricted themselves to mortgage lending. The 
result was that they developed a network of mortgage intermediation, expertise and 
culture appropriate to support access to housing, which was almost their exclusive 
preserve.  The  key  challenge  however  was  to  make  the  business  efficient  to  be 
sustainable in the long term.  
 
In countries with rapid economic growth and expanding urban populations, mortgage 
intermediation is the most rapidly growing business, making a major contribution to 
financial systems and economic development. In addition, in some countries, such 
as  the  United  States  and  United  Kingdom,  financial  innovations  undertaken  with 
respect  to  mortgage  lending  have  spread  quickly  to  other  parts  of  the  financial 
system,  resulting  in  increasing  financial  depth  (Doling,  1997,  Stephens,  2005b, 
Stephens, 2003b). Given the recent development of the mortgage market in Egypt, 108 
 
the following review of existing mortgage models and institutions might propose first 
best solutions for Egypt, in terms of developing origination standards and network of 
mortgage  intermediation  for  offering  mortgages  primarily  for  low-  and  moderate-
income households. 
 
State vs. a market-based mortgage system  
 
Privatization is very much a precondition to market-based mortgage market: where 
there is no housing being sold to households there will be no demand for mortgage 
credit,  because  there is no need for it  (Renaud,  1996). There  are  three  different 
types of financial systems with various consequences for connections between state 
and  economy  (enterprises,  banks  and  other  intermediaries)  (Zysman,  1983).  The 
first  is  a  system  based  on  a  capital  market,  with  resources  allocated  by  prices 
established on the competitive markets where the enterprises and the intermediaries 
operate. The second is the state-based system with critical prices controlled by the 
state. The third is the credit-based system dominated by the  bank and non-bank 
institutions. The state may appear in all three roles simultaneously, even though this 
brings it into conflicting situations. 
 
One of the common problems in developing countries is the political intervention in 
financial  markets,  which  is  costly  and  has  proven  hard  to  prevent  (Long,  2002). 
Public  ownership  gives  financial  institutions  an  inside  track  to  certain  types  of 
government business. It also assists the financial institutions to win large deposits 
from state-run pension funds and other government bodies. State-owned housing 
finance institutions tend to have a monopoly, but this is usually unprofitable business 
in  a  developing  economy.  Contracts  which  are  profitable  today  may  become 109 
 
unprofitable if the government changes the pricing structure, and the government 
could decide to assist an ailing public sector institution by transferring it to a lucrative 
contract held by another stronger institution. 
 
In the early literature on financial liberalization there was a notion that if markets 
were sufficiently competitive, owners with sufficient equity interest in their financial 
institutions would seek to manage those institutions so as to increase their equity 
over time, leading ultimately to a healthy, competitive financial system (Wilson and 
Caprio, 2002). Further, countries where private agents have better means to monitor 
financial  institutions  enjoy  higher  levels  of  financial  sector  development,  because 
private agents have better incentives to monitor and exercise market discipline vis-à-
vis financial institutions if they are not protected by too generous insurance (Beck, 
2003). Some also agree that rather than investing significant amounts in state-owned 
financial  institutions,  governments  would  be  better  served  by  having  greater 
investments in infrastructure, such as legal and regulatory structures, supervisory 
resources  and  practices,  information  provision,  liquidity  facilities,  payments  and 
securities settlement systems, and exchange systems (Caprio and Peria, 2000).  
 
Building societies/state banks 
Until the 1980s, mortgage activity in most European countries was dominated by 
specialist lenders, mainly state banks and mutual or building societies (Coles and 
Hardt,  2000,  Chiquier  and  Lea,  2009).  State  banks  dominate  in  countries  like 
Germany  and  Austria  (Hamm,  2008,  Zehnder,  2005,  Kretschmar  and  Damaske, 
2003, Deutsch and Tomann, 1995, Frederiksen, 1894). Building societies are active 
in the United Kingdom (Stephens, 2007, Stephens, 2003b, O'Sullivan, 1994).  110 
 
 
During the 1980s, market efficiency and the more market-related allocation of capital 
became paramount in many countries (Paine and Kane, 1985). It was beginning to 
be clear that the special tax and regulatory concessions that had been given to the 
building  societies  were  resulting  in  distortions  in  the  allocation  of  capital,  and 
dangerous systemic risks were beginning to build up. In most jurisdictions the way 
was opened for the building societies to convert themselves into equity based banks, 
or to merge  with  banks,  because the  capital base  of the bank  facilitated a  rapid 
increase in the amount of mortgage business that could be carried on the balance 
sheet of the institution.  
 
As a consequence of such change, the European mortgage markets have shown an 
impressive expansion, which can be attributed to two main factors: deregulation in 
the  financial  system  and  low  interest  rates.  Deregulation  has  enabled  non-
specialized lenders to enter the mortgage market and also encouraged specialized 
lenders to change their legal status (Berg and Bergström, 1995, Stephens, 2007). 
The low interest rates resulted in greater affordability of mortgage finance, thereby 
creating favourable conditions for high demand for housing. This new environment 
has led to an increase in the variety of institutions granting mortgage loans in the EU 
(Zehnder, 2005). Coupled with rapid technological advances, this has pushed state 
banks  and  building  societies  to  develop  new  financial  products  and  methods  to 
market their products to the customer (Stephens, 2007).  
 
Another notable change is the emergence of the commercial banks as key players in 
the European mortgage markets (Chiquier and Lea, 2009). Unlike other models, for 
example  mortgage  credit  in  the  United  States,  the  European  mortgage  markets 111 
 
continue to operate with no national or European government agency support to help 
the mortgage lenders fund their loans, because EU regulations prohibit state aid in 
the form of guarantees as there may be an element of competitive distortion (Hamm, 
2008).  This  makes  it  essential  for  any  EU  mortgage  lender  to  be  successful  in 
funding the credit for the lifetime of the mortgage.  
 
To reduce the pressure on the capital structure of the institution, as EU mortgage 
lenders need to hold funds of between 4 per cent and 8 per cent for mortgages on 
their balance sheet, most of the banks and building societies refinance their assets 
to a large extent through issuing mortgage bonds in the secondary market (Hagen 
and  Holter,  2002).  Although  the  mortgage  bonds  are  still  on  balance  sheet 
instruments,  they  reduce  the  pressure  to  increase  the  capital  base  to  fund  new 
business as they allow for recycling part of the mortgage credit portfolio through the 
secondary  market,  releasing  part  of  the  allocated  capital  (Mihaljek  et  al.,  2002). 
However, one would note that this emphasis on capital adequacy based on Basle II 
accord has failed in the recent credit crunch (for example in the case of Northern 
Rock). For this reason, Basel III will tighten the requirements and try to make them 
counter-cyclical.       
 
Savings and Loans 
Historically, savings and loans institutions in the United States and Latin America 
initiated all the key functions associated with mortgages (Lea and Renaud, 1995, 
Chiquier and Lea, 2009). In the United States, between the 1930s and 1970s, the 
savings  and  loan associations,  or  „thrifts‟, used  to  be  the main mortgage lending 
institutions,  funding  long-term  fixed-rate  mortgages  on  the  basis  of  variable  rate 
deposits. For almost 50 years this system worked well, benefiting from stable interest 112 
 
rates  in  the  United  States.  However,  once  the  interest  rates  started  rapidly  to 
increase  from  late  1979  onwards  the  thrift  system  revealed  its  fundamental 
deficiency  of  borrowing  short  and  lending  long.  This  led  to  a  major  squeeze  on 
interest  margins  and  liquidity,  resulting  from  pressure  to  pay  increased  rates  on 
deposits while holding a portfolio of fixed-rate mortgages (Coles and Hardt, 2000). 
Following a very sharp increase in interest rates, the thrift system finally collapsed 
during  the  1980s,  and  it  became  clear  that  the  system  needed  to  restructure  its 
funding model to mitigate the risk associated with high and fluctuating interest rates 
in the future.  
 
To  support  the  restructuring  of  the  system,  Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac  were 
federally  chartered  as  government  sponsored  enterprises  (GSEs)  by  the  United 
States  Congress  to  provide  stability  and  on-going  assistance  to  the  secondary 
market  for  residential  mortgages,  and  to  promote  access  to  mortgage  credit  and 
home  ownership  in  the  United  States  (Grebler,  1983).  Since  their  establishment, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have played central role in serving the United States 
housing  finance  system.  They  pursue  their  public  policy  mission  by  purchasing 
single- and multi-family residential mortgages from lenders in the primary mortgage 
market,  as  well  as  guaranteeing  the  timely  payment  of  principal  and  interest  on 
mortgage-related securities. Their large aggregate size allows economies of scale 
which reduces the funding costs for the mortgage lenders in the United States. This 
enabled the S&Ls to effectively mitigate the asset liability mismatching risk and the 
interest rate risk while still carrying out their mortgage business.  
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In  September  2008,  following  the  sub-prime  market  crisis  in  the  United  States, 
Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac  were  placed  into  conservatorship  by  the  Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), because it determined that the companies could 
not operate in a safe and sound manner and fulfil their public mission. The FHFA has 
broad powers to take all actions it deems necessary and appropriate to put the two 
companies in a sound and solvent condition and carry on the companies‟ business 
and preserve and conserve their assets and properties. This continued government 
support has been widely debated as part of the GSE and mortgage market reform 
(Solove and Richards, 2009, Schmudde, 2009, Loutskina and Strahan, 2009).  
 
Commercial Banks  
 
In  many  developing  countries,  commercial  banks  tend  to  dominate  the  financial 
system  (Long,  2002).  In  fact,  it  is  not  just  a  question  of  the  commercial  banks 
controlling  the  financial  system  in  terms  of  intermediation  between  savers  and 
borrowers. They also sometimes dominate all other areas of financial activity, such 
as share brokerage, fund management, leasing companies and perhaps insurance. 
This dominance gives commercial banks two big advantages – pricing power and 
ability  to  benefit  from  changes  in  the  public‟s  asset  distribution.  This,  however, 
contributes to less than optimal competition and efficiency in the financial system, 
and cost inefficient banks can continue to survive in such an imperfect system where 
profit opportunities are abundant for all types and sizes of commercial banks(Isik and 
Hassan, 2002). 
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Examples of mortgage credit intermediation systems based on commercial banks 
can  be  found  in  countries  such  as  Mexico  and  South  Korea  (Zaltzman,  2003, 
Blankenship, 2000, You, 2003, Lozano, 2006, Ruiz, 2005, Ossa, 2003). In Mexico, 
the shape of the mortgage market today reflects the chaotic history of the industry 
over the last several decades. In the 1980s, the banking system was nationalized 
and federal requirements mandated only a relatively small volume of social interest 
or low-income loans to be originated each year. When the commercial banks were 
liberalized, in the early 1990s, mortgage lending took off in response to the pent-up 
demand for credit – as a percentage of GDP. 
 
However, as the markets were booming, in 1995 the value of the peso plummeted in 
response to a set of national macroeconomic problems. Though the effects of this 
devaluation were felt in all sectors, nowhere was the impact greatest than in the 
financial  markets,  and  the  mortgage  markets  in  particular  where  the  rate  on 
adjustable rate mortgages (Mexico did not use fixed-rate mortgage products) jumped 
to extraordinary levels. Though most Mexican home loans had been designed to 
track inflation, repayment could not keep pace. Mexican households‟ incomes rarely 
experienced nominal inflation jumps comparable to that of their mortgage payments. 
Thus, the gap between what borrowers were paid and what was owed often became 
so big that the mortgage loans were negatively amortizing themselves to a point 
where repayment was essentially impossible.  
 
A notable measure taken by the government was the establishment of the Federal 
Mortgage Bank (Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal or SHF) to fill the gap created by the 
exit of many banks from the mortgage sector. SHF supported the development of the 115 
 
Sofols  sector  (Sociedad  Financieras  de  Objeto  Limitado),  non-bank  financial 
institutions authorized to originate and service mortgages and also to provide bridge 
financing for developers  (2002). With  the  backing  of SHF, most Sofols  source  in 
excess of 90 per cent of their funding for mortgages from SHF, and in meeting the 
housing  finance  needs  especially  of  low-income  segments,  Sofols  have  realized 
market share increases.  
 
The underlying success factor for the Sofols is their low default rates compared to 
both Mexican bank mortgages and international standards (Zaltzman, 2003). This is 
particularly noteworthy in light of the low-income market segment the Sofols target. 
The performance of the mortgage portfolios held by the Sofols is linked to several 
factors including: (1) the high level of efficiency in their collection methodologies; (2) 
good underwriting standards; (3) the non-conventional methods of servicing; and (4) 
the quality of the management teams (Ruiz, 2005). In the recent period, another 
interesting development has been the number of sizable Mexican mortgage-backed 
securities issued with support from international banks (Lozano, 2006).  
 
In South Korea, the mortgage system provides another example for the evolution of 
the  commercial  banks‟  role  in  the  mortgage  intermediation  process.  The  recent 
institutional  reform  and  creation  of  new  players  in  the  Korean  financial  market, 
including Korea National Mortgage Corporation (KNMC), was made necessary by 
fundamental changes in the Korean housing finance system  (Blankenship, 2000). 
The  establishment  of  KNMC  was  deemed  necessary  because  the  government 
concluded that the primary mortgage market could be exposed to systemic risk due 
to  the  expansion  of  short-term  mortgages  with  a  variable  rate  after  the  Korean 116 
 
financial crisis. KNMC‟s main objective is to foster the secondary mortgage market, 
especially long-term funding instruments (for example mortgage-backed bonds and 
securities).  
 
An  interesting  consequence  of  this  is  the  increasing  involvement  of  commercial 
banks  in  the  Korean  mortgage  system,  and  the  fierce  competition  among  these 
banks for a larger market share that led to structural change in the primary mortgage 
market  (You,  2003).  Most  banks  with  high  deposit  balances  used  to  solve  the 
maturity gap problem by providing retail customers with short-term mortgages and 
transferring  interest  risks  to  them  through  variable  rate  products.  Such  practice 
constrained the mortgage market from expanding.  
 
Secondary mortgage markets  
 
Countries  with  well-developed  capital  markets  also  have  well-developed  primary 
markets and vice versa (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996). In the recent period, the 
effort in many developing countries to build capital markets  has been premature. 
Many countries have only recently become convinced of the utility of capital markets, 
or have liberalized their markets sufficiently to allow the creation of non-bank funding 
instruments  such as stocks  and bonds. The  growth  of  the  capital markets  has a 
decisive impact on the primary market as well as on the emerging markets (Das, 
2003). With their expansion, some of the commercial banks‟ financing business has 
started to be taken over by the capital markets. 
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The speed at which capital market development takes place depends on several 
factors,  including  the  attitude  of  the  regulatory  authorities  to  licensing  new 
institutions. It is affected by the ability of the domestic capital market to attract the 
attention of local financial entrepreneurs and foreign institutions seeking a part of the 
transition‟s benefits. It is also very much influenced by population ageing and the 
development  of  domestic  professional  investors,  for  example  investment  funds, 
pension  funds,  insurance  companies  and  hedge  funds,  (Blommestein,  1998, 
Blommestein,  2002).  All  these  factors  reflect  the  pace  of  economic  growth  in 
developing countries, the progress made in modernizing national financial systems, 
and the interest from the global capital market in a national economy (Mihaljek et al., 
2002, Der, 2002). 
 
Capital markets support the development of mortgage markets. They provide capital 
for mortgage credit originators and they provide financial assets for investors. This 
can  be  done  in  a  variety  of  ways  and  by  a  variety  of  institutional arrangements. 
Mortgage  credit  originators  can  raise  funds  from  the  capital  (secondary)  market 
through  the  issue  of  mortgage  bonds  and/or  mortgage-backed  securities.  Such 
secondary mortgage markets have become popular in developing countries in recent 
years  (Warnock  and  Warnock,  2008,  Chiquier  and  Lea,  2009,  Loutskina  and 
Strahan, 2009). In Brazil, for example, long-term lending has traditionally been very 
scarce due to the very high inflation rates prevailing until not so long ago. However, 
with support from the IMF and the World Bank, Brazil began to issue securities in the 
international market (Euroweek, 2001). Until recently, these securities represented 
an attractive asset class for local and international investors (Euromoney, 2007).  118 
 
Chile‟s housing experience also provides a wealth of ideas for secondary mortgage 
market development (Corrigan, 2001, Cruz, 2004, EIU, 2003, Rojas, 2001). Chilean 
housing  policy,  which  anticipated  the  enabling  approach  in  the  1990s,  has 
succeeded  in  improving  housing  conditions  in  the  country  (Ruprah and  Marcano, 
2008). The analysis of  Chile‟s experience indicates that its success only partially 
comes from reforms in the housing sector, and that its financial mechanisms are the 
result  of  reforms  in  capital  markets  and  a  stable  macroeconomic  environment. 
Lessons from this experience include the need for an integrated approach to reform 
both housing production and financing systems. The facilitation of private financing 
for housing and the reform of the secondary market are also important components 
of this approach.  
 
The  significant  development  of  private  mortgage  financing  in  Chile  was  made 
possible  by  financial  system  and  social  security  system  reforms  (Ruprah  and 
Marcano,  2008).  The  reforms  strengthened  the  general  banking  system  that 
originates most of the mortgages. They greatly increased the supply of long-term 
funds for loans. Strong banks support the credit rating of mortgage-backed bonds 
since they are obligations of the issuing bank.  
 
Today,  the  universal  banking  system  in  Chile  is  the  main  originator  of  mortgage 
loans that are securitized and sold in the capital markets. Two instruments exist. The 
first is the indexed mortgage-backed bond (MB) that is issued as an obligation of the 
originating  bank  and  sold  to  investors  in  the  stock  exchange.  The  second  is  the 
Endorsable Mortgage Credit (EMC) issued by banks and mortgage credit companies 
(Corrigan, 2001, Cruz, 2004). These are financial assets backed by first mortgages 119 
 
endorsed  by  the  mortgage  originator  that  transfers  to  investors  the  principal  and 
interest risk of the loan, with the property pledged as collateral. (All mortgage-backed 
loans in Chile are denominated in a unit of account, the Unidad de Fomento (UF). 
The value of the UF is fixed daily by the Central Bank and follows inflation very 
closely.)  The  availability  of  these  financial  instruments  and  the  demand  for  them 
created  by  institutional  investors  (life  insurance  companies  and  private  pension 
funds),  who  are  the  major  purchasers  of  these  long-term  obligations,  form  the 
backbone of mortgage financing in Chile. 
 
Another important feature of Chile‟s experience is the formation of private pension 
funds to administer worker and employer contributions to individual retirement funds 
(a  private-sector-led  initiative  similar  to  the  housing  provident  fund  (HPF)  in 
Singapore and China). These funds created powerful institutional investors in the 
Chilean capital markets. Together with insurance companies in Chile, these types of 
institutional investors have a natural appetite for long-term securities that match their 
obligations.  Their  growth  ensures  the  availability  of  funds  for  expanding  housing 
finance.  As  a  result,  mortgage  bonds  are  now  widely  accepted  in  the  Chilean 
secondary market, unlike in the early years when the Central Bank had to create a 
buying power for MBs due to the reluctance of investors to buy them.  
 
 
International finance institutions  
 
Events in recent history such as the Mexican crisis of 1995, those in Asia during 
1997/98, the Russian default of August 1998 and the sub-prime market crash in the 
United States in 2008 have all led to much more thought being given to the issue of 
international  support  to  troubled  or  developing  mortgage  markets.  International 120 
 
finance institutions, such as the World Bank, International Finance Corporation or the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), can have an important 
influence  on  the  direction  which  a  country‟s  mortgage  market  takes  (Torre  and 
Schmukler, 2005, Beck et al., 2009, Chiquier and Lea, 2009). The practices and 
conditions for financial support packages from international finance institutions can 
determine the circumstances in which support is extended to a mortgage  market. 
Such practices are, on one hand, a major impetus for many countries to change their 
policies and reform their local markets. On the other hand, they can lead to severe 
adjustment  crises,  above  all  in  those  that  do  not  have  appropriate  institutional 
structures  in place  to  mitigate effectively  the  different  costs associated  with  such 
transitions (Fuhr, 2001).  
 
3.6 Theoretical Arguments for Mortgage Credit Intermediation     
As is clear from the previous discussion, the simple objective of a housing finance or 
mortgage system is to provide the funds which are required to invest in and access 
housing. The essential feature of any mortgage system is the ability to effectively 
and sustainably channel the funds of investors to those investing in or purchasing 
residential properties. This requires any mortgage system to be able to attract funds 
from  the  institutions  and  households  who  have  a  surplus  of  financial  assets  and 
channel these to those who, wish to borrow.  
 
This section provides a theoretical framework for mortgage credit intermediation and, 
in so doing, attempts to reduce the intermediation activities to the bare essentials. 
The  framework  developed  in  this  section  can  be  subsequently  used  to  critically 
review  the  relevant  mortgage  models  to  this  study.  The  theoretical  perspectives 121 
 
considered here are  related to the issue of creating an effective and sustainable 
mortgage market that is based on co-operation and that works better especially for 
low- and moderate-income households. In this respect, it is important to note that 
Adam Smith is the first scholar to explain systemically how social institutions of the 
free market promote the creation of wealth by encouraging people concerned with 
their interest to behave in a way that best serve the interest of others (Smith, 2007). 
Since  then,  a  large  empirical  literature  documenting  the  experiences  of  social 
institutions  in  the  housing  sector  or  community-based  housing  organizations  has 
developed that consists primarily of individual case studies scattered in edited books, 
academic journals, small-circulation publications and the mostly unpublished records 
of  non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs);  cross-national  collections  of  case 
studies; and national surveys or assessments.  
 
Theoretical perspectives on co-operation are being developed in both the political 
science and economics literatures, but much of this is of questionable applicability to 
a discussion of community-based organizations which operate in a mortgage market 
at the grassroots level, often have no paid staff and operate on very small budgets. 
So, it is important to note that the objective of this section is not to focus on the 
theoretical perspectives of co-operation but to try to integrate these perspectives and 
theoretical perspectives from other different fields of research.   
 
3.6.1 Theories of Financial Intermediation  
A community-based NGO such as a housing cooperative society mobilizes financial 
resources from the “surplus” units (for example individual and institutional savers) via 
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allocates and distributes these funds to the “deficit” units (for example households, 
housing developers, financial institutions, etc.) after examining their creditworthiness 
(Kwast,  2007).  In  the  system  of  financial  intermediation,  savings  help  financial 
institutions economize on the cost of monitoring borrowers (Fama, 1985). Economies 
of scale are realized both by pooling funds from the surplus units and by diversifying 
risk  allocation  among  the  deficit  units  (Benston,  1972,  Hellwig,  2000).  financial 
institutions are delegated by the “surplus” units to economize on monitoring costs 
(Green  and  Lin,  2000).  Without  doubt,  they  play  an  important  role  in  a  market 
economy. Financial institutions are believed to be particularly effective in the early 
stages  of  economic  development,  where  efficient  monitors  are  badly  needed 
(Tompson, 2000).  
 
3.6.2 Transaction Costs, Economies of Scale and the Intermediation Fee 
Intermediation  costs  can  be  categorized  into  fixed  and  variable  costs  (Strahan, 
2004).  Fixed  costs  of  financial  intermediation  include  marketing,  legal  and 
administrative  costs, while  variable  costs  incorporate marketing,  labour and other 
intangible costs related to the sale of financial services, for example mortgage credit. 
Economies of scale are achieved when the intermediary‟s marginal cost of mortgage 
credit provision decreases at higher levels of provision. This decrease in the cost of 
mortgage credit provision arises because the fixed costs of mortgage credit provision 
become a smaller component of total costs as volume increases.  
 
However,  diseconomies  of  scale  may  emerge  at  very  large  volumes,  when  the 
marginal  cost  of  mortgage  credit  provision  increases.  This  may  be  due  to 
inefficiencies of administration and agency conflicts in the intermediary (Palazzo and 123 
 
Rethel, 2008). In terms of intermediation spreads, economies of scale in providing 
mortgage credit will lower the average costs of providing those mortgage credits as 
transaction  size  increases.  With  reducing  costs  as  transaction  size  increases, 
financial  intermediaries  are  able  to  charge  reduced  (in  other  words,  “affordable”) 
interest rates (Farhi et al., 2009). There is also a possibility that intermediation costs 
may  increase  for  very  large  volumes,  reflecting  diseconomies  of  scale.  These 
diseconomies would then be reflected in increasing intermediation fees for very large 
transactions.  
 
3.6.3 Credit Rationing  
 
Credit rationing is defined as a situation in which a financial institution refuses to 
extend credit to a borrower at the price announced by the lender for that borrower 
class (Stansell and Mitchell, 1985, Kent, 1987, Duca and Rosenthal, 1991). Credit 
rationing is not a phenomenon whereby a potential borrower refuses to accept credit 
because the price is unfair or too high (in other words, “unaffordable”). The essential 
point is that credit is denied at a price selected by the financial institution itself. Even 
if the borrower accepts a higher interest rate than that asked for by the financial 
institution, credit is refused by the financial institution. 
 
In the mortgage market, credit rationing is a puzzling practice. When mortgage credit 
is  rationed,  there  is  an  unsatisfied  demand  for  mortgage  credit  at  the  price 
announced by the mortgage lender, that is, mortgage credit demand exceeds supply 
at that price. Conventional economic theory, or just plain common sense, suggests 
that  the  mortgage  lender  could  increase  its  profits  by  increasing  the  price  of 
mortgage credit (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Also, whenever the mortgage lender can 124 
 
supply more credit at a higher price, its profits should be greater. Thus it seems 
irrational for a profit maximizing mortgage lender to ration credit. 
 
3.6.4 Co-operation   
Emelianoff offered a number of propositions based on his theoretical analysis of the 
economic nature of the co-operative (Emelianoff, 1995). His theoretical approach is 
extremely useful as an analytical tool in trying to explain why some co-operatives fail 
and why others succeed. However, it will become evident later on that success or 
failure, even from an economic point of view; do not entirely depend on economic 
behaviour.  Sociological  and  political  influence  may  in  fact  be  as,  if  not  more, 
important in deciding the future of a co-operative or the co-operative movement as a 
whole.  
 
Looking  at  the  role  of  government  in  the  success  or  failure  of  co-operatives, 
Davidovic claims that the initiation and financing of co-operative action by the state 
has proved to be effective and fruitful only when it has been organized in a way that 
stimulates self-help action of the people, encourages their initiative, awakens their 
energies, and leads to the mobilization of their efforts, their work and their resources 
no  matter  how  modest  they  are  (Davidovic,  1967).  However,  he  warns  that  the 
dependence of co-operatives on the state brings some dangers. First, politicians are 
tempted to take advantage of the co-operative movement for their own political ends 
rather than for the economic aims of the people. Second, state officials often see in 
co-operative policy and co-operative activity a field for the advancement of their own 
careers.  
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Relevant  to  the  above  theoretical  perspectives  on  co-operatives  is  the  neo-
institutional  economists‟  work  on  the  agency  theory  to  define  the  institution  as  a 
„nexus of contracts‟, and to consider agents and transactions, institutionally, socially, 
legally and culturally, as contingent (incomplete) constructs  (Beccerra and Gupta, 
1999,  Heath,  2009,  Ross,  1973).  They  argue  that  the  institution‟s  claimants  go 
beyond  shareholders  to  include  others  with  whom  the  institution  has  any  explicit 
and/or  implicit  contractual  interaction.  In  this  „nexus  of  contracts‟  view,  each 
community, including employees, customers, suppliers and investors, provides some 
asset in return for some gain. Contracts result from bargaining by these communities 
over the terms of their compensation, as well as the institutional arrangements that 
protect  this  compensation  from  post-contractual  expropriation.  According  to  this 
view, all stakeholders are regarded as contractors with the institution, with their rights 
determined through bargaining.  
 
Stakeholder theories are also considered relevant to the analysis of co-operatives. 
The stakeholder theories argue that all stakeholders have a right to participate in 
making  decisions  that  affect  them,  managers  have  a  fiduciary  duty  to  serve  the 
interests  of  all  stakeholder  groups,  and  the  objective  of  the  institution  is  the 
promotion of all interests, not only those of the institutions‟ shareholders (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996, Kaplan and Norton, 2001). This view is commonly referred to as the 
„stakeholder model‟ of corporate governance, where stakeholders include customers, 
suppliers,  providers  of  complementary  services  and  products,  distributors  and 
employees. Therefore, this theory holds that institutions ought to be managed for the 
benefit of all who have some stake in these institutions‟ business.  
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The stakeholder model is still evolving; it is yet to find a sound theoretical foundation 
in co-operative economic literature. One issue is how to draw a line of distinction 
between a stakeholder and a non-stakeholder. Existence of a stakeholder entity and 
its rights are easy to recognize, but questions still remain as to who really qualifies 
as  an  actual  stakeholder.  The  third  issue  deals  with  the  stakeholders‟  right  to 
influence management decision making or to participate in the governance of a co-
operative. Questions arise as to why stakeholders should be given such a right and 
why  managers  should  have  a  fiduciary  duty  to  protect  the  rights  of  non-member 
stakeholders if  such  stakeholders have  protected their  rights,  through  bargaining, 
within the terms of the contracts.  
 
Although there appears to be a consensus on identifying the rights of non-member 
stakeholders and an implicit agreement to protect these rights, there is still a debate 
about  why  such  stakeholders  should  participate  in  the  control  and  management 
processes of a co-operative. So far discussions of the stakeholder model have not 
been able to articulate a convincing argument on theoretical, moral or legal grounds 
to recognize an active role for stakeholders in the management and control of a co-
operative. 
 
3.7 Analytical Framework 
Following the above theoretical arguments, it is important to turn our attention to the 
key issues that need to be considered when developing an analytical framework for 
the application of these theories, as follows. 
 
 
 127 
 
3.7.1 Institutional Capacity 
Mobilizing savings requires more stringent standards than managing mortgages, for 
one reason above all others: while mortgage funds come from investors or lenders, 
savings  belong  to  the  households  (McNulty  et  al.,  2007).  This  alone  compels 
institutions to consider mobilizing savings only if their capacity and governance are 
clearly  up  to  the  job.  For  mortgage  intermediation,  mobilizing  savings  should  be 
approached with great caution (Scholten, 2000, Struyk et al., 2004).  
 
To be profitable, mobilized savings must usually be lent out. This process of financial 
intermediation  is  typically  much  more  complex  than  managing  mortgages  alone. 
Keeping mortgage loans (or assets) well matched with savings (or liabilities) is a 
complex balancing act – and losing this balance puts the intermediary‟s operating 
performance at risk. To add to this challenge, management of savings is fraught with 
many risks including fraud, mismanagement and illiquidity.  
 
So,  the  first  prerequisite  a  mortgage  lender  needs  to  satisfy  is  the  capacity  to 
intermediate savings  (Marini, 2008). A mortgage lender should only offer savings 
services if it is at break-even or very close to profitability to maintain financially viable 
operation. Otherwise, the lender‟s business will not be sustainable, exposing savers 
to unjustifiable risks. Accordingly, a financially viable operation is important in order 
to  provide  a  minimal  but  essential  assurance  that  operating  cost  will  not  be 
recovered  from  clients‟  savings.  Second,  financial  viability  enables  the  mortgage 
lender  to  bring  a  basic  competence  and  efficiency  to  its  operations.  A  mortgage 
lender is less likely to place households‟ savings at risk if it can competently invest 
them on at least a break-even basis.  128 
 
As  demonstrated  in  the  recent  credit  crisis,  the  most  wide-spread  reason  that 
mortgage  lenders  fail  is  that  they  cannot  collect  on  their  invested  funds  and/or 
extended credit (Scholten, 2000). High rates of delinquency quickly lead to default 
that consumes reserves, retained earnings and other capital. When the mortgage 
lender‟s business is funded by savings, the effects for the lender can be devastating. 
Mortgage  lenders  should  only  intermediate  savings  if  they  have  demonstrated  a 
history of sound credit management. The savings should not be put at risk due to 
fund management. Viability and effective fund management ensure that a mortgage 
lender will continue to be profitable once it mobilizes savings.  
 
A mortgage lender must also maintain adequate capitalization to provide a cushion 
against  unanticipated  losses,  thereby  protecting  the  savers  and  the  intermediary 
(Hagen  and  Holter,  2002).  Achieving  sustainability  enables  a  mortgage  lender  to 
build up capital. Adequate provisioning against losses protects capital. Maintaining 
overall institutional profitability helps ensure capital adequacy on a going concern 
basis. As further protection of capital adequacy, some lenders may have access to 
additional capital when needed, from investors, liquidity facilities or other sources. 
 
If savings are to fund mortgage lending, responsible credit management is essential. 
Once  a  mortgage  lender  starts  to  intermediate  savings,  managing  liquidity  and 
balancing  assets  with  liabilities  become  imperative  and  demanding.  Ideally,  the 
lender should have a backup source for liquidity that can help it manage external 
shocks. The lender must also be able to motivate its staff to make the necessary 
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least, the lender must have the physical facilities and security to afford adequate 
protection and inspire the trust of clients.  
 
3.7.2 Good Governance 
Effective governance and management oversight are minimum preconditions for all 
financial  intermediaries  (Farhi  et  al.,  2009).  Only  if  effective  governance  and 
management are clearly in place should a mortgage lender consider the demand for 
savings services. Some, including most financial regulators, would argue that only 
for-profit  institutions  should  be  permitted  to  intermediate  savings  from  the  public. 
They would cite two key advantages for profits. First, owners may be able to provide 
additional capital in the form of equity if necessary. Second, as owners with a direct 
financial  interest  in  the  intermediary‟s  performance,  they  may  have  stronger 
incentives to be proactive in governance. 
 
However, recent experience suggests that for-profit ownership is no guarantee of 
solvency  (Schmudde,  2009).  Furthermore,  non-profit  and  community-based 
organizations found in the world have demonstrated their ability to play an important 
role  in  savings  mobilization  in  many  developing  countries  (Gugerty,  2007).  Well 
managed non-profit organisations in some settings have proven capable of effective 
governance and intermediation despite the absence of owners. For these reasons, 
non-profit organizations and community-based organizations are considered to be 
important agents for extending the reach of mortgage finance if the preconditions are 
met. Such an approach offers a pragmatic way to balance the goals of access and 
protection. 
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3.7.3 Regulation and Supervision 
The search for a proper financial intermediation model is a search for an efficient 
device  for  transmission,  and  for  a  method  for  outsiders  to  exercise  control  over 
institutions (Stiglitz, 1985, Goodhart, 1994). So, in addition to sufficient institutional 
capacity and good governance, mortgage intermediation should be subject to some 
external  supervision  of  its  operations.  External  supervision  can  further  protect 
savers.  Many  experts  argue  that  intermediation  should  only  be  undertaken  by 
institutions  that  are  licensed  and  well  supervised  (Farhi  et  al.,  2009).  This  is the 
principle of security or protection. There is often conflict between a principle that 
protects customers and one that optimizes households‟ access to relatively safe and 
convenient financial services. 
 
The  trade-off  between  the  principles  of  security  and  access  is  difficult  for  two 
reasons.  First,  effective  supervision  is  a  scarce  resource.  Those  who  prioritize 
security over access argue that regulatory authorities should only license institutions 
to intermediate credit to the extent that the authorities have the capacity to supervise 
them on an ongoing basis. In most countries, however, regulatory authorities simply 
do not have the capacity and, in some cases, the commitment to add the supervision 
of new organizations to their existing responsibilities (McNulty et al., 2007). On the 
other hand, regulation and supervision of financial institutions do not guarantee that 
customers will be safe. Failure of even large government backed financial institutions 
has been common in recent years. Thus, regulation can provide a false sense of 
security if actual oversight is stretched beyond capacity.  
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Ideally, financial rules and regulations should be adjusted to permit well managed 
non-profit  and  community-based  organizations  to  become  licensed,  supervised 
financial intermediaries, empowered to offer financial services to their members and 
the general public. Until this idea becomes a reality, however, one must consider 
whether  strong  non-profit  and  community-based  organizations  should  be  able  to 
intermediate mortgage credit if they fully disclose to their members and the public 
that they are not regulated, and explain in plain language their key financial ratios 
and  conditions.  Where  capable  supervision  is  not  an  option,  financial  authorities 
should implement a process that identifies which intermediaries are strong enough to 
intermediate  mortgage  credit  based  on  strict  criteria  for  financial  performance, 
systems, security and management.  
 
3.7.4 Financial Safety Net 
In general, financial resources tend to flow away from the parts of the economy with 
few or no guarantees towards those with substantial coverage. The ultimate effect 
can be a limited reach of finance. In a mortgage finance system, many argue that a 
financial  safety  net  really  matters  (Kane,  2009,  Watson,  2008,  Stephens  and 
Quilgars,  2007,  Ferguson,  1999,  Nishimura,  2010).  It  matters  because  actual  or 
perceived guarantees can impair the efficiency of the system.  
 
State guarantees can change the way participants in a mortgage market respond to 
risk. This can be explained by the basic concept of moral hazard that the economists 
use to analyse risk-taking behaviour, explicitly the possibility that an insured financial 
intermediary  will  take  excessively  risky  actions  with  little  outside  direct  control 
(Mussa, 2009, Steyn, 2008). Under such conditions of moral hazard, the financial 132 
 
intermediary has no incentive to limit the risk of incurring the loss since maximal risk 
sharing leads to maximal risk taking in a situation of moral hazard.  
 
What  do  these  preconditions  mean  for  mortgage  intermediation?  As  has  been 
demonstrated,  the  preconditions  for  offering  mortgages  are  as  follows:  adequate 
institutional capacity (financial sustainability, credit management, staffing, systems 
and  facilities),  good  governance,  effective  supervision  that  provides  an  ongoing 
supervision on mortgage finance intermediation, and a financial safety net to protect 
households  and  community-based  organizations  in  the  mortgage  market.  Taken 
together, these preconditions guard against the most important risk-loss of capital for 
housing.  They  are  meant  to  prevent  mismanagement  of  the  mortgage  lender‟s 
funding base, and a liquidity crisis, either of which can leave the lender unable to 
honour their customers‟ financial claims. These preconditions also protect the lender 
against  the  many  risks  it  faces  in  introducing  new  products  and  services  solely 
and/or jointly with other institutions (for example CBOs) to expand mortgage finance. 
 
3.7.5 Legal Framework  
The legal system is an important element in increasing the penetration of mortgage 
credit (McNulty et al., 2007). A legal system which is unpredictable, unenforceable, 
incomplete and corrupt diminishes the effectiveness of all aspects of mortgage credit 
intermediation. There are several ways in which a faulty legal system directly affects 
the  effectiveness  of  mortgage  lenders.  The  main  question  is  whether  mortgage 
lenders are able to receive redress in the courts against delinquent borrowers. The 
issue is not just whether the courts would ever rule in a mortgage lender‟s favour. 
There is also the need to have that judgment enforced. So a debtor‟s house would 133 
 
have  to  be  re-possessed  or  their  assets  seized.  And  even  if  judgment  and 
enforcement are possible, if the whole process takes years and years, it may not be 
worth  pursuing.  A  mortgage  lender  which  knows  that  it  will  take  a  long  time  to 
recover collateral from a delinquent debtor – even if the judgment goes in its favour – 
is likely to cut a deal to recover a portion of what is owed. And of course debtors 
know that mortgage lenders are going to face that choice.  
 
Another main reason why relatively little mortgage credit is voluntarily supplied in 
developing countries is the lack of credible contracts. Williamson explains that it is 
the cost of post-contract governance rather than the cost of producing contracts that 
explains the restrained supply of mortgage credit (Williamson, 1985). Some agree 
with this view and provide evidence based on the experience of some developing 
countries (Buckley, 1994), where the eviction of a poor family that has had bad luck 
(for example the loss of income caused by the death of the  income earner) can 
easily prompt sympathetic protections of the borrower in local courts.  
 
3.7.6 Risk Management  
Risk is endemic to business but central to mortgage credit. The risks in business are 
as diverse as life itself. Businesses face possible losses owing to flood, fire, machine 
failure, war or capricious acts by a government that destroys or confiscates property 
(sovereign risk). Mortgage lenders face all of these risks, but risks of the unavoidable 
variety define the business of mortgage intermediation. It is important to bear in mind 
that risk is not due to variability, but rather due to uncertainty. The major risks faced 
by  mortgage  intermediaries  are  widely  debated,  and  are  briefly  discussed  below 134 
 
(Deutsch and Tomann, 1995, Hagen and Holter, 2002, Farhi et al., 2009, Struyk, 
2010, Buckley et al., 2003, Sunega and Lux, 2007). 
 
A) Default or credit risk 
This is the risk that a borrower will fail to make the contractual payment on a timely 
basis (Buckley et al., 2003, Struyk, 2010, Hagen and Holter, 2002). This kind of risk 
is central to virtually all rental transactions, and as in the case of almost all of saving 
contracts, moral hazard is a key element in default risk. The availability of default risk 
has two aspects. Mortgage intermediaries can choose assets with little or no default 
risk, such as government guaranteed mortgage-backed securities. Such a strategy, 
however,  may  provide  a  return  that  is  only  slightly,  if  at  all,  greater  than  the 
intermediary‟s cost of funding, and such a low profit margin may be unattractive to 
the intermediary. 
 
Given that most mortgage intermediaries choose assets with substantial default risk, 
their ability to control default risk derives from their ability to resolve moral hazard 
and other informational problems. To illustrate, mortgage intermediaries should enjoy 
a special advantage in screening and monitoring borrowers. However, it is virtually 
impossible  to  monitor  a  borrower  so  closely  that  default  or  credit  risk  can  be 
completely eliminated.  
 
There are two sources of default risk: cash flow variations beyond the borrower‟s 
control (physical hazard) and moral hazard. For the first source of default risk, part of 
the mortgage intermediary‟s role is to screen the borrower so that it can accurately 
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financial  position  and  other  relevant  non-financial  information  (for  example  health 
condition) about the borrower. In this capacity, the mortgage finance intermediary 
only assesses the risk but does not bear it, that is, it is acting as a pure broker. Thus, 
the mortgage intermediary should be able to efficiently generate information about 
default risk stemming from cash flow variations beyond the borrower‟s control.  
 
For  moral  hazard,  the  mortgage  intermediary‟s  monitoring  capability  is  important 
(Mussa,  2009,  Steyn,  2008).  The  borrower  has  an  incentive  to  take  action  after 
taking a risky loan that increases the mortgage intermediary‟s risk exposure. Thus, 
the efficiency with which the mortgage intermediary performs its basic functions is a 
key  determinant  of  its  own  credit  risk  exposure.  Moreover,  loans  are  subject  to 
management as a portfolio. A mortgage intermediary can control its default risk by 
holding in its asset portfolio many loans with imperfectly correlated prospects and 
thereby diversify across loans. 
 
B) Interest rate risk 
This risk derives from the variation in market prices (Struyk, 2010). If the mortgage 
intermediary‟s assets and liabilities are traded, they are subject to being valued by 
the market. Any such revaluation, due to changes in either the level or structure of 
interest rates, is described as interest rate risk. Another aspect of interest rate risk, 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  mortgage  intermediation,  is prepayment  risk.  This risk 
arises from the borrower's option to prepay. If interest rates rise, there will be no 
prepayment. But if interest rates fall sufficiently after the loan has been taken, the 
borrower is likely to prepay the loan by taking advantage of refinancing at a lower 
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In many developing countries, interest rates have been raised to, and sustained at, 
extremely  high  levels.  The  persistence  of  high  interest  rates  signals  a  failure  to 
achieve  a  rapid  impact  on  either  inflationary  expectations  and/or  expectations  of 
currency devaluation (Calvo, 1991). The central role given to tight monetary policy 
has allowed interest rates to rise to that  extremely high level in order to restrain 
liquidity – a consequence of the priority accorded to commodity price inflation and to 
the exchange rate targets. Such standard approach, to be exact using the interest 
rate to control lending, is oversimplified in that not all borrowing excesses can be 
resolved by tightening the flow of funding alone (Roe, 2003). The bad lending and 
borrowing decisions of the past are already set into balance sheet structures at the 
point when a crisis begins. So, the mere act of making borrowing more expensive 
cannot  alter  that  reality.  Furthermore,  policies  that  lead  to  widespread  financial 
distress are likely to  promote „financial innovation‟ and unregulated new forms of 
lending  activities  that  can  substitute  for  formal  credit  that  is  being  made  more 
expensive. This is almost certain to be a harmful development and one that makes 
long-term stability harder to achieve. Hence, a sound regulatory system is essential.  
 
C) Liquidity risk 
This is the risk that a mortgage intermediary (seller of a collateral/property) will not 
be able to realize the full value of the collateral at the time a sale is desired to repay 
a  mortgage  credit  (Sunega  and  Lux,  2007,  Farhi  et  al.,  2009).  A  mortgage 
intermediary also faces liquidity risk if savers unexpectedly withdraw their savings 
and the intermediary may be unable to replace them without impairing its net worth. 
This  risk  applies  symmetrically  to  mortgage  intermediaries  in  their  relationship  to 137 
 
savers.  The  most  extreme  manifestation  of  liquidity  risk  is  that  the  mortgage 
intermediary is simply unable to sell the collateral at any price. 
  
3.8 Comparative Analysis of Mortgage Systems     
This section attempts, modestly, to make some comparisons in respect of housing, 
the savings market and mortgage systems. The discussion and data in this section 
are based on the available comparative literature relevant to the topic of this study. 
To attempt to compile compatible literature from the range of previous studies would 
be a monumental task. Indeed, the published international literature is very wide and 
it is quite possible that some of the literature is far from perfect and relevance. But, 
based on the earlier discussion, it has now been established that to work effectively 
and sustainably any mortgage system has to raise fund from those institutions and 
households who do not intend to borrow and be able to lend it over long periods of 
time.  
 
There are several routes by which this can be achieved, some of which are partially 
successful in Egypt but which do not make full use of the intermediation process. For 
example, there is the direct route, by which those who need funds to get on to the 
property ladder obtain those funds directly from relatives and friends with surplus 
financial assets. Another option is the contractual route by which part, but not all, of 
the funds which an institution or a household requires are raised from the savings of 
other  potential  residential  property  investors  or  home-buyers,  or  from  other 
contractual saving schemes. There is also the deposit financing route, by which short 
term savings of institutions and households are channelled into long term loans by 
intermediaries,  such  as  banks,  either  generally  or  financial  institutions  which 138 
 
specializes  in  the  provision  of  mortgage  credit.  Finally,  it  is  worth  noting  the 
mortgage bank route, by which institutions making mortgage loans fund these by 
mortgage backed securities issues.  
  
As  is  noted  earlier  in  Chapter  2,  the  direct  route  has  dominated  the  Egyptian 
economy  for  many  years  due  to  the  lack  of  well-developed  mortgage  system 
following 1952 revolution. But it is not possible and feasible to say much more about 
the  direct  method  of  financing  because,  almost  by  definition,  it  represents  a 
traditional and informal route to access housing that is very challenging to study. 
Given  the  reluctance  of  many  Egyptian  banks  to  have  major  exposure  to  the 
mortgage market following  the  recent  global financial crisis,  the deposit financing 
route  does  not  also  represent  an  attractive  option  for  extending  the  reach  of 
mortgage credit in the country. Further, the mortgage bank route in Egypt is still in its 
early phase of development and subject to a great funding volatility in the Egyptian 
capital market  especially  since  the  beginning  of  2011  revolution.  This  leaves  the 
study with the contractual route, which is obviously relevant at present in the current 
Egyptian context given the fact that the contractual system has already existed for 
many years but not at the desired level of effectiveness and sustainability. Formal 
contractual systems in a number of countries, whether community sector based or 
financial  sector  based  systems,  exist  in  a  number  of  countries,  most  notably 
Germany  and  Czech  Republic  through  special  institutions,  the  Bausparkassen 
(Behrman  and  Rondinelli,  2000,  Deutsch  and  Tomann,  1995,  Franscini  and 
Schillinger,  2001,  Frederiksen,  1894,  Hagen  and  Holter,  2002,  Hamm,  2008, 
Kretschmar and Damaske, 2003, Roy, 2008, Stephens, 2003b, Zehnder, 2005), in 
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by a large number of bank and non-bank financial institutions (Burell, 2006, Chen et 
al., 1997, Davies et al., 2009, Koh et al., 2008, Lee, 2000, Linda and Aw, 1996, 
Lindeman,  2002,  Phang,  2001,  Si-Ming  and  Zheng,  2007, Wang,  2000,  Wu  and 
Wang, 2003, Yiu and Hui, 2005, Zhu, 1997, Zhu, 2002), and in India and Malaysia 
through community based organisations (Yahaya, 1989, Malpezzi, 1997, Sukumar, 
2001, Mahadeva, 2006, Saravanan, 2007, Abdul-Aziz, 2009, Coontz, 2008, Salleh, 
2008, Tan, 2008, Ganapati, 2010, Mohit, 2010, Ramanath, 2010, Teck-Hong, 2011).  
 
The essence of all contractual saving schemes is almost the same in that regular 
savings are made over a period of years and receive an interest rate at below the 
market level, following which the investor or home-buyer becomes entitled to a loan, 
again at an interest rate below market level. Generally, government bonuses are 
available to those who take part in contractual savings schemes. Arguably, it is the 
bonuses  which  make  the  schemes  attractive  (Whitehead,  2000,  Gibb,  2003, 
Stephens, 2005b). All these schemes will now be illustrated and evaluated in detail.  
 
3.8.1 Contract Savings  
Historically, the most popular system created to increase savings for housing is the 
Bausparkassen  system  that  was  originally  developed  in  Austria  and  Germany 
(Zehnder,  2005,  Deutsch  and  Tomann,  1995,  Frederiksen,  1894).  The 
Bausparkassen system has since developed in a number of Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries where its products now represent a significant portion of 
the  mortgage  markets  (Mints,  2004,  Sunega  and  Lux,  2007).  Bausparkassen 
institutions are designed to collect savings on a regular basis at a low, below-market 
rate and to recycle the low rate on their funding into low rates on their mortgages. In 140 
 
the simplest version of such a system, there is no net gain to savers, who must 
forego enough interest on average during the saving part of the cycle to fund the 
below-market rate on a mortgage later (Deutsch and Tomann, 1995).  
 
In principle, if individuals valued such an arrangement, either because of the low 
fixed rate on such mortgages or because contracting to deposit savings regularly 
was  desirable  (perhaps  because  it  is  easier  to  save  or  because  it  provides  the 
mortgage  intermediary  with  evidence  that  they  are  reliable  borrowers),  the  public 
would participate in such a system set up by a mortgage intermediary. This has been 
tried in several countries, but generally such simple arrangements are not popular 
(Zehnder, 2005). Why? It appears that households do not value these advantages 
enough to give up the flexibility of deciding when and how much to save and when to 
ask for a mortgage credit. 
 
The Bausparkassen system moves beyond this to introduce a significant government 
subsidy and make it attractive for savers to participate (Zehnder, 2005). The extra 
payments go towards making the return on savings equal  to or even better than 
other forms of savings, so that households will want to participate even if they are 
not sure that they will want a mortgage credit after their savings period. If it is the 
case that the return on savings is just equal to the alternative market return (for 
example on bank deposits), households are still attracted because the system offers 
a significant subsidy to those who actually do borrow at the below-market rate. 
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A) Bausparkassen System in the CEE Countries  
The Bausparkassen system in the CEE markets is comprised of financial institutions 
that  are  established  for  the  purpose  of  providing  mortgage  credit,  although  their 
position is being challenged by retail banks offering conventional mortgage products. 
At present, the countries with the most developed markets for this form of mortgages 
are the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and, to a lesser extent, Hungary (Roy, 
2008, Zehnder, 2005, Stephens, 2003b). All of these countries have implemented an 
adapted  version  of  the  German/Austrian  Bausparkassen  systems.  However,  the 
system in these countries is a closed, self-financing arrangement.  
 
B) Drivers of Bausparkassen System Growth 
Although mortgage products have been available in CEE markets since the early 
1990s,  growth  in  mortgages  in  most  countries  has  only  become significant  since 
around 2000. In some cases, this growth area has been the single largest driver of 
total lending growth since 2000. A number of developments combined to create the 
necessary environment for the market to grow (Roy, 2008, Stephens, 2003b). The 
EU accession process saw the convergence of high nominal interest rates in CEE 
markets with much lower Euro rates. This has made mortgages considerably more 
affordable. In some cases where nominal short-term rates remained in the double 
digits  by  2000  (for  example  Poland),  aggressive  marketing  of  foreign  currency 
mortgages has accelerated mortgage growth; in other cases (for example Hungary), 
generous subsidies lowered the effective nominal rates (Duebel, 2000).  
 
In the banking sector, few incumbent CEE banks had strong retail lending operations 
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generally poor health of the banking sector, the disruption caused by bailouts, large-
scale privatization and restructuring (Renaud, 1996). However, recent banking sector 
restructuring, including acquisitions by strategic investors with strong retail expertise 
combined with the unfavourable outlook for corporate banking, led to a strong push 
into  retail  banking  in  general,  with  mortgages  an  anchor  product  (Kwast,  2007, 
McNulty et al., 2007, Sunega and Lux, 2007).  
 
Significant improvements in the regulatory and legal environments made financial 
institutions  considerably  more  comfortable with  mortgages  (McNulty  et  al.,  2007). 
Many  of  these  changes  came  as  part  of  the  EU  accession  process,  including 
strengthened  and  streamlined  bankruptcy  legislation,  better protection  of  property 
rights and liberalization of real estate markets (Buckley et al., 2003). Credit bureaus 
help build lender confidence as the market expands. Additional improvements are 
also taking place, for example in relation to mortgage bond legislation and capacity 
constraints in court systems.  
 
C) Bausparkassen System and Subsidy 
There are several public benefits claimed for Bausparkassen systems. The simplest 
is the support for housing subsidy in general (Hamm, 2008, Deutsch and Tomann, 
1995). The  major  added  advantage  is that,  in  order to  receive  the  below  market 
mortgage  credit  (which  is  the  major  source  of  subsidy  to  the  participant),  the 
beneficiary must complete a programme of savings that arguably shows that he or 
she has a reliable character and, even more importantly, is a good credit risk. 
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An additional argument is made to support the provision of sufficient subsidy so that 
the  return  on  savings  is  even  better  than  that  available  from  more  conventional 
savings  vehicles  (Struyk  et  al.,  2004,  Scholten,  2000,  Borsch-Supan  and  Stahl, 
1991). A savings system where the subsidy only becomes available at the end of the 
savings cycle produces a pool of savings that is very stable in the short run; few will 
find it worthwhile not to finish the savings programme once started. In theory, it is 
very desirable to fund a mortgage for housing out of such stable pools of resources. 
Although  the  need  for  artificially  constructing  pools  through  such  subsidies  is 
debatable in the modern system (there are many more efficient alternatives), this 
argument is still considered to be a significant advantage of the system. 
 
Finally, it is claimed that by tying a subsidized mortgage credit to the completion of a 
savings programme, households are more likely to save and those that save will 
save more. In other words, Bausparkassen systems expand the supply of domestic 
household savings. It is worthwhile noting that there are somewhat different visions 
of  the  role  of  a  Bausparkassen  system  in  Germany  and  Austria  (Deutsch  and 
Tomann, 1995). 
  
In  Germany,  the  government  bonuses  are  relatively  small  and  just  sufficient  to 
compensate those savers who do not eventually borrow for the lost opportunity to 
get a market rate elsewhere. The focus of the programme is on encouraging good 
savings (and mortgage repayment) habits and on delivering a small below-market, 
but relatively short-term, mortgage credit at the end of the savings period.  
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In Austria, the system is more oriented towards creating a large pool of long-term 
funds for use in funding large below-market mortgages with relatively long terms for 
housing. To accomplish this, the subsidies to savers are set such that the return is 
higher than on other options, to compensate savers for the loss of liquidity resulting 
from saving in the Bausparkassen system. Such a system is more expensive to the 
government, but also conveys larger subsidies to housing, especially by permitting 
very long terms on the Bausparkassen mortgages. 
 
Slovakia  and  the  Czech  Republic  were  the  first  CEE  countries  to  adopt 
Bausparkassen systems, and did so early in their transition programmes, followed 
much later (due to longer debate) by Hungary (Roy, 2008). It is not a coincidence 
that  these  countries  took  this  step.  There  are  very  large  potential  commercial 
rewards  possible  from  such  systems,  especially  in  the  early  years  when  no 
participants qualify for a low-rate mortgage and yet the Bauspars can invest the low-
cost  funds  at  market  rates.  Moreover,  all  three  countries  have  had  high  market 
interest rates relative to the Bausparkassen's low savings interest rates, making the 
potential profits that much larger. This situation was a great attraction to those with 
the potential to profit from it and policymakers in all the countries report that strong 
lobbying efforts of German and Austrian Bausparkassen interests were decisive in 
achieving the creation of a Bausparkassen system in their country. 
 
Programmes such as the interest-free or low interest mortgage programmes (started 
up in the Czech Republic and Slovakia after the  Bausparkassen systems began) 
provide  assistance  that  is  delivered  through  low-cost  arrangements  with  private 
lenders,  and are  targeted  at  low-  and  moderate-income  households  building new 145 
 
houses. While such programmes are not necessarily the most effective (they may 
not help those with the greatest housing needs and many of the subsidized units 
would  have  been  built  anyway),  the  impact  on  actual  construction  activity  is 
apparently considered to be greater than any impact so far by the Bauspars, at a 
much lower cost. 
 
3.8.2 The Housing Provident Funds (or Payroll-Based Saving System) 
The recent studies about increasing savings and creating a pool of stable funding for 
mortgage  credit  offer  a  review  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  the  effects  of  the 
housing provident fund (HPF) (Lee, 2000, Lindeman, 2002, Burell, 2006, Si-Ming 
and Zheng, 2007, Davies et al., 2009, Wu and Wang, 2003, Yiu and Hui, 2005, Koh 
et al., 2008, Chiquier and Lea, 2009). An HPF, as an instrument of housing finance, 
provides  an  inspirational  experience  in  extending  the  reach  of  mortgage  market 
(Chiquier and Lea, 2009, Wu and Wang, 2003, Burell, 2006, Si-Ming and Zheng, 
2007). Housing policy as effected through the HPF contributed to the overall growth 
and  stability  of  the  mortgage  markets  and  associated  financial  institutions  in 
countries such as Singapore and China.  
 
But, what does HPF mean? The term housing provident fund refers to long-term 
housing  savings  paid  and  deposited  by  state  organs,  state-owned  enterprises, 
collective  enterprises  in  cities  and  towns,  foreign-invested  enterprises,  private 
enterprises in cities and towns and other enterprises in cities and towns, institutions, 
co-operatives,  private  non-enterprise  units  and  associations,  and  their  on-the-job 
staff and workers (Lindeman, 2002). 
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The regulations of HPFs are usually formulated for the purpose of strengthening their 
management, safeguarding the lawful rights and interests of their owners, promoting 
the construction of houses in cities and towns, and improving housing standards of 
residents in cities and towns. The regulations are also applicable to the payment and 
deposit,  withdrawal,  use,  management  and  supervision  of  the  HPF  within  the 
country. The housing provident fund that pays out to and is deposited into by staff 
and workers themselves, and that buys the units for its staff and workers, is owned 
by the staff and workers (Wu and Wang, 2003, Yiu and Hui, 2005, Davies et al., 
2009). 
 
Management of an HPF is required to comply with the following principles: policy-
making by housing provident fund management committees, operated by housing 
provident  fund  management  centres,  depositing  in  special  bank  accounts  and 
supervising by finance departments. The interest rate of deposits and mortgages for 
a housing provident fund is usually proposed by the central bank, and submitted for 
approval after soliciting the opinions of the competent administrative departments of 
housing.  
 
The competent administrative department of housing also formulates policies on the 
housing provident fund jointly with the finance department and the central bank, and 
supervises the implementation. The regional departments of housing, jointly with the 
finance departments at the same level and the branches of the central bank, are 
responsible for supervising the implementation of the management regulations and 
policies of the housing provident fund within their administrative areas. 
 147 
 
A) Singapore  
There  is  no  doubt  that  development  in  Singapore  in  general  and  its  saving  and 
investment performance in particular were led by the government through both its 
policies  and  state  institutions. Thus,  the  natural  starting  point  for a  discussion  of 
Singapore‟s HPFs and their effects on the savings for housing in the country is the 
government itself.  
 
From  the  early  years  of  development,  saving  policy  in  Singapore  was  a  central 
element to the country‟s development strategy (Linda and Aw, 1996). Beyond the 
government‟s  regulatory  power  to  create  and  control  institutions  like  the  Central 
Provident Fund (CPF) and the Housing Development Board (HDB), the provider of 
public housing, there were four further important roles through which the government 
influenced savings for housing behaviour and decided actively to do so: 1) financial 
intermediary through its own saving; 2) entrepreneur through its direct involvement in 
the Singapore economy affecting corporate saving as well as wages, which in turn 
influence household saving; 3) regulator of disposable income and of the welfare 
system; and 4) driver of attitudes towards saving (Phang, 2001, Chen et al., 1997). 
Through  its  role  as  a  significant  entrepreneur  in  the  Singapore  economy,  the 
government also directly affected the level of corporate savings. But potentially even 
more  importantly,  it  influenced  wage  levels,  particularly  in  combination  with  its 
National Wage Council, setting guidelines for the whole economy.  
 
The CPF was created by an Act of Parliament in 1953 and launched on 1 July 1955, 
still under colonial administration, with the objective of securing retirement incomes 
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which  individuals  can  withdraw  their  own  and  their  employer‟s  contributions  plus 
interest  on  retirement,  rather  than  receiving  payments  to  retirees  from  the 
contributions of those still working. Among the economies classified by the World 
Bank as high income, Singapore is unique in using the mandatory national provident 
fund mechanism to finance its social security. 
 
Contributions are withheld at the source, to be precise on payment of salary, and the 
CPF  is  only  allowed  to  invest  them  in  government  securities.  Membership  is 
mandatory  for all  resident  workers.  The  self  employed  were  not obliged  to make 
contributions before 1992. Foreign workers and unpaid family workers have never 
been required to be active members. Nevertheless, the coverage of the CPF has 
increased gradually, from about one half of the labour force in the mid-1970s to over 
three quarters in the early 1990s. On top of their own contributions, children are 
encouraged to top up the CPF accounts of their parents and at times the government 
also offered top up schemes.  
 
Over  time  the  CPF  has  been  transformed  from  a  simple  pension  fund  to  a 
multipurpose saving scheme, which has been used by the government both as a 
channel of resource allocation and as a macro-economic stabilization device (Neo et 
al., 2003, Wang, 2000, Wu and Wang, 2003). Among the main alterations over time 
was the introduction of early withdrawals for the purchase of public council housing 
in 1968, which was extended in 1981 to include residential properties for investment 
purposes.  
 
The  higher  home  ownership  rate  in  Singapore  is  largely  the  result  of  two  major 
policies introduced by the Singapore government in the 1960s – the sale of public 149 
 
housing and the establishment of the CPF. If the home ownership rate is high, most 
home buyers in the market are expected to be „second home seekers‟. This means 
they hope to acquire a new property while reselling the one they currently own. Thus, 
it  helps  reduce  the  effect  of  financial  constraints  on  housing  consumption  in 
Singapore. 
 
Better still; the ability to repay a mortgage has been secured by the implementation 
of the CPF in Singapore. The CPF not only helps Singaporeans accumulate wealth 
for retirement, but also provides another means of financing the purchase of a home. 
According  to  the  Central  Provident  Fund  Board  of  Singapore  (CPF,  2010),  the 
financing schemes for home purchasers are as follows. 
 
First, the Public Housing Scheme allows CPF members to use their CPF savings to 
buy flats built by the Housing Development Board (HDB) and to pay the instalments 
on their housing loan;  
 
Second, the Residential Properties Scheme allows CPF members to use their CPF 
savings to buy private residential properties and executive condominiums, and to 
pay the instalments on their housing loan. CPF members can also use savings in 
their Special Accounts to help meet shortfalls in their  ability to  pay their housing 
instalments arising from a reduction in their employer‟s CPF contribution. 
 
In  addition  to  the  loan  scheme,  the  CPF  Board  launched  the  Home  Protection 
Scheme, which is a compulsory mortgage-reduction insurance scheme. It protects 
families who are using their CPF savings to repay their housing loans on HDB flats. 150 
 
CPF members can use their CPF savings to pay for their insurance premiums and 
thus be covered for the term of their housing loan or until they reach the maximum 
age of coverage, whichever is the earlier. In order not to impose an additional burden 
on members, the CPF contribution rates are also carefully determined. 
 
The rates of contribution are reviewed regularly and are adjusted to an appropriate 
level with respect to the economic situation. In addition, the contribution rates are 
different for different age groups. The rates are inversely proportional to age. As a 
result, younger members are required to save a larger portion of their income when 
they are more financially capable. 
 
In 2002, about 95 per cent of employees aged  twenty-one or above who owned 
public housing properties bought them with their CPF savings. For private properties, 
70 per cent of employees did so. The statistics show that the CPF is successful at 
helping Singaporeans to purchase their properties. It has also helped to indirectly 
stabilize the housing market in Singapore. 
 
B) China 
Reforms in the Chinese housing market during the early 1980s laid the foundation 
for the re-emergence of a private housing market (Lee, 2000). Subsequently, the 
state  withdrew  from  direct  provision  of  housing  for  their  employees.  The  existing 
stock of housing was sold to tenants, private developers were allowed to build new 
residential projects and the government allowed the formation of a secondary market 
in real estate. 
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The retreat of the state required new instruments of housing finance. China‟s first 
specialized  mortgage-financing  institution for housing finance,  the  Yantai Housing 
Savings  Bank,  opened  in  1987.  This  was  soon  followed  by  the  introduction  of  a 
housing provident fund (HPF) in Shanghai in 1991, modelled on Singapore‟s Central 
Provident  Fund  (Burell,  2006).  The  HPF  system  is  one  of  the  most  important 
promises made by the Chinese government to address the housing problem of low- 
and moderate-income households. It is a compulsory housing deposit system. The 
provident fund is collected by the employee and the employer respectively for 5 per 
cent to 10 per cent of the employee's salary and it is specifically for purchasing, 
constructing  or  repairing  the  employee's  housing.  It  is  a  compulsory  policy, 
guaranteed with mutual benefit. 
 
The success of Shanghai‟s HPF led to its extension through the rest of the country 
(Burell, 2006, Si-Ming and Zheng, 2007). Today, all individuals and work units in 
China are required to contribute a certain portion of an employee‟s salary to an HPF. 
The  HPF  provides  low-rate  provident  fund  loans  to  subscribers  for  two  main 
purposes: 1) short-term funding to work units, housing co-operatives and developers 
for  developing  affordable  housing;  2)  financing  households  for  housing,  including 
buying  a  house,  building  a  house  and  paying  rent.  Further,  although  commercial 
banks are currently the dominant lender in the Chinese primary mortgage market, 
they are supplemented by the HPF. As a result, China's housing mortgage industry 
has  grown  from  almost  nothing  in  1998  to  a  multibillion  US  Dollar  market  in  the 
recent past, accounting for about 10 per cent of the nation's GDP (Burell, 2006, Si-
Ming and Zheng, 2007).  
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3.8.3 Community Based Organisations  
Whatever  organisational  form  a  mortgage  system  takes  -  saving  and  loan 
association, building society, national mortgage bank, or some combination of these 
– no single aspect of its operation is likely to determine its success or failure than its 
ability to extend the reach of mortgage credit to better serve the low- and moderate- 
income households. For this reason, it is important to go further than figure 3.2 cited 
earlier. This section considers the role of community based organisations (CBOs) in 
the development of effective and sustainable mortgage credit systems at the lower 
income end of the housing market.  
 
A) The arguments for community based organisations   
In  the  face  of  the  urban  revolution  in  today‟s  world,  which  promises  to  rival  the 
industrial revolution of the previous century, governments everywhere are faced not 
only  with  the  challenge  of  providing  shelter  for  low-  and  moderate-  income 
households, but with ever-decreasing resources to devote to it (Hendriks, 2008). At 
the same time, international donor agencies are facing the challenge of dealing with 
the growing global economic and financial crises (Obi, 2011). Consequently, funds 
earmarked  for  programs  of  affordable  housing  and  low-cost  mortgage  credit  are 
usually insufficient.  
 
For  this  reason,  the  World  Bank  advocated  an  enabling  strategy  based  on 
privatization and deregulation with the aim of improving efficiency and effectiveness 
of housing policy and finance (World Bank, 1993). This strategy paved the way to a 
shift in the role of the state from a direct provider of services to an enabler, facilitator 
and regulator role (Jones and Datta, 2000, Angel and Mayo, 1996). It also supported 153 
 
the emergence of new initiatives based on co-production and/or co-management of 
different  institutions  such  as  private  sector  enterprises,  community-based 
organizations  (CBOs)  and  non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs)  (Stephens, 
2005a, Clapham and Kintrea, 2000, Otiso, 2003, Silverman, 2009). Since then, the 
state  has  been  expected  to  maintain  capability,  effectiveness  and  creditability  to 
support these different actors. On the other hand, direct provision by the state has to 
be reduced (UNCHS, 1990, World Bank, 1993, Fraser and Kick, 2007, Gupta et al., 
2006). 
 
CBOs usually operate on the principle that all people have a right to control their own 
destiny, and have a preference for housing solutions based on their own community 
or neighbourhood (Skinner, 1984). In cities around the world, low- and moderate- 
income households and the communities or neighbourhood organizations that they 
form undertake most additions to the housing stock. In many countries, CBOs play 
the  role  of  originators,  enablers  and  implementers  of  new  ideas  and  models  for 
housing delivery and finance (Davidson et al., 2007).  
 
The research on CBOs has also contributed much to the understanding of the nature 
and scale of housing problems and their collaborative efforts as coalition agents is 
now  evident  in  many  countries,  as  such  coalitions  seek  to  influence  government 
policies and priorities (Sukumar, 2001). In many instances CBOs have succeeded in 
demonstrating alternative solutions to meeting housing and service needs through 
specific projects, and these in turn have sometimes pointed to approaches which 
have  wider  applications  (Taher,  1997,  El  Demery,  2002,  Mitlin,  1999,  Stephens, 
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It is also argued that CBOs provide effective opportunities for the implementation of 
community  participation  ideals  and  that  these  organizations  are  more  likely  to 
promote authentic forms of participation than the state and private sector (Davidson 
et al., 2007). They are more flexible as they are not restricted in their activities to a 
particular field of work or driven by profit maximization objectives. Housing CBOs are 
established in many developing countries, working together with sympathetic local 
elites. Where the burden of maintaining these countries‟ public housing has become 
considerable,  the  government  is  increasingly  selling  its  public  housing  stock  to 
CBO‟s (Andrusz, 1999).  
 
B) Key challenges confronting community based organisations   
While  it  is  true  that  CBOs  have  played  a  major  role  in  the  promotion  of  home 
ownership in some countries, it cannot be claimed that their involvement has been 
faultless  (Rahman,  2002).  CBOs  have  been  in  existence  in  many  developing 
countries for many years, but most have not been able to generate sufficient funding 
through term savings to increase access to housing for their members; usually the 
more successful ones consist of high income households (Rodgers, 1998, Andrusz, 
1999,  Conaty,  2003).  Some  CBOs  are  too  ambitious;  engaging  in  relatively 
expensive  forms  of  housing  development  programmes  and  defaulting  is  not 
uncommon  (Teck-Hong,  2011).  Another  common  problem  is  that  CBOs  relatively 
find it difficult to acquire affordable and suitable land for the development of housing 
(Hendriks,  2008).  Other  problems  with  corporate  governance  also  limit  the 
effectiveness  of  CBOs  (Cairncross  and  Pearl,  2003).  All  these  problems  are 
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Financial Resources   
The nature of the CBOs‟ set-up and their activities are perhaps more involved and 
complicated  than  any  other  type  of  organisations.  The  CBOs  require  substantial 
financial resources at their disposal for investments in housing schemes extending 
for considerable length of time, and such funds should be available at reasonable 
interest rates (Pathak, 2008). The problem becomes even more involved in view of 
the  fact  that  the  founding  members  of  CBOs  are  of  limited  financial  means  and 
furthermore the funds needed are for long term investments in housing (Hendriks, 
2008). Securing credit is a difficult matter and particularly credit stretching for a long 
period of fifteen to twenty years. There are few organisations which are interested in 
this type of loans (Robertsen, 2007). So, the problem of raising adequate finance at 
reasonable interest rates ranks among the key problems facing most of the CBOs in 
the housing market. 
 
Many financial institutions are usually reluctant to consider long term loans (Hamm, 
2008). The few lending institutions that accommodate CBOs with credit might decide 
not to do so anymore on the grounds that their funds are exhausted or need all their 
financial  resources  for  the  development  of  their  own  schemes  or  enterprises 
(Ganapati,  2008).  So,  only  a  few  financial  institutions  may  be  prepared  to  give 
sympathetic  consideration  to  their  request  provided  the  credit  is  for  short  term. 
Further, the interest rates have to be high and very heavy securities are required. 
Accepting  credit on  this basis would  entail the members to make  heavy  monthly 
repayments causing hardship to them and in almost all the cases it will be almost 
impossible for them to meet their obligation (Robertsen, 2007).   
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Thus, the government has to come forward to grant credit which in many cases only 
in  respect  of  CBOs  where  the  participants  are  government  employees  (Andrusz, 
1999). In view of the numerous priorities that require the attention of government 
involving enormous public expenditure, it is unlikely that further large credit would be 
available to CBOs from this source for some time until the situation improves (Sibly, 
2011). The position therefore becomes increasingly difficult in the matter of raising 
fund.  
 
Access to Land  
CBOs need suitable land for the development of housing at a cost which will not be 
beyond  the  repaying  capacity  of  the  members  (HABITAT,  1989,  Rahman,  2002, 
Conaty, 2003). Such land should be suitable for building purposes and should be 
within the areas served by public transport and in which the supply of light and water 
and  other  services  are  available.  The  acquisition  of  land  for  the  development  of 
affordable housing is of paramount importance. Without suitable building land the 
functions of CBOs will come to a complete standstill (Agus, 1989, Pathak, 2008). 
Several  factors  have  to  be  considered,  especially  matters  such  as  cost,  the 
availability of supply of light and water and other services, suitability of the land for 
development  of  housing,  distance  to  the  town  centre,  the  availability  of  public 
transport system in the area, the nature of express conditions applicable to the land 
and the physical nature of the land to determine the cost that would be involved for 
development and also whether or not access to the main road would be available 
and finally whether the required clearances from the authorities concerned would be 
forthcoming in due course (Hendriks, 2008).  
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So, considerable care should be exercised by the CBOs when purchasing land for 
development of housing. Failure to do so will cause them untold difficulties and inflict 
unnecessary  hardship  to  the  members by  way  of  increased  cost  to  them  (Mohit, 
2010).  CBOs  have  hitherto,  in  a  few  cases  like  India,  Malaysia  and  Egypt, 
encountered  such  shortcomings  that  led  to  serious  trouble,  warranting  the 
abandonment of their housing schemes midway causing substantial financial losses 
and undue delay in the completion of the schemes and also attracting unfavourable 
criticism both from the press and the public damaging the image of  CBOs in the 
domestic housing market (Ganapati, 2008, Teck-Hong, 2011).  
 
Corporate Governance  
Having considered the two major problems, namely financial resources mobilisation 
and  access  to  land,  which  continue  to  inflict  the  CBOs  and  frustrate  their  free 
operation in many countries, let us turn our attention to the other challenges facing 
the CBOs. Today, the CBOs have to provide the same advantages and facilities, if 
not better than those provided by the private sector (Salleh, 2008, Abdul-Aziz, 2010). 
But,  the  problem  of  not  having  sufficient  number  of  trained,  experienced  and 
dedicated personnel for service is indeed a pressing one (Andrusz, 1999).  
 
The  activities  of  CBOs  as  non-profit  organisations  are  complex  in  nature  and 
problems of all sorts keep emerging from time to time. Large sums of money are 
generally  involved  in  their  undertakings  and  any  slight  mistake  or  misjudgement 
would  render  the  CBOs  to  incur  serious  losses  (Ramanath,  2009).  Precise  and 
correct  information  should  be  furnished  to  the  members,  failing  which  friction 
between the CBOs and their members are likely to arise. 
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Another  issue  related  to  corporate  governance  that  deserves  mention  is  that  the 
democratic set-up of the CBOs tends to create problems between them and their 
members. Unlike commercial organisations, the members in  CBOs have a say in 
their  management  (Rahman,  2002).  It  is  not  an  easy  matter  to  satisfy  all  the 
members  and  quite  often  conflicting  ideas  and  opinions  between  the  CBOs  and 
members, tend to restrict actions and decisions of the management of CBOs (Otiso, 
2003).  
 
C) Community based organisations and extending the reach of mortgage credit    
It  has  already  been  acknowledged  in  the  international  literature  that  community-
based approaches are making a significant contribution to extending the reach of 
housing  finance  (Skinner,  1984,  UNCHS-Habitat,  1984a,  UNCHS-Habitat,  1984b, 
Clapham and Kintrea, 2000, de Wit and Berner, 2009, Silverman, 2009). So, CBO‟s, 
as  non-profit  organisations,  appear  to  be  attractive  policy  agents  to  enhance  the 
development  of  an  effective  and  sustainable  mortgage  market  (Daniels,  2004, 
Stephens, 2005c). Their capacity to mobilize capital for mortgage credit programmes 
is usually  supported by  high  levels of  social motivation,  supportive  organizational 
structures and low-cost funding mechanisms (Thiripurasundari, 2004).  
 
This  has  led  many  researchers  and  policy  makers  to  experiment  with  more 
innovative credit programmes which are initiated or sustained by CBOs (Stephens, 
2005c,  Copestake,  1996).  However,  in  some  cases  especially  in  the  developing 
countries,  the  CBOs  have  played  a  relatively  limited  role  in  this  area  (HABITAT, 
1989). Indeed, the idea of a partnership between mortgage lenders and CBOs such 
as housing co-operative societies has not been fully explored. This can be attributed 159 
 
to two reasons. First, in its role as provider, the government has always maintained a 
somewhat suspicious attitude towards the effectiveness of CBOs‟ role in this area. 
This is clear from the very limited government funding for CBOs in some developing 
countries (Rahman, 2002). Second, the general problems of the CBOs in developing 
countries have meant that there have been few of them with whom governments can 
engage in a dialogue (Otiso, 2003).  
 
On the other hand, the CBOs record in some countries indicates an ability to assist 
in organizing a flow of capital from a group in  society that has traditionally been 
outside of the formal financial system (Andrusz, 1999, Dwelly, 1999). The CBOs also 
represent a natural match to the individual or group capacity for savings (HABITAT, 
1989, Conaty, 2003). In another words, integrating the activities of CBOs in the area 
of savings mobilisation and  the activities in the domestic mortgage market would 
support  extending  the  reach  of  mortgage  credit  and  building  inclusive  housing 
finance system (UNCDF, 2006, Beck et al., 2009).  
 
The following review of India‟s current financial co-operative movement highlights the 
importance  of  CBOs  development  in  expanding  the  national  mortgage  credit 
markets, which can provide useful lessons to Egypt.    
 
 
The Case of India’s Financial Co-operative Movement  
In the absence of commercial lending institutions catering to their financial needs, 
many  low-  and  moderate-income  households  and  their  housing  co-operative 
societies in India have to depend entirely on the co-operative movement (Mahadeva, 
2006). Now more than 100 years old, India‟s financial co-operative system is the 160 
 
largest in the world in terms of households served. Credit union pioneer Edward A. 
Filene‟s visit to India‟s financial co-operatives in 1906 inspired him to help launch the 
credit union movement in the United States (UNCDF, 2006).    
 
India‟s current financial co-operative movement consists of a three-tier structure of 
urban co-operative banks (UCBs), rural financial co-operatives and credit societies 
(Reserve  Bank  of  India,  2011).  The  rural  co-operative  tier  is  further  divided  into 
108,000  primary  agricultural  co-operatives  that  meet  the  needs  of  127  million 
members, including small farmers and traders, and district co-operative banks that 
serve both individuals and other co-operatives. The country also supports 30 state-
level co-operative banks.  
 
In total, India‟s financial co-operatives serve an estimated 267 million to 350 million 
households.  Table  3.2  shows  the  market  share  of  India‟s  financial  co-operative 
movement in the domestic banking sector as on March 31, 2010.  
 
Table 3.2 Market Share of India‟s financial co-operatives in the banking sector as on 
March 31, 2010    
Indicators   Co-operative Banks & 
Credit Societies 
Commercial Banks  
Number of Banks  2,157  83 
Share  in  Total 
Deposits, % 
9.9  90.1 
Share in Total Loans & 
Advances, % 
8.8  91.2 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, 2011 
 
India‟s financial co-operatives have been operating for a long time. In early days, 
they were quite content in looking after the interest of their members and returning 
them  with  the  highest  possible  dividends  but  were  not  at  all  concerned  with  the 161 
 
development  and  expansion  of  the  other  sectors  of  the  co-operative  movement 
(Saravanan,  2007).  With  the  attainment  of  independence  and  with  the  enlarged 
activities of the financial co-operatives, the attitude of India‟s financial co-operatives 
began  to  change.  They  realised  that  they  have,  if  not  legal,  at  least  a  moral 
obligation to the other sectors of the movement. With this changed attitude they kept 
coming  forward  to  assist  whenever  required  and  were  also  prepared  to  provide 
house building loans (including house repairing loans) even though more attractive 
investment opportunities were available outside the movement (Mahadeva, 2006). 
This was the turning point in the history of the financial co-operative movement in 
India  and  the  housing  co-operatives  in  particular  have  been  benefitting  from  this 
changed attitude (Sukumar, 2001).  
 
The  financial  co-operative  institutions  which  form  the  backbone  of  the  Indian  co-
operative movement have substantial financial resources at their disposal and their 
working  capital  remarkably  grows  every  year.  These  institutions  are  old  and 
efficiently managed and from the membership of these institutions have emerged the 
leaders  of  the  co-operative  movement  who  were  responsible  for  initiating  the 
establishment  of  new  co-operative  ventures  including  the  housing  co-operative 
societies (Digby, 1978). In keeping with the policy of active co-operation among co-
operative  institutions  and  to  invest  surplus  funds  as  far  as  possible  within  the 
movement, the Indian financial co-operative institutions have been coming forward to 
grant credit to housing co-operative societies.  
 
Another important factor which prompted financial co-operative institutions to do this 
is that a very large proportion of the members of housing co-operative societies are 162 
 
members of financial co-operative institutions as well (Ganapati, 2008). Rather than 
investing  surplus  funds  in  commercial  banks  and  in  enterprises  outside  the 
movement, India‟s financial co-operative institutions consider it right and proper to 
invest  in  co-operative  undertakings  particularly  in  housing  co-operative  societies 
which  will  go  to  benefit  the  co-operators  (Mahadeva,  2006).  Furthermore,  the 
investments  in  housing  co-operative  societies  yield  reasonable  returns  and  also 
obtain first class securities in the form of mortgages to cover the credit advanced. 
Lastly, India‟s financial co-operative institutions derive the satisfaction of contributing 
substantially towards the continued expansion and development of the co-operative 
movement (Saravanan, 2007).  
 
It  is  reckoned  that  India‟s  financial  co-operative  institutions  have  so  far  provided 
many credits to housing cooperative societies. The problem however was that India‟s 
financial co-operative institutions do not have the necessary machinery to supervise 
and  manage  investments  of  this  nature  and  to  process  loan  applications  from 
housing co-operative societies as these are not their real functions (Sukumar, 2001). 
To  overcome  this  problem,  the  financial  co-operative  movement  established  co-
operative central banks and the National Cooperative Housing Federation of India. 
Whilst the function of the co-operative central banks is to mobilise the surplus funds 
available in the movement across India for the purpose of providing loan facilities to 
co-operative  undertakings,  the  National  Cooperative  Housing  Federation  is  to 
provide advisory and technical services and also to help to process applications for 
credit  from  housing  co-operative  societies.  With  the  gradual  development  of  co-
operative central banking, India‟s financial co-operative institutions have adopted the 163 
 
policy  of  assisting  housing  co-operative  societies  through  this  institutional  set-up 
rather than making direct loans (Saravanan, 2007).  
 
The co-operative central bank have been established firstly to serve as the banking 
institution  for  the  regional  sector  of  the  financial  co-operative  movement  and  to 
provide adequate and timely credit at reasonable interest rates to needy households 
or their co-operative societies to implement their schemes or expand their activities 
(Mahadeva,  2006).  With  housing  co-operative  societies  having  no  other  sources 
available to them to raise fund, the co-operative central banks would be called upon 
to play an increasingly major role in the provision of long term credit to them in the 
future.  To  meet  this  situation  the  co-operative  central  banks  have  reorganised 
themselves in a manner to be able to tap all the available financial resources in the 
movement speedily (Ganapati, 2010).  
 
The  Reserve  Bank  of  India  is  vested  with  the  responsibility  of  regulating  and 
supervising the primary (urban) co-operative banks. Through its 17 regional offices, 
the Reserve Bank of India performs three main functions: regulatory, supervisory 
and developmental to ensure that the financial co-operative movement conduct its 
affairs  in  the  best  interests  of  the  member  depositors  and  also  comply  with  the 
regulatory framework (Reserve Bank of India, 2011). The Reserve Bank of India is 
committed to work towards building a strong and viable co-operative banking and 
credit system across India.   
 
The Reserve Bank of India recognises the useful role of the financial co-operative 
movement in the unbanked districts and centres. For this reason, it encourages new 164 
 
entrants to open co-operative banks and credit societies in states and districts which 
are  unbanked  or  inadequately  banked.  Further,  it  also  extends  institutional  credit 
support to small units and grants refinance facilities to urban cooperative banks.          
 
3.8.4 Mortgage Credit Subsidy 
Apart from viewing affordability as an income problem, it can also be seen as a 
housing  market  problem  (Gibb,  2003).  First,  government  intervention  tends  to  be 
geared towards adjusting the denominator of the rent-to-income ratio. If access to 
affordable housing is considered a market problem, it refers to a government role 
concerning  the  physical  provision  of  housing.  A  typical  house  can  be  made 
affordable by means of a subsidy, but this option is rather limited for developing 
countries due to the scale of their housing problems and shortage of financial means 
(Malpezzi and Mayo, 1987). 
 
The earlier discussion has illustrated the role of subsidy in some mortgage systems, 
example the Bausparkassen systems in Western and Eastern Europe. It remains 
important, however, to note that subsidy programmes should be considered short-
term alternatives to an efficient mortgage system. In an inefficient mortgage system, 
mortgage lenders may ration mortgage credit because of concern about risks and 
information problems.  
 
This is known as credit rationing, whereby a borrower is refused a mortgage credit 
regardless of the price they are willing to pay  (Stansell and Mitchell, 1985). This 
phenomenon has long perplexed economists, in particular because it indicates an 165 
 
apparent suspension of price as the arbiter of allocations  (Kent, 1987, Duca and 
Rosenthal, 1991).  
 
Rationing of mortgage credit is done in two ways: first, mortgage lenders limit access 
to credit to those able to afford to make significant down payments; and second, they 
limit eligibility for mortgage credit for those unable to pay more than a specific share 
of their income for repayments. In such a case, many governments may intervene 
and provide subsidies for households so that they are able to save enough in a 
second  mortgage  to  top  up  the  low  loan-to-value  (LTV)  ratio  they  can  get  from 
mortgage  lenders.  However,  such  subsidies,  as  indicated  earlier,  constitute  a 
significant  portion  of  national  budgets,  and  in  many  cases  lead  to  deficits  and 
considerable inflationary pressure.  
 
Duebel (2000) reviewed a number of mortgage subsidy reform programmes in very 
heterogeneous markets, in terms of their overall development and macroeconomic 
context,  the  level  of  mortgage  market  penetration  and  the  depth  of  public 
involvement  in  direct  provision  of  low-income  mortgage  and  housing  services 
(Duebel,  2000).  Table  3.3  summarizes  his  ratings  of  these  reform  programmes. 
However, one should note the shortcoming of Duebel‟s review and ratings as they 
can  be  considered  oversimplified  and  lack  clear  criteria  for  assessment  and 
comparison.     166 
 
 
Table  3.3  Ratings  of  some  mortgage  market  and  subsidy  for  homeowners 
reform programmes 
Country   Subsidy Reform  Mortgage Market Reform 
Sweden   Successful   Partly successful  
United Kingdom  Highly successful   Partly successful  
Germany   Successful   Neutral  
Hungry   Successful   Partly successful  
Philippines  Partly successful  Unsuccessful  
Czech Republic   Highly successful  Neutral 
South Africa   Partly successful  Partly successful 
Chile   Successful   Neutral  
Costa Rica   Partly successful  Highly unsuccessful 
 Source: (Duebel, 2000) 
 
 
The important fact however is that subsidies can help or hinder market development 
(Rosen,  1983,  Maclennan  and  Gibb,  1993,  Le  Blanc,  2005).  Deep  mortgage 
subsidies seem to encourage large amounts of lending, associated primarily  with 
taking out mortgages in order to substitute for other funds that earn a higher return. 
Such lending activity can encourage more lenders to enter the market but, notably, 
there  is  little  evidence  that  mortgage  subsidies  have  much  impact  on  lending 
volumes,  at  least  in  the  earlier  stages  of  market  development.  Common  sense 
suggests  that  such  subsidies  should  have  some  impact,  but  that  impact  may  be 
overshadowed  by  the  fact  that  subsidies  usually  undermine  the  development  of 
market-rate  lending  (Stephens,  2005a,  Gibb  and Whitehead,  2007).  The  low-rate 
government  mortgages  made  in  some  transitional  economies  (for  example  the 
Czech  Republic)  have  almost  certainly  stunted  demand  for  regular  mortgages 
(Sunega and Lux, 2007).  167 
 
Finally, subsidy usually, though not always, tends to improve access to the mortgage 
market  and  hence  increase  housing  demand.  The  overall  impact  of  subsidy 
programmes  may  be  either  positive  or  negative  depending  on  the  way  they  are 
funded and the form in subsidies are distributed. Generally, subsidy programmes are 
often considered inefficient in achieving their objectives. For example, some studies 
considered that mortgage tax relief was substantially capitalized in higher prices and 
failed to achieve housing policy objectives in relation to access to housing (Bramley, 
1992). This explains why the World Bank favoured, for a number of years, the neo-
liberalist policies that promote cost recovery and user pays principles (Pugh, 2001).  
 
In recent years, many transition economies reduced and replaced their  mortgage 
subsidy programmes with other instruments such as mortgage default insurance, for 
cost effectiveness and better efficiency. When correctly structured, mortgage default 
insurance programmes are more efficient than other schemes that rely on subsidies 
to address mortgage credit problems, for example credit rationing (Buckley et al., 
2003).  During  the  recent  financial  crisis,  mortgage  lenders  in  different  countries 
significantly  tightened  origination  standards  for  mortgages  primarily  for  low-  and 
moderate-income households. But, the creation of insured mortgage programmes, in 
countries such as the United States and Canada in which the governments either 
guarantee or purchase mortgages from the mortgage market, have supported the 
lenders  in  these  markets  to  access  low-cost  funding  necessary  and  to  continue 
offering affordable mortgages. 168 
 
3.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has reviewed the international literature and agencies that prompt much 
of it, with particular reference to the prerequisites for the development of an effective 
and  sustainable  mortgage  intermediation  system  that  works  better  for  low-  and 
moderate-income  households  in  terms  of  increasing  their  access  to  the  housing 
market. Several approaches have been reviewed in search for policy alternatives 
and mortgage credit models. There is no doubt that some of these alternatives and 
models do propose „first best‟ solutions to improve the provision of mortgage credit 
for  Egyptian  low-  and  moderate-income  households.  They  also  highlight  several 
attributes required to increase the penetration of Egyptian mortgage credit market 
based on which the following propositions can be made.  
 
Mortgage credit in some developing countries has received very little attention over 
the years. Mortgage credit has to be seen in the context of the national economy and 
more  specifically  the  national  financial  system.  The  state  of  mortgage  credit 
intermediation in a country reflects to some extent the state of its economy. It is not 
likely that the problem of limited penetration of mortgage market can be addressed 
without  solving  the  economic  problem  first.  For  example,  the  development  of 
effective  and  sustainable  mortgage  market  requires  effective  inflation  targeting 
policies.  
 
It is also evident from the literature that household savings and government support 
are  important  factors  for  mortgage  market  development.  Historically,  the  bulk  of 
funding for mortgage credit usually came from the primary markets, namely various 
types  of  term  saving  schemes.  The  track  record  of  the  term  saving  schemes 169 
 
movement in the developing and transitional countries offers a number of lessons for 
a  country  like  Egypt.  For  example,  term  saving  is  inappropriate  for  high  inflation 
countries, where the bulk of the subsidy is going towards offsetting inflation, and the 
net rewards for saving in the system relative to a mortgage is very dependent on the 
course of inflation during the contract period. Moreover, the fears that term saving 
could be very expensive, and that the budget burden would be politically difficult to 
manage, have been confirmed.  
 
The high demand for mortgage credit, coupled with low interest rates on savings, 
raise many questions over the continued ability of institutions to fund mortgage credit 
primarily through funds from the primary markets alone. Today, mortgage lenders  
are  increasingly  combining  funding  from  the  primary  markets  with  other  funding 
sources, such as the capital (secondary) markets, for the purpose of liquidity risk 
management.  
 
Efficiency of mortgage markets is measured by funding capacity. Increasing savings 
and creating sustainable funding for mortgages is important for the development and 
effectiveness of mortgage markets. Thus, a mortgage market would largely benefit 
from  the  entry  of  several  saving  institutions,  including  non-profit  and  community-
based organizations, which can mobilize savings at a low cost for mortgage lenders 
such  as  commercial  banks.  However,  an  extended  network  of  mortgage  credit 
intermediation has a downside. The growing involvement of savings institutions can 
make the mortgage market more vulnerable to speculative runs in an early stage of 
development.  
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The flow of more capital to a mortgage market is also dependent on the existence of 
a robust financial safety net. The resilience shown by a mortgage market and the 
willingness of a government and financial institutions to safeguard the network of 
mortgage  credit  intermediation  should  provide  some  support  to  increase  the 
penetration of the mortgage market at the low- and moderate-income level of the 
housing market.  
 
The regulation of mortgage credit and the reason for the existence of a network of 
intermediaries  are  intertwined.  Regulation  is  not  solely  the  outcome  of  a  political 
agenda that is separate from the reasons why mortgage institutions exist. To make 
mortgage credit intermediation a viable business in which there is public confidence, 
reform of the regulatory environment is essential.  
 
The significant social and economic benefits of developing effective and sustainable 
mortgage market with high penetration level can be attained quickly in the middle 
and later stages of transition if proper supply-side preparations have been made. 
Reform and development of a mortgage market is needed early on in the transition 
process to prepare for this outcome. The enthusiasm of mortgage credit institutions 
(as well as their required margin) will depend on the presence of an adequate legal 
and  financial  infrastructure  for  mortgage  credit.  Mortgage  credit  institutions  and 
regulators face a steep learning curve as well; this is an area where the role of non-
profit and community-based organizations is probably very important. 
 
A  continuing  direct  government  role  through  subsidy  programmes  can  distort 
mortgage  market  development  and  efficiency  in  several  ways.  Government-171 
 
influenced institutions may fix mortgage rates too low to be commercially attractive, 
and then ration access to minimize the damage. Borrowers may perceive that such 
institutions  are  not  free  to  aggressively  pursue  mortgage  credit  recovery.  At  the 
opposite  extreme,  consolidation  of  the  monopoly  position  of  the  government-
influenced institutions may permit charging rates that are too high, similarly stunting 
the market. 
 
To sum up, the analysis and experiences discussed in this chapter suggest that the 
development of mortgage markets in many developing countries is strikingly similar 
in  their  starting  point.  But,  some  countries  appear  relatively to  have  made  major 
progress in increasing the penetration of their mortgage markets to support access 
to  housing  for  low-  and  moderate-income  households.  Some  of  the  proposed 
solutions based on these experiences might not be applicable to the context of Egypt 
at present. However, the analysis highlighted the important role of community-based 
organizations in the development of effective and sustainable mortgage markets that 
can work better for low- and moderate-income households. This role needs to be 
evaluated  in  the  context  of  Egypt  where  CBOs  such  as  housing  co-operative 
societies have already been considered as a response to the housing problem in the 
country. Such evaluation is important to fill the gap in Egyptian literature in relation to 
why community-based organizations in Egypt can be seen as an important policy 
instrument to deepen the mortgage credit intermediation and to improve access to 
housing in Egypt.  
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4. METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Introduction 
Embarking on a research project presents many challenges for the researcher right 
from the onset. Once the initial hurdle of defining the research topic is achieved,  it is 
important to start the process of choosing a relevant research method or methods 
(Riley et al., 2000). The complex nature of firstly understanding methodologies, and 
secondly applying research methods and tools, can often incrementally or radically 
alter the initial proposed research topic.  
 
As  is  clear  from  the  review  of  the  current  Egyptian  context  (chapter  2)  and 
international literature (chapter 3), mortgage credit in Egypt remains limited in its 
reach and this requires a clear strategy for the supply side to address this limitation. 
Thus, there is a need to assess the intermediary role of existing institutions on the 
supply  side  of  the  Egyptian  housing  and  mortgage  markets.  Two  of  the  most 
prominent  institutions  in  these  markets  at  present  are  the  housing  co-operative 
societies and banking institutions.  
 
The co-operation between housing co-operative societies and banking institutions in 
Egypt  can  create  an  effective  and  sustainable  mortgage  credit  intermediation 
system.  This  can  improve  access  to  housing  for  low-  and  moderate-income 
households in the country. So, this chapter explains the selected methodology and 
data collection methods for the assessment and studying the relationship between 
these  institutions  and  the  reasoning  behind  those  selections  as  well  as  the 
advantages and disadvantages of such selections. 
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4.2 Context for Suggested Housing Policy Reforms 
For more than 20 years Egypt has been in transition from central planning economy 
to  a  free  market.  During  this  time  the  Egyptian  government  has  become 
progressively unstable due in part to the country‟s attempt to change simultaneously 
its political structure and its economic orientation. As is noted earlier, the Egyptian 
government has undertaken an economic reform and structural adjustment program 
starting  from  1991  (Handoussa,  1992).  In  the  recent  past,  the  reform  program 
entered a new phase, where more aggressive changes and adjustments were made 
to foster private sector development, as the main policy agent in the country‟s new 
development strategy to achieve rapid, efficient, and sustainable economic growth – 
something  that  the  past  centrally-planned  system  has  not  delivered  (Moharam, 
2006).  
 
A few months before the recent revolution in Egypt at the beginning of 2011, a raft of 
new economic reforms was planned for 2011-12 (CBE, 2010). The government was 
planning to continue its programme of incremental reductions to subsidies especially 
on energy products in a bid to align domestic and international prices and minimise 
the fiscal drain. In the financial sector, the government‟s consolidation programme in 
the banking sector aimed to maintain a relatively stable and domestic liquidity at 
comfortable levels. The government also continued to tighten regulation and to work 
on improving access to finance for the private sector. Further, the objective of public 
private  partnership  (PPP)  law  passed  in  June  2010  was  to  facilitate  the 
implementation of PPPs and thereby speed up the ongoing government programme 
to improve Egypt‟s infrastructure (for example: hospitals, roads, railways, ports, and 
wastewater treatment) and other public services such as affordable housing. 174 
 
While  the  earlier  reform  program  was  successful  in  fostering  private  sector 
development, the benefits of economic growth in recent years have not been evenly 
spread, and despite the emergence of a growing middle class, the bulk of Egypt‟s 84 
million population remained extremely poor (Askar, 2005, IDSC, 2008). Perhaps the 
most fundamental miscalculation that led to the recent revolution in Egypt is that the 
government has failed to address the issue of inequality in the distribution of the 
benefits  of  economic  growth.  The  Egyptian  government,  which  has  always  been 
controlled by authoritarian military rule since a coup in 1952, used force to address 
any  disaffection  among  the  population  about  inadequate  salaries  and  poor  living 
standards. Unaware of the risk of social dislocation, the government‟s liberalisation 
program  that  has  always  favoured  the  private  sector  even  more  than  other  non-
governmental sectors moved too quickly, and the reforms ignored the increasingly 
bold  demonstrations  and  industrial  actions  by  labour  activists,  which  finally 
developed a more overtly political tone in January 2011.    
 
Following  the  revolution,  the  interim  government  has  been  trying  to  address  the 
inherited problems from the previous government. Most notably,  it is focusing on 
mending the relation with the public by focusing on maintaining supplies of essential 
goods and services and on creating jobs, for example through allocating resources 
for public works projects. The interim government however remains confined by the 
scale of economic and social challenges in the country. Further, political instability 
has prompted the interim government to put reforms on hold and in some cases 
reverse previous policies, especially in relation to privatisation.  
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However, Egypt is generally classified as a lower middle-income developing country 
by the World Bank. Table 4.1 below provides selected statistics on Egypt published 
by the World Bank in comparison to selected countries that made major progress in 
the  transition  and  development  of  their  national  housing  finance  systems,  as 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Table 4.1 A Comparison of Selected Egyptian and Transitional Economies Data  
Indicators   Egypt  Czech Republic  China   India 
GDP Growth, %  4.9%  -4.1%  10.3%  9.7% 
GNI per Capita, US$  $2,440  $17,400  $3,650  $1,340 
Gross Savings (% of GDP)  17%  27.1%  51%  28% 
Population, millions  82  10.6  1,338.9  1,172.7 
Population Growth,%  1.9%  0.4%  0.5%  1.3% 
Youth Population, %  37%  n.a.  32%  35% 
Unemployment, %  9.4%  6.7%  4.3%  4.4% 
Poverty Headcount, %  22.0%  <2%  2.8%  36.0% 
Bank Credit (% of GDP)  78%  58%  145%  73% 
Inflation Rate, %  11.8%  2.3%  4.6%  10.9% 
Overall Budget Balance, %  -6.6%  -6.1%  -2.8%  -4.9% 
Source: (World Bank, 2011)   
 
As is clear, the key issue remains that the Egyptian population continues to grow by 
around 1.9% per year with unemployment already high at 9.4%, so large numbers of 
new jobs must be created. GNI per capita is low at $2,440, and according to the 
World Bank‟s data; the last estimated percentage of people living below the poverty 
line  in  Egypt  is  22%.  The  successive  governments  have  been  trying  to  increase 176 
 
expenditures on social programs with an objective of alleviating poverty in Egypt. In 
reaction  to  rising  inflation,  the  government  usually  expands  the  program  of 
subsidizing a basket of basic goods. But, with an annual inflation rate of 11.8% as of 
2010, such politically motivated subsidies cannot be sustainable as subsidies put 
more strain on public finances. The government‟s over-strained budget can ill afford 
more subsidies, with the overall budget deficit reaching 6.6% of GDP in 2010. Such 
budget deficit pressures limits the government capacity to use non-market measures 
particularly subsidies to improve access and affordability in the housing market.  
 
On the other hand, there is still a strong demand for mortgage credit as evidenced by 
the high population growth at 1.9% and large percentage of youth population at 37%. 
The existing mortgage system is still limited in its reach and serves a small section of 
the  population.  Accordingly,  establishing  an  effective  and  sustainable  mortgage 
market  that  works  better  for  low-  and  moderate-  income  households  without 
increasing budget deficit pressures can make an important contribution to stability 
and economic growth in Egypt.  
 
In recent years, the government has already begun to implement a major financial 
sector restructuring program (El-Refaie, 1998, CBE, 2010). This is in order to tackle 
the deterioration in commercial bank performance and develop non-bank financial 
services. In essence, the government started with a series of reforms and process of 
consolidation  within  the  banking  sector  in  order  to  create  financially  sound 
institutions. But, one can hardly note any measures taken to date to encourage the 
development of non-bank financial services (especially at the lower- and moderate- 
income end of the housing market).  177 
 
A policy reform that is focusing on strengthening mortgage market infrastructure and 
developing  the  role  of  housing  co-operative  societies  as  market  intermediaries 
similar  to  the  Indian  financial  co-operative  movement  to  make  market  resources 
available  for  housing  the  low-  and  moderate-  income  households  would  make  a 
positive contribution in closing the current gap.  
 
4.3 Objectives/Hypothesis Testing  
Research on the mortgage market in Egypt so far appears to concentrate almost 
exclusively on understanding the nature and scale of the market. It overlooks many 
questions in relation to the effectiveness and sustainability of the mortgage system in 
improving  the  provision  of  mortgage  credit  and  the  role  of  institutions  after  the 
mortgage market has reached a certain stage of development. This overlook actually 
suggested the overall research objective in terms of evaluating the effectiveness and 
sustainability  of  the  institutional  structure  and  network  of  mortgage  credit 
intermediation and the role of banking and community based organisations in the 
proposed reform. Thus, the research objective is to address the following: 
 
  Why Egyptian housing co-operative societies can be seen as important policy 
agents to expand the mortgage credit beneficiaries base in Egypt;  
  Evaluate the effectiveness of the Egyptian housing co-operative societies as 
community based organisations and policy agents;  
  Identify  and  analyse  the  various  economic,  social  and  political  factors 
influencing this effectiveness;  178 
 
  Assess the role of the banking institutions (as contextual stakeholders in the 
immediate  environment  of  the  Egyptian  housing  co-operative  societies)  in 
expanding access to mortgage credit and savings in Egypt; and  
  Identify which institutions constrain most the development of an effective and 
sustainable  level  of  mortgage  credit  for  low-  and  moderate-income 
households. 
 
Addressing  these  objectives  would  contribute  to filling  part  of  the  existing  gap  in 
literature regarding the limited penetration of the mortgage credit in Egypt at present, 
and the role of community based organisations and banks as stakeholders in the 
development of an effective and sustainable strategy to deal with this issue.  
 
4.4 The Choice of Methods  
After reviewing the context for suggested housing policy reforms and identifying the 
research objectives, we now turn our attention to the choice of methods. There are 
four  main  methods  that  a  social  researcher  can  use:  questionnaires,  interviews, 
observation  and  documents.  Each  method  provides  a  tool  for  the  collection  of 
empirical data to help the researcher to gain a clearer picture of things; an accurate 
measurement of things; and facts and evidence about the subject matter. Before 
choosing and using any of these tools, it was important to consider five points:  
 
• First, although certain research strategies have come to be associated with the use 
of certain research methods this does not rule out the possibility of choice.  
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• Second, each of the methods has its particular strengths and weaknesses.  
 
• Third, when it comes to choosing a method, researchers should base their decision 
on the criterion of 'usefulness'.  
 
• Fourth, research methods do not need to be seen as mutually exclusive. More than 
one method can be used for the research with the clear intention that weaknesses in 
one method can be compensated for by strengths in another method.  
 
• Fifth, the use of more than one method allows the researcher to use triangulation. 
The combination of different methods can be used by the researcher to look at the 
research  topic  from  a  variety  of  perspectives,  as  a  means  of  comparison  and 
contrast, with each method approaching the topic from a different angle.  
  
Based  on  these  considerations,  it  was  decided  that  different  methods  are  better 
suited  to  this  research.  Accordingly,  the  four  main  methods  (questionnaires, 
interviews, observation and documents) were almost all used within this research but 
at different degrees. Surveys and interviews were selected to be key methods for 
this research while documents were considered to be less reliable, especially under 
the authoritarian regime in Egypt since 1952 that used propaganda rather than facts 
to rule the country.      
 
Surveys tend to be linked with questionnaires which were used because they are 
believed to be productive in this research situation: 1) there is a large numbers of 
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relatively brief and uncontroversial; 3) there is a need for standardized data from 
identical  questions  –  without  requiring  personal,  face-to-face  interaction;  4)  the 
respondents are able to read and understand the questions; and 5) the social climate 
is open enough to allow full and honest answers.  
 
While  questionnaires  proved  to  be  a  more  cost-effective  method,  the  collected 
information remained simple with some uncontroversial facts. Further, the attitude of 
some respondents in answering the questionnaires continued to reflect the limited 
openness of the social climate in Egypt, in terms of freedom of expression. Thus, the 
researcher  still  needed  to  gain  insights  into  the  respondents'  opinions  and 
experiences. There was a great value in establishing contact with key players in the 
field who can give privileged information.  
 
Accordingly,  interviews  provided  another  suitable  method.  The  interviews  helped 
address procedural issues around data collection through questionnaires. Although 
interviews can be used for the collection of straightforward factual information, their 
potential as a data collection method is better exploited when they are applied to the 
exploration of more complex and subtle topic such as the topic being addressed in 
this research. The decision to use interviews for this research project, of course, 
needed to take account of their feasibility as a data collection method. So, before 
embarking on the programme of interviews the researcher needed to feel assured 
that:  
 
• It  is  possible  to  gain  direct  access  to  the  prospective  interviewees.  There  is 
obviously no point in pursuing the idea of conducting interviews unless there are 181 
 
good grounds for believing that the necessary people can be accessed, and that 
some agreement can be obtained from all the parties involved in the research.  
 
• The interviews are viable in terms of the costs in time and travel involved. With 
limited  resources,  the  researcher  needed  to  ensure  that  the  people  are  not 
distributed  too  widely  across  a  large  geographical  area  and  that  conducting  the 
interviews will not incur prohibitive costs.  
  
In  addition  to  questionnaires  and  interviews,  reviewing  Egyptian  government 
publications and official statistics seemed to be an attractive method to be applied in 
the  research.  However,  the  extent  to  which  such  documents  were  used  as 
authoritative, objective and factual methods depended very much on the data they 
contained. In general, certain types of official statistics, to all intents and purposes, 
provided an objective picture of reality. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for 
certain  other  types  of  official  statistics.  For  example,  when  Egyptian  politicians 
debated  the  accuracy  of  unemployment  figures  or  the  significance  of  particular 
national economic figures, such as economic growth, there is clearly some doubt 
and  controversy  about  the  objectivity,  the  accuracy,  the  completeness  and  the 
relevance of some official statistics.  
 
This alerted the researcher to the point that official statistics cannot always be taken 
as 'objective facts'. To say this is not to indicate that the use of all official statistics as 
a source of data was rejected for this research. But what it does mean is that before 
treating a set of official statistics as accurate and objective, the researcher had to 182 
 
consider some factors. Whether there are vested interests in the statistics that are 
produced.  
 
Clearly, the Egyptian government did appear to have a vested interest in a variety of 
statistics, and as indicated earlier, statistics are being manipulated to support the 
authoritarian regime in the country. They are the outcome of a series of decisions 
and judgements made by the government that is not open to being challenged. 
 
4.5 Research Methodology  
Methodology is the term used to explain the author‟s philosophical approach and 
presents  a  list  of  the  data  collection  techniques  or  research  methods  to  be 
administered during a given research project. A methodology refers to the overall 
approach to the research process from the theoretical underpinning to the collection 
and analysis of the data (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Methodology is thus not the 
methods or tools used to collect data, it is the theoretical underpinning behind the 
project, that guides the research. Methodology refers to the what, why, where and 
how you collect and analyse data (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  
 
Each  research  proposal  or  paper  includes  a  significant  prose  on  research 
methodology. It is this methodology that guides or even steers the research process, 
bringing  the  topic  to  life  through  the  collection  of  data  (Riley  et  al.,  2000).  The 
methodology  hence  highlights  the  intended  or  actual  research  methods  used  to 
enable this collection of data to occur. It is not enough just to decide which research 
methods are to be administered within a given research project, as not all methods 
are applicable or feasible within all research topics (Sarantakos, 1998). 183 
 
The philosophical standpoint of the researcher brings great influence to bear on the 
research methods adopted. Methodology should reflect or be guided by research 
paradigms, which are also referred to as philosophies. This may suggest therefore 
that methodologies can also be broadly classified under either the positivistic or the 
phenomenological  paradigm.  These  are  frequently  also  discussed  as  quantitative 
and qualitative methodologies respectively (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  
 
Some  methodologies  can  be  used  under  either  the  positivistic  or  the 
phenomenological paradigm depending on the assumptions of the researcher. The 
positivistic paradigm or positivism has a long history in philosophy but later had a 
considerable  influence  upon  social  research,  notably  in  promoting  the  status  of 
experimental and survey research and the quantitative forms of analysis associated 
with them. If the research undertaken reflects the principles of positivism, then the 
researcher will probably adopt the philosophical stance of the natural scientist. The 
researcher will be concerned with the testing of theories. Thus, for positivists, the 
most important feature of scientific theories is that they are open and subject to test. 
This requires the exercise of control over variables, which can be achieved through 
physical control, as in experiments, or through statistical analysis of a large number 
of cases, as in survey research. Without any control over variables, it is argued, one 
can do no more than speculate about causal relationships, since no basis for testing 
hypotheses is available.  
 
On the other hand, the phenomenological paradigm is an approach that focuses on 
how life is experienced. It is not primarily concerned with explaining the causes of 
things but tries, instead, to provide a description of how things are experienced first 184 
 
hand by those involved. It is concerned, first and foremost, with human experience. 
Accordingly, it prefers to concentrate its efforts on getting a clear picture of the things 
in themselves – the things as directly experienced by people. The phenomenologist 
would argue that generalisability is not of crucial importance. Perhaps the strongest 
argument the phenomenologist could make is the necessity to discover the details of 
the situation to understand the reality, or perhaps a reality  working behind them. 
Perhaps the clearest examples here are in the world of organizational behaviour.  
 
The chosen paradigm determines the potential choice of the research methodology 
and thus the research methods. There are a number of research methodologies that 
lend  themselves  more  to  one  paradigm  than  to  another.  The  choice  of  a 
methodology should therefore reflect the research paradigm. In figure 4.1 below the 
main  key  methodologies  under  the  two  philosophies,  positivistic  and 
phenomenological, are highlighted.  
 
Figure 4.1 Key Research Methodologies 
 
Positivistic Phenomenological
Associated methodologies
Cross sectional studies
Experimental studies
Longitudinal studies
Surveys Surveys
Associated methodologies
Action research
Case studies
Ethnography
Feminist perspective
Grounded theory
Hermeneutics
Particpative enquiry
Approaches to social sciences Positivistic Phenomenological
Associated methodologies
Cross sectional studies
Experimental studies
Longitudinal studies
Surveys Surveys
Associated methodologies
Action research
Case studies
Ethnography
Feminist perspective
Grounded theory
Hermeneutics
Particpative enquiry
Approaches to social sciences
 
Source: (Hussey and Hussey, 1997) 
 
It is important to note that there is no single best methodology or way of collecting 
data. According to Robson (1993), the three traditional research methodologies are 
experimental  studies,  case  studies  and  surveys.  Experimental  studies  measure 185 
 
under  systematic  and  controlled  conditions  predominantly  causal  relationships, 
whereas case studies concentrate on studying single cases in depth (Sarantakos, 
1998). Survey  research is, according to Tull and Albaum (1973), the art and the 
science  of  asking  questions  and/or  observing  behaviour  to  obtain  information. 
Robson (1993) explains: „the term survey is used in a variety of ways but commonly 
refers  to  the  collection  of  standardized  information  from  a  specific  population  or 
some  sample  from  one,  usually  by  means  of  a  questionnaire  or  interview‟. 
Questionnaires thus fall into the category of survey methods. 
 
4.6 Developing the study approach  
My  approach  to  this  study  is  based  on  a  combination  of  historic  and  document 
research, with a cross-section of survey and in-depth interviews with key actors in 
the banking and co-operative sectors.  
 
Stage 1 Background research  
The background research sets the topic of this study in the context of wider housing 
policy and institutional development. As explained earlier (chapter 2), the Egyptian 
mortgage credit system has had to come to terms with different sets of pressures. 
The system has had to devise its own policies for the first time; it has had to learn 
about improving its services and offerings and to live with the risks involved; it has 
had to do this at a time of rapid expansion in the housing market; and it has had to 
learn  to  be  competitive.  On  the  other  hand,  the  current  policy  reforms  in  Egypt 
support the transition from a highly centralized and subsidized system to a system 
driven mainly by private and community-based initiatives and delivery systems. The 
overall  aim  is  to  reduce  the  direct  role  of  the  state  and  increase  the  role  of  the 186 
 
market. This has had serious consequences for access to mortgage credit for low- 
and moderate-income households in general, and a knock-on effect on their housing 
co-operative societies in particular.  
 
Stage 2 Identifying the characteristics of the Egyptian housing co-operative societies  
In order to analyse the characteristics of the Egyptian housing co-operative societies, 
around seventy-five housing co-operative societies were selected for study from the 
Co-operative Housing Union data, to help our understanding of their business model, 
organizational efficiency and the ability of the co-operative societies to adapt to their 
operating environment.  
 
This  stage  initially  clarified  the  key  characteristics  of  the  Egyptian  housing  co-
operative  societies  as  community-based  organizations  with  one  clear  mission  to 
provide affordable and decent housing for their moderate income members  by all 
available means, including: mobilization of their savings; provision of lands for co-
operative housing developments; procurement of building materials and necessities 
from the primary sources at best price; contribution to the preparation of feasibility 
studies; benefiting from  economy of scale to reduce the unit cost; raising private 
funds through credit and capital markets; and use of services provided by the wider 
co-operative sector.  
 
However,  due  to  the  absence  of  many  indicators  –  on  rent  collection,  new 
development,  void  levels and  price/rent  increases  –  it  was  difficult  to  assess  the 
efficiency  of  housing  management  services,  both  in  terms  of  cost  control  and 
effective use of resources and procedures. 187 
 
Stage 3 Survey of thirty housing co-operative societies  
It was not possible to conduct a survey and in-depth interviews with all housing co-
operatives. Thus, I studied a significant sample from the whole population of housing 
co-operative societies (see appendix for a copy of the survey questionnaire used in 
the field study). A sample survey is a method of gathering information from a number 
of  individuals  or  organizations,  in  order  to  learn  something  about  the  larger 
population from which the sample is drawn (Barnett, 1991). One can identify several 
advantages to the study of a sample drawn from a population, rather than attempting 
to  study  the  population  in  its  entirety.  In  contrast  to  enumeration  of  the  whole 
population, data are cheaper and easier to collect, it saves time in both collecting 
and analysing data and a smaller number of cases make it possible to collect and 
deal with more elaborate information from each (Barnett, 1991). Such an approach 
enables  the  researcher  to  concentrate  on  a  specific  instance  or  situation  and  to 
identify, or attempt to identify, the various interactive processes at work, which may 
remain hidden in a large-scale survey but may be crucial to the success or failure of 
systems or organizations (deVaus, 1996). Studying a sample of thirty housing co-
operative  societies  drawn  from  the  list  of  the  seventy-five  housing  co-operative 
societies  identified  in  stage  2  enabled  me  to  spend  more  time  with  each 
organization, interviewing two representatives on average in each. This helped to 
produce detailed in-depth data. By also studying a sample, the process of analysing 
detailed  qualitative  material  was  more  manageable  than  with  a  larger  number of 
housing co-operative societies.  
 
The sample of thirty housing co-operative societies was selected so that it was as 
representative of the whole population as possible, along the lines of region, size of 188 
 
co-operative, the nature of the area of operation and performance (see table 4.2). 
Random sampling was rejected in favour of quota sampling, which is described as a 
method that attempts to approximate or represent the population characteristics by 
dividing  the  sample  along  dimensions  of,  for  example,  class,  race  and  gender 
(Patton,  1990).  In  the  studied  sample,  such  divisions  would  not  have  been 
appropriate. However the method was particularly suitable to ensure representation 
of  the  whole  population  along  the  lines  of  region,  size  of  co-operative  and 
performance of co-operative.  
 
Table 4.2 Breakdown of Egyptian Housing Co-operative Societies by Geography 
  Municipality  No. of Operating Co-
operatives 
No. of Sample 
1.  Cairo  589  19 
2.  Giza  162  7 
3.  Kaluobiah   23  - 
4.  Alexandria  175  - 
5.  Monofiyha   20  - 
6.  Kafr El Sheikh  108  - 
7.  El Gharbiyah  38  - 
8.  El Sharkiyah  35  - 
9.  El Dakahliyah  50  - 
10.  El Beharah  35  - 
11.  Damietta   45  - 
12.  Port Said  125  - 
13.  Ismailia  117  - 
14.  Suez  64  2 
15.  Red Sea  56  - 
16.  North Sinai   24  - 
17.  South Sinai  13  - 
18.  Marsa Matrouh  23  1 
19.  El Fayoum   23  - 
20.  Bani Swaf  29  - 
21.  El Mania   29  - 
22.  Assiut   39  - 
23.  Sohag  37  - 
24.  Qena  61  - 
25.  Aswan  91  1 
26.  El Wadi El Gadid   49  - 
 Source: Co-operative Housing Union Data, 2009  
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Although around seventy-five potential housing co-operative societies were originally 
approached,  only  thirty  co-operative  societies  responded  (see  table  4.3).  This 
sample represents co-operative societies from a wide variety of economic sectors in 
Egypt.  
 
Table 4.3 Summary Profile of Respondents 
Co-operative  Society 
Name 
Inception  No. of 
Members  
Asset Size  Housing 
Stock 
6
th of October  1982  30,847  EGP505million  2640 
El Sharara  1982  982  EGP167million  962 
Presidential   1978  3,605  EGP156million  2855 
National Bank   1982  12,799  EGP147million  819 
Telecom Authority   1984  611  EGP144million  850 
El Noor  1982  1382  EGP130million  540 
Engineers Union   1976  11,841  EGP124million  2505 
Amenhotep  1982  1,476  EGP118million  1476 
Republican Guards  1992  1,596  EGP113million  481 
Riviera Village  1982  798  EGP97.6million  840 
Central Bank  1970  5,700  EGP83million  1890 
Research Centre  1982  1,680  EGP58million  360 
Eltahreer  1975  1,835  EGP40million  850 
Suez Gulf   1970  3,337  EGP33.4million  687 
El Sha'bi  1964  2,094  EGP23million  673 
Belayim   1982  1,589  EGP14million  306 
El Refai  1982  1,084  EGP13million  1084 
Heliopolis  1977  240  EGP13million  255 
Education   1982  1,737  EGP10million  286 
Commerce Union   1977  5,400  EGP9.8million  950 
Co-operative Towers  1982  1,100  EGP9.6million  600 
Dar El Sa'ada   1976  624  EGP8million  70 
Agri-Projects   1977  891  EGP7.3million  74 
Zahrat al Madinah  1982  n.a.  EGP6million  n.a. 
El Remal  1981  n.a.  EGP4.8million  n.a. 
El Haram  1982  n.a.  EGP3.8million  n.a. 
Golf   1979  278  EGP3.3million  96 
Nubian Sons  1979  1,561  EGP2.5million  374 
Cairo Pharm  1982  570  EGP1.3million  463 
Fashion Houses  1985  600  EGP0.09million  6 
 Source: Co-operatives‟ Data, 2009  
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Stage 4 In-depth interviews  
Self-completion  questionnaires  are  limited  in  scope  and  offer  no  opportunities  to 
probe  or  seek  clarification.  For  this  reason,  the  survey  was  followed  by  in-depth 
interviews with key personnel in the Co-operative Housing Union, senior managers 
of the respondents and their bankers to verify and complete some answers. The 
interviews were semi-structured in order to allow the interviewee to answer more on 
their  own  terms  than  the  standardized  interview  permits  (Yin,  1994,  Cooper  and 
Schindler,  1998).  I  also  used  a  checklist  of  issues  to  explore  respondents‟ 
perceptions  of  the  research  questions.  The  key  aspect  of  housing  co-operative 
societies and of bank credit for affordable housing purposes that were examined in 
relation to the research objectives/hypotheses are summarized in table (4.4) below.  
 
Table 4.4 Topic Guide 
Why Egyptian housing co-operative societies can be seen as important policy 
agents to expand the mortgage credit beneficiaries base in Egypt?  
 
 Respondents‟  views  on  the  role  of  Egyptian  housing  co-operative  societies  as 
community  agents  and  their  policy  role  in  addressing  the  housing  problems  in 
Egypt.  
 Background  on  the  co-operative  housing  sector,  including  perceptions  of 
performance as senior manager and bank credit officer. 
 
Evaluate the effectiveness of the Egyptian housing co-operative societies as 
community based organisations and policy agents. 
 
 Respondents‟ views on the effectiveness of housing co-operatives‟ business model 
and systems of governance. 
 How housing co-operatives operate on the ground. 
 How housing co-operatives develop their business and the respondents‟ perception 
of how that approach affects the way the organizations work. 
 How the respondent perceives the difference in the management and governance 
of co-operative housing compared to other types of housing. 
 How  housing  co-operatives  fund  their  operations  and  protect  their  financial 
resources. 
 How effective the co-operative housing sector is in increasing access to housing for 
Egyptian low- and moderate-income households. 
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Identify  and  analyse  the  various  economic,  social  and  political  factors 
influencing this effectiveness. 
 
 Public  policy  and  the  respondents‟  perceptions  of  the  reasons  for  the  rise  and 
decline of the role of housing co-operative societies.  
 Respondents‟ perceptions of the reasons for the lack of government support. 
 
Assess the role of the banking institutions (as contextual stakeholders in the 
immediate  environment  of  the  Egyptian  housing  co-operative  societies)  in 
expanding access to mortgage credit and savings in Egypt.  
 
 Background on the banking system and its role in the housing sector. 
 Funding arrangements and the influence of mortgage financing upon the institution. 
 
Identify which institutions constrain most the development of an effective and 
sustainable  level  of  mortgage  credit  for  low-  and  moderate-income 
households. 
 
 Respondents‟ perceptions of the reasons for the current low co-operation between 
housing co-operatives and banks, for example is it due to demand factors (credit 
slowdown) or supply factors (for example credit policy change, crowding out, etc.), 
or both?  
 Which supply factor led to the decline in bank credit lines for housing co-operative 
societies.  
 Is the decline in bank credit lines related to the bank‟s degree of risk aversion, 
liquidity  preferences,  problems  facing  the  housing  co-operative  societies  or  the 
housing market as a whole? 
Source: Interviews, 2008 and 2009  
 
Within each of the thirty co-operative societies, I interviewed between one and two 
members of senior management and senior bank credit officer. In total, I interviewed 
forty-five  individuals  between  March  2008  and  October  2009.  Respondents  were 
notified in advance of the issues to be discussed during the interviews. Interviews 
were carried out either face-to-face or by telephone and lasted for approximately one 
hour. Tape recording of interviews was rejected due to the general connotation of 
that option for recording information, particularly in Egypt.  
 
This is in addition to the many disadvantages of tape recording, especially in terms 
of  the  potential  adverse  effect  on  the  relationship  between  interviewees  and 192 
 
interviewer as well as possible inhibition of interviewees‟ responses and reduction of 
reliability. Instead, I relied on making notes of key words and phrases for each issue 
discussed during the interviews.  
 
Each interview involved adapting the core checklist of issues mentioned above (see 
table 4.3) to relate them specifically to the roles of interviewees. Discussions with 
chairmen,  for  example,  focused  on  organizational  and  corporate  issues  and 
discussions  with  finance  directors  and  bank  credit  officers  focused  on  housing 
finance issues. The main focus of the interviews was to examine how respondents 
perceived the effect of these issues upon their organizations and members, and to 
explore the organizational changes that housing co-operative societies and banks 
introduced and their impact on their decision making.  
 
Why  interview  Bank  Credit  Officers?  Historically,  bank  credit  used  to  be  the  key 
external funding source for many housing co-operative societies in Egypt. The recent 
banking sector reform programme has led to a relatively stronger and more efficient 
role of banks in the financial system in general and the housing market in particular. 
So, it appears that banks are better positioned to address the research objectives, 
especially in terms of how low- and moderate-income households could be assisted 
through  their  housing  co-operative  societies  to  access  affordable  housing  in  an 
organized manner and based on a sustainable financing system.  
 
The initial investigation, however, revealed a major decline in approved bank credit 
lines to the co-operative housing sector since the early 1990s. Thus, for a balanced 
perspective,  Bank  Credit  Officers  had  to  be  interviewed.  The  interviewees  were 193 
 
mainly selected from five state-owned and specialized banks whose core lines of 
business include property finance and who have long-standing relations with the co-
operative  housing  sector  and  an  interest  in  bank  credit  programmes  for  social 
development purposes. 
 
Stage 5 Data analysis  
The resulting data from the survey and interviewees were analysed in two stages. In 
the first stage, I developed a single pro forma based on the review of literature and 
analysis of housing policy in Egypt. The approach was piloted with eight housing co-
operative  societies,  and  amendments  were  made  to  the  pro  forma  to  rectify  its 
limitations.  The  amended  pro  forma  was  then  sent  to  seventy-five  housing  co-
operatives  for  completion.  But  only  thirty  housing  co-operatives  responded  and 
agreed to take part in interviews and to refer me to their bankers to elaborate more 
on their answers in the returned questionnaires. All data from the questionnaires and 
interviews were analysed using this method, with a single pro forma per housing co-
operative society. All the interviews were analysed and views recorded in the pro 
forma. This helped to identify common themes and areas where the respondents 
disagreed. The questionnaire grouped the views and perspectives of all respondents 
in a single location on the form, which facilitated the second stage of analysis.  
 
The second stage involved tabulating key data from the completed questionnaires. 
Tables  for  key  data  on  organizational  development,  operating  and  financial 
performance  and  bank  credit  were  developed.  The  second  stage  analysis  also 
provided numerical data on the perspectives of respondents and interviewees, which 
was used to build the charts included in the text.  194 
 
4.7 Data Collection and Analysis  
Based on the above research objectives, methods and approach, this thesis includes 
both collection and analysis of secondary data and collection of primary data.  
 
4.7.1 Uses of Secondary Data  
Secondary data were used for two main research purposes. First, they helped to fill 
the need for a specific reference on some points, mainly affordable housing and 
finance  in  the  developing  countries  in  general  and  in  Egypt  in  particular,  to 
demonstrate why the research could fill the void in the knowledge base. Examples of 
secondary data used include the recent figures on housing production and finance in 
Egypt.  
 
Second, secondary data were used to justify the costs and benefits of carrying out 
primary  research.  In  essence,  the  researcher  tried  to  mine  existing  databases  to 
discover  the  patterns  of  housing  problems,  the  models  of  finance  and  the 
environmental  conditions  required  to  increase  access  to  affordable  housing  and 
finance  for  low-  and  moderate-income  households.  Each  of  these  pieces  of 
information was used to develop a clearer statement of the research questions and a 
comparative  literature  review  to  glean  some  relevant  lessons  from  other 
experiences. 
 
4.7.2 Collection of Primary Data 
The collection of primary data initially started by testing, on a small population as 
explained above, a pilot questionnaire regarding the survey of housing co-operative 
societies, most of which are in the capital city of Egypt, Cairo, in order to detect any 195 
 
weaknesses in the research design and instruments. This enabled the researcher to 
use the suggestions of the first group of respondents to identify and change any 
confusing or awkward questions. During this pilot test, the researcher discovered 
that the wording of nearly one third of the questions was liable to confuse, especially 
in relation to the legal and financial profile of housing co-operative societies as non-
profit organizations. Thus, testing was useful to refine the questionnaires and also 
the questions asked during the later interviews to obtain detailed information from 
the respondents.  
 
Employing a range of methods, secondary and primary, in this study was important 
and  contributed  to  reaping  the  benefits  of  such  an  approach  in  terms  of  a  high 
degree  of  confidence  about  the  issues  being  addressed  and  the  final 
recommendations (Saunders et al., 2000). 
 
A) Questionnaires 
Questionnaires  are  a  primary  data  collection  research  method  and  include  all 
techniques of data collection in which each person is asked to respond to the same 
set of questions in a predetermined order (De Vaus, 2001). Questionnaires therefore 
include  structured  interviews,  telephone  questionnaires  and  mail  questionnaires 
(Erdos, 1970). According to Saunders et al. (2000) questionnaires are currently the 
most  widely  used  data  collection  technique.  The  collection  of  evidence  with 
questionnaires  falls  broadly  into  two  categories,  self-completion  methods  and 
interviews.  Self-completion  methods  include  mailed  and  computerized 
questionnaires, whereas interviews include personal and telephone interviews.  
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I. Mail Questionnaire 
The mail questionnaire is an impersonal survey method whereby the questionnaire is 
mailed to a predetermined set of respondents with a covering letter informing the 
recipient of the nature of the study. Furthermore, the time available to complete the 
questionnaire as well as the benefits to be gained from taking part are outlined. Mail 
questionnaires  tend  to  be  highly  structured  with  predominantly  closed-ended 
questions.  They  should  be  simple  to  complete  and  not  too  long.  According  to 
Remenyi et al. (1998) they should not take longer than twenty minutes to complete, 
to achieve a reasonable response rate. 
 
II. Computer-Administered Questionnaire 
Questionnaires are increasingly being administered electronically across the network 
through the use of e-mail or the internet. The structure of this type of questionnaire is 
very  similar  to  the  posted  questionnaire  (Sayre,  2001).  However  information  and 
messages sent via e-mail reach their destination within minutes, rather than days as 
with traditional mail.  
 
Circumstances where questionnaires apply 
The  circumstances  under  which  questionnaires  apply  are  outlined  below.  The 
discussion  is  subdivided  into  three  parts,  the  positioning,  characteristics  and 
categories of questionnaires. 
 
Part 1: Positioning 
As questionnaires can be seen as subordinate to the positivistic paradigm one can, 
by  identifying  its  key  characteristics,  start  to  explain  under  what  circumstances 197 
 
questionnaires are useful and hence applicable in a research project (Sayre, 2001). 
The positivistic paradigm is good at collecting information on facts and opinions from 
a large sample (Remenyi et al., 1998; Hussey and Hussey, 1997) to draw inferences 
about  the  whole  population.  The  data  collected  tends  to  be  highly  specific  and 
precise and therefore measurement is an essential element of the research process. 
The  researcher  must  apply  considerable  rigour  to  ensure  the  accuracy  of  the 
measurement. Validity, which measures the extent to which the research findings 
accurately  represent  what  is  really  happening,  therefore  tends  to  be  low  for  the 
positivistic paradigms (Riley et al., 2000). 
  
Moreover, the world is considered to be objective and external to the researcher. 
According to Sayer (1992) in the positivistic paradigm, the researcher is independent 
from  that  being  researched.  The  positivistic  paradigm  emphasis  is  hence  not  so 
much on the skills of the researcher as an interviewer, but more upon the research 
instruments employed to collect, analyse and measure data.  
 
Besides, the quantitative paradigm is associated with hypothesis testing and tends to 
have a highly structured research design in comparison to the phenomenological 
paradigm.  Finally  the  issue  of  reliability  is  important  in  the  positivistic  paradigm 
(Sarantakos, 1998). It implies that as the research findings are repeated, they will 
generate the same results. 
  
Part 2: Characteristics  
In  the  following  some  more  explicit  characteristics  associated  with  surveys  are 
outlined.  Surveys  can  be  carried  out  for  any  of  the  research  purposes  whether 198 
 
explanatory, descriptive or exploratory. In reality surveys are not particularly good at 
delivering  exploratory  research  or  research  that  requires  large  numbers  of  open 
questions.  Questionnaires  as  one  form  of  survey  work  best  with  standardized 
questions where the researcher can be confident that they will be interpreted in the 
same way by all respondents (Robson, 1993). One can ask a wide range of open-
ended questions, but it is likely to be an inefficient and ineffective procedure taking a 
great deal of time to analyse. Hence many surveys are carried out for descriptive 
purposes. Descriptive or analytical research will enable the researcher to explain and 
examine  the  relationship  between  variables,  in  particular  cause  and  effect 
relationships (Saunders et al., 2000). 
 
Data  concerning  behaviour  and  attitudes  within  an  organizational  setting  are  not 
easily obtained through surveys, therefore qualitative methods such as participant 
observation are more viable. May (1997) states that surveys are a deductive or a 
static-causal  snapshot  of  attitudes.  Surveys,  and  hence  questionnaires,  do  not 
attempt to understand how and why people change. 
 
Moreover,  in  questionnaires  generally  a  relatively  small  amount  of  information  is 
collected from any one individual and there is no attempt to manipulate variables or 
control  situations,  as  in  experiments.  Surveys  are  also  more  versatile  than  most 
techniques  but  do  not  have  the  qualitative  depth  of  some  other  alternatives 
(Oppenheim,  1992).  It  depends  what  type  of  questions  are  asked  within  a 
questionnaire.  The  researcher  may  use  open-end  questions  where  no  fixed 
responses are provided from which the respondent is to choose (Tull and Albaum, 
1973). These questions encourage the interviewee to answer „what‟, „how‟ and „why‟ 199 
 
questions (Saunders et al., 2000) and hence have the potential to offer a more in-
depth analysis. However they have some drawbacks such as higher administrative 
costs and the increased possibility that interviewer bias  will influence the answer 
(Zikmund, 1999). Closed questions may, on the other hand, be used to obtain more 
specific  information  or  to  confirm  a  fact  or  an  opinion  (Saunders  et  al.,  2000). 
Depending on the research topic one can gain either more qualitative or quantitative 
responses and hence results.  
 
Part 3: Categories of questionnaires 
When deciding  which  survey  method to apply,  one  needs  to  determine  the most 
significant restrictions and criteria associated with the research project. In the table 
below some of the key characteristics of the different types of questionnaires are 
outlined in order to understand which method or combination of methods is likely to 
prove useful in specific situations. 
 
Table 4.5 Key Characteristics of the Different Types of Questionnaires 
Criterion  Personal 
Interview 
Mail  Telephone  E-mail 
Cost  High  Low  Moderate  Low 
Response rate  High  Low  High  Low 
Control of Interview situation  High  Low  Moderate  Low 
Applicability  to  geographically 
dispersed populations 
Moderate  High  Moderate  High 
Applicability  to  heterogeneous 
populations 
High  Low  High  Low 
Collection of detailed information  High  Moderate  Moderate  Moderate 
Speed  Low  Low  High  High 
Source: (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996) 200 
 
Economy is the most appealing advantage of self-completion questionnaires. It does 
not  require  an  interviewer  to  be  present,  but  only  includes  the  cost  of  planning, 
printing, mailing and providing stamped self-addressed envelopes for the return. In 
the  words  of  Sellitz  et  al.  (1976)  “questionnaires  can  be  sent  through  the  mail, 
interviewers cannot”. Processing and analysing are also usually simpler and cheaper 
than for the other methods (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). Mail and e-
mail  questionnaires  hence  encourage  greater  accessibility  and  permit  wider 
geographic contact at minimal cost.  
 
Moreover, mail and e-mail questionnaires reduce bias error that might result from the 
personal  characteristics  of  the  interviewers  and  the  variability  in  their  skills 
(Sarantakos,  1998).  Personal  interviews,  for  example,  due  to  the  interaction,  are 
likely  to  include  a  certain  level  of  bias.  Furthermore,  greater  anonymity  for  the 
respondent is assured, which is especially helpful if the survey deals with sensitive 
issues  (Frankfort-Nachmias  and  Nachmias,  1996).  In  addition,  mail  and  e-mail 
questionnaires  are  preferable  when  questions  demand  some  consideration  rather 
than an immediate answer or if answers require respondents to consult personal 
documents or other people to verify them (Zikmund, 1999).  
 
One  weakness  of  self-completion  questionnaires,  however,  is  that  there  is  no 
opportunity for probing and prompting of questions (Sarantakos, 1998). Answers are 
final and there is no way of clarifying ambiguous answers or of appraising the non-
verbal behaviour of respondents, as is possible with the other two methods. A low 
flexibility  in  the  questioning  process  is  evident  and  collection  of  supplementary 
information impossible  (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). Moreover, mail 201 
 
and e-mail questionnaires tend to require simple questions as they can only be used 
if the questions are straightforward enough to be understood solely on the basis of 
printed instructions and definitions.  
 
If it is important who fills out the questionnaire then personal interviews or telephone 
questionnaires are more suitable. In the case of self-completion questionnaires the 
researcher has no control of the respondent‟s environment and hence they cannot 
ensure that the right person completes the questionnaire. An individual other than 
the intended respondent may fill it out and thus cause a negative impact on the 
findings (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). The most crucial disadvantage 
of mail questionnaires, however, is the low response rate, which is lower than for 
other methods.  
 
B) Interviews  
Interviews have the advantage of offering opportunities for probing and clarifying, 
and enabling the respondent to provide sensitive information. The in-depth interview 
encourages  respondents  to  share  as  much  information  as  possible  in  an 
unconstrained environment. The interviewer uses a minimum of prompts and guiding 
questions. With more focused in-depth interviews, the researcher provides additional 
guidance by using a set of questions to promote discussion and elaboration by the 
respondent.  In  these  interviews,  the  researcher  guides  the  topic  direction  and 
coverage. The aim is to provide a relaxed environment in which the respondent will 
be  open  to  discussing  topics  fully.  This  kind  of  questioning  is  often  used  in 
exploratory research or where the investigator is dealing with complex topics that do 
not  lend  themselves  to  structured  interviewing.  It  is  also  useful  in  case  research 202 
 
among various participants at a major event; a substantial portion of the questioning 
is usually unique to each respondent and benefits from an unstructured approach. 
Interviews can be conducted in many forms, but are mainly personal (that is face-to-
face) or telephone interviews.  
 
I. Personal interview  
Personal  interviews  require  a  face-to-face  conversation  between  interviewer  and 
interviewee  that  can  be  either  formal  or  informal.  In  the  informal  approach  the 
interviewer is allowed to interact freely with the interviewee. Questions tend to be 
more open-ended and the interviewer is given the freedom to change the wording of 
the  questions  or  to  add  questions.  The  formal  approach  on  the  other  hand  is 
characterized by a set of predetermined questions, which are presented in a pre-
coded form, thereby ensuring that the answers are recorded in a standardized form 
across  the  entire  sample.  Response  rates  are  higher  than  for  the  other  survey 
methods. Personal interviews can be seen as in-depth surveys as they attempt to 
obtain detailed in-depth evidence from a small number of informants through a series 
of interviews (Remenyi et al., 1998). 
 
Advantages and disadvantages of personal interviews  
There  are  real  advantages  and  clear  limitations  to  personal  interviewing  (Patton, 
1990, Cooper and Schindler, 1998, Yin, 1994). The greatest value lies in the depth of 
information and detail that can be secured. It far exceeds the information secured 
from  telephone  and  self-administered  studies  via  intercepts,  mail  surveys  or 
computer. The interviewer can also do more to improve the quality of the information 
received than with other methods.  203 
 
 
Interviewers also have more control than with other kinds of interrogation. They can 
pre-screen to ensure the correct respondent is replying, and they can set up and 
control  interviewing  conditions.  They  can  adjust  to  the  language  of  the  interview 
because they can observe the problems and effects the interview is having on the 
respondent. 
 
The researcher may, however, consider using another survey method. Probably the 
greatest reason is that personal interviewing is costly, in both money and time. Costs 
are  particularly  high  if  the  study  covers  a  wide  geographic  area  for  personal 
interviewing has stringent sampling requirements.  
 
Finally, results of personal interviews can be affected adversely by interviewers who 
alter the questions asked or in other ways bias the results.  
 
Conditions for success of personal interviewing  
There are three broad conditions for the success of personal interviewing (Patton, 
1990,  Cooper  and  Schindler,  1998,  Yin,  1994).  They  are  (1)  availability  of  the 
information needed from the respondent, (2) an understanding by the respondent of 
his or her role, and (3) adequate motivation by the respondent to co-operate. 
 
II. Telephone interview  
The  telephone  interview  is the  most applied  method  (deVaus, 1996,  Cooper and 
Schindler, 1998). It requires that questions are brief, simple and focused. If open-
ended questions are used, it is strongly advised that such questions do not exceed 204 
 
fifteen  words  and  that  the  interviewee  is not  expected  to  give  long  answers.  For 
closed-ended  questions  the  number  of  pre-coded  options  presented  should  not 
exceed five.  
 
When  deciding  which  method  best  suits  the  research,  the  researcher  has  to 
determine which criteria are most significant to the research objective. The overall 
aim should be to obtain valid and reliable data. Each method differs in the price the 
researcher has to pay, in terms of potential invalidity in one area to strengthen their 
claim to validity in another area (Sapsford and Jupp, 1996).  
 
Advantages and disadvantages of telephone interviewing  
Of the advantages that telephone interviewing offers, probably none ranks higher 
than its moderate cost (deVaus, 1996, Cooper and Schindler, 1998). Much of the 
saving comes from cuts in travel costs and administrative savings  in training and 
supervision. When calls are made from a single location, the researcher may use 
fewer  yet  more  skilled  interviewers.  Telephones  are  especially  economical  when 
callbacks to maintain probability sampling are involved and respondents are widely 
scattered (Saunders et al., 2000). Long-distance service options make it possible to 
interview nationally at a reasonable cost.  
 
With the widespread use of computers, telephone interviewing can be combined with 
immediate entry of the responses into a data file by means of terminals, personal 
computers or voice data entry (Saunders et al., 2000). This brings added savings in 
time and money.  
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When compared to either personal interviews or mail surveys, the use of telephones 
brings a faster completion of a study, sometimes taking only a day or so for  the 
fieldwork. When compared to personal interviewing, it is also likely that interviewer 
bias, especially bias caused by the physical appearance, body language and actions 
of the interviewer, is reduced by using telephones (Cooper and Schindler, 1998).  
 
Finally,  behavioural  norms  work  to  the  advantage  of  telephone  interviewing:  if 
someone is present, a ringing phone is usually answered, and it is the caller who 
decides the purpose, length and termination of the call (deVaus, 1996).  
 
There are also disadvantages to using the telephone for research (Saunders et al., 
2000, Cooper and Schindler, 1998). Obviously, the respondent must be available by 
phone. A limit on interview length is another disadvantage of the telephone, but the 
degree  of  this  limitation  depends  on  the  respondent‟s  interest  in  the  topic.  In 
telephone interviewing, it is not possible to use maps, illustrations, complex scales or 
measurement techniques. Telephone surveys can result in less thorough responses, 
and those interviewed by phone find the experience to be less rewarding to them 
than  a  personal  interview.  Respondents  report  less  rapport  with  telephone 
interviewers  than  with  personal  interviewers.  Finally,  in  telephone  interviews,  the 
researcher  loses  the  opportunity  to  witness  the  non-verbal  behaviour  of  the 
participant, which may adversely affect the researcher‟s interpretation about how far 
to pursue a particular line of questioning. 
 
 
 
 
 206 
 
4.8 Analytical Framework  
A research project with the above objectives is a major undertaking as it will have to 
deal with different academic languages, disciplines and styles in order to close the 
gap between the study of social housing policy and mortgage credit intermediation in 
a transitional economy like Egypt. This could make the study in places more or less 
challenging. So, a good starting point is to establish a framework right from the start 
for the researcher to follow throughout the study so as to remain within well defined 
boundaries. 
  
For  this  reason,  the  analytical  framework  of  this  thesis  includes  macroeconomic 
analysis so that one can understand the prerequisites for developing an effective and 
sustainable  mortgage  system  that  expand  the  mortgage  credit  beneficiaries  base 
(see figure 4.3 below). The analytical framework also considers the efficiency of the 
wider  financial  system  and  the  role  of  institutions  in  the  housing  and  mortgage 
markets, which depend on the fiscal, financial and real sector policies in a country 
(Angel  and  Mayo,  1996).  The  last  includes  those  policies  that  determine  the 
institutional structure of the housing and mortgage markets, whether public sector 
and/or private sector based markets.  
 
All these policies determine the ability of the housing and mortgage institutions to 
face the challenge of resource mobilization and allocation. One can argue, however, 
that housing studies as a discipline usually do not adhere to one framework (Gibb, 
1996, Gibb, 2009). It is also important to distinguish three main traditions of analysis: 
political, social and economic. The analytical framework below is no exception, in 
that it tries to follow the same traditions in order to address the research objectives.  207 
 
Figure 4.2 Thesis Analytical Framework 
 
Policy Programme  
 
Context  Type of System  Objectives  Instruments  Adequacy of Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social:  identifies  the 
general needs. 
Economic: identifies the 
impact  of  the 
macroeconomic, financial 
and privatization policies.  
Political:  identifies 
political priorities. 
State Role: identifies the 
responsibility of the state 
and  the  size  of  public 
funds  allocated  to  meet 
this purpose. 
Market  Institutions: 
identifies  the  role  of  the 
market  and  community 
and  the  key  factors 
hindering  their  wider 
participation. 
Effective  and  sustainable 
mortgage  market  to  meet 
policy  objectives  in  terms 
of  improving  access  to 
housing  for  low-  and 
moderate-income 
households.  
 
Well-established non-
subsidized network of 
mortgage credit 
intermediation.   
An adequate financial 
safety net (in terms of 
adequacy of 
protection against 
undue lending risks 
and risk allocation in 
the housing and 
mortgage markets)    
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The above framework supports the earlier arguments in relation to the pre-conditions 
for  well-functioning  mortgage  markets  (Angel  and  Mayo,  1996,  Coles  and  Hardt, 
2000, Renaud, 1996, Renaud, 2000). It highlights the importance of undertaking an 
investigation  of  several  issues  within  a  well-defined  analytical  framework  that 
reviews,  among  other  things,  the  socio-economic  environment  and  the  broader 
government policies, for example on subsidy, regulation and finance. The framework 
also fits well with the key objectives of the study.  
 
The main debates on financial intermediation, household dynamics and affordability 
have all been investigated in the first part of the thesis (chapters 2 and 3) and linked 
to the more specific question of promoting mortgage credit for low- and moderate-
income households. It also took a step forward from the grassroots level to the actual 
providers of housing and mortgage credit in a transitional economy like Egypt. These 
aspects  form  the  basis  of  the  existing  housing  policy  and  mortgage  credit 
intermediaries in Egypt. However, closing the wide gap in the market at present still 
requires  innovative  solutions.  The  factors  and  conditions  influencing  the 
effectiveness  of  these  solutions  need  to  be  carefully  assessed,  as  well  as  the 
mismatches and matches between supply and demand for housing and mortgage 
credit. The individual component of the analytical framework is outlined below. 
 
 
A) Context  
As is clear from the discussion in chapter 3, during the three decades after World 
War II most mortgage credit was originated by community based organisations, such 
as thrifts and savings and loans (Lea, 2009). These institutions attracted a large 
inflow  of  saving  deposits  in  part  because  they  were  legally  sheltered  from 209 
 
competition from other financial institutions. The thrift institutions were also covered 
by various government deposit insurance programmes.  
 
Such community based organisations are believed to have also worked elsewhere, 
at  least for some  specific period  of  Egypt‟s  vibrant  history.  Egyptian  housing  co-
operative  societies  are  the  most  distinguished  example  of  community  based 
organisations in Egypt which are recognized by the Egyptian Constitution. Thus, they 
enjoy  both  political  support  and  the  confidence  of  the  people  despite  the 
shortcomings  in  their  performance  in  the  recent  past  (Moharam,  2006).  Further, 
Egyptian  housing  co-operative  societies  relate  closely  to  their  members  at  the 
grassroots level and are therefore better placed to understand their aspirations and 
interests (Moharam, 2006, Rashad, 2008). However, there has been no attempt to 
evaluate this apparent success using any kind of analytical tools, especially from 
social, economic and financial perspectives.  
 
The current Egyptian mortgage market mainly supports the high income households 
and is concentrated exclusively on homeowners in the urban areas developed by the 
private  sector  (Struyk  and  Roman,  2008).  Many  low-  and  moderate-income 
households are unable to qualify for mortgage credit due to the stringent lending 
terms that include high qualifying incomes, high interest rates and short repayment 
periods. Thus, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the banking and co-operative 
institutions requires first an evaluation of the social, economic and political context. 
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B) Type of System  
To  enable  greater  access  to  housing,  the  World  Bank  advocated  that  innovative 
financial schemes and institutional arrangements should take place in the housing 
and mortgage markets (Buckley and Kalarickal, 2005). The challenge however is to 
determine  the  options,  terms  and  conditions  of  housing  finance  under  which  the 
lender should be eager to provide mortgage credit and the borrower to accept it. For 
this  reason,  some  know-how  about  the  livelihood  strategies  of  the  low-  and 
moderate-income households is important, in addition to understanding how banking 
and community institutions could serve them.  
 
Knowledge of the livelihood strategies can lead to a bottom-up approach that aims at 
transforming  informal financial  organizations  into  regulated financial institutions  to 
expand the network of mortgage credit intermediation. On the other hand, top-down 
policies, as formulated by central banks and financial authorities, provide guidelines 
about how formal financial institutions have to deal with low- and moderate-income 
households in a society (McPherson and Rous, 2010, Tra and Lensink, 2007, Beck 
et al., 2009, UNCHS-Habitat, 1991). Finally, innovative schemes can compete with 
the informal financial sector. Due to such competition informal systems can not only 
improve their effectiveness but can also be replaced by successful formal financial 
institutions  when  they  do  not  succeed  (Boleat,  1984,  Lee,  1996,  Torre  and 
Schmukler, 2005).  
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The Global Strategy for Shelter  
The Global Strategy for Shelter emphasized the importance of developing broad-
based housing finance systems as part of the national financial sector, as well as 
cost  recovery  as  an  alternative  to  the  use  of  subsidies  (UN-HABITAT,  1988, 
UNCHS-Habitat, 1990 ). Therefore, market-based finance systems were preferred 
above directive credit systems, because mortgage credit institutions are required to 
compete in mobilizing funds at real interest rates and by offering different financial 
services  (Marathe  and  Shawky,  2003,  Buckley  and  Kalarickal,  2005,  Erba  and 
Nothaft, 2005, Rabenhorst and Ignatova, 2008). The Strategy also recommended 
that  interest  subsidies  had  to  be  replaced  by  cost-effective  funding  strategies  to 
adequately  reach  the  low-  and  moderate-income  households.  This  suggested 
moving  away  from  soft  credit  and  encouraged  economic  programmes  aimed  at 
reducing government budget deficits (Gupta et al., 2006, Lee, 1996).  
 
 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programs 
Economic structural adjustment programs were developed by the World Bank in the 
1980s with the aim of encouraging sustainable growth, restructuring public budget 
and  social  sector  spending,  trade  liberalization,  privatization,  the  deregulation  of 
markets  and  global  economic  integration  (Seddon,  1990).  The  impact  of  the 
economic structural adjustment programs on housing and mortgage markets is that 
governments started to have smaller budgets and had to reduce their expenditure, 
for example, on mortgage credit subsidy and  low- and moderate-income housing 
development  schemes.  Moreover,  faced  with  the  necessity  of  earning  foreign 
currencies to repay debts, governments began to steer credit to investments that 
were  assumed  to  be  more  productive  than  housing.  Although  many  developing 212 
 
countries  cut  back  on  mortgage  credit  in  the  1980s,  they  continued  to  provide 
mortgage  subsidies  to  make  housing  affordable  for  low-  and  moderate-income 
households  (Ozanne  and  Malpezzi,  1985,  Kaufmann,  1987,  Malpezzi  and  Mayo, 
1987, Whitehead, 2000).  
  
Economic  structural  adjustment  programs  have  generally  given  priority  to  direct 
investments  in  the  economy  and  competition  for  funds.  Despite  an  enormous 
housing shortage and the need to improve the existing housing stock, the mortgage 
market remained underdeveloped in many developing countries as it is extremely 
difficult to establish a well-functioning mortgage market with a shortage of funds. In 
addition, mortgage credit institutions have to face the conflict between short- and 
long-term lending (Erba and Nothaft, 2005, Vigdor, 2006, Rabenhorst and Ignatova, 
2008).  These  issues  resulted  in  a  shift  of  focus  towards  the  development  and 
efficiency  of  resource  mobilization  and  allocation  in  the  housing  and  mortgage 
markets (Hao, 2006).  
 
 
C) Objectives  
It is proposed that the development of an effective institutional network of mortgage 
credit  provision  for  low-  and  moderate-income  households  is  necessary  to  meet 
policy objectives in terms of improving access to housing. Thus, it is important to 
understand why a mortgage lender might ration credit. One needs to examine the 
conditions under which it would not be optimal for the mortgage lender to increase its 
credit interest rate when faced with excess demand for mortgage credit. It is difficult 
to see why mortgage lenders would do this if they had as much information as the 213 
 
borrower.  If  the  mortgage  lender  was  perfectly  informed,  it  could  always  set  an 
appropriate risk-adjusted price and lend accordingly. 
 
However, in a world of asymmetric information, mortgage credit rationing can be an 
optimal strategy for a profit maximizing mortgage lender. The explanation turns upon 
two types of information hurdles (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). First, a mortgage lender 
may not be able to distinguish perfectly between borrowers with different credit risks, 
even after it has analysed each borrower‟s financial information. This is called the 
pre-contract  private  information  problem.  Even  if  the  mortgage  lender  knows  the 
average riskiness of borrowers within a given risk classification, it may not be able to 
identify  individual  risks  (Hagen  and  Holter,  2002).  The  mortgage  lender  will, 
therefore, charge a common price to all within the risk class, so that some borrowers 
are subsidizing others. A second problem is that the mortgage lender may not be 
able to completely control the borrower‟s actions. The borrower may thus be able to 
increase project risk, either through its choice of projects or through its expenditure 
of effort, without detection by the mortgage lender. 
 
Now assuming that a mortgage credit interest rate is announced by the mortgage 
lender  for  a  particular  risk  class  (for  example  co-operative  housing),  and  at  that 
interest  rate  there  is  an  excess  demand  for  mortgage  credit  by  borrowers  (for 
example  housing  co-operatives)  in  that  risk  class,  what  would  happen  if  the 
mortgage  lender  chooses  to  increase  the  mortgage  credit  interest  rate?  One 
possibility is adverse selection. Safer borrowers within the given risk classification 
may be unwilling to borrow at the higher interest rate, so that the mix of borrowers 
within  the  pool  becomes  riskier.  If  this happens,  the  mortgage  lender‟s  expected 214 
 
profit could actually be lower at the higher interest rate. A second possibility is that 
an  increase  in  the  mortgage  credit  interest  rate  could  worsen  the  moral  hazard 
problem. That is, those borrowers within the pool who have some latitude in their 
investment  decisions  may  choose  riskier  projects  at  the  higher  mortgage  credit 
interest rate. This again could mean a lower than expected profit for the mortgage 
lender  at  the  higher  interest  rate.  Thus,  the  mortgage  lender  may  conclude  that 
increasing the mortgage credit interest rate is not worthwhile since its expected profit 
is maximized at an interest rate at which credit demand exceeds supply. 
 
Finally, a mortgage lender‟s capital position may also affect its decision to ration 
mortgage  credit  since  different  categories  of  credit  have  different  capital 
requirements (Weber and Darbellay, 2008). For example, a mortgage lender has the 
necessary  deposits  but  would  need  to  raise  additional  capital  to  satisfy  a  credit 
request. The additional cost of raising this capital, relative to that of raising money 
from other sources, will then be a charge against the mortgage lender‟s profit from 
making the credit. If this additional cost is sufficiently high, the mortgage lender may 
prefer to invest the available deposits in more liquid assets (for example marketable 
securities) rather than in mortgage credit. 
 
D) Instruments  
The analytical framework suggests the need for: 
A Well-established Non-subsidized Network of Housing Finance Provision 
The  thesis  acknowledges  the  importance  of  co-operative  institutions  as  ideal 
participants  in  such  a  network,  for  many  well  cited  reasons.  UNCHS  already 
suggests that membership of co-operatives is usually open and voluntary, control is 215 
 
democratic for members, interest on the share capital may be limited, and equitable 
distribution of annual surpluses and the education of members takes place (UNCHS-
Habitat,  1984b).  Another  strength  of  co-operatives  is  their  ability  to  mobilize 
resources at a low-cost basis (UNCHS-Habitat, 1989). The credit delivery however is 
restricted to short-term purposes, while there may be considerable unused funds 
available. This is mainly due to a lack of opportunities for short-term investments by 
the  members  of  the  co-operatives.  Instead  of  such  short-term  credits  they  are 
believed, rather, to need long-term finance (ESCAP, 1991).  
 
Despite this preoccupation with long-term credits, there is a need for a finance model 
that  advocates  a  combination  of  savings  and  credit  to  expand  the  provision  of 
mortgage credit for low- and moderate-income households. Saving encourages the 
households to put some money aside and shows their ability and willingness to make 
regular payments. In order to mitigate the risk of default, a guarantee fund can be 
established to provide a safety net, but this only copes with the consequences of 
default. Ferguson (1999) argues that a guarantee fund system is not so suited for 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the mortgage market. Lenders generally 
operate  in  different  frameworks,  where  those  waiting  for  mortgage  credit  to  be 
funded and those having to repay mortgage credit may not know each other or come 
into contact with each other. Furthermore, the organization of collective action for 
obtaining  basic facilities  requires  some  technical  assistance,  which  increases  the 
costs of the scheme (Ferguson, 1999).  
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An Adequate Financial Safety Net 
The  financial  safety  net,  as  defined  for  the  purpose  of  this  study,  consists  of  all 
explicit or implicit state guarantees of non-government institution financial liabilities. 
By  non-government  institution  financial  liabilities,  we  mean  debts  owed  by  one 
private  sector  and/or  community-based  mortgage  market  participant  to  another, 
including  the  contractual  saving  liabilities  of  non-bank  financial  institutions,  for 
example  housing  co-operative  societies.  By  state  guarantees,  we  mean  a  state 
commitment to protect low- and moderate-income households from losses due to the 
default of any of these institutions. Formal programmes, such as savings insurance 
or microfinance guarantee programmes, form the explicit safety net. As is clear, not 
all types of state protection are addressed here, most notably social safety nets such 
as social security or disaster relief programmes. Also, the key focus here is on cases 
in  which  the  state  places  itself  between  households  and  mortgage  lenders  by 
guaranteeing the lenders‟ obligations to the other stakeholders, whether households, 
community-based organizations or financial institutions.  
 
E) Adequacy of Framework  
The adequacy of the analytical framework depends on the success or failure of co-
operatives in playing their intermediary (agency) role in the mortgage market. Most 
research on co-operation has concentrated on establishing the technical causes for 
the economic failure or success of various co-operative endeavours, paying scant 
attention to theory. Unsurprisingly, most of these findings seem to arrive at similar 
conclusions which include: lack of sufficient start-up capital, trying to do too much too 
soon; high levels of illiteracy; too much government interference; inappropriateness 
of  western  models  of  co-operation  for  some  cultures;  and  failure  to  comply  with 217 
 
internationally  accepted  co-operative  principles  (Habitat,  1989,  Mullins,  1993, 
Emelianoff, 1995, Rodgers, 1998, Andrusz, 1999, Dwelly, 1999).  
 
4.9 Research Limitations 
While the need for more and better evaluation may be clear, actually carrying it out is 
not so easy. Many problems and pitfalls appeared which could have discouraged the 
research process from getting started, distorted the results it produces and led to its 
abandonment soon after it began. I point out below some of the problems in relation 
to carrying out this study.  
 
There are a number of reasons why the impact of Egyptian housing co-operatives 
and their programmes is so difficult to measure. One has to do with the diversity of 
housing  co-operatives‟  origin  and  background.  Another  is  related  to  the  basic 
technical and logic-related problems of all evaluation systems, and yet another with 
common human shortcomings that arise when evaluation is undertaken.  
 
4.9.1 Diversity of background  
Most  of the  housing co-operatives  in  Egypt  are established by  the  employees of 
institutions operating in different social and economic sectors, including households, 
banking,  oil  and  gas.  So,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  characteristics  of  each 
research subject significantly depend on the strength of the parent institution and the 
performance of the sector in which the co-operative operates. For example, housing 
co-operatives  established  by  employees  in  the  oil  and  gas  sector  may  provide 
different views on the problems and challenges than those established by employees 
in  other sectors,  such  as  the army,  education,  civil  service,  etc. For  this reason, 218 
 
selecting research subjects from across the different social and economic sectors 
was beneficial in identifying the common problems in the co-operative housing sector 
and  consequently  helped  in  generalizing  the  research  outcome  and 
recommendations.  
 
4.9.2 Technical and logic-related problems 
It is generally very difficult to directly measure the outcomes of the activities of non-
profit organizations in Egypt. In many cases goals are too broad, diffuse and long-
term to capture in measurable terms, with only a few indicators that produce data for 
immediate use. When outcomes could not be measured with confidence, an attempt 
was often made to measure activities on the assumption that showing improvements 
will  cause  outcomes  to  be  achieved.  Unfortunately,  there  were  often  no  ways  to 
prove that engaging in certain activities would produce particular outcomes.  
 
When  one  raised  the  question  of  „efficiency‟  (that  is  to  say  which  organization 
provides  the  best  results  for  a  given  amount  of  money),  there  were  even  more 
problems  because  it  was  like  trying  to  compare  apples  and  oranges.  Once  it  is 
agreed what to measure, there was the problem of how to measure it. While there 
are many technical methods for getting information, the problem was that not all 
were equally appropriate, valid or reliable. Also, in the non-profit sector, in which 
most of Egypt‟s registered housing co-operatives operate, with a very small number 
of paid staff, many do not have the time, money or experience for developing these 
methods.  
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When measurement occurred, by whatever method, there was then the question of 
interpreting the data. One of the reasons interpretation was difficult was due to the 
lack of standards that reveal if the measurements indicate success or failure: good, 
average or poor results. In the non-profit sector there is a general dearth of such 
standards. Further, there are no industry norms or even benchmarks for comparison 
with other organizations.  
 
Similarly, measurement is not used for making decisions and there is no effort to 
understand why the results are the way they are. Accordingly, many explanations 
are possible. They could be due to the poor design of the programme, incompetent 
staff, poor management, external conditions that could not be controlled or other 
variables and combinations of variables.  
 
All these technical problems are very common and cause evaluation efforts to be 
rather burdensome. In spite of this, attempts were made, and the evaluation process 
contained explicit statements that set out why the evaluation was being undertaken, 
who was to be involved, what was to be measured, how the resultant data were to 
be interpreted and how the final results would be used in decision making.  
 
4.9.3 Human problems 
A set of factors that also created major problems when it came to clearly showing 
how  an  organization  makes  a  difference  were  the  very  common  psychological 
tendencies that arise frequently whenever evaluators attempt to measure the work of 
others. The first of these tendencies is that those being measured usually want to 
present their work as positively as possible, or, conversely, if things are not looking 220 
 
good,  they  want  to  avoid  being  blamed  for  the  situation.  Once  this  mind  set  is 
operative, the chances of obtaining a successful evaluation drop dramatically.  
 
In addition to the above, the study encountered another human problem due to the 
inevitable ambiguity that occurred when it came to interpreting the meaning of some 
data.  But,  just  because  there  was  ambiguity  did  not  mean  that  no  interpretation 
occurred. People usually want answers and solutions, so every kind of subjective 
explanation can arise to provide them. This subjective explanation comes from the 
evaluator‟s  personal pre-existing  beliefs,  perceptions  and  experiences. When  this 
subjective explanation of reality differs from the original meanings, as it often does, 
conflict  and  political  behaviour  arise.  Employing  multi-methods  in  this  study  was 
beneficial in addressing this problem. The in-depth interviews helped interpret the 
meaning of any ambiguous data from the survey.  
 
4.9.4 Legal and financial structures  
Housing co-operatives are legally constituted as not-for-profit organizations. Some 
are stand-alone but the majority are part of a group structure. In the case of a group 
structure there is a „parent‟ organization that performs different activities, for example 
financial,  commercial,  industrial  or  social.  Housing  co-operatives  have  their  own 
boards and staff nominated by the parent organization. This created a challenge to 
negotiate and collect data at both levels, specifically the parent organization and the 
housing co-operatives themselves.  
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4.9.5 Business Model 
Housing co-operatives commonly focus on the needs of their members in terms of 
affordable  housing  provision.  One  thing  that  distinguishes  housing  co-operatives 
from other affordable housing providers is the fact that they have limited access to 
bank  credit.  Their  main  source  of  funding  is  subscriptions  and  savings  that  they 
collect from their members. Housing co-operatives also receive funding from their 
parent organizations, principally for investment in developing new housing schemes. 
Peer  group  analysis  could  highlight  the  performance  of  housing  co-operatives  in 
relation to the competition.  
 
4.9.6 Accounting standards 
Most of the housing co-operatives follow a simple form of accounting, called receipts 
and payments. This consists of recording all the money that comes in (receipts), and 
all the money that goes out (payments). They use this method to draw up an income 
and expenditure account for each financial year. This is in addition to a balance 
sheet that lists all the assets and liabilities of the organization and their values, and 
shows its net worth. The analysis could have reviewed in more detail the reliability 
and  prudence  of  such  simple  accounting  standards  compared  to  other  local  or 
international accounting standards, to identify best practice.  222 
 
4.10 Conclusion  
In  this  chapter,  the  main  objectives  of  the  thesis  have  been  clearly  stated  and 
substantiated  in  terms  of  understanding  the  nature  and  scale  of  community 
participation in the Egyptian housing and mortgage markets and its contribution to 
increasing access to affordable housing and mortgage credit for low- and moderate- 
income  households,  the  effectiveness  of  housing  co-operative  societies  as 
community based organisations and policy agents, and the role of these societies 
after  the  housing  and  mortgage  markets  have  reached  a  certain  stage  of 
development. This is in addition to the consideration of the contextual stakeholders 
in  the  immediate  environment  of  the  Egyptian  housing  co-operative  societies, 
especially banks. Such consideration is thought to be important for identifying from 
different perspectives which institutions limit most the development of an effective 
and sustainable strategy that increases mortgage credit beneficiaries through their 
housing co-operative societies. 
 
The selected research methods to investigate these issues include both analysis of 
secondary data and collection of primary data via questionnaires and interviews. In 
many walks of life research methods are used on a daily basis to understand and 
appraise  in  particular  and  gain  information  in  general.  While  the  objectives  of 
research  methods  are  different  from  one  piece  of  research  to  another,  they  are 
common in their usage, a point which is often lost on those who concentrate solely 
on  their  validity,  instead  of  the  way  they  are  used  as  instruments  for  gaining 
information  and,  often,  employing  power  for  the  purposes  of  investigation  and 
assessment.  
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It is also worth emphasizing that the data derived through a research method are not 
simply „accurate‟ or „distorted‟ pieces of information, but provide the researcher with 
a  means  of  analysing  the  ways  in  which  other  people  would  consider  the  same 
issues and relationships, and the reason they would offer for doing so, to be precise 
it is their presuppositions in the interpretation of the data that should be the subject 
of  the  analysis.  Quite  simply,  if  both  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  different 
methods of research and the approaches to their analysis are understood, they can 
provide the researcher with an essential way of understanding and explaining the 
issues of concern.  
 
In the following two chapters, the data collected during the field study and the results 
are  presented  and  analysed.  Chapter  5  focuses  mainly  on  evaluating  the 
effectiveness of the Egyptian housing co-operative societies as community based 
organisations and policy agents with a long-standing interest in increasing access to 
housing for low- and moderate-income households in Egypt. The chapter analyses 
the various economic, social and political factors influencing this effectiveness.  
 
Chapter 6 provides different perspectives on the research topic by considering the 
contextual stakeholders, namely Egyptian banking institutions, and their perceptions 
of the Egyptian housing co-operative societies in the current context of the modern 
economic  history  of  Egypt.  The  chapter  also  explores  which  institutions  most 
constrain most the development of a sustainable level of mortgage credit supply from 
the  banking  sector  to  the  low-  and  moderate-income  households  through  their 
housing co-operative societies.  224 
 
 
5.  THE  EGYPTIAN  HOUSING  CO-OPERATIVE  SOCIETIES:  ARE 
THEY READY TO PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE?  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Co-operation in Egypt developed in recent times, when the country‟s economy was 
still  in  a  backward  state  and  in  a  very  similar  economic  position  to  many  other 
developing areas around the world today. This means that lessons and conclusions 
drawn from the Egyptian experience could be used beyond its borders. The fact that 
Egypt  passed  rapidly  through  several  stages  of  economic  transition  and 
development  also  offers  the  opportunity  to  draw  conclusions  about  co-operation, 
both as a tool of economic development in a developing country and also as an 
important player in an emerging mortgage market.  
 
In view of the above, the key objectives of this chapter are as follows: 1) to address 
why Egyptian housing co-operative societies can be seen as important policy agents 
to  expand  the  mortgage  credit  beneficiaries  base  in  Egypt;  2)  to  evaluate  the 
effectiveness of the Egyptian housing co-operative societies as community based 
organisations  and  policy  agents;  and  3)  to  identify  and  analyse  the  various 
economic, social and political factors influencing this effectiveness.  
 
Chapters  5  and  6  complement  each  other  in  evaluating  and  explaining  the 
effectiveness and sustainability of the mortgage market and institutions in expanding 
the mortgage credit beneficiaries base in Egypt. Chapter 5 reviews and analyzes the 
results of a survey on the operational and financial performance of Egyptian housing 225 
 
co-operative  societies  to  assess  their  effectiveness  and  ability  to  provide  an 
alternative  solution  to  increase  mortgage  credit  for  low-  and  moderate-income 
households. The chapter explores the key factors behind the sluggish relationship 
between the Egyptian housing co-operative societies and other stakeholders in the 
housing  and  mortgage  markets,  mainly  banking  institutions.  It  also  investigates 
whether the decline in recent years in the volume of mortgage credit to the housing 
co-operative  societies  is  due  to  demand  factors  (for  example,  credit  slowdown). 
Finally, the chapter identifies the other obstacles to enhancing the effectiveness of 
housing co-operative societies as intermediaries. Chapter 6 focuses on evaluating 
the effectiveness of the banking institutions in the provision of mortgage credit in 
general  and  to  the  Egyptian  housing  co-operative  societies  in  particular;  and 
understanding  the  bank  credit  supply  factors  (for  example,  credit  policy  change, 
crowding out, etc.).  
 
The remainder of the present chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
addresses  the  first  research  question  in  relation  to  why  Egyptian  housing  co-
operative societies can be seen as important policy agents to expand the mortgage 
credit  beneficiaries  base  in  Egypt.  Second,  the  results  of  the  questionnaire  and 
interviews are presented and analysed to address the research questions number 
two  and  three  pertaining  to  the  evaluation  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  Egyptian 
housing co-operative societies as community based organisations and policy agents; 
as well as the identification and analysis of the various economic, social and political 
factors influencing this effectiveness. The final section concludes and provides the 
basis for further investigation and analysis. 
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5.2 Why Egyptian housing co-operative societies can be seen as 
important policy agents? 
As is clear from the discussion in chapter 2, the large amounts of valuable resources 
devoted to co-operative development, and the assumed potential of co-operation as 
an  important  economic  policy  tool,  make  it  important  that  there  is  a  clear 
understanding of the economic nature of co-operation and the various forces at play 
during the planning, implementation and development stage, so as to establish the 
real causes of success or failure and to suggest possible mechanisms for avoiding 
failure.  
 
Not  many  decades  ago  Egypt  was  still  a  developing  nation  with  an  economic 
structure  not  dissimilar  to  that  of  many  developing  countries  today.  However  the 
economic history of co-operation as discussed in Chapter 3 appears to tell a different 
story. In the case of Egypt, it is often claimed that co-operation has enabled the 
country to succeed in meeting its overall social and economic objectives (Moharam, 
2006,  Rashad,  2008).  Surprisingly,  this  apparent  success  has  not  attracted  any 
serious  academic  research  despite  the  fact  that  other  features  of  Egypt  have 
repeatedly attracted the interest of political and economic scientists during the last 
thirty years. 
 
The first question that needs to be addressed with regards to housing co-operative 
performance in Egypt is whether it has been as successful as often claimed. It is a 
very difficult task to  define success in the context of co-operation. By successful 
operation of co-operatives different people mean different things. Some measures of 
success are said to include profitability, number of members and number of active 227 
 
societies, and the percentage of total and volume of housing projects handled by the 
housing co-operative.  
 
An attempt to establish whether a certain line of action was successful should begin 
with clearly setting the objectives of that action. Success can then be measured in 
terms of how far those objectives have been met. Not surprisingly there can be more 
than one objective and therefore they should be placed in order of priority. By giving 
them weights, perhaps, an imaginative mathematician could work out an optimum 
solution. The degree of success of a specific effort can then be measured against 
this optimum solution.  
 
However,  housing  co-operation  has  already  been  shown  to  aim  at  acting  as  a 
substitute intermediary between the housing sector, the capital markets, the input 
markets and the mortgage market. This does not mean that the main objective of a 
housing co-operative society is to get rid of all intermediaries, but rather, to eliminate 
any  abnormal  profits  made  by  these  intermediaries  due  to  the  various  market 
imperfections so characteristic of housing markets at work. Peasant exploitation was 
not the result of the existence of financial institutions, but rather, the absence of 
competition on the supply side and very low elasticity on the demand side due to 
prohibitively high transaction costs, difficult access to information and various other 
externalities.  So, any  assessment  should  look  behind  the  rhetoric  of  housing  co-
operative success or failure to see whether, or to what extent, co-operation managed 
or failed to overcome the barriers to progress.  228 
 
 
5.3 Survey and Interview Results 
The key purpose of the survey and interviews were to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the Egyptian housing co-operative societies as community based organisations and 
policy  agents  and  to  identify  the  various  factors  influencing  this  effectiveness. 
Addressing these issues would help reach a conclusion on whether the  Egyptian 
housing  co-operative  societies  can  provide  an  alternative  solution  for  the  limited 
penetration of the mortgage market in Egypt. Thus, the researcher had to ask a wide 
variety  of  questions  in  relation  to  the  performance  of  the  Egyptian  co-operative 
housing  sector  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  housing  co-operative  societies‟ 
business  model  and  systems  of  governance.  Addressing  these  questions  was 
important  in  understanding  how  housing  co-operative  societies  operate  on  the 
ground, how they fund their operations and protect their financial resources, and how 
effective  they  are  in  increasing  access  to  housing for  low-  and moderate-income 
households. It was also important to understand the reasons for the rise and decline 
of the role of housing co-operative societies as well as the reasons for the lack of 
government  support  in  the  recent  period.  The  following  discussion  presents  the 
results of the survey and interviews.  
 
5.3.1 Public Policy Environment  
Twenty-five  of  the  thirty  respondents  considered  the  change  in  public  policy 
regarding social housing provision and agreed that the change reflects the trend in 
the broader economic environment. The literature already suggests that after the 
housing  boom from  the  late  1970s  to  the early  1990s dynamic economic growth 
came to a halt due to the worldwide economic recession, Asian economic crisis and 229 
 
a  changing  international  division  of  labour,  which,  in  turn,  led  to  ever-increasing 
unemployment  in  Egypt.  In  response,  besides  lowering  the  interest  rates  on 
mortgage  credit,  the  government  reinstated  the  resettlement  scheme  by 
incorporating it into the private sector model in an effort to combat recession and, at 
the same time, give a boost to the major economic sectors such as the construction 
industry. 
 
The chairman of a large housing co-operative society in Cairo commented: 
„Unlike previous developments in state-led social housing, the government 
revealed  its  intention  to  promote  private-sector-led  social  housing  with 
more financial benefits being given. On the production side, wider scope 
has been given to private promoters in terms of price setting. The price 
ceilings on private sector social housing, as regulated by the government, 
were relaxed, along with the restrictions on output since the beginning of 
the new millennium. Lifting the ceiling on the price of a social housing unit 
gave private promoters a wider scope in relation to their social housing 
investments‟. (3) (see appendix 2)   
 
In terms of social housing distribution policy, he reported that: 
„The  restrictions  on  qualified  would-be  house  buyers  were  relaxed  to 
make the houses more affordable to the prospective owners from the fast 
growing  low-  and  moderate-income  class  segment.  Besides,  the 
regulation relating to eligibility criteria was also amended, with a universal 
low interest rate mortgage scheme being introduced with no specific rules 
attached that applied to the buyers of the private sector social housing‟.  230 
 
This meant that private sector social housing was not limited to low- and moderate-
income households, which, as a result, allowed higher-income households to enter 
into the social housing sub-market. 
 
For this reason, the general notion among respondents is that social housing has 
been  gradually  privatized  in  the  sense  that  there  has  been  a  shift  from  the 
domination  of  state-led  and  co-operative  housing  to  the  growth  of  private  sector 
social housing. Further, private sector social housing has been promoted and has 
become  a  dominating  form  of  development.  To  encourage  private  agents  to 
participate, a senior government official in the Ministry of Housing agreed that: 
„Subsidies and initiatives were provided. In other words, the rules relating 
to  distribution  based  on  social  considerations  were  relaxed,  with  more 
capitalistic  relationships  pervading  the  production  and  consumption 
aspects of the social housing market in Egypt‟. (4) (see appendix 2)   
 
A) Government Support  
Although the Egyptian economy has been experiencing impressive growth in recent 
years, many of the responses provided clear evidence of the existing inequality in 
sharing the benefits from economic growth, as demonstrated by the fact that many 
Egyptians  continue  to  live  in  poverty.  Further,  while  government  subsidies  are 
essential  for  many  people‟s  survival,  they  are  limited  in  both  size  and  reach,  as 
shown by the fact that around half of the Egyptian population is living on just USD2 a 
day (Galal, 2002). The Egyptian state has been subsidizing basic goods such as fuel 
and  bread  since  the  1940s,  with  fuel  subsidies  alone  costing  the  government  a 231 
 
significant  percentage  of  the  national  budget  annually.  However,  government 
subsidies remain vulnerable to corruption and have many shortcomings.  
 
One respondent suggested that:  
„The state used public and provident funds to provide financial support in 
the form of  subsidized mortgage credit for the purpose of  co-operative  
housing  development.  This  led  to  housing  co-operative  societies 
becoming the main non-governmental providers of social housing since 
the 1980s. For some time, central and local government institutions have 
provided them with administrative support (through planning powers) and 
financial  support.  Today,  financial  support  is  limited  because  of  the 
structural economic reform‟. (5) (see appendix 2)   
 
Another respondent endorsed this view by acknowledging that: 
„The  government  also  used  to  allocate  land  to  housing  co-operative 
societies at below market price, and subsidized credit facilities from public 
sector financial institutions. When the state budget could not sustain such 
spending,  cross-subsidization  was  allowed  to  fund  new  co-operative 
housing projects, by the development for sale of units for the public at 
market rate. However, the way in which government provides support for 
housing  co-operative  societies  has  changed  significantly  since  the  late 
1990s . . . In the recent past; the emphasis has changed from providing 
such direct support to providing support to the low-income home buyers. 
Also, as the country progressed with its liberal economic policy, the co-
operative  housing  sector  began  to  be  perceived  as  an  unfit  model  of 232 
 
social housing provision. As a result, total government spending on direct 
and indirect support for co-operative housing has fallen; hence, housing 
co-operative societies are now obliged to compete in the open market for 
alternative funding sources and land acquisition at the prevailing market 
rates. Given their status as non-profit-based organizations, this has led to 
a significant decline in the contribution of the co-operative housing sector 
in recent years‟. (6) (see appendix 2)   
 
In  the  last  five  years,  however,  there  has  been  a  growing  pressure  on  the 
government to promote and reform the co-operative housing sector. This reflects a 
wish  to  deploy  all  the  available  resources  from  both  the  private  sector  and  civic 
society  to  support  the  mortgage  market  development.  So  far,  this  has  led  to 
refocusing part of the attention on how to integrate co-operative housing and the 
mortgage market.  
 
Twenty of the thirty respondents believe that dependence on government support 
inhibits  the  autonomy  of  many  housing  co-operative  societies  to  choose  which 
activities  to  undertake  and  to  select  the  most  effective  intervention  strategies  to 
achieve their objectives. To a certain extent, the government has its own agenda, to 
be  precise  its  own  views  as  to  which  problems  are  important  and  the  best 
intervention strategies to address these problems. They also indicate that they are 
compelled to follow and allow the government to dictate the scope and direction of 
their activities, or else receive no funds, planning and building permits.  
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B) Intermediary Role and Housing Mobility  
One of the key objectives of any reform in the housing sector is to build a competitive 
mortgage credit system, with sound banking and non-banking financial institutions, 
able to provide efficient financial services for housing (Renaud, 1996, Renaud, 2000, 
Stephens, 2005a, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Committee on 
Human Settlements, 2005). As noted earlier (chapter 3), the terminology of housing 
finance  is  a  broad  one.  It  not  only  refers  to  providing  mortgage  credit  but  also 
includes advising on, arranging, entering into, administering or agreeing to carry on 
contractual savings for housing and/or home purchase plans.  
 
In a mortgage credit situation, a financial institution lends money to a consumer to 
help  them  purchase  a  property  and  the  financial  institution  makes  its  money  by 
charging interest on the sums lent. In a home purchase plan, the financial institution 
buys the property for the consumer and makes its profit from renting the property to 
the  consumer.  The  survey  and  interview  results  provided  an  opportunity  to 
understand better the business model upon which almost all Egyptian housing co-
operative  societies  operate.  As  one  respondent  summarize  it  during  an  interview 
following the survey:  
„Egyptian housing co-operative societies are in effect involved in mortgage 
credit  intermediation  activities.  The  housing  co-operative  usually  enters 
into  a  contractual  savings  plan  for  housing  with  its  member.  The  co-
operative  then  invests  the  member‟s  savings  together  with  any  other 
funds (for example grants, credit, etc.) in acquiring or developing land and 
becomes the freeholder. Next, the member enters into an agreement to 
buy the property from the co-operative at cost either by paying in full at 234 
 
the  end  of,  or  paying  by  instalments  during  the  course  of,  a  specified 
period.  The  co-operative  and  member  enter  into  a  rental  agreement, 
giving  the  member  the  right  to  occupy  the  property  throughout  the 
specified period. Once all payments have been made at the end of the 
specified period, the co-operative transfers the freehold ownership to the 
member‟. (7) (see appendix 2)   
 
Looking  at  this  dynamic,  it  is  important  to  examine  the  factors  that  distinguish 
members who manage to own their home at the end from those who do not. An 
obvious reason is to understand how members fund their housing objectives. Apart 
from formal and informal credit suppliers – moneylenders or friends and relatives – 
we understand that the personal savings of the members themselves constitute a 
large  proportion  of  the  required  finance.  There  is  also  an  indication  that  this 
proportion is higher in smaller co-operative societies due to the limited potential for 
institutional financial support. 
 
Even  though  there  has  been  rapid  progress  towards  economic  liberalization  and 
reform, ten of the thirty questionnaire respondents had the courage (during Mubarak 
administration) to criticize the process as it has mostly benefited the middle- and 
higher-income classes. To support their argument, they cite the private sector banks 
and mortgage finance companies as the most important institutions in the Egyptian 
mortgage  market  today.  Further,  state  housing  finance  institutions,  while  not 
providing credit themselves as before, have also promoted lending to private housing 
firms. In effect, only NGOs and co-operative societies are active at the lower income 
end of the housing market.  235 
 
 
The  limited  outreach  of  mortgage  credit  is  also  reflected  in  the  answers  to  the 
questionnaire  and  the  replies  during  the  interviews.  Nineteen  of  the  thirty 
respondents believe that access to formal mortgage credit is very limited and they 
have to rely on their own sources to finance their activities. These sources rely solely 
on the contractual savings of their members. But, given the fact that such a funding 
arrangement is not properly regulated, it is seen as an informal non-commercial form 
of borrowing to finance housing purchase. Informal credit can be distinguished by 
transactional credit suppliers, such as money lenders or pawnbrokers, from personal 
loans from family or other closely related persons who do not charge interest (Tra 
and Lensink, 2007). Only a small number, representing mainly the major housing co-
operative societies, have used formal mortgage credit to fund their activities. The 
majority  used  to  have  access  to  mortgage  credit  from  state-owned  specialized 
financial  institutions  such  as  the  Housing  &  Development  Bank.  However,  the 
situation is considerably worse for at least 80 per cent of the sample as they have 
been unable to access formal mortgage credit institutions since the beginning of the 
economic transition process in the late 1990s. 
 
From  one  respondents‟  point of  view,  „another  important  reason is related to  the 
failure of mortgage credit institutions in marketing their services‟ (8) (see appendix 
2). This might be due to the difficulty in obtaining verifiable information on the size 
and stability of many housing co-operative societies‟ financial positions. This failure 
also  suggests  that  lack  of  credit  or  financial-related  information  for  housing  co-
operative  societies  means  that  lenders  require  collateral,  which  makes  the  credit 
market fail for co-operative societies without sufficient assets. Even with the requisite 236 
 
collateral, limited enforcement of foreclosure laws makes most mortgage institutions 
wary  of  marketing  mortgage  credit.  Given  the  current  limited  outreach  of  the 
mortgage market, contractual savings or liquidating other assets therefore remain 
the only options for many housing co-operative societies. In the meantime, housing 
development  represents  a  significant  lumpy  expenditure  for  most  co-operative 
societies. 
 
Accordingly, contract savings of members represent the main way for most housing 
co-operative societies to fund activities. Among the sample co-operative societies, 
some manage to mobilize savings regularly, either through account fund savings or 
other  forms.  The  proportion  is  higher  in  the  better-off  sectors.  For  instance,  the 
housing co-operative societies in sectors such as oil and gas and financial services 
usually mobilize more savings from their members who save regularly, while housing 
co-operative  societies  established  by  key  workers,  such  as  teachers  and  civil 
servants,  and  cannot  mobilize  similar  levels  of  savings  from  their  key  worker 
members. Obviously, this reflects the variation in household income and the ability to 
save regularly for housing purposes across the different economic sectors.  
 
In  this  regard,  it  is  important  to  note  that  our  analysis  of  the  contract  savings 
behaviour of the housing co-operative societies‟ members is taken as given. The 
analysis does not attempt to explain explicitly the motives of different members for 
saving or the factors that allow them to do so, except to the extent that they are used 
as controls in this analysis. There is a very large literature on these issues, some of it 
focusing on contract savings for housing in transition economies (UNCHS-Habitat, 237 
 
1989, Borsch-Supan and Stahl, 1991, Scholten, 2000, Struyk et al., 2004, Chiquier 
and Lea, 2009, Lea and Renaud, 1995). 
 
However, some of the motivations for saving suggested by Keynes in 1936 – the 
precautionary motive, life cycle considerations and saving to make a major purchase 
– are most relevant to the savings behaviour of low-income households (Keynes, 
2007). However, this is less relevant in a traditional society like Egypt where there 
are strong family ties and where consumption appears to be much more linked to 
income.  
 
In  the  context  of  housing  mobility,  members  of  Egyptian  housing  co-operative 
societies appear to be relatively willing to save to accumulate funds to purchase or 
make a deposit on a dwelling unit. As noted earlier, among low-income Egyptian 
households, formal saving mechanisms and access to credit are often out of reach. 
Thus, housing co-operative societies can be considered as part of the solution. But 
the  potential  for  utilizing  savings  among  members  of  the  housing  co-operative 
societies has not been explored yet. In rotating savings and credit, in fund savings 
schemes,  members  of  the  housing  co-operative  societies  can  regularly  make  a 
contribution to a common fund which is then made available to another co-operative 
or member in turn.  
 
While low transaction costs make this type of funding a cheaper source of finance, 
the enforcement of fund rules is difficult – especially under the present regulatory 
settings that do not recognize Egyptian housing co-operative societies as financial 
intermediaries. There is nothing to suggest that the Egyptian housing co-operative 238 
 
societies carry on financial intermediation. But, as is clear from the above, one can 
certainly recognize the key strength of the Egyptian housing co-operative societies 
and their pivotal role as financial intermediaries not only in attracting low-cost funding 
from  their  members,  which  provides  a  stable  source  of  funding  and  support  for 
developing  specialized  financial  services  for  affordable  housing,  but  also  in 
extending the reach of the mortgage market at the middle and lower income end of 
the housing market. The majority of the respondents already supported this view and 
one of them confirmed during the interview „the need to integrate the co-operative 
housing sector into the formal financial system to enhance its financial intermediation 
capabilities through organization and regulation of their contract savings mobilization 
activities, risk management, standards and home purchase plan offerings‟.  
 
5.3.2 Business Model and Strategy 
The survey and interviews have confirmed the status of the Egyptian housing co-
operative societies as not-for-profit organizations that invest for social purposes and 
therefore invest in a different way to other housing firms. As the president of the 
Central Co-operative Housing Union illustrated:  
„Private  sector  housing  developers  usually  acquire  land  and  build, 
redevelop, refurbish or improve properties so that they create added value 
by selling the properties immediately after the works are completed or at a 
future date, to maximize the return for shareholders. Egyptian housing co-
operative societies follow a similar path in that they acquire land and build, 
redevelop,  refurbish  or  improve  properties.  However,  they  usually  sell 
properties at cost to achieve social objectives‟. (9) (see appendix 2) 
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The largest housing co-operative societies in the sample (to be exact those with an 
asset  base  of  more  than  EGP25million)  appeared  confident  in  their  business 
strategies that are primarily focused at present on core social housing activities as 
well as the maintenance of a strong business profile and good financial performance. 
In  keeping  with  the  Egyptian  government‟s  housing  development  plan,  they  also 
intend to help build new communities and regenerate areas, while at the same time 
increasing housing choice for their members. On the other hand, the smaller housing 
co-operative societies did not appear to have a clear strategy for expansion and 
becoming a „one-stop-shop‟ to create mixed-tenure neighbourhoods and provide a 
range of related services that can enable them to respond to the government‟s policy 
of area regeneration, provision of affordable homes, and large-scale development 
investment in places where the housing shortage is most severe.  
 
Structure and Development Strategy  
The structure and development strategy of the selected sample varies for different 
geographical areas, adapting to local housing market conditions: more housing for 
sale to be developed, for example, and less emphasis given to rental housing and 
regeneration projects. The development aspirations are ambitious; large housing co-
operative  societies  aim  to  develop  thousands  of  new  units  per  year  in  the  next 
couple  of  years.  The  pace  of  development  is  not  monitored  carefully  at  present, 
although these housing co-operative societies have previously demonstrated their 
ability  to  be  flexible  about  their  plans,  having  cut  back  on  their  development 
programmes  where  projects  have  not  been  sufficiently  funded,  or  where  market 
conditions have deteriorated. 
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While  the  housing  stock  of  the  selected  sample  is  widely  dispersed  throughout 
Egypt,  a  significant  percentage  is  in  and  around  the  major  Egyptian  cities,  for 
example Cairo and Giza, where certain areas have been in decline and there have 
been  consequent  demand  issues,  which  have  led  to  large-scale  co-operative 
investment  in  infrastructure  development.  But  the  housing  co-operative  societies‟ 
exposure is relatively small as the developments are phased over several years (six 
to  seven  years).  Their  current  strategies  pay  no  attention  to  the  potential  for 
increasing development activity in some markets, such as housing for rent, with any 
surplus income from property sales funding additional growth. On the other hand, 
they continue to work alongside other agencies and developers, public and private, 
and  play  an  important  role  in  the  economic  development  of  local  governments 
through  the  deployment  and  investment  of  household  savings,  the  provision  of 
affordable housing and development of new communities.  
 
5.3.3 Governance and Management  
Twenty-one  co-operatives  agreed  that  governance and management  issues  have 
affected their organizations over the last three years. During the interviews, it was 
made clear by the management of the Central Co-operative Housing Union that: 
„The co-operative housing sector in Egypt is required to adhere to certain 
rules, in terms of: volunteering and opening of membership; democratic 
management;  independent  self-governance;  learning,  training  and 
awareness;  and  community  care.  These  rules  are  considered  the 
backbone of the co-operative movement and represent the co-operative 
structures  that  distinguish  the  co-operative  movement  and  its  role  and 
objectives from other movements‟. (10) (see appendix 2) 241 
 
This  is  in  addition  to  the  strict  regulatory  environment  for  co-operative  housing 
activities  based  on  the  Co-operative  Housing  Law  number  14/1981  through  the 
Central  Co-operative  Housing  Union  and  the  Public  Authority  for  Co-operative 
Construction and Housing (Egypt, 1996). 
 
A supervisor in the Central Co-operative Housing Union also noted that:  
„The Directors of housing co-operative societies are required to observe 
these rules. Further, the Directors exercise ultimate control but should set 
their co-operative societies‟ strategies in consultation with representatives 
of the members, to work towards their strategic objectives. They should 
be all elected members. The management teams should also be selected 
based  on  their  good  track  record  in  terms  of  managing  development 
projects, serving members, and working with the government‟. (11) (see 
appendix 2) 
 
In  practice,  however,  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  not  all  housing  co-
operative societies are managed by people who have proven ability to consolidate 
resources  and  processes  to  provide  support  for  the  achievement  of  their  co-
operative societies‟ business objectives.  
 
5.3.4 Operational Performance  
As  noted  earlier,  Egyptian  housing  co-operative  societies  have  existed  for  many 
years  and  grew  significantly  between  1980  and  1995  as  major  social  housing 
investors.  This  led  to  housing  co-operative  societies  becoming  the  main  non-
governmental providers of affordable housing and developing a more businesslike 242 
 
and  less  charitable  approach  during  this  period  of  time.  However,  since  the  late 
1990s, it was noticeable that the role of housing co-operative societies declined.  
 
Many respondents attributed this decline to „withdrawal of government support under 
the Structural Economic Reform Programme, which resulted in reducing subsidized 
loans  and  the  allocation  of new  land  at  affordable terms‟. It  was  also  noted  that 
„private funding witnessed a significant drop in order to promote the private sector 
role in the economy in general and in the housing market in particular‟.  
 
Despite  this  change  in  public  policy,  the  co-operative  housing  sector  generally 
continued to enjoy good performance for a number of reasons including increasing 
demand from the fast growing low- and moderate-income segments of society and 
business  expansion  to  accommodate  the growing  demand  for affordable  housing 
(see figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1 Reasons for Housing Co-operative Societies‟ Good Performance 
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Source: Survey results, 2009, n = 21 
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According to the Finance Manager of a large housing co-operative society in Cairo, 
„such positive operating performance is credit strength as it generally tends to result 
in cash being added to the bottom line‟ (12) (see appendix 2). On the other hand, he 
reported that „housing co-operative societies that experienced difficulty cite opposite 
factors, including an upsurge in the prices of building materials, declining demand, 
lack of credit, competition [from the private sector], and high arrears [members failing 
to adhere to their contractual obligations]‟ (see figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2 Reasons for Housing Co-operative Societies‟ Bad Performance 
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Source: Survey results, 2009, n = 9 
 
Some interviewees also indicated that „the current operating environment has largely 
been irrelevant in terms of allowing the co-operative housing stock to respond to the 
demand from many low- and moderate-income households. As a government official 
in the Egyptian Ministry of Housing explains: 
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„Housing that is delivered within the confines of a co-operative housing 
framework  is  only  affordable  to  those  earning  at  or  above  the  median 
household  income.  Thus,  those  households  earning  less  are  forced  to 
look elsewhere for shelter. In virtually all cases, their search leads them to 
the  other  alternatives  including  the  informal  sector  where  government 
rules  and  regulations  associated  with  formal  housing  production  are 
ignored‟. (13) (see appendix 2) 
 
5.3.5 Regulatory Framework  
During the interviews, „the adverse change in the regulatory environment‟ was widely 
noted as a „negative factor affecting performance in the co-operative housing sector‟. 
The  Egyptian  housing  co-operative  societies  used  to  be  solely  regulated  by  the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, based on Co-operative Law number 317 issued in 1956. In 
1960, the Egyptian state enacted Law number 267 to establish public co-operative 
organizations for agriculture, housing, vocational industry and water resources. Also, 
separate laws for each of these activities were enacted and allocated by the Ministry 
of Social Affairs to the appropriate ministries of agriculture, housing, supply, rural 
development, domestic trade, industry and trade.  
 
Law  number  14/1981  stipulated  that  to  be  authorized  as  a housing  co-operative, 
societies,  the  entities  must  satisfy  a  number  of  conditions  and  provide  ongoing 
information  relating  to  these  conditions  and  to  financial  and  management 
performance, including:  
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  Non-distribution of surpluses,  which are retained by the  organization to be 
applied to social housing purposes; 
  Setting of rents/prices that are affordable to their members; and  
  Embracing  social  objectives  and  using  all  resources  to  promote  these 
objectives rather than making payments to members.  
 
The law also paved the way to the inauguration of the Co-operative Housing Union 
and the Public Authority for Co-operative Construction and Housing to supervise and 
regulate the housing co-operatives‟ activities.  
 
Today, all housing co-operative societies in Egypt are regulated under government 
statute  and  are  subject  to  the  authority  of  the  above  two  institutions  as  well  as 
several  other  government  agencies  and  unions.  While  these  regulatory  settings 
promote  best  practice,  the  common  perception  among  most  of  the  interviewees 
however is that „co-operative housing regulatory environment is chaotic‟ as a result 
of  „excessive  supervision  by  different  authorities  in  some  areas‟  (for  example, 
„building permits‟). There is a general consensus among the senior managers of the 
housing  co-operative  societies  in  the  sample  regarding  „the  need  to  reform 
regulations and policies to recognize co-operative housing as a valuable asset class 
and to make the sector work more efficiently‟.  
 
This view offered some insights into the costs of the current high level of regulations, 
especially in certain areas. Like many governments around the world, the central and 
local  authorities  in  Egypt  are  required  to  use  master  plans,  zoning,  subdivision 
regulations,  and  building  codes  to  control  development,  and  to  regulate  financial 246 
 
resources mobilization. These regulations were enacted to help protect the urban 
and  natural  environment,  to  gear  development  with  infrastructure  capacity,  to 
maintain  and  enhance  the  property  values  of  Egyptian  neighbourhoods,  and  to 
mitigate  financial  risks.  Many  interviewees  agreed  that  „quite  often  the  planning 
systems  and  regulations  are  excessive  and  dictate  practice‟.  As  a  president  of 
housing co-operative society explains: 
„In the course of adopting these excessive regulations, little if any thought 
is given to the potential cost effects of the controls. Thus, this drives up 
housing  costs  and  thereby  lowers  affordability  for  many  housing  co-
operative societies and their members‟. (14) (see appendix 2) 
 
In order to get a better understanding of the main issues, the  interviewees  were 
asked  to  note  the  government  regulations  that  are  considered  as  burdensome. 
These can be identified in four broad ways: (1) land supply constraints, (2) excessive 
plot size standards and subdivision design, (3) procedural delays and red tape, and 
(4) restrictions on financial resources mobilization. The following sections take up 
these key constraints. 
 
A) Land supply constraints  
Restrictions on the supply of land and the density of residential development greatly 
affect land costs. As the president of one housing co-operative society explains:  
„The supply of land by the government has recently become limited as the 
government attempts to maintain its fiscal position by designating land for 
the  more  fiscally  desirable  upper  residential  market,  as  well  as 
commercial and industrial activities. These policies have constrained the 247 
 
supply of developable land for middle- and low-income housing. Further 
strong  zoning  policies  in  some  areas  to  block  the  further  outward 
expansion  of  the  city,  and  land  readjustment  methods  linked  with 
monopolistic  administrative  practices,  have  all  forced  up  land  price  in 
Egypt in recent years‟. (15) (see appendix 2) 
 
The sharp increase in land price and housing prices already challenges the stability 
of  the  present  regime.  Despite  the  fact  that  90  per  cent  of  the  land  is  in  public 
ownership,  the  supply  of  serviced  plots  is  constrained  due  to  the  lack  of 
infrastructure provision. As a consequence, land and housing prices have increased 
in real terms far faster than household income. This has resulted in the acceleration 
of  informal  sector  settlements  as  more  and  more  low-  and  middle-income 
households are priced out of the housing market.  
 
A  government  official  in  the  Ministry  of  Housing  believes  that  „past  urban  land 
management strategies have relatively been more successful in meeting the more 
important objectives of providing adequate quantities of urban land at reasonable 
prices and safeguarding the rights of the underprivileged‟. (16) (see appendix 2) 
 
B) Subdivision standards  
It was also noted that housing authorities and municipal governments usually set 
very  high  regulations  for  subdivision  layouts  that  influence  the  cost  of  plots.  As 
illustrated by a manager of housing co-operative society:  
„While  narrow  plots  assigned  for  co-operative  housing  development 
reduce  the  per  plot  costs  of  streets  and  infrastructure,  housing  blocks 248 
 
developed on narrow plots produce houses with narrow rooms. On the 
other hand, given the high prices of land and building materials, prices for 
narrow houses remain quite high and less affordable for potential buyers. 
This is in addition to the adverse impact of the regulations of infrastructure 
provision in Egypt on the costs of co-operative housing developments‟. 
(17) (see appendix 2) 
 
An assessment of the impact of these regulations on the economies of co-operative 
housing development could have illustrated how costs can be dramatically reduced 
by lowering standards. However, it was difficult to obtain specific information and 
data  on  co-operative  housing  projects  from  the  surveyed  housing  co-operative 
societies. But, as is clear, these regulations limit the ability of housing co-operative 
societies to respond to rising land costs by altering the design of subdivisions. As 
land prices increase, strict plot size or circulation requirements make it difficult for 
them  to  build  at  higher  densities.  Co-operative  housing  developers  in  Egypt,  like 
elsewhere, are socially rather than market driven. They do not build housing that is 
profitable to provide. 
 
C) Procedural delays and red tape  
Regulation  and  governance  are  important  issues  for  many  co-operatives  in  the 
selected  sample.  Housing  co-operative  societies  are  currently  supervised  and 
regulated by several organizations. These organizations play similar roles in terms of 
producing  notes  of  guidance  for  housing  co-operative  societies  to  follow  and 
requiring them to submit reports on their operational and financial activities for review 
and approval. Some also have relatively wider and more diverse roles, including the 249 
 
mobilization  and  provision  of  financial  and  non-financial  resources  as  well  as 
technical  support  to  the  housing  co-operative  societies.  Further,  they  are  also 
involved in acquiring land for the development of co-operative housing compounds, 
and investing in the planning, preparation and infrastructure of the land before it is 
finally  allocated  to  the  housing  co-operatives  for  the  development  of  new  co-
operative dwelling units. In recent years, their role has significantly evolved in the 
value chain to include the development of co-operative housing compounds, putting 
them in direct competition with the housing  co-operative societies  which led to a 
major divergence in their original enabling and regulatory role. This resulted in a 
number  of  constraints  and  confusion  for  many  housing  co-operative  societies, 
especially in terms of issuing planning and building permissions.  
 
A  senior  manager  of  housing  co-operative  society  outside  the  capital  city  Cairo 
reported that „complicated procedures for obtaining development permission make it 
difficult for housing co-operative societies to respond quickly to changing housing 
demands and they create barriers to new projects‟. Thus, an analysis of the system 
of co-operative housing development approval would be instructive. According to the 
management of another housing co-operative society:  
„The reason for the rise in Egypt‟s housing prices is the combination of 
overly complex and time-consuming housing project approval procedures, 
the  sluggish  response  of  the  housing  industry  to  increases  in  housing 
prices,  and  high  housing  demand.  For example,  it might  take  years to 
obtain  all  the  necessary  permits  from  several  government  agencies  to 
allow  development  permission.  This  leads  to  a  delay  in  co-operative 250 
 
housing supply response that increases the co-operative housing prices 
with the growth in demand‟. (18) (see appendix 2) 
 
D) Financial resources mobilization 
The  final  way  in  which  government  regulations  influence  co-operative  housing 
development  is  through  financial  regulation.  The  work  of  Egyptian  housing  co-
operative societies – the provision of financial services such as contract savings for 
housing  and  the  home  purchase  plan  –  is,  under  the  terms  of  their  objectives, 
„unprofitable‟.  Traditionally,  these  co-operative  societies  rely  on  their  members‟ 
contributions to cover the costs of their activities. Today, many co-operative societies 
often find such limited traditional funding sources insufficient to meet rising costs. On 
the  other  hand,  restrictions  on  borrowing  make  it  more  difficult  to  do  long-term 
planning, improve services or reach full potential, especially in terms of extending the 
reach of the home purchase plan. 
 
As  the  Finance  Manager  of  a  large  housing  co-operative  society  in  the  city  of 
Alexandria discussed:  
„When the costs of a co-operative‟s core activities exceed the inflow of 
funding from members, it is forced to either reduce the size and/or quality 
of  its  housing  scheme,  or  to  find  new  sources  of  funds  to  cover  the 
difference. Reaching out to new sources of funds with innovative fund-
raising approaches, for example through commercial ventures, remains 
one  of  the  key  challenges  for  many  Egyptian  housing  co-operative 
societies‟. (19) (see appendix 2) 
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5.3.6 Financial Performance 
The  table  below  provides  key  financial  information  for  some  of  the  housing  co-
operative societies in the selected sample:  
 
 
Table 5.1 Housing Co-operative Societies‟ Key Financial Information 
 (In EGP millions) 
Name  Total 
Assets¹ 
Total 
Liabilities² 
Total 
Capital³ 
T. Liab/ 
T. Capitalᶣ 
Surplus/ 
(Deficit)ƽ 
6
th of October  505  9.5  495.5  0.02 : 1  2.50 
El Sharara  167  22.3  144.7  0.15 : 1  0.12 
National Bank   147  25.5  121.5  0.20 : 1  0.55 
Telecom Authority   144  8.7  135.3  0.06 : 1  0.04 
Engineers Union   124  31.2  92.8  0.33 : 1  -0.26 
Amenhotep  118  38.2  79.8  0.47 : 1  0.14 
Republican 
Guards 
113  77.3  35.7  2.16 : 1  -0.15 
Riviera Village  97.6  87.6  10  8.76 : 1  -1.18 
Central Bank  83  2  81  0.02 : 1  0.03 
Research Centre  58  23.3  34.7  0.67 : 1  0.05 
Eltahreer  40  33.5  6.5  5.15 : 1  -0.17 
Suez Gulf   33.4  2.2  31.2  0.07 : 1  0.00 
El Sha'bi  23  18.8  4.2  4.47 : 1  0.43 
Belayim   14  2.2  11.8  0.18 : 1  0.03 
El Refai  13  1.1  11.9  0.09 : 1  0.00 
Heliopolis  13  1.77  11.23  0.16 : 1  -0.25 
Education   10  2.6  7.4  0.35 : 1  0.00 
Commerce Union   9.8  3.8  6  0.63 : 1  0.31 
Co-operative 
Towers 
9.6  1.6  8  0.20 : 1  -0.17 
Dar El Sa'ada   8  7.88  0.12  65.7 : 1  0.00 
Agri-Projects   7.3  2.1  5.2  0.40 : 1  -0.38 
Zahrat al Madinah  6  0.09  5.91  0.015 : 1  0.05 
El Remal  4.8  1.2  3.6  0.33 : 1  -0.01 
El Haram  3.8  0.34  3.46  0.09 : 1  -0.02 
Golf   3.3  2.97  0.33  9 : 1  -0.09 
Nubian Sons  2.5  0.04  2.46  0.016 : 1  0.016 
¹In financial accounting, assets are economic resources. Anything tangible or intangible that is capable of being owned or 
controlled to produce value and that is held to have positive economic value is considered an asset. Assets also represent 
ownership of value that can be converted into cash.  
²Total liabilities represent the sum of all monetary obligations of a co-operative and all claims creditors have on its assets.  
³Total capital of a co-operative is the total of all ordinary capital, reserves, preferences and minorities.  
ᶣA ratio of a co-operative's financial leverage calculated by dividing its total liabilities by total equity capital. It indicates what 
proportion of capital and debt the co-operative is using to finance its assets.  
ƽ  This  reflects  the  net  result  after  comparing  the  co-operative‟s  funding  sources  against  housing  programme  expenses, 
administrative costs and other operating commitments. 
Source: Co-operatives‟ data, 2009  
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A) Financial Policy and Accounting Standards  
According  to  Law  number  14/1982  and  its  executive  regulations,  housing  co-
operative  societies  have  to  prepare  income  and  expenditure  accounts  to 
demonstrate whether they are operating at a surplus or a deficit, balance sheets to 
demonstrate  the  value  of  their  assets  and  liabilities  and  cash  flow  statements  to 
show whether they can afford to meet their financial obligations as they fall due.  
 
The  review  of  the  respondents‟  financial  statements  has  shown  that  there  is  no 
unified standard for financial reporting. Further, there is a lack of a well-developed 
evaluation system within the sector to assess the efficiency and creditworthiness of 
housing  co-operative  societies  based  on  performance  indicators  (PIs).  Thus,  a 
comprehensive review to develop these reporting standards and PIs is required.  
 
On  the  positive  side,  the  majority  of  housing  co-operative  societies  remain  self-
funded. Therefore, they are relatively very low geared, calculated as total debt over 
total  debt  plus  equity,  compared  to  the  other  participants  in  the  housing  market. 
According to the finance manager of a housing co-operative society, however:  
„The low geared financial position is mainly due to supply factors rather 
than conservative financial policy. The banking sector is thought to be in 
favour  of  extending  more  bank  credit  to  the  private  sector‟.  (20)  (see 
appendix 2)  
 
B) Operating Cost  
Overall, cost pressures and expansion into lower margin businesses put pressure on 
the  financial  performance  of  the  majority  of  the  surveyed  housing  co-operative 253 
 
societies. Failure to maintain an appropriate level of financial cushion during a period 
of  business  growth  and  change  was  noted  as  another  challenge.  Further,  the 
financial  performance  of  many  surveyed  co-operative  societies  has  weakened  in 
recent years, reflecting the limited support to grow and compete in the marketplace.  
 
Some surveyed co-operative societies show relatively stable financial performance, 
well-managed  operations,  clear  growth  strategy,  good  liquidity,  financial  flexibility 
and good quality asset base. But, these strengths remain offset by tightly controlled 
finances and an inability to mobilize sufficient financial resources. Accordingly, they 
are unable to grow their balance sheets by acquiring new land and development of 
new affordable housing for either home ownership or rental housing schemes.  
 
What provides some satisfaction, however, is that some co-operative societies have 
been  historically  major  providers  of  contract  savings  schemes  and  affordable 
housing investments. Accordingly, they still have the know-how to manage and use 
properties in the housing sector that cannot be marketed, for example in expanding 
their social rental housing activities. In this regard, a finance manager of a housing 
co-operative  society  noted  „the  very  limited  scope  of  the  relationship  between 
housing co-operative societies and local authorities‟ (21) (see appendix 2). This is in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  most  local  authorities  in  Egypt  struggle  with  managing  and 
maintaining their housing stock. Although this represents a gap that can be filled by 
the  housing  co-operative  societies,  the  same  finance  manager  believes  that  „this 
could  have  negative  cash  flow  implications  as  property  sale  income  would  be 
replaced by much lower rental income‟.  
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C) Efficiency and Economies of Scale  
The financial structure of the housing co-operative societies in the sample varies. 
Some are stand-alone and others are part of a group structure. In the case of a 
group structure there is a parent that does not necessarily perform similar activities 
and an affiliated co-operative owned by the parent‟s employees. The affiliated co-
operative usually has its own independent board and staff elected by the members 
through  a  voting  process.  It  is noteworthy  that  the  board and  staff  represent the 
employees of the parent and commonly negotiate and buy support from the parent 
when needed.  
 
Further,  large  co-operative  societies  in  the  selected  sample  have  managed  to 
develop their in-house capabilities better to manage and control their activities. In 
doing so, they achieved significant cost savings over time by eliminating external 
contractor  margins.  However,  most  of  the  representatives  of  these  co-operative 
societies  highlighted  that  they  have  never  known  or  experienced  the  creation  of 
group  structures  where  several  co-operative  societies  merge  together  to  achieve 
economies of scale (for example higher level of co-operative housing provision at a 
lower funding cost).  
 
D) Funding Structure 
As  noted  earlier,  the  investment  in  the  asset  base  of  the  housing  co-operative 
societies  has  been  financed  largely  by  funds  contributed  by  their  members,  who 
represent a core component of their funding structure. In conducting their business, 
most  of  the  co-operative  societies  in  the  selected  sample  adopt  similar  funding 
structures. Around 70 per cent use their own funds (members‟ contract savings) as 255 
 
the main source of financing (figure 5.3). Supplier facilities are the main source of 
external financing (24 per cent), followed by bank credit (6 per cent). This implies 
that bank credit is a minor source of external funding at present. According to one 
interviewee, who is representing a small housing co-operative society, the use of 
members‟ contract savings is considered cheaper and easier to mobilize than bank 
credit (22) (see appendix 2). 
 
Figure 5.3 Housing Co-operative Societies‟ Main Sources of Funding 
Source: Survey results, 2009 
 
In the last three years, the majority of the co-operative societies in the sample did not 
apply for bank credit due to high interest rates, low loan-to-collateral value, long and 
tight procedures, and short maturity profile of available bank credit facilities, which all 
suggest the existence of credit rationing in relation to co-operative housing lending 
(figure 5.4). This is also evidenced by the other survey results that showed a major 
decline  in  the  approved  bank  credit  applications  made  by  these  co-operative 
societies during the last three years. Further, small housing co-operative societies in 
the sample faced more difficulties in obtaining bank credit than large co-operative 
societies.  
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Figure 5.4 Reasons for Housing Co-operative Societies‟ Avoiding Mortgage Credit 
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Source: Survey results, 2009 
 
E) Cash Flow  
Cash generated from operations of most of the co-operative societies in the sample 
are adequate in comparison with the sector norms. Net cash flow from operations 
after almost nil interest and tax is usually positive, which is viewed as credit strength. 
This supports the capacity of  these co-operative societies to acquire and service 
external funding such as bank credit. But repayments could be less relevant where 
self-funding  capacity  is  expected  to  grow  to  fund  new  investments  in  housing 
development.  Some  co-operative  societies  managed  to  increase  their  operating 
surpluses, which were reinvested, reducing the need to fund new development by 
bank credit. They managed to achieve that by focusing on cost control and efficient 
management of the business to enhance their cash generative position.  
 
Other co-operative societies engaged in some sort of cross-subsidy programme to 
fund  new  affordable  housing  development  projects  from  the  profits  of  non-co-
operative housing activities. While this increased their market exposure, it allowed 
them to see their funds from operations trending upwards. Any increasing reliance 
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on  cross-subsidy  from  unusual  business,  however,  remains  subject  to  changing 
market conditions, which could be outside the control of these housing co-operative 
societies, therefore such programmes need to be closely monitored.  
 
The above also highlights that some housing co-operative societies are increasingly 
subject  to  systemic  market  risk  as  they  expand  their  business.  While  these  co-
operative societies‟ cash positions are generally stable, small co-operative societies 
could not demonstrate an ability to start building their cash cushion to protect against 
cyclical  downturns  in  the  property  market  and  the  economy,  to  which  they  are 
increasingly  exposed.  This  supports  the  earlier  finding  in  relation  to  the  difficulty 
experienced by small co-operative societies in raising funds from sources other than 
their members‟ contract savings (for example bank credit).  
 
F) Cash Management 
In managing their cash, some finance managers pointed out that their housing co-
operative  societies  face  a  number  of  challenges  in  terms  of  the  provision  of  the 
financial resources necessary to achieve their purposes: management of associated 
risks (organizational and financial) that might threaten their ability to achieve these 
objectives;  management  of  their  financial  assets  in  a  way  that  ensures  that  they 
maintain their value; and management of the financial liabilities in a way that ensures 
that they remain affordable. 
  
Some finance managers also confirmed that the members of housing co-operative 
societies usually agree the following: cash management policies, including the limits 
of  the  approved  treasury  management  activity;  how  the  financial  management 258 
 
strategy is formulated; the approved methods of fund raising; approved sources of 
finance; delegated powers; and review and reporting arrangements. However, the 
success of these policies depends on balancing the need to optimize the position on 
paying or receiving cash with the need to have sufficient funds available to finance 
new projects. Cash reserves are held to enable the co-operative societies to fund 
transactions and to cover an unforeseen contingency.  
 
G) Tightening of Credit Conditions 
The marked rise in a sector‟s debt level and the increase in institutions‟ uncertainty 
about  the  economic  outlook  are  among  the  main  factors  that  could  lead  to  a 
contraction  in  credit demand  (Stansell  and Mitchell,  1985,  Kent, 1987,  Duca and 
Rosenthal,  1991).  From  a  macroeconomic  perspective,  credit  slowdown  due  to 
demand  factors  may  occur  because  of  weak  investment  opportunities.  From  a 
microeconomic perspective, a structural problem such as adjustments by firms to 
reduce the debt-equity ratio may also be a factor.  
 
It was noted during the analysis that access to credit of many of the co-operative 
societies in the sample is relatively not adequate for these co-operative societies to 
achieve their full potential (figure 5.5). Generally, Egypt scores very low in terms of 
the ease of getting credit, one of the most problematic factors in doing business in 
Egypt (CAPMAS, 2007, CBE, 2010, UNDP, 2004, Weis et al., 2002). The tight credit 
conditions are not only experienced by new housing co-operative societies but also 
by some co-operative societies that have long-term relationships with their banks. 
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Figure 5.5 Is It Difficult for Housing Co-operative Societies‟ to 
Obtain Mortgage Credit? 
Yes, 71%
No, 29%
Source: Survey results, 2009 
 
As indicated in table  5.2 below, around 67 per cent of the respondents think that 
performance  problem  is  not  considered  an  important  obstacle  to  obtain ing  bank 
credit. However, the majority reported that inadequate collateral is a major obstacle 
as banks  are not usually  flexible in negotiating collateral value, while around  the 
same percentage  said the same of interest rates on credit. In this regard, it was 
noted that small housing co-operative societies face tighter collateral requirements 
than  large  co-operative  societies,  which  is  probably  because  small  housing  co-
operative societies lack bargaining power compared to large co-operative societies.  
 
Despite  high  interest  rates  on  loans  and  tight  credit  requirements,  most  of  the 
interviewees  indicated  that  preferences  for  bank  credit   remains  strong  as  the 
majority  still  prefer  bank  credit  as  a  source  of  external  funding,  due  to  the 
underdevelopment of the other external funding sources such as the capital market.  260 
 
Table 5.2 Key Obstacles to Obtaining Mortgage Credit 
Obstacle   % 
Performance Problem  
Important   33.33 
Not Important   66.67 
Inadequate Collateral  
Important   79.17 
Not Important   20.83 
High Interest Rate  
Important   66.67 
Not Important   33.33 
Risk at Business Sector  
Important   33.33 
Not Important   66.67 
No Obvious Reason  
Important   79.17 
Not Important   20.83 
Terms and Conditions  
Important   12.50 
Not Important   87.50 
Laws and Regulations  
Important   20.83 
Not Important   79.17 
Source: Survey results, 2009  
 
H) Capital Market  
Although  securing  funding  by  issuing  housing  securities  in  the  capital  market  is 
usually less costly than bank credit, only a very few Egyptian housing firms (mainly 
large private sector companies) are able to sell them, while small- and medium-sized 
housing firms find it difficult to issue and sell fixed income securities. Social housing 
securities  traded  on  the  Egyptian  stock  exchange  represent  a  relatively  small 
percentage of the total number of registered securities in the market. This fact seems 
to corroborate the respondents‟ argument that capital market investors usually have 
a  significant  risk  perception  of  social  housing  securities,  especially  following  the 
recent sub-prime crisis in the United States, as well as strong liquidity preference 
and prefer to invest in highly performing securities in order to realize quick gains by 261 
 
selling them quickly. Thus, according to many interviewees, this makes bank credit 
more attractive and desirable.  
 
I) Financial Safety Net  
There  is  a  general  consensus  among  the  finance  managers  of  the  housing  co-
operative societies in the sample that the solidarity system among Egyptian housing 
co-operative societies is not legally binding. Nevertheless cohesion is assured by the 
existing  two  regulatory  institutions  that  mainly  handle  the  co-operative  housing 
strategic planning and external relations with the government and wider community. 
Accordingly, the housing co-operative societies are not supported by any financial 
safety net, such as a financial guarantee scheme, to protect their members‟ contract 
savings in case of any default at the co-operative level or in case of an economic 
shock. Several interviewees cited as an example the case of Sakr Quriesh Housing 
Co-operative (discussed below) that defaulted more than two decades ago and its 
members and customers remain with no access to compensation.  
 
5.4 Co-operative Failure in Egypt 
5.4.1 State Bureaucracy 
Co-operatives  have  been  used  by  the  Egyptian  government  as  instruments  for 
development. As a rule, these organizations are started by the government, the initial 
investments and a part of the current expenditures are provided from public funds, 
and  state  employees  are  frequently  given  management  jobs.  State  bureaucracy 
therefore plays a very important role as a variable in the co-operative function.  
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The existence of a body of public officials with its own professional standards is said 
by Albrow to create sectional interests. A sharing of values between officials and the 
public  cannot  be  expected  and  the  problem  of  bureaucracy  is  inherent  in  the 
situation.  Based  on  this  line  of  thinking,  Marxist  and  sociological  analyses  of 
bureaucracy  see  the  conflict  between  democracy  and  public  administration  as 
inevitable in differentiated societies with distinct administrative staffs (Albrow, 1970).  
 
Traditional theoretical analysis has shown an inherent tendency of bureaucracy to 
accumulate power until it reaches the point where it controls the policy and action of 
the  organization  it  is  supposed  to  serve.  Writing  about  the  role  of  co-operative 
housing organizations, some earlier scholars emphasize the apparent impossibility of 
reducing government control at a later stage through developing participation, self-
help,  self-responsibility  and  autonomy  of  the  land  recipients‟  organization.  They 
almost  all  agree  that  government  bureaucracy  dislikes  vacating  its  spheres  of 
influence  and  action  (Digby,  1978,  Gesamtverband  Gemeinnütziger 
Wohnungsunternehmen., 1969, Goodlad, 2000, Warbasse, 1922, Andrusz, 1999).  
 
State involvement in the affairs of co-operatives in Egypt has come under strong 
criticism  by  nearly  every  interviewee.  State  agents  are  sometimes  accused  of 
misappropriating  co-operative  funds  for  their  own  advantage  or  mishandling  co-
operative affairs to enhance their own career prospects. What appears to be missing 
from these criticisms is any attempt to explain these observations in an analytical 
way,  making  use  of  existing  theories  on  bureaucratic  behaviour,  corruption  and 
corporate  governance. What  is  also  apparently  missing  from  the  large  volume of 
media  headlines  dealing  with  the  abuse of  powers of  the  state in  relation  to  co-263 
 
operatives is an analysis of co-operative legislation to explain how state agents find 
themselves in such powerful positions of control over the affairs of co-operatives, 
and  what  the  effect  would  be  of  introducing  a  different  co-operative  legal 
environment.  
 
The analysis of the pre-1981 co-operative legislation in Egypt and the consequent 
empowerment of state agents should be preceded by a clear understanding of the 
two existing types of memberships, emphasizing the distinction between primary and 
non-primary  co-operative  societies.  A  primary  society  is  one  whose  membership 
consists exclusively of natural persons. In the case of non-primary co-operatives, 
membership  consists  mainly  of  primary  and  other  non-primary  societies.  The 
distinction between a primary and a non-primary society is a very important one with 
respect to defining the distribution of power over the affairs of the society, between 
state, political parties, members and co-operative agents. 
 
Although co-operative legislation recognizes the General Meeting of members as the 
highest authority within a co-operative, the right to take strategic and operational 
decisions  is  usually  reserved  for  the  elected  committee  and  the  appointed 
management of a co-operative. This feature is not unique to Egyptian co-operative 
legislation,  but  found  in  corporate  legal  environments  in  most  parts  of  the  world 
which adhere to the principle of corporate governance. This means that where a 
senior  co-operative  officer  was  able  to  exercise  a  controlling  influence  over  the 
management of co-operative societies he or she was also able to influence important 
decision making in these co-operative societies.  
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In many Egyptian co-operatives, senior co-operative officers were in a position to 
exercise  significant  influence  over  the  Secretaries  of  the  general  meeting  of 
members,  therefore,  where  managerial  power  lay  mainly  with  the  Secretary,  the 
senior executive officer could exert significant influence over the affairs of the co-
operative. This influence became very strong in the case of second and third tier co-
operative  societies  since  their  members  were  usually  represented  at  the  Annual 
General  Meeting  by  those  societies‟  Secretaries,  which  meant  that  elected 
committees were also made up of Secretaries. In other words, in the case of non-
primary co-operatives both elected and appointed management was made up of co-
operative employees who saw their career prospects very much dependent upon 
their relationship with the senior co-operative officer. 
 
In the case of primary societies the influence exercised by the senior co-operative 
officers appears to have been far less effective although still significant, as a result 
mainly  of  the  composition  of  elected  committees  and  membership.  Members  of 
primary  societies  were  ordinary  citizens  outside  any  system  of  dependency  in 
relation  to  their  co-operative‟s  association  with  the  senior  co-operative  officers. 
Committee members were elected by these members and performed their duties 
without  any  monetary  compensation.  Losing  their  place  on  the  committee  would 
merely have meant losing a certain amount of power of patronage which that place 
provided them with. The amount of influence the senior co-operative officers were 
able to exercise over these committees depended therefore on how important such 
patronage  power  was  to  the  committee  members  and  also  on  the  distribution  of 
power between Secretaries and committee members.  
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It is hardly surprising that in the absence of an independent system of accountability, 
second  and  third  tier  co-operatives  were  managed  as  if  they  were  the  private 
business of the senior co-operative officers. It was only natural that non-primary co-
operative committees made up mainly of primary co-operative societies‟ Secretaries 
became  obedient  servants  to  the  wishes  of  the  senior  co-operative  officers  and 
looked upon them as their real bosses. The same did not hold true in the case of 
primary  co-operative  committees.  Members  of  these  committees  were  directly 
elected by the user-members and being unpaid officers of the society their main 
objective  was  to  maximize  members‟  economic  surplus,  including  their  own.  The 
degree of their obedience to the senior co-operative officers depend very much on 
the  distribution  of  power  between  Secretary  and  elected  committee  members.  In 
societies with a very powerful Secretary, the senior co-operative officer must have 
been able to exercise a much greater amount of influence over the affairs of the 
society  than  in  the  case  of  co-operative  societies  under  the  strong  influence  of 
committee members. But even where the Secretary was the most influential person 
on the scene, the mere existence of five committee members, elected through a 
procedure outside the control of the senior co-operative officer, listening and being 
informed about the affairs of the society, meant that some degree of accountability 
did exist. The powers of the senior co-operative officer were therefore somewhat 
restrained and this may explain why no serious malpractice was reported by the 
Egyptian investigating authorities in the case of the sample of primary co-operatives 
whose affairs were investigated.  
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5.4.2 The Sakr Quariesh Affair 
Relevant  to  the  analysis  of  the  various  factors  influencing  the  effectiveness  of 
Egyptian housing co-operative sector is the consideration of a real example for a co-
operative failure as a result of the influence of these factors. Sakr Quariesh is a large 
housing  co-operative  society  in  Cairo  City,  Egypt.  It  is  a  non-profit  membership 
society  established  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  and  encouraging  the  creation  of 
adequate and affordable housing accommodation for its low- and moderate-income 
members. It was responsible for initiating and sponsoring the development of two co-
operative housing projects on the outskirts of Cairo. As part of its support to the co-
operative housing projects, the government provided Sakr Quariesh with large long-
term, low-interest mortgage loans and substantial tax exemptions. The society also 
benefited from a large member base, totalling around 40,000 members who used a 
great deal of their life savings to support the development of the society‟s projects.  
 
As noted earlier, co-operatives like Sakr Quariesh are registered pursuant to the Co-
operative Housing Act, which contains many controls and guidelines applicable to 
the organization, finance and construction of co-operative housing projects. These 
include a requirement to have Directors and to lodge annual returns. In the case of 
Sakr Quariesh, however, the Directors replaced the committees that previously ran 
the  co-operative,  and  the  Directors  gained  complete  control  of  the  co-operative‟s 
finances, directions and selection of tenants.  
 
Following the receipt of statements and considerable documentation in 1984, it was 
determined that the current disclosures regarding the Sakr Quariesh amounted to 
„public  interest  disclosures‟.  Accordingly,  the  co-operative  authorities  wrote  to  the 267 
 
Minister for Housing and the Minister for Social Affairs, formally notifying them of the 
intention to conduct an investigation into the matters raised. They were informed that 
the allegations to be investigated included alleged improper conduct on the part of 
the Directors of the Sakr Quariesh. 
 
Due to the financial nature of the complaints, an accountant reviewed the accounts 
and administrative procedures at Sakr Quariesh. The review covered the period of 
the  financial  years  immediately  prior  to  the  allegations  being  made  in  1984.  In 
summary,  the  investigation  indicated  serious  financial  mismanagement  by  the 
Directors of Sakr Quariesh. As a result of the investigation, the Minister for Housing 
decided  to  fire  the  Directors  and  place  the  co-operative  under  administration  to 
protect  the  members‟  funds.  However,  as  a  result  of  the  long  investigation,  the 
development of the co-operative‟s two projects had almost stopped, which, in turn, 
increased the cost of the projects to a level beyond the control of the co-operative‟s 
members  and  other  creditors,  namely  banks.  This  led  to  the  failure  of  the  co-
operative to meet its contractual and financial obligations.  
 
Rose-Ackerman  discusses  corruption  in  the  context  of  political  economy.  She 
proposes that both an informed electorate and comprehensive set of interest groups 
must  be  present  in  order  to  provide  sufficient  protection  against  corrupt  activity 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1996). The Sakr Quariesh affair may be assessed based on Rose-
Ackerman‟s theoretical analysis; the threat of legal and administrative sanctions is 
likely  to  encourage  secrecy  and  may  convert  corrupt  transactions  into  bilateral 
bargains.  Shopping  around  will  often  be  costly  because  bureaucrats  will  need  to 268 
 
develop trusting relationships with customers before making play-off requests (Rose-
Ackerman, 1996).  
 
On the basis of this analysis, secrecy is an inverse function of the number of people 
involved in the corrupt arrangement. What is more, payoffs are also inverse functions 
of the number of people involved in the deal. This explains why the committees of 
different non-primary societies involved in the Sakr Quariesh affair were made up of 
a small number of the same co-operative agents. The media reports do in fact point 
out that as these agents were simultaneously members of a large number of co-
operative committees, they had no time to exercise properly their duties as members 
of management. These reports also blame poor management on these agents‟ lack 
of any relevant qualifications, calling them mere decorative elements.  
 
Regarding the public policy consequences of corruption and political payoffs, Rose-
Ackerman concludes that bureaucrats will design programmes in ways that permit 
them  to  appropriate  the  gains  that  would  otherwise  be  received  by  nominal 
beneficiaries.  Thus  corrupt  bureaucrats  will  favour  programmes  with  complex, 
special-purpose inputs that cannot be bought off the shelf in competitive markets, 
making it difficult for outsiders to determine whether costs have been padded by 
kickbacks. Similarly, they are likely to favour more capital intensive inputs if they 
believe that suppliers of capital are more likely to have excess  profits to use for 
payoffs than the suppliers of labour (Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  
 
This analysis explains some of the empirical evidence from the Sakr Quariesh affair. 
It is clear from the available information that most of the misappropriation of funds 269 
 
must  have  taken  place  during  the  purchase  of  land  and  building  materials.  This 
became  evident  once  the  investigating  authorities  asked  for  an  independent 
valuation  of  a  number  of  purchased  fixed  assets  which  showed  that  on  certain 
occasions land and building materials had been bought at grossly overvalued prices.  
 
From  another  perspective,  there  are  many  cases  in  the  Egyptian  co-operative 
housing  sector  in  which  co-operative  societies  are  not  adequately  covered  by  a 
formal guarantee scheme; thus, they cannot receive public assistance in paying their 
debts  including  the  members‟  contractual  savings.  But,  the  government‟s 
interference provides an example of the state's interest in extending implicit state 
guarantees to support the uninsured savers of failed housing co-operative societies. 
Such  an  example  creates  a  public  perception  that  similarly  situated  contractual 
savers will be assisted if problems arise in the future.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
Policy makers, but also scholars of co-operation generally, appeared to believe that 
co-operative  societies  may  be  appropriate  policy  vehicles  for  housing  and  credit 
distribution among various classes of income groups but have so far ignored their 
potential as appropriate intermediaries in expanding the penetration of the financial 
services, such as mortgage lending. The main objective of this chapter has been to 
test  the  effectiveness  of  co-operation  as  an  instrument  of  housing  policy  in  the 
context of the current liberal economic policy of Egypt, identifying and analysing the 
role of the various economic, social and political factors influencing the co-operative 
operation. This analysis has led to a number of interesting conclusions regarding 
both the primary objective of the thesis, extending the reach of housing finance, but 
also  in  relation  to  the  determinants  of  success  and  failure  in  the  creation  of  an 
effective and sustainable housing and mortgage markets.   
 
A very important conclusion is that despite the pivotal role played by the housing co-
operative  societies  in  the  mobilization  of  resources  and  alleviating  the  housing 
problem, their role has been scaled back in the recent past by the increasing land 
prices, reducing subsidies, and crowding out the low-cost housing producers from 
having  access  to  the  mainstream  mortgage  system.  Accordingly,  there  is  little 
evidence to support their success as community based organisations in improving 
access to housing and credit for low- and moderate-income households.  
 
The effectiveness of the Egyptian housing co-operative societies‟ role as community 
agents  continues  to  be  negatively  influenced  by  various  factors.  Housing  co-
operative  societies  rely  heavily  on  contributions  from  their  members.  Also, 271 
 
government support is limited by the available fiscal space. Subsidies (in the form of 
subsidized building materials, allocation of low-priced land as well as low interest 
loans) used to enable the sector in the past to keep its prices and rents relatively 
low.  However,  in  recent  years,  the  sector  started  to  face  a  number  of  major 
challenges, mainly as a result of the economic transition and regulatory environment 
in Egypt. 
 
Another conclusion is that Egyptian housing co-operative societies are constrained 
by weak institutional capacity and limited exposure, in terms of saving mobilization, 
financial management and credit counselling. Also, their role in Egypt as an effective 
mechanism of housing policy created too great a burden on the national budget, at 
least  during  two  of  the  most  critical  stages  of  the  country's  socio-economic 
development. The role of housing co-operative societies is not only to support the 
development  of  affordable  housing  over  time  but  also  to  extend  the  reach  of 
mortgage system through their contract savings schemes. The evidence from the 
questionnaires  and  interviewees  indicates,  however,  that  there  are  a  number  of 
challenges  restricting  the  housing  co-operative  societies  from  playing  a  more 
important role in the process.  
 
These  challenges  can  be  summarized  as  follows.  First,  there  are  long  and 
complicated procedures required for the approval of the applications presented by 
the housing co-operative societies to their regulators and the government in general. 
Almost all decisions made by the senior management of the housing co-operative 
societies  have  to  be  pre-approved  by  the  Central  Housing  Co-operatives  Union 
before they become effective, which is usually a time-consuming process. Second, 272 
 
on many occasions, the housing co-operative societies have to deal with conflicting 
decisions made by the different government departments concerned. Third, there is 
a restraint on the housing co-operative societies‟ development in terms of allocation 
of new lands and planning permissions. Fourth, the operating costs are rising faster 
than  co-operative  housing  rents  and  prices.  This  is  at  a  time  when  the  level  of 
support from the central government is sharply declining due, as noted earlier, to the 
national  budget  inflexibility.  In  addition,  there  is  increased  competition  from  the 
private  sector  in  the  social  housing  sector.  As  a  result,  there  is  a  need  for  the 
management of housing co-operatives to become increasingly organizationally and 
financially sophisticated to meet the growing challenges within the social housing 
sector.  
 
The analysis also highlights the nature and implications of housing policy in terms of 
the change in the actual combinations of agents in relation to the provision of social 
housing in Egypt. It shows how changing public policy in favour of the private sector 
throws new light on the underdevelopment of the co-operative societies‟ role in the 
housing and mortgage markets. The analysis suggests that members‟ savings and 
government support are inadequate to meet current programme needs, or to expand 
the  co-operative  housing  sector‟s  activities.  With  so  many  worthy  causes  that 
address  genuine  needs,  even  major  housing  co-operative  societies  lack  the 
resources  needed  to  fund  every  worthwhile  effort.  Further,  affordability-related 
problems still demand urgent attention and require substantial solutions. Meanwhile, 
Egyptian housing co-operative societies face rising costs for staff and other inputs 
(for example building materials), straining even more their limited resources.  
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Interestingly, even those housing co-operative societies fortunate enough to be fully 
funded in their current operations face uncertainty over future funding. This creates 
further questions relating to the possibility that the same challenges will remain in the 
coming years. Will the housing co-operative societies be able to keep up with the 
increasing costs? Or as Egypt develops economically, will co-operative activities be 
diverted to other areas? Could local political or social problems lead to a further cut 
in public support? What if the parent company itself goes out of business as in the 
case  of  Sakr  Quariesh  affair?  The  uncertain  continuity  of  funding,  be  it  contract 
savings or bank credit, makes it extremely difficult for housing co-operative societies 
to plan and manage their operations. It may also force many of them to live a project-
to-project existence, being unable to make long-term plans to expand core activities 
or to improve the quality of their services for members.  
 
Thus today‟s Egyptian housing co-operative societies‟ managers face an increasing 
need for their organizations‟ services, increasing costs for providing those services, 
and an increasingly competitive and restrictive environment for obtaining funds. At 
best,  these  problems  prevent  their  organizations  –  and  those  they  serve  –  from 
reaching their full potential; at worst, the very survival of many housing co-operative 
societies is at stake. The challenge facing housing co-operative societies‟ managers 
is to find ways to increase financial security without sacrificing the mission of their 
organizations.  
 
To  sum  up,  a  significant  step  up  in  the  reform  process  is  required  and  more 
importantly  the  focus  should  be  on  reforming  the  co-operative  housing  sector  to 
increase the effectiveness of their role as community agents and intermediaries in 274 
 
the  housing  and  mortgage  markets.  Egyptian  housing  co-operative  societies 
generally  enjoy  stable  overall  financial  performance  when  compared  with  other 
participants in the housing and mortgage markets. There is an opportunity for them 
to generate surpluses from non-co-operative housing activities that can be invested 
in expanding their core housing base. In addition, good relationships in the mortgage 
credit market and the ability to tap the capital markets can increase the availability of 
funds for the development of a sustainable business model with adequate capital 
levels to meet the different needs of their low- and moderate-income members.    
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6. MORTGAGE CREDIT FOR CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING PURPOSES 
IN EGYPT  
 
6.1 Introduction  
Based on the results and discussion in chapter 5, housing co-operative societies can 
be seen as an important policy agent for improving access to housing and mortgage 
credit  for  low-  and  moderate-income  households  in  Egypt.  However,  the 
effectiveness of the Egyptian housing co-operative societies is constrained not only 
by demand factors but also supply factors. According to the literature, a decline in 
credit  to  the  sector  could  result  from  supply  factors  such  as  credit  rationing  or 
crowding out (Duca and Rosenthal, 1991, Kent, 1987, Stansell and Mitchell, 1985). 
Thus,  it  is  important  to  consider  the  contextual  stakeholders  in  the  immediate 
environment of the Egyptian housing co-operative societies who have an interest in 
what  they  are  doing  and  are  capable  of  acting  as  intermediaries  in  the  current 
context  of  the modern  economic history  of  Egypt.  This  chapter  is  to  identify  and 
analyse these supply factors and their influence on the provision of housing finance.  
 
For this reason, the purpose of this chapter is: 1) to assess the role of the banking 
institutions (as contextual stakeholders in the immediate environment of the Egyptian 
housing co-operative societies) in expanding access to mortgage credit and savings 
in Egypt; and 2) to identify which institutions constrain most the development of an 
effective  and  sustainable  level  of  mortgage  credit  for  low-  and  moderate-income 
households, through their housing co-operative societies. In view of these objectives, 
it is important to start with an assessment of the Egyptian banking system as a whole 
and its role in the housing and mortgage markets.  276 
 
 
A  group  of  banking  officers  from  both  public  and  private  sector  banks  were 
interviewed to investigate which supply factor led to the decline in mortgage credit 
provision in the co-operative housing sector in the recent period. The interviews also 
tried to explore whether the reason for the decline is related to the banking sector‟s 
degree of risk aversion, liquidity preferences and problems facing the housing co-
operative  societies,  or  the  housing  and  mortgage  markets  as  a  whole.  The 
interviews‟ results are analysed and presented below. 
 
6.2 Egyptian Banks as Contextual Stakeholders: Key Performance 
The purpose of this section is to review and assess the key drivers of the Egyptian 
banks‟ performance (as contextual stakeholders in the immediate environment of the 
Egyptian housing co-operative societies) in the mobilisation of savings and extending 
credit in Egypt.   
 
6.2.1 Franchise Value 
In 2004, the CBE took over the responsibility for restructuring and reforming Egypt‟s 
banking sector, and established a dedicated Banking Reform Unit (BRU) responsible 
for implementing its banking sector reform programme (CBE, 2010). The programme 
was based on four pillars: (1) consolidation and privatization of the banking sector; 
(2) financial and managerial restructuring of the state-owned banks; (3) solving the 
problem of high non-performing loans – specifically at the state-owned banks; and 
(4) upgrading the supervisory and monitoring capabilities of the CBE. 
 
Implementation of the second and third pillars is having a major positive impact on 
the  state-owned  banks,  which  have  in  the  past  faced  problems  relating  to  their 277 
 
overall  competitiveness  and  financial  strengths.  These  included  material  asset 
quality  problems  in  relation  to  their  low  capitalization,  weak  recurring  earnings, 
entrenched  bureaucracy  and  challenges  in  raising  staff  calibre  and  modernizing 
operations.  The  public  sector  banks  have  also  been  burdened  by  an  inefficient 
corporate  customer  base,  which  mainly  comprised  public  sector  entities  and 
companies with longstanding financial problems. 
 
The situation as described above has been in the process of being fundamentally 
changed  over  the  past  five  years.  Under  the  auspices  of  the  CBE  and  in 
collaboration with external consultants, restructuring is under way in the areas of risk 
management,  human  resources  and  information  technology.  Significant  progress 
has  been  noted  on  all  three  fronts:  experienced  bankers  were  recruited  in  key 
positions, early retirement schemes were offered to reduce employee numbers, new 
policies  were  introduced  for  selection,  recruitment  and  appraisal,  and  numerous 
training programmes have been taken; new banking information technology systems 
have  been  implemented;  new  risk  management  policies  and  procedures  were 
introduced. At the same time, the banks‟ medium-term strategic initiatives were re-
defined, and this included a „front-office‟ restructuring aimed at redefining processes, 
focus on client service, and expanding their product base and expertise to include 
Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) and retail banking. 
 
The operational restructuring of the state-owned banks, combined with their financial 
restructuring –specifically addressing the asset quality issues and low capitalization 
– and their significant market share which exceeds 40 per cent, should allow these 
banks  to  strengthen  their  franchises,  which  already  benefit  from  a  strong  retail 278 
 
funding  base,  extensive  branch  network,  and  high  single-obligor  limits  that  allow 
them to serve Egypt‟s largest firms. 
 
However, the implementation of the whole restructuring programme is expected to 
take  longer  than  many  envisage.  On  the  one  hand,  changing  the  „public  sector 
mentality‟ and shaking off bureaucratic habits remains one of the state-owned banks‟ 
most  challenging  tasks,  while  their  levels  of  IT  automation,  operational  re-
organization and risk management capabilities still lag behind those of the leading 
private  sector  banks.  The  global  credit  crunch  and  deteriorating  macro/market 
conditions may also delay their financial restructuring. 
 
6.2.2 Competitiveness  
The recent industry consolidation – triggered by the authorities‟ decision to raise the 
banks‟ paid-up capital requirements, the sale by state-owned banks of their stakes in 
joint-venture banks, and privatizations – has led to the number of banks operating in 
Egypt falling from fifty-seven in 2004 to forty currently. This process is making the 
bank credit market in Egypt more competitive. The consolidation has also led to the 
entry/strengthening  of  foreign  banks  (for  example  Intesa  Sanpaolo,  Societe 
Generale, Calyon and Barclays), bringing expertise, capital and an extended product 
range to the Egyptian bank credit market, while the concentration of population in 
Cairo and Alexandria makes it relatively inexpensive to develop a branch network 
with decent demographic coverage. Nonetheless, the sector may still be considered 
under-banked given that only 10 per cent of the eighty million population have a 
bank account, and the loans-to-GDP ratio of 45 per cent in June 2008 indicates that 
there is a significant growth potential available to local banks (CBE, 2008). 279 
 
6.2.3 Risk Positioning 
Overall, Egyptian banks maintain a weak risk positioning constrained by high credit 
concentrations – their top twenty group exposures typically exceed 200 per cent of 
their capital, even before taking into account their sovereign exposures (CBE, 2008). 
With the exception of a small number of private sector banks, Egyptian banks‟ risk 
management  systems  and  corporate  governance  culture  have  historically  been 
weak.  This  is  reflected  in  the  high  level  of  non-performing  loans  and  significant 
related-party transactions to state-owned enterprises, whose ability to honour their 
commitments has proven questionable.  
 
One  can  acknowledge,  however,  that  as  part  of  the  banking  sector  reform 
programme  there  is  evidence  of  substantial  improvements  in  both  the  risk 
management systems and corporate governance culture of the state-owned banks. 
The banks are redefining their credit risk management processes by strengthening 
their origination, underwriting and monitoring procedures, introducing internal rating 
systems, centralizing credit procedures and establishing a credit committee to review 
and approve loan requests. These new processes and systems should improve the 
banks‟ risk management capabilities but a successful track record needs to be built 
before their positive impact can be confirmed. 
 
6.2.4 Profitability and Efficiency 
The profitability of the state-owned Egyptian banks remains weak, with a 2008 return 
on average equity of 4.1 per cent and return on average assets of 0.16 per cent. The 
banks‟ low profitability levels are mainly the result of low net interest margins – of 
under 1 per cent, partly because the banks have stopped accruing interest on non-280 
 
performing loans – and high provision charges that absorbed more than 75 per cent 
of pre-provision income (CBE, 2008). Efficiency indicators at the state-owned banks 
are  also  weak  given  their  still  low  levels  of  automation  and  centralization,  public 
sector mentality, and overstaffing (although salary levels remain low). On the other 
hand, private sector banks continue to record a much stronger performance. This is 
a result of their focus on better-quality customers and more efficiency. 
 
6.2.5 Liquidity Management  
Liquidity management capabilities in the Egyptian bank credit market depend partly 
on the CBE‟s reserve requirements. The CBE  usually requires banks to maintain 
with  it  cash  reserves  equal  to  14  per  cent  of  local  currency  deposits  (excluding 
deposits with a maturity exceeding three years) and 10 per cent of foreign currency 
deposits. In addition, the banks are required to maintain liquid reserves of no less 
than 20 per cent of their liquid liabilities (25 per cent for foreign currency), and also 
have the ability to raise additional funds through facilities offered by the CBE. 
 
Egyptian banks maintain strong liquidity reserves and funding bases, comfortably 
meeting these minimum reserve requirements. Liquid assets account for more than 
50 per cent of total assets, while government exposures (to be precise balances with 
the central bank and government bonds) are estimated to exceed 25 per cent of total 
assets. Egyptian banks rely almost exclusively on customer deposits to fund their 
activities, as these account for approximately 70 per cent of total assets, while the 
banks‟ aggregate loans-to-deposits ratio stood at under 55 per cent (CBE, 2008). 
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Egyptian banks do, however, run large mismatches in the maturity profile of their 
assets  and  liabilities,  but  the  risks  are  partly  mitigated  by  their  sizeable  liquidity 
reserves  as  well  as  the  „stickiness‟  of  customer  deposits  and  lack  of  investment 
alternatives for the retail depositors (for example pension, money market funds). The 
„credit  crunch‟  has  also  increased  the  cost  of  funding.  Hence,  Egyptian  banks 
currently have a moderate market risk appetite, primarily confined to interest and 
exchange rate risks, but – given relatively strict internal and regulatory limits – these 
are  usually  not  excessive.  The  Egyptian  banks  have  no  material  exposures  to 
structured  products,  but  the  state-owned  banks  in  particular  are  exposed  to 
substantial  equity/valuation  risks  because  of  their  sizeable  equity  investment 
portfolios. 
 
6.2.6 Capitalization 
According  to  CBE  data,  the  sector‟s  capital  adequacy  ratio  for  2008  stood  on 
average  at  14  per  cent  (against  the  10  per  cent  minimum),  with  core  capital 
representing approximately 10 per cent and supplementary capital approximately 4 
per cent. More recent data show the ratio of shareholders‟ equity to total assets at 
around  6  per  cent  (CBE,  2008).  Although  the  ratios  appear  adequate,  one  can 
consider that – at least for the public sector banks – capitalization levels are low. On 
the other hand, following sector consolidation and the entry of stronger regional and 
international banks, many of the private sector banks are now better placed to raise 
additional capital if and when required. 
 
Egyptians  banks  have  not  yet  implemented  Basel  II.  The  CBE  is,  however,  in 
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Bank  to  assist  with  Basel  II  implementation.  It  is  expected  that  Basel  II 
implementation will help strengthen Egyptian banks‟ risk management processes by 
recruiting  specialized  risk  professionals,  acquiring  new  systems  to  measure  and 
monitor risk, and improving their public disclosures on risk issues. 
 
6.2.7 Systemic or Other External Support 
The  potential for  external  support  –  systemic  or  other  external  support  –  usually 
improves the creditworthiness of financial institutions and their obligations. However, 
such support is often uncertain. With regard to systemic support, Egypt is considered 
as a „high‟ support country, taking into consideration the history of support for banks, 
and the size, strength and degree of fragmentation of the Egyptian banking system. 
Although there is no deposit insurance scheme in place, the Egyptian authorities 
have historically demonstrated both their willingness and their ability to intervene and 
prevent the system from defaulting. Therefore, the probability of systemic support is 
very high for Egyptian banks with any existing and/or potential exposure to sector 
such as social housing.  283 
 
 
6.3  Interview  Findings:  Which  Institutions  Constrain  Most  the 
Development  of  an  Effective  and  Sustainable  Level  of  Mortgage 
Credit for Low- and Moderate-Income Households? 
 
6.3.1 Network of Financial Intermediation  
A) Banks  
Despite recent reforms, a senior credit officer in National Bank of Egypt, the largest 
Egyptian banking institution, pointed out that:  
„The Egyptian banking sector continues to suffer a very high degree of 
concentration;  its  structure  approaches  an  oligopoly.  Product 
diversification  (long-term  finance,  small  business  lending,  mortgage 
finance, etc.) is limited, pricing is not yet completely competitive, and the 
market is segmented. These features are a result of prudential regulations 
that are unjustifiably restrictive, and restrictive especially for real estate 
finance, reserve and liquidity requirements that inflate the cost of funds for 
all  banks,  and  a  government fiscal  policy  that  discourages  banks  from 
taking  risks  with  social  purpose  lending.  In  addition,  Egypt's  legal  and 
judiciary systems reportedly cause uncertainty regarding debt recovery, 
accentuate  the  risk  of  doing  business, and  inflate transaction  costs for 
banks and other businesses like‟. (23) (see appendix 2) 
  
Regulatory barriers to competition include administrative restrictions on the licensing 
of new banks and restrictions on the types of activities that banks are allowed to 
undertake.  The  CBE  requires  a  minimum  authorized  capital  for  new  banks  of 
EGP500million fully paid. Banks are also barred from extending to a single client a 
credit  facility  of  any  kind  that  exceeds  25  per  cent  of  their  paid  in  capital  and 
reserves.  284 
 
Another issue is the severe shortage of long-term credit. While three quarters of the 
credit extended by the domestic, commercial, investment and specialized banks is 
short  term  (one  year  or  less),  historically  the  government  and  the  state-owned 
enterprises  enjoyed  monopoly  access  to  long-term  finance  provided  by  the 
international funding agencies and donors – a situation which resulted from the past 
policy of administering credit and allocating priority quotas for public sector firms.  
 
This  system  was  in  theory  dismantled  as  part  of  Egypt's  economic  reform  and 
structural adjustment programme, but it still persists. There is no conclusive analysis 
as to why the banking sector has not as yet been prompted to offer long-term credit 
to  some  sectors  in  Egypt,  especially  housing  co-operative  societies.  A  housing 
finance officer in Housing and Development Bank, the largest real estate specialised 
bank in Egypt, reported a number of reasons which include: 
„The lack of access to the types of savings that would allow longer-term 
matching maturities (a problem which could be addressed if banks are 
allowed to bid freely, for example for social security funds or other long-
term sources, for example contractual savings in the community sector); 
the weak state of contract enforcement institutions, which heightens risks 
for long-term lending; the problematic securitization regulations; and the 
lack of competitive pressure on banks, which others advocate is a case of 
market failure . . . Banks' lending activities are also severely hampered by 
the provisions of Egypt's outdated civil and commercial codes. The lack of 
a  system  that  organizes  non-possessory  securities  is  the  most 
pronounced impediment to extending credit. There is a pressing need to 285 
 
introduce simpler and less expensive forms of registering mortgages and 
security interests‟. (24) (see appendix 2) 
 
B) Contractual Savings Institutions  
During the interview, it was clear that many interviewees believe that the contractual 
savings  sector  (CS)  in  Egypt  can  cause  a  shift  in  favour  of  long-term  financial 
resources that could be used to promote the development of the housing market. As 
a senior dealer in National Bank of Egypt explains:  
„Housing  equities,  as  well  as  longer-term  debt  securities,  can  be 
developed to complement the short-term instruments available in the local 
banking and money markets. By investing in housing stocks and long-
term bonds, CS could change wealth composition in  favour of housing 
assets  that  can  be  intermediated  locally  to  expand  the  supply  of 
reproductive capital. CS may also play an important role in increasing the 
demand for long-term housing bonds. This is important, especially since 
the maturity of newly issued housing debt in Egypt is limited to short- to 
medium-term securities‟. (25) (see appendix 2) 
 
The social insurance programmes that cover public and private employees were also 
cited by a number of the bank officers interviewed. As one of them, who is working 
for the second largest Egyptian bank, Banque Misr, notes: 
„We understand that the contribution rates are high while current benefit 
payouts are relatively low, and the operating surplus is healthy. The fiscal 
position of the large social insurance programmes is reasonably secure 
over  the  short  and  medium  terms.  The  major  problem  for  the  SI 
programmes, however, is the investment of their surpluses. All operating 286 
 
SI surpluses are deposited in the National Investment Bank (NIB) where 
they are credited with very low nominal rates of return‟. (26) (see appendix 
2) 
 
Historically, interest rates were as low as 5per cent as compared to the 13per cent 
(still a negative real rate of return at that time) which was offered by commercial 
banks. Subsequently, the NIB raised the rate on new deposits to close this  large 
gap.  The  raise  applied  only  to  new  deposits;  old  deposits  are  still  earning  the 
extraordinarily low rates. Inflation has substantially eroded the real value of the SI 
reserves. It is clear that the SI funds provided a substantial net subsidy to the NIB 
and the state, while none of these funds have been accessed by the private and 
community sectors in the housing market in the recent past. 
 
C) Capital Market 
According  to  a  senior  research  manager  in  Concord  International  Investments,  a 
leading investment banking firm in Egypt:  
„The issuance of housing securities in the capital market is a relatively 
new trend. Historically, the public sector, which dominated the economy, 
generated very little demand for securities because it relied on bank credit 
from public sector financial institutions to satisfy its funding requirements. 
During the past decade, the Egyptian government's privatization strategy 
relied,  inter  alia,  on  the  sale  of  public  enterprise  shares  in  the  stock 
exchange. In 1992 the People's Assembly passed the new Capital Market 
Law number 95, which introduced important improvements and paved the 
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the  private  sector  to  capital  raised  in  the  capital  market‟.  (27)  (see 
appendix 2) 
 
There remain, however, some impediments to expanding access for other sectors, 
such as social housing, to the capital market. 
 
6.3.2 Systemic Problems  
The interviewees highlighted two key issues that arise in assessing the efficiency of 
allocating  risk  in  the  Egyptian  credit  market.  Here  we  sketch  the  two:  first, 
asymmetric information and second, the legal and regulatory structure of the system.  
 
Asymmetric information:  
A supervisor in Central Bank of Egypt agrees that:  
„The  first  major  problem  area  in  extending  bank  credit  is  asymmetric 
information. Bankers naturally know less about the borrowers‟ prospects 
in  the  housing  market  than  the  borrowers  themselves.  Furthermore, 
borrowers with riskier projects are willing to pay higher interest rates [on 
the assumption that riskier projects come with higher returns]. Adverse 
selection  then  results,  whereby  the  quality  of  the  pool  of  borrowers 
declines as banks raise interest rates. As banks‟ profits depend not on the 
interest  rate  charged,  but  on  the  interest  collected,  profits  fall  if  credit 
quality declines fast enough as interest rates rise. With adverse selection 
and high enough interest rates, bankers would not want to make a loan to 
any borrower who would take it‟. (28) (see appendix 2) 
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One suggested solution to asymmetric information is for bankers to develop long-
term  relationships  with  their  borrowers,  in  an  effort  to  increase  the  chances  that 
borrowers will value the prospects of future credit when deciding to borrow for any 
particular project. It is, however, unclear whether relying on long-term relationships 
to overcome asymmetric information problems is a reliable strategy (see chapter 5). 
The literature on corporate governance from the late 1980s and early 1990s was 
generally  positive  about  long-term  relationships  as  a  means  of  allowing  banks to 
smooth lending, through more intimate knowledge of their borrowers and through 
leverage gained as the chief source of finance (Mayer, 1988).  
 
A credit officer in National Bank of Egypt suggests that:  
„Another  way  to  deal  with  asymmetric  information  is  to  put  more 
information into the public‟s hands.  But, if information on a borrower is 
entirely public but costly to generate, and the loan made to the borrower is 
tradable,  then  bankers  will  under-invest  in  information.  Bankers  can 
simply lend to the same receiving credit from the institutions that take the 
trouble to invest in information collection. One solution to the problem is to 
force the monitoring costs onto the firms, with verification through a public 
regulator [for example the Central Co-operative Housing Union]‟. (29) (see 
appendix 2) 
 
Legal infrastructure, market structure and prudential regulation:  
A board member in the Egyptian Financial Services Authority (EFSA) noted that: 
„Financial  intermediation  by  its  very  nature  is  an  activity  in  which 
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event that a co-operative‟s project is unsuccessful, the issues surrounding 
bankruptcy  law,  liens  and  dispute  resolution  come  squarely  into  view. 
Collateral may be an elegant solution to the problem of adverse selection, 
but only if the banker can effectively take control of the collateral in the 
event  of  default.  Antiquated  or  inadequate  laws  and  capricious 
adjudication  in  Egypt  have  undermined  the  value  of  collateral  as 
protection against bad credit‟. (30) (see appendix 2) 
 
Indeed, the issue of dispute resolution can be seen as a sub-set of a larger issue: 
the degree of legal protection for financial intermediaries. Without effective protection 
for financial intermediaries, be they bank or non-bank financial institutions, the scope 
for saving and credit market development, and with it overall financial intermediation 
development, is impaired (Porta et al., 2000).
  
 
A partner in a leading Egyptian legal firm claims an important subset in the Egyptian 
legal environment for extending credit, between supervision and regulation‟. Barth, 
Caprio,  and  Levine  (2000)  have  studied  the  issues  about  the  optimal  regulatory 
structure by using a database on banking supervision and regulation in over 100 
countries. They reported the following conclusions: 
„Government  ownership  of  banks  is  associated  with  sub-par  financial 
development,  as  measured  by  the  extent  of  private  credit  to  GDP, 
overhead, interest margins or the chance of a credit crunch... Restrictions 
on  financial  intermediation  activities  do  not  improve  the  stability  of 
financial  systems  or  their  efficiency...  Foreign  financial  institutions‟ 
presence,  while  enhancing  volatility,  fosters  growth  through  reduced 290 
 
fragility and greater cost and allocative efficiency, Regulatory structures 
that rely on private market forces lead to more stable financial systems‟ 
(Barth et al., 2000). 
 
A) State Domination of the Credit Market  
A senior manager in Commercial International Bank, the largest private sector bank 
in Egypt, believes that:  
„The main opportunity undermined by state ownership is not the slack it 
can provide in capital standards but rather the ability to directly control the 
allocation  of  credit.  .  .  This  has  been  a  power  that  the  Egyptian 
government  used  [other  interviewees  said  abused]  in  forcing  corporate 
restructuring. Further, it is something the government is using in focusing 
on  selected  industry  credit  constraint,  chiefly  by  the  large  commercial 
banks (National Bank of Egypt, Bank Misr, Bank Du Caire and Housing & 
Development Bank). Wider state ownership of assets through institutions 
like  these  banks  has  allowed  the  establishment  of  special  foreclosure 
authorities in an effort to speed debt restructuring‟. (31) (see appendix 2) 
 
Unfortunately, the chief challenge of state ownership is direct control of credit. The 
highest  loan  losses  are  uniformly  found  in  state-dominated  institutions  in  the 
developing countries, but the government is thought to have a poor track record in 
allocating  credit  (Porta  et  al.,  2000).  Indeed,  the  major  challenge  facing  Egypt's 
banking system today is the effort to improve the lending practices of its state-owned 
banks  that  collectively  control  most  bank  assets,  with  a  collective  NPL  ratio  of 
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B) Structural Changes in Bank Credit 
Several interviewees  agreed that the change in the  volume of bank credit in the 
social housing market reflects a wider change in the share of bank credit directed 
towards several activities. For example, the relative share of bank credit directed 
towards manufacturing firms began to decline in the second half of the 1990s, just 
before the government started its programme of economic liberalization and financial 
deregulation. The share of bank credit supplied to manufacturing firms declined from 
about  50  per  cent  to  30  per  cent  in  the  late  1990s.  This  decrease  has  been 
particularly substantial since 2000. By contrast, non-manufacturing firms were still 
depending on bank credit.  
 
Thus, after Egypt's major economic growth came to a halt in the mid-2000s, the 
major  part  of  bank  credit  shifted  from  the  manufacturing  sector  to  such  non-
manufacturing  industries  as  housing,  construction  and  services.  A  supervisor  in 
Central Bank of Egypt, asserts that:  
„It  was  these  non-manufacturing  firms  that  the  banks  should  have 
monitored and disciplined for inefficient management. However, Egyptian 
banks  were  not  prepared  to  be  effective  monitors.  Thus,  the  rapid 
increase in bank credit directed to non-manufacturing firms during the late 
1990s  uncovered  the  weak  point  in  Egypt's  bank  credit  market, 
specifically its lack of monitoring capacity. The problem of non-performing 
loans that surfaced in the housing market recently was a consequence of 
this weakness‟. (32) (see appendix 2) 
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C) Secondary Market Development  
A  senior  officer  in  the  Egyptian  Mortgage  Refinance  Company  (EMRC) 
acknowledges that:  
„No major experienced secondary market institutions exist in Egypt. No 
fully  developed  primary  mortgage  market  has  evolved  in  the  country. 
Financing for social housing has traditionally come from the state Social 
and Pension Fund, a compulsory contract savings scheme absorbing up 
to 10 per cent of wages, and from voluntary savings accounts in savings 
and loan institutions [for example, housing co-operative societies]‟. (33) 
(see appendix 2)  
 
A number of problems have also been noted as well in relation to these schemes: 
„State,  private  and  voluntary  savings  deposit  loans  have  varied 
considerably  over  the  years.  The  schemes  have  not  reliably  provided 
banks  with  sufficient  housing  capital...Savings  deposits  have  been  and 
remain  extremely  sensitive  to  general  economic  conditions  and 
government policies...For the most part savings accounts in Egypt reflect 
very short-term liabilities while housing credit, despite their relatively short 
terms, are for longer periods. At times, disintermediation – resulting from 
general interest rate increases – place banks at risk‟. 
 
Thus, failure to develop a secondary market limits the bank credit market‟s ability to 
easily increase lender liquidity as  well as the overall supply of funds for housing 
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market the capacity to readily access capital for housing. Very few secondary market 
institutions exist to efficiently link lenders to domestic and international investors. 
 
Lack of a secondary market impedes the bank credit market‟s efforts to reduce the 
capital disparities between its diverse regions; disparities that result from economic 
as well as social differences. Lack of a secondary market also frustrates the bank 
credit market‟s ability to reduce and fairly allocate the risks associated with providing 
housing credit and it impedes development of diverse funding structures responsive 
to the need of consumers, lenders and investors.  
 
In view of the above, almost all of the housing credits that are made in Egypt remain 
on the balance sheet of the originating bank. A very limited number of banks have 
had experience with mortgage bonds based on their portfolio. Bad credits in the past 
have  made  it  difficult to  securitize  their  current  portfolio  and  secure  easy  market 
acceptance of their bonds.  
 
With support from the banking sector, some housing developers have attempted to 
issue  debt  notes  based  on  real  estate  receivables  or  the  cash  flow  from  their 
projects.  Their  experience  to  date  has  not  been  extensive  and  has  been  very 
expensive. Housing developers have been required to accept relatively high interest 
rates and relatively short terms. Most of the securitizations do not reflect true sales 
or transfer of the property. 
 
Absence of a secondary market has muted the willingness and/or desires of new 
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has  also  impeded  development  of  a  secondary  market.  Mortgages  are  long-term 
investments. Lenders in Egypt have a more reasonably-priced way to share their 
risks with capital market investors. But they cannot lay off debt easily. Credits also 
remain on lenders‟ balance sheets. Lenders, of necessity, have to assume and retain 
all the key functions – origination, servicing, risk management, finance, etc.  
 
Several  additional  factors  have  also  been  noted  as  limiting  the  evolution  of  an 
efficient market in Egypt. The cyclical nature of the Egyptian economy, combined 
with government stabilization policies, has muted investor interest in housing. There 
has been too much uncertainty in the economy. Interest and inflation rates have 
remained  volatile.  Other  competitive  investments,  both  in  the  public  and  private 
sectors, offered investors what appeared to be safer alternatives to housing (as an 
asset class). 
 
The existing housing finance system may have contributed to difficulties associated 
with the development of a primary system. In some respects, the state part of the 
system competes with the private sector. It provides implicit and explicit subsidies to 
participants  in  the  system.  It  may  have  narrowed  the  market  for  private  sector 
housing loans and impeded the establishment of fully-developed primary markets. 
 
Moreover, until recently, Egypt lacked a legal or regulatory framework to encourage 
lenders  and  investors.  Assets  could  not  easily  be  transferred.  There  was  no 
assurance  that  lenders  could  foreclose  on  property  in  a  timely  and  cost-efficient 
manner. Egypt then still lacked standardized underwriting criteria. It also still lacks 295 
 
good accessible information systems concerning housing values, housing markets, 
credit, liens, portfolio history, etc.  
 
A senior real estate equity analyst in HC Securities, a leading Egyptian investment 
bank, reports that:  
„Developers have partially filled the housing finance void. They have pre-
sold units before construction and they have provided instalment loans to 
buyers.  Developer  credits  generally  are  not  secured  by  the  property. 
Construction of pre-sold units is often delayed until the payments from 
buyers equal the costs. Precise estimates are not available, but usually 
developers finance approximately 70 per cent of all units. . . While some 
developers have attempted to secure funding for pre-sold units and future 
projects by securing debt based on receivables, this has not been easy, 
given the cost of funds and the lack of a certain and predictable legal and 
administrative  framework.  Banks  and  other  investors  have  not  been 
forthcoming, in part because of the perceived weakness of the portfolio of 
receivables. Construction firms are not always best suited to evaluate the 
credit risks of potential borrowers‟. (34) (see appendix 2) 
 
A housing finance officer in Housing and Development Bank argued that „fewer risks 
would  be  involved  if  there  was  a  separation  of  construction  finance  and  buyer 
finance functions‟ (35) (see appendix 2). Developers tended to agree but noted that 
financial institutions generally will not provide credit directly to a developer. A finance 
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„Discounting  of  instalment  loans  to  secure  funds  has  become  more 
common than securitization. But it is very costly for developers. They pay 
a real premium for risks assumed by banks. Developers have also tried to 
form partnerships with local governments to lessen their financial burden 
and to join in joint ventures with willing investors‟. (36) (see appendix 2) 
 
According to the same source:  
„Developer financing of instalment credit has inadvertently made the task 
of  creating  a  bank  credit  market  for  a  social  housing  purpose  more 
difficult. Buyer expectations have been changed. Home buyers seem to 
like  instalment  sales.  They  think  it  poses  less  risk  than  mortgage 
financing.  Some  do  not  like  the  idea  of  mortgage  financing  and 
foreclosure  possibilities.  Thus,  the  public  will  have  to  be  re-educated 
regarding housing credit, deeds of trust, legal obligations etc. To develop 
a  primary  market  for  social  housing  will  require  that  the  consumer 
understands laws related to foreclosure etc‟. (37) (see appendix 2) 
 
Social housing developer-based financing has been a necessary way to keep the 
industry going and to provide consumers with an option in the light of the limitations 
associated  with  the existing  finance  system.  But  it  is not  sufficient  to  respond  to 
Egypt's immense housing needs. The amount of funds that has been and can be 
provided by developers is limited and the criteria imposed by developers on their 
loans are restrictive. If funds are tied up in loans related to construction and sale and 
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off  loans,  they  are  limited  as  to  how  many  units  they  can  build  or  provide  to 
consumers. 
 
6.3.3 Creation of a New System  
Most of the interviewees agreed on the need for Egypt's government and private 
sector to grant priority attention to the development of fully-functioning primary and 
secondary markets. Some interviewees generated a discussion concerning various 
functions that they believe must be performed by an efficient mortgage system. They 
recognized that some of the particular approaches used in the developed countries 
to develop and sustain primary and secondary markets may not fit Egypt because of 
its different economic, political and social characteristics (see comparative analysis 
in Chapter 4). However, they agreed that some experience in developing strategic 
primary and secondary market functions can offer many practical lessons for Egypt. 
They also discussed several major functions or activities related to the unbundling of 
integrated mortgage activities or services. 
 
A) Origination  
In the Egyptian Financial Services Authority, they endorses that it is important to 
have  a  broad  range  of  originators  with  specialized  institutions  in  social  housing 
finance.  Regular  banks  have  many  other  issues  to  deal  with.  Housing  finance 
intermediation in Egypt needs competition and the geographical choices that come 
with  diversity  of  originators.  It  needs  many  different  types  of  structures.  It  needs 
different  products  to  fit  consumer  needs.  It  needs  to  separate  origination  from 
funding if it ever is to achieve specialization and an increase in liquidity, as well as 
total housing funds.  298 
 
Unbundled originators have more flexibility. They can decide to keep mortgage loans 
in their portfolios or sell to a secondary market institution. If originators successfully 
transfer loans to varied secondary market institutions, they will be able to replenish 
their funds for additional housing loans. They are able to allocate much of the credit 
risks  first  to  a  secondary  market  facility  (for  example  the  Egyptian  Mortgage 
Refinance  Company)  and  subsequently  to  diverse  investors  associated  with 
mortgage lending. 
 
B) Insurance 
A senior officer in the Insurance Supervision Department of the Egyptian Financial 
Services Authority believes that: 
„Egypt should address credit or default risk through the development of 
the  insurance  sector.  While  laws  make  it  easy  to  fairly  and  efficiently 
foreclose on property in the case of default, on most occasions neither 
portfolio lenders nor investors in single or pooled mortgages want to take 
possession of and liquidate foreclosed properties. They much prefer liquid 
assets. Mortgage insurance remains underdeveloped in Egypt. There are 
hopes that private businesses will develop relevant insurance products‟. 
(38) (see appendix 2) 
  
As for the idea of a single government insurer: 
„This is an idea for the 1960s not the new millennium. We want private 
companies to provide mortgage insurance. However, we think that Egypt 
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help  to  develop  a  well-functioning  and  efficient  market‟.  (39)  (see 
appendix 2) 
 
While private sector entities might be able to provide insurance and otherwise handle 
risks  associated  with  mortgages  for  the  upper  income  segment  of  the  market  in 
Egypt,  it  is  likely  to  require  government  insurance  to  broaden  the  reach  of  the 
financing system to low- or moderate-income population. 
 
C) Loan Servicing 
In Egypt, loans are now serviced, more often than not, by financial institutions that 
provide loans and bear direct risks in case of default. Separate servicing entities are 
not  common  in  Egypt.  In  Housing  and  Development  Bank,  a  senior  manager 
acknowledged that: 
„The development of a capable servicing industry in Egypt is critical. State 
and  private  financial  institutions  should  develop  and  foster  fair  and 
effective  reimbursement  schedules.  They  should  assure  transparent 
regulations and ground rules concerning servicing functions. They should 
stimulate relevant information systems. They should standardize loan and 
security  instruments  as  well  as  related  underwriting  criteria‟.  (40)  (see 
appendix 2) 
 
D) System Recognition  
Some  interviewees  acknowledged  the  difference  between  mortgage  banking 
systems, secondary mortgage market facilities and a secondary mortgage market 
system.  Most  discounted  the  long-term  ability  of  mortgage  banking  systems  and 300 
 
secondary  mortgage  market  facilities  to  meet  Egypt's  long-term  needs  for  social 
housing  capital.  Both  systems  involve  institutions  that  principally  rely  on  general 
obligation  bonds  to  access  capital  markets.  Both  generally  require  lending 
institutions to retain mortgages as balance sheets investments. 
 
Mortgage banks and/or secondary mortgage market facilities are used extensively in 
a number of countries. They generally have developed in situations where there is 
relatively  minimal  specialization.  The  absence  of  asset-backed  securities  limits 
capital market opportunity. While there are cost savings, they do not seem to match 
the  savings  in  interest  and  transaction  costs  accorded  to  secondary  mortgage 
market systems. 
 
Egypt has created the legal framework and is now developing the mechanism to put 
in place a comprehensive secondary mortgage market system. Its domestic capital 
market is potentially relatively large, and  with  effective strategies, it can begin to 
penetrate regional capital markets.  The United States experience of a secondary 
mortgage  market  seems  more  relevant  to  Egypt  at  the  present  time  than  the 
experience of other nations with mortgage banking and secondary mortgage market 
facilities.  This  opinion  actually  explains  why  the  Egyptian  Mortgage  Refinance 
Company  (EMRC)  remains  the  only  institution  in  the  market  created  to  perform 
secondary  mortgage  market  functions  within  the  framework  of  the  mortgage  law 
number  2001.  Much  discussion  focused  on  clarifying  the  present  and  future 
character  of  EMRC.  The  officers  interviewed  in  the  EMRC  were  asked  several 
questions. Is EMRC a private company or a GSE? Is it or will it become a monopoly 
and,  if  so,  what  precautions  are  in  place  to  prevent  abuse? What  is the present 301 
 
relationship of EMRC to government and what should it be in the future? How does 
EMRC compare to the secondary market system institutions that have developed in 
the United States? 
 
It was indicated that EMRC is mostly a private sector entity. It is not a government-
sponsored enterprise even  though  the  government  is one  of  its  shareholders.  Its 
financial products do not carry any explicit or implicit government guarantee. The fact 
that  government  and  major  banks  are  shareholders,  however,  should  increase 
investor  confidence  in  the  mortgage-backed  securities  that  are  issued  in  Egypt. 
However,  there  is  a  general  preference  for  a  securitization  entity  completely 
independent  from  the  government.  This  is  viewed  as  a  better  way  to  let  private 
entities set the rules rather than the government. This reflects a willingness to see 
the  mortgage  market  operate  without  too  much  government  regulation.  In  other 
words, Egypt should be able to build on the understanding of market mechanisms 
and products that have been developed elsewhere. Further, Egypt may not need a 
government  guarantee  for  any  of  the  government-supported  secondary  market 
institutions that developed in countries like the United States. It is conceivable that if 
the Egyptian policy makers are able to secure an even playing field concerning the 
legal framework, as well as the tax and regulatory system, the private sector will 
respond without significant government enhancements. 
 
However, two of the EMRC‟s officers suggested the need, at least at the outset, for 
greater government involvement. They also challenged the assumption that EMRC 
was  independent  of  government.  Government‟s  role  as  a  board  member  and 302 
 
shareholder  may  create  at  least  an  implicit  government  guarantee  –  a  moral  or 
practical obligation to back securities.  
„EMRC should think through its present mission and structure. Its ties to 
government  could  well  be  an  asset  as  Egypt  moves  towards  the 
development  of  a  secondary  market.  EMRC  could  become  a  GSE  – 
Egyptian  style  –  and  help  lead  efforts  to  establish  a  vigorous  security 
market. As a GSE like Freddie Mac it could help make the market‟. (41) 
(see appendix 2) 
 
It  was  also  indicated  during  the  interviews  with  the  EMRC‟s  officers  that  at  a 
minimum,  government  must  create  effective  oversight  mechanisms  for  EMRC, 
particularly  if  EMRC  remains  a  monopoly.  It  is  necessary  to  have  proper  risk 
management and independent oversight of capital. EMRC is not currently regulated 
as  a  financial  institution.  It  will  operate  responsibly,  because  of  the  active 
involvement of its board.  
„While  EMRC  is  now  the  only  securitization  entity  resulting  from  law 
number 2001, it is not a permanent monopoly . . . There is some value in 
having EMRC operate as the sole secondary market entity initially. . . It 
will make it easier to achieve levels of standardization which are critical to 
market functioning. It will permit achievement of volume and scale‟. (42) 
(see appendix 2) 
 
Some interviewees from the banking sector were somewhat uneasy about a single 
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„This is against fair and effective monitoring and regulatory system. Also, 
competition  will  lead  to  lower  costs,  more  varied  products  and  more 
efficiency. If ERMC were able to secure a very large share of the market, 
it would begin to act like a monopoly and freeze out potential competitors‟. 
(43) (see appendix 2) 
 
At the end, it appears that the government should consider the benefits and costs of 
an Egyptian variation on this theme. Government ownership of a secondary market 
facility  and  government  enhancements,  including  guarantees  of  mortgage-backed 
securities,  would  probably  help  Egypt  to  develop  both  a  primary  market  for 
mortgages  and  a  secondary  market  for  securitized  mortgage  pools  directed  at 
expanding  housing  opportunities  for  low-  and  moderate-income  groups.  Properly 
designed  and  regulated,  a  government-owned  facility  like  EMRC  could  make  a 
difference. It would not compete, except at the margin, with the market. Indeed, it 
may help foster the growth of relevant private entities by making a secondary market 
and by building investor confidence in securities.  
 
6.3.4 Bundling to Unbundle  
Most of the interviewees acknowledged Egypt's efforts to develop sound and stable 
depository and non-depository institutions for credit origination purposes, as well as 
the country‟s need to secure a critical mass of stable institutions engaged in the 
secondary market. According to a fixed income broker in National Bank of Egypt:  
„The capital market initially may not be responsive in a significant manner 
to  housing  sector  debt  and  equity  requirements.  .  .  Egypt's  economy, 
while  apparently  emerging,  is  viewed  by  many  investors  as  uncertain. 304 
 
Further, the legal framework for housing, while improving, is still basically 
untested,  particularly  with  respect  to  use  of  property  as  collateral  for 
housing-related  mortgage  pools  and  securitization.  Moreover,  EMRC  is 
the only secondary market institution to date and government bailouts and 
restructuring  already  resulting  from  high  inflation  and  loan 
delinquencies/defaults led to a shrinking market for housing finance and 
resulted in the ultimate transfer of billions in housing loans from banks to 
the Central bank. Investors at the present time are not overwhelmed by 
the  prospect  of  housing  investment.  Also  lack  of  government  credit 
enhancement  mutes  their  willingness  to  significantly  invest  in  housing 
loans‟. (44) (see appendix 2) 
 
In the Egyptian Financial Services Authority, a senior officer noted that: 
„Egypt  may  need  and  may  be  able  to  initiate  something  unique  to 
accelerate the development of its primary and secondary markets. . . Why 
not build a new government entity or add to the functions of an existing 
experienced  organization  or  system?  The  new  or  restructured  group 
would  combine  insurance  of  primary  loans  and  a  secondary  market 
guarantee. As an option, it could be granted powers to restructure present 
non-performing loans. Thus, the new organization or system would have 
four  separate  unbundled  departments  within  its  bundled  structure: 
insurance, guarantee, restructuring and lending‟. (45) (see appendix 2) 
 
A board member of the Egyptian Financial Services Authority supported this view 
and indicated that: 305 
 
„The ability of the new or restructured organization to provide insurance 
would  help  increase  the  size  and  the  liquidity  of  the  primary  market. 
Similarly,  the  ability  of  the  new  organization  or  system  to  guarantee 
security  backed  by  insured  credits  will  help  ensure  liquidity  in  the 
secondary market. Finally, the ability of the new organization or system to 
provide their conduit for the restructuring of non-performing loans held by 
the Central bank of Egypt and by savings institutions would increase the 
overall efficiency of the mortgage market and the related ability of savings 
institutions to also extend mortgage loans to the under-served‟. (46) (see 
appendix 2) 
  
Clearly, if such a new organization is established along the lines suggested, it will be 
powerful enough to force the standardization of mortgages and underwriting at the 
lower income end. Although this proposal may not be endorsed by many members of 
the government, it was met with interest by some of the bankers interviewed some of 
whom think that, at a minimum, the proposal helps in understanding the relationship 
between unbundled activities and the market. It also suggests Egypt needs to take 
bolder steps. Further, the proposal illustrates a comprehensive approach.  
 
On the other hand, those bankers who did not endorse it were concerned that if 
Egypt included lending, insurance, guarantees and restructuring under one roof in 
one government supported group, it would create a dominant market institution; one 
able  to  crowd  out  many  of the  country‟s fledgling  primary  and  secondary  market 
institutions. „It would initially limit or impede competition. Investors and originators as 
well as other market participants would move to secure the visible advantages of the 306 
 
government  supported  enterprise.  Egypt  might  find  it  difficult  to  establish  private 
insurers, private securitization firms, etc.‟, a property finance officer in Banque Misr 
said. 
 
6.3.5 Adequacy of Legal Framework 
Banks need a legal framework that recognizes and respects the various contractual 
relationships required to create an efficient mortgage market. The court system must 
act in a timely and predictable manner to enforce contractual relationships and the 
provisions in the law. The law must provide the banks with an enforceable claim on 
the  property  which  comprises  the  collateral  for  the  loan  in  the  event  that  the 
borrowers  default  on  payments.  It  was  noted  that  the  existing  legal  framework 
provides  for  a  deed  of  trust.  Based  on  this,  creditors  may  take  possession  of  a 
property  using  an  administrative  process  that  is  outside  the  court‟s  remit.  The 
security interests, ostensibly, will be fully transferable and creditors‟ interests will be 
protected  in  the  event  of  bankruptcy  or  insolvency  of  the  originating  institution. 
However, some interviewees expressed concern that „politics and political pressures 
will not permit the legal chances concerning foreclosure, for example, to be easily 
converted to reality‟.  
 
There also seems to be a general consensus that it is important for the housing and 
mortgage markets to proceed in a socially responsible fashion. In Central Bank of 
Egypt, they believe that 
„Public education regarding social housing and related responsibilities is 
an  important  function  that  must  be  performed  by  some  entity.  With 
appropriate  public  education  and  good  underwriting  standards,  it  is 307 
 
possible  to  minimize  hardships  .  .  .  Sometimes  well-intended  actions 
designed to protect the banks from adverse effects of market transactions 
can have the opposite effect‟. (47) (see appendix 2) 
 
A supervisor in Central Bank of Egypt also cited a past instance when protection 
against  evictions  was  strengthened  in  the  law,  „while  it  may  have  made  eviction 
difficult, it raised the cost of housing for all and reduced its availability for the low 
income  consumers‟.  Laws  and  related  regulations  are  required  that  acknowledge 
both the lenders‟ rights to periodic payments on housing loans and their rights to 
efficiently secure property used as collateral for loans. Protections, while necessary, 
should  not  impede  fair  and  efficient  enforcement  of  the  rights  of  lenders  and 
investors. If they do, banks will not be able to extend more credit for social housing 
purposes.  
 
A) Capital market Law 
The  Capital  Markets  Law  was  amended  to  enable  "capital  market  instruments", 
including housing-credit-backed securities and housing-credit-covered bonds, to be 
issued  by  housing  finance  institutions,  mortgage  finance  companies,  and  banks. 
These entities will be regulated by the Capital Markets Board (CMB), the supervisory 
authority in charge of the securities market in Egypt.  
 
The Capital Markets Law also regulated the appraisal profession. It granted authority 
to the CMB to determine appraisers' qualifications, working and reporting standards, 
valuation  principles  and  penalties  for  non-compliance.  It  also  supported  the 
establishment of an association of appraisal specialists to regulate and license the 308 
 
profession. Relatively there are plenty of licensed appraisers in Egypt at present, and 
appraisals are not very time consuming. In an attempt to benefit from this newly-
developed profession, an interviewee from a leading law firm in Egypt suggested „the 
need for a new category of appraisers that are specially licensed to value social 
housing properties‟. 
 
B) Foreclosure and bankruptcy laws 
The  foreclosure  and  bankruptcy  laws  were  amended  to  shorten  the  foreclosure 
period, which previously used to last for many years. The law also limited the misuse 
of the appeal process, by increasing the amount a borrower must deposit in order to 
suspend  foreclosure  proceedings.  However,  many  of  the  bank  credit  officers 
interviewed pointed out that past experiences continue to negatively influence bank 
credit decisions related to co-operative housing loan applications.  
 
Enforceable  property  rights  and  contracts  are  at  the  very  foundation  of  a  free 
housing market. As the number of housing transactions has grown (along with the 
attendant litigation), the Egyptian judicial system has proved to be slow, expensive 
and uncertain. The average case takes six years to be decided. As a result of the 
current rates of filing and disposition, there are currently thousands of cases awaiting 
resolution in the courts. It is therefore obvious that an overhaul of the country's real 
estate  judicial  system,  which  was  initially  designed  to  serve  a  planned  socialist 
economy,  is  needed  if  social  housing  development,  led  by  housing  co-operative 
societies, is to succeed.  
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The system has two main deficiencies. First, it is badly in need of additional qualified 
judges.  Several  compounding  factors have  led  to  this:  judges‟ caseloads are  too 
heavy; they lack the specialization needed to render a technically proper decision; 
the  low  wages  make  it  difficult  to  train  and  to  retain  them;  and  the  system  of 
promotion is based more on seniority than performance. Furthermore, the lack of 
qualified  and  motivated  support  staff  and  the  poor  infrastructure  and  facilities  for 
case management add to the woes. 
 
Second,  the  judicial  system,  even  by  transitional  economy  standards,  is  grossly 
underfunded. In addition, its services are inefficiently priced. The cost of real estate 
judicial decisions is extremely high as, in effect, the real estate system has been 
designed to cross-subsidize justice.  
 
6.3.6 Tax System 
The recent tax system in Egypt aimed to decrease the operational costs involved in 
the  management  of  housing  stock  through  various  tax  incentives,  including  the 
exemption of stamp duties and other transactional taxes, and the tax deductibility of 
interest payments on mortgages. It was noted during interviews that many are not 
aware of these incentives and their contribution to minimizing housing costs, which 
support the demand for social housing. On the other hand, recent amendments in 
the real estate tax law have generally created a state of anxiety in the bank credit 
market towards residential properties as collaterals.  
 
A comprehensive look at Egyptian tax laws and regulations is a necessity, noted 
several interviewees. Egypt has many different taxes. In the housing market, there is 310 
 
a concern over the relationship between taxes and Egypt's desire to build an efficient 
mortgage market. A credit officer in the Egyptian Arab Land Bank cautioned that tax 
consequences must be considered by the government. These consequences limit 
the market and restrict the flow of capital into housing.  
„At  the  heart  of  an  efficient  tax  administration  lie  predictability  and 
transparency. This is not the case in Egypt, where the arbitrariness and 
ambiguity  of  the  process  actually  deter  potential  real  estate  investors. 
Within this system, incentives granted by the government to foster private 
investments,  such  as  tax  holidays,  are  rendered  meaningless  as  their 
benefits  are  outweighed  by  the  tax  uncertainty  .  .  .  The  fundamental 
problem of Egypt's tax administration system lies in the conditions that 
provide  the  tax  collectors  with  virtually  unlimited  discretionary  powers. 
These conditions include the lack of independent tax appeal mechanisms, 
no legally recognized accounting standard, and the practice of rewarding 
collectors  according  to  the  revenues  they  bring  in.  In  this  context,  tax 
collectors can (and do) unilaterally assess the taxpayers‟ liability, instead 
of auditing their declaration. It is not surprising, then, that an estimated 
half  of  all  taxpayers  seek  (or  accept)  informal  settlements‟.  (48)  (see 
appendix 2) 
 
6.3.7 Regulatory Reform 
The  need  to  streamline  current  regulations  affecting  mortgage  credit  was  a 
continuous and pervasive issue in most of the interviews. Mortgage credit rules must 
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regulatory  system.  A  board  member  of  the  Egyptian  Financial  Services  Authority 
reported the need to:  
„Create  a  workable  and  balanced  regulatory  framework  if  Egypt  is  to 
initiate  strong  primary  and  secondary  market  systems.  It  must  reflect 
banking  interests  and  the  interests  of  the  borrowers.  But  it  also  must 
reflect  an  understanding  of  the  needs  of  the  marketplace  for  quick, 
transparent  and  equitable  decisions.  Mediation  needs  to  acknowledge 
profits  and  cash  flow  as  much  as  the  need  to  respect  social  welfare 
objectives. One without the other will not produce what is necessary – an 
expanded mortgage market and housing choices‟. (49) (see appendix 2) 
 
Egypt,  as  part  of  its  proposed  housing  policy  deliberations,  granted  considerable 
time to the transparent development of fair and efficient regulations. However, most 
wanted government to review the need for present rules that direct and limit the 
allocation of deposits in the credit market, discourage flexibility concerning the sale 
and/or  portfolio  treatment  of  construction  loans,  and  limit  the  use  of  insurance, 
mutual funds and/or pension funds for social housing purposes. 
 
6.3.8 Asset Quality  
While  the  bank  credit  environment  is  improving,  it  is  still  in  need  of  ongoing 
development.  The  high  level  of  NPLs,  especially  those  related  to  speculative 
development projects at the upper end of the housing market, remain a major issue 
in the Egyptian bank credit market, particularly at the state-owned banks; however, 
this issue is being addressed as part of the financial sector reform. Further, industry 
consolidation is making the bank credit market more prudent and competitive. But 312 
 
high  credit  concentrations  in  the  housing  market  still  compromise  banks‟  risk 
positioning.  
 
Asset quality issues related to the housing market have been a major concern for 
state-owned Egyptian banks for many years, but limited information has in the past 
prevented an accurate quantification of this problem. NPL balances are not disclosed 
in financial  statements,  which  are prepared  under Egyptian accounting  standards 
and  audited  by  the  Egyptian  Central  Auditing  Organization.  However,  owing  to 
restructuring efforts by the CBE, the banks have in recent years been more forward 
in discussing – and more importantly addressing – problems in their housing credit 
portfolio.  
 
The  majority  of  the  public  sector  bankers  expressed  their  satisfaction  with  the 
government‟s commitment and support to resolve any issues that relate to exposure 
to the housing market. However, this satisfaction is based on historical government 
interventions in the bank credit market. Some of the examples cited included the 
government‟s move to settle the Bank of Alexandria‟s public enterprise loans ahead 
of  its  privatization  and  the  agreement  reached  with  the  Ministry  of  Investment 
regarding the NPLs owed by public business enterprises, including housing firms, to 
the remaining state-owned banks. 
 
Interviewees from the private sector  banks also shared some of this  satisfaction, 
especially  following  the  CBE  decision  to  establish  an  NPL  Management  Unit  to 
support both public and private banks in rescheduling and/or settling non-performing 
accounts,  primarily  through  moral  support.  A  Secretariat  for  Conciliation  and 313 
 
Arbitration  was  also  established  to  undertake  the  management  of  the  settlement 
mechanism and to offer banks an alternative to lengthy court proceedings. 
 
The interviews highlighted the major difference in bank credit standards in public and 
private sector banks in terms of the commitment to address the asset quality issue 
by settling/rescheduling existing problematic exposures, building up the provisioning 
reserves and strengthening internal credit policies and risk management systems. In 
general,  private  sector  banks  display  better  credit  vetting  and  controls  than  their 
public sector counterparts; in many cases, these were introduced by their foreign 
shareholder banks. They have mainly been involved in lending to good quality public 
sector institutions and leading private sector companies in the housing market. Thus, 
they suffer from fewer problem loans, while provision reserves are broadly in line 
with NPLs.  
 
6.3.9 Asset Liability Management  
The  consecutive  financial  crises  during  the  past  two  decades,  from  the  Asian 
financial crisis in the late 1990s to the recent credit crunch, have changed the way 
many banks manage their liquidity in Egypt. According to an equity analyst in HC 
Securities: 
„Egyptian banks are now more likely to allocate their excess liquidity to 
buying less risky assets such as treasury bills or government bonds rather 
than  extending  more  credit.  However,  if  they  decide  to  increase  their 
credit portfolios, they prefer shorter- to medium-term credits to public and 
private sector firms . . . While private sector banks show more flexibility in 
extending  credit  in  the  housing  market,  public  sector  banks  remain 314 
 
cautious, reflecting their increased risk aversion following the substantial 
increase in their NPLs as a percentage of total loan portfolios, most of 
which related to credits approved to fund speculative housing projects in 
the recent past . . . When investigating how demand for bank credit in the 
housing  market  has  changed  over  the  last  three  years,  on  average, 
demand for bank credit has either increased or remained the same‟. (50) 
(see appendix 2) 
 
This confirms the previous finding that the observed decline of bank credit to the co-
operative housing sector cannot be attributed to a decrease in demand for credit 
(credit slowdown). 
 
6.3.10 Mortgage Credit as an Asset Class  
Given the fact that the operating environment is challenging in terms of low per-
capita GDP, and high unemployment and inflation, bank credit for social housing 
purposes is perceived by many of the interviewees to be a high risk business. Data 
on co-operative housing credit are not available but the level of co-operative housing 
credit  is  estimated  to  be  extremely  low  compared  with  credit  for  other  types  of 
housing. Also, most of the interviewees pointed out that bank credits that are actually 
disbursed for social housing purpose usually have very low loan-to-value ratios. This 
is largely based on a hypothetical notion that the market value of social housing as 
an asset class tends to sharply decline during economic downturn, which, in turn, 
results in increased defaults and foreclosures. 
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The  average  life  of  a  bank  credit  in  the  social  housing  market  also  tends  to  be 
shorter, around ten to fifteen years, even though some banks have credit policies 
allowing for longer maturities of twenty-five to thirty years. The short average life of 
bank  credit  means  that  monthly  loan  repayments  will  be  comparatively  large 
(unaffordable).  Moreover,  most  of  the  bank  credits  in  Egypt  are  offered  at  fixed 
interest  rates,  as  the  floating-rate  credits  system  remains  underdeveloped.  Thus, 
bank credit instalments are usually fixed throughout the life of the transaction. On the 
other hand, the salaries of most housing co-operative societies‟ members are not 
adjusted on a regular basis to compensate for the loss of purchasing power as a 
result  of  high  inflation.  Hence,  their  contract  savings  with  housing  co-operative 
societies are not growing enough to match the increase in bank credit obligations, 
which partly explains why access to bank credit is currently limited and prohibitive in 
the co-operative housing sector.  
 
6.3.11 Credit Risk Appetite and Criteria 
The  interviewees  were  asked  about  any  change  in  the  general  credit  criteria  for 
approving new credit in the housing market during the last three years and what is 
the main objective of such change. In general, it was noted that most public and 
private banks do not differ in how they tightened or eased their criteria. But, banks 
tightened criteria for credit in the real estate market as a result of the change in the 
CBE‟s regulations and the increased risk aversion of the banking sector.  
 
This change in risk appetite reflects the perspective that most real estate projects 
require  large  investments  and  longer  maturity  before  firms  are  able  to  pay  back 
loans. In particular, it reflects the declining level of government support to the co-316 
 
operative housing sector, lack of reliable financial information about many housing 
co-operatives, and the absence of corporate governance in the sector. Thus, terms 
and conditions for approving new credit lines to housing co-operative societies have 
changed  in  the  recent  past.  Remarkably,  interest  rates  increased.  Collateral 
requirements have also shown some tightness, guided by the financial regulators to 
address the deterioration of many borrowers‟ creditworthiness in the housing market.  
 
However, some credit officers acknowledged  that the relationship between banks 
and  large  housing  co-operative  societies  continues  to  play  a  significant  role  in 
approving or denying a credit application. Thus small housing co-operative societies 
are most likely to be denied credit while there is little chance that a credit application 
of a well-known large housing co-operative will be rejected. This implies banks have 
a risk-averse attitude towards small housing co-operative societies. One justification 
for this practice is that banks base their approval or rejection primarily on borrowers‟ 
information,  particularly  of  well-known  and  established  housing  co-operative 
societies. Thus, non-price factors are more important in making lending decisions 
and an information asymmetry problem exists in the  co-operative housing sector. 
Therefore, providing quality borrower information could help minimize the negative 
consequences of the asymmetric information problem. 
 
It was also noted that banks are more likely to approve credit applications if housing 
co-operative societies are willing to provide higher collateral values or accept shorter 
loan terms. This again confirms that banks‟ credit criteria and risk-averse attitudes 
play an important role in extending or reducing credit in the  co-operative housing 
sector. Further, the inflexibility of banks on approving credit to housing co-operative 317 
 
societies  based  on  higher  interest  rates  constitutes  a  credit  rationing  that  has 
implications for the implementation of housing finance policy. 
 
Finally, most of the credit officers interviewed agreed that bank credit to the private 
sector  in  the  housing  market  has  substantially  increased  in  recent  years,  which 
suggests that the private sector might be crowding out the other sectors, including 
co-operative housing. However, this argument should be carefully considered in the 
light of the earlier review of bank credit conditions in Egypt, which demonstrated that 
banks generally enjoy high lending capacity. The banks‟ high lending capacity can 
reflect low credit risk appetite. Thus, this implies that private sector borrowing is not 
necessarily crowding out housing co-operative societies.  
 
6.3.12 Regulations and Supervisions  
The bank credit crisis of 2000-2005 highlighted the inherent weaknesses of Egypt‟s 
bank credit system. Banks were suffering from poor governance and macroeconomic 
volatility  in  the  absence  of  a  strong  regulatory  and  supervisory  framework.  State 
banks had financed many speculative housing projects with short-term borrowing, 
and  suffered  from  maturity  mismatch  between  their  assets  and  liabilities,  leaving 
them in a vulnerable position. Further, when the exchange rate distorted and interest 
rates soared, banks experienced high losses, with NPLs at peak after the crisis. As a 
part of the authorities' response, the Central Bank of Egypt imposed a limit on bank 
credit for real estate purpose. Although this action helped improve risk management 
in many banks, it resulted in reducing bank credit available for some businesses, 
such as housing co-operative societies.  
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6.3.13 Change in Management  
The reform of the Egyptian bank credit market has led to replacing the management 
of many banks. Since the relationship between banks and their borrowers is of a 
long-term  nature,  this  replacement  has  contributed  to  the  breakdown  of  this 
relationship as new managements are not familiar with the business circumstances 
of housing co-operative societies‟ activities. Accordingly, some banks started to be 
more cautious in approving new loan applications even to some long-time clients. 
Interestingly,  this  tightening  of  credit  has  occurred  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  many 
housing  co-operative  societies  experienced  increased  demand  and  business 
expansion in recent years. 
 
6.3.14 Opportunities for Growth  
When asked about opportunities for growth, most of the interviewees noted that they 
would focus on growing their retail banking and SME businesses as they offer better 
profit margins than other lending. Expanding their retail base will also enable their 
banks  to  diversify  operations,  risks  and  revenue  streams.  Exposure  to  the  retail 
sector is still low, and banks have good opportunities for selective growth. Retail 
sector loans currently make up 20 per cent of total loans and just 7 per cent of total 
assets but nonetheless represent a significant area of growth (CBE, 2008). This is 
specifically  so  for  mortgages,  credit  cards  and  personal  loans,  while  the 
establishment  of  a  credit  bureau  in  July  2007  enhances  banks‟  information  on 
consumer lending. 319 
 
 
6.4 Conclusion  
Chapter 6 evaluated and explained the effectiveness of banking institutions in the 
provision of credit in Egypt. The chapter explored whether demand or supply factors 
have  contributed  to  reducing  approved  credit  in  recent  years  for  housing  co-
operative societies. As is clear, Egyptian banking institutions have started to apply 
more  prudential  criteria  in  the  light  of  the  strengthened  regulatory  environment. 
Several  banks  have  lately  been  attempting  to  reduce  their  exposure  to  the  real 
estate market in general and co-operative housing sector in particular, which is also 
in line with the recent policies of Central Bank of Egypt to regulate real estate finance 
in Egypt. 
 
The  bank  interviews  also  indicated  that  information  about  housing  co-operative 
societies and their ability to service bank credits and to provide enough collateral 
plays a key role in the credit decision. In addition, there has been a change in banks‟ 
asset liability management policies as they moved to hold more liquid and less risky 
assets, which implies that banks perceive a lack of sound business opportunities and 
are, hence, becoming more risk averse. But such perception reflects a preference to 
remain liquid during difficult market conditions rather than credit concern to extend 
bank credit in the social housing market. Thus, banks‟ preference for more liquid 
assets,  such  as  government  securities,  implies  that  government  borrowing  is 
crowding out other types of borrowers, including housing co-operative societies.  
 
The  banks‟  risk-averse  attitude  also  results  from  the  rise  of  NPLs  and  the  legal 
challenges of many banks in the aftermath of the recent series of financial crises. 
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of  a  nationwide  credit  rating  system  for  housing  co-operative  societies.  In  other 
words, the rise in interest rates on bank credits reflects the difficulty for banks to 
confidently  distinguish  between  “risky”  and  “safe”  borrowers  in  the  co-operative 
housing sector. 
 
These results have several implications, given the research objectives. Much still 
needs to be done in order to increase the effectiveness of banking and co-operative 
institutions in the mortgage market. This should be an important part of any strategy 
to  increase  access  to  mortgage  credit for  low-  and moderate-income  households 
through  their  housing  co-operative  societies.  This  should  also  be  an  important 
prerequisite for the creation of an effective and sustainable mortgage market based 
on a network of mortgage credit intermediation supported by: i) a group of institutions 
with sustainable business models and adequate funding, ii) a regulatory regime that 
is predictable, clear and transparent, and iii) keeping the risks of extending mortgage 
credit  to  low-  and  moderate-income  households  whether  directly  or  indirectly, 
through their housing co-operatives, at a manageable level.     321 
 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
The development of an effective and sustainable mortgage system that expands the 
mortgage credit beneficiaries base and works better for low- and moderate-income 
households is currently a national priority in Egypt. The broad conclusion of the study 
is  that  to  extend  the  penetration  of  mortgage  credit,  there  needs  to  be  a  wider 
strategy to mobilize private and community resources, broaden the mortgage market 
and  improve  risk  allocation.  Expanding  the  mortgage  credit  beneficiaries  base  in 
Egypt can be better addressed through a stakeholder approach that brings together 
different actors to create a sustainable network of mortgage credit intermediation that 
can go a long way to create an enabling environment for a vibrant mortgage market. 
The result will be a wider access to the housing sector thus making it possible for 
many low- and moderate-income households to be able to afford their own homes 
directly  or  indirectly,  through  their  community  based  organisations.  The  following 
remarks can also be made about the study.      
 
7.1 Research Questions and Methodology  
This thesis highlights the need for a sustainable strategy for the supply side in the 
Egyptian mortgage market (chapter 2). Accordingly, the thesis reviews the issues 
that are central to the evaluation of mortgage credit supply. This includes a review of 
theoretical and empirical issues associated with the assessment of mortgage credit 
intermediation  models,  identifying  their  reach  and  the  limit  of  that  reach  and, 
implicitly, examining what needs to be done to close the gap on what would be an 
effective and sustainable mortgage market.  
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In doing so, the researcher tried to identify the relative importance of the purposes of 
mortgage  credit  in  Egypt.  Based  on  the  assessment  of  the  current  status  in  the 
Egyptian mortgage market, it appeared that the mortgage market is limited in its 
reach  to  low-  and  moderate-income  households.  Therefore,  there  is  a  need  to 
explore ways to increase the mortgage credit beneficiaries base in Egypt (chapter 3). 
This  led  to  the  development  of  the  key  objectives  and  hypotheses  of  the  thesis 
(chapter 4), in relation to why housing co-operative societies can be seen as an 
important policy instrument to improve access to affordable housing and mortgage 
credit for low- and moderate-income households in the country.  
 
Therefore,  it  was  important  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  the  current  level  of 
participation  by  the  Egyptian  housing  co-operative  societies  in  the  housing  and 
mortgage markets; to identify and analyse the various economic, social and political 
factors influencing this effectiveness (chapter 5); to consider the financial institutions 
in their immediate environment with existing interests in what they are doing and 
capable  of acting  as  intermediaries; and finally  to  identify  which  institutions  most 
constrain the development of a sustainable level of mortgage credit provision for low- 
and  moderate-income  households,  through  their  housing  co-operative  societies 
(chapter 6). 
 
This thesis, to the best of the researcher‟s knowledge, makes the first attempt to 
address the above issues through such an approach, which is a multidisciplinary one 
integrating  theories  from  different  subject  areas  (mainly  urban,  management  and 
financial studies) and practice. As for the methodology used, it combines an original 
framework of analysis, questionnaire and interviews.  323 
 
7.2 Results and Conclusions  
The results and conclusions of the research can be regrouped and summarized as 
follows.  
   
7.2.1 Relative Importance  
As the thesis shows, Egypt has significant funding requirements to support access to 
housing for low- and moderate-income households. While creation of a mortgage 
market  will  expand  housing  choices  for  Egyptian  households,  it  seems  that  the 
primary  direct  beneficiaries  will  be  the  upper  income  households.  But  the 
development  of  a  sustainable  mortgage  market  will  better  permit  government  to 
target its limited resources to address the needs of the under-served households.  
 
Survey results and interviews (chapters 5 and 6) reveal how little is known about the 
Egyptian co-operative housing societies, the number of co-operative housing units 
built  per  annum,  co-operative  housing  prices,  infrastructure  deployment  patterns, 
and so on. Given the important role that the housing co-operative societies play in 
housing and credit distribution, it is extremely important that the implications of their 
performance and development are understood.  
 
A key feature of mortgage credit intermediation is diversification, that is to say having 
access to mixed funding sources rather than depending on a single source to meet 
current  and  future  mortgage  credit  needs.  This  cardinal  rule  also  holds  true  for 
Egyptian housing co-operative societies that need sustainable mortgage credit lines 
to  meet  current  and  future  requirements.  In  choosing  the  optimal  mix  of  funding 
sources to provide financial security, housing co-operative societies need to keep 
abreast of developments affecting their expenditures and change the funding mix as 324 
 
circumstances dictate. Contract savings continue to be the mainstay of housing co-
operative funding, but almost nothing has been done to organize and regulate these 
savings. Clearly, the more a housing co-operative society can approach its members 
for support, the more it can devote its time and energy directly on its mission.  
 
After considering their funding options, many co-operative societies might determine 
that relying fully on contract saving schemes is the best fit with their organization‟s 
needs, abilities and values. But even in these cases, housing co-operative societies 
are wise to diversify their base of financial support rather than being dependent on a 
single source. This process parallels how successful housing co-operative societies 
manage their portfolio of funding sources to meet their particular financial security 
needs. 
 
The  mission  of  housing  co-operative societies  in  Egypt  is  viewed  as  creating 
financial intermediaries for low- and moderate-income households, similar to the role 
played  by  the  savings  and  co-operative  institutions in  other  countries  (for  
example Sparkassen  and  Volksbanken  in  Germany).  While  Egyptian  housing  
co-operative societies  are  committed  to  this  social  objective,  with  the  support  
of  the  mortgage market they can expand their activities to provide a wider platform 
for the provision of numerous mortgage services, that meet different needs of low- 
and moderate-income households. A very limited number of institutions are able to 
meet the current needs, because the provision of such  a  type  of  mortgage credit 
requires  a network of specialised intermediaries, highly  trained  staff  and  good  
understanding  of  the reality that  the  clients  often  represent  informal  entities.  
Furthermore, for the mortgage system to work better for low- and moderate-income 325 
 
households, there is no reason why housing co-operative societies cannot play an 
intermediary role in mortgage credit supply. 
 
7.2.2 Market Development  
The thesis highlights that extending the reach of mortgage credit is, on the whole, a 
natural  development  of  an  evolving  network  of  financial  intermediation.  It  also 
highlights a number of important prerequisites for the development of an effective 
and  sustainable  mortgage  market,  for  example  an  appropriate  legal  framework, 
incorporating  the  fundamental  aspects  of  contract  enforcement  and  a  functioning 
foreclosure process. In addition, issues such as nature of the mortgage credit system 
must be taken into consideration to ensure that any risks are assessed and allowed 
for. 
 
Given  the  urgency  of  the  many  macro-  level  issues  within  the  Egyptian  context 
following the recent revolution, together with the clearly inadequate state resources 
and current tension in relation to the role of private sector, it appears that the time is 
ripe for a reassessment of the macroeconomic policy. This reassessment could draw 
on some approaches that are especially concerned with building capacity for self-
sustained  development.  This  study  has  sought  to  be  provocative  rather  than 
definitive in its discussion of macroeconomic issues; it is intended to offer a starting 
point for further discussion. A balanced approach to the development of a sound 
macroeconomic policy in Egypt should insist on a broad perspective that asks what 
macroeconomic policy can achieve in the areas of distribution, social equity, and 
sustainability.  The  goal  should  be  to  provide  a  framework  for  linking  efforts  to 326 
 
restructure and improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the mortgage system 
and institutions to extend the reach of mortgage credit.  
 
The evidence from our earlier comparative analysis in Chapter 3 suggests that the 
early  macroeconomic  instability  and  inflation  undermined  earlier  development  of 
housing finance systems in countries in transition (Caprio and Peria, 2000). Thus, 
some of these countries like India relied on the development and mobilization of the 
community sector resources to provide an alternative solution. But, the study also 
shows that even if the basic macroeconomic situation and the financial sector have 
been stabilized, extending the reach of the mortgage credit volume does not always 
increase.  So,  countries  still  need  to  introduce  special  instruments  and  enhance 
existing schemes to promote and support mortgage credit growth. For example, the 
study notes the popularity of contractual saving schemes in the Czech Republic that 
is geared to the German Bausparkassen system as well as the housing provident 
funds in China that are based on the compulsory comprehensive savings schemes 
or payroll-based saving system in Singapore. These schemes are compatible with 
and complement the structure and objectives of community based organisations in 
India and Czech Republic. In that context, market-based mortgage credit started to 
supplement state intervention (Schnitzer, 1999).  
 
The analysis and discussion in Chapter 6 indicate that the government and private 
sector  tend  to  be  the  largest  borrowers  in  the  domestic  market  at  interest  rates 
higher than those in international markets. The perception of the greater than ever 
role of the public and private sectors in economic transition in Egypt, and the higher 
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the  recent  financial  crises,  seem  to  be  among  the  main  factors.  But,  this  credit 
concentration squeezes lending that could be available to other potential borrowers 
in the domestic market such as low- and moderate-income households and their 
housing co-operative societies. To address this crowding-out effect, it is important to 
improve  the  level  of  awareness  and  expertise  in  the  mortgage  market  about  the 
major  and  potential  role  of  housing  co-operative  societies  in  expanding  the 
penetration of mortgage credit. 
 
Many of the views expressed during the field work reflect a lack of awareness of the 
capacity within the co-operative housing sector in terms of mobilization of savings 
and  allocation  of  mortgage  credit.  The  situation  is  aggravated  by  the  paradox 
surrounding  the  government  role  and  its  priorities  in  the  mortgage  market,  the 
absence of a credit rating system for co-operative institutions, usually complex and 
lengthy  administrative  and  judicial  procedures  when  co-operative  societies  are 
legally challenged, and the lack of corporate governance in the co-operative housing 
sector. Overall, there is a difficulty in assessing the creditworthiness of housing co-
operative societies due to the absence of reliable and sufficient information and data 
about their operational and financial performance, and a benchmark to rate them. 
 
Chapter 5 seems to indicate that co-operative housing regulations powerfully shape 
the process and cost of co-operative housing production. They impede co-operative 
housing supply, increase the costs of residential units, and limit the ability of housing 
co-operative societies to respond to demand. Complicated approval procedures and 
lack  of  funding  facilities  limit  co-operative  housing  sector  competition  by  creating 328 
 
barriers to entry. They also make the co-operative housing sector more sluggish and 
slow to adjust activities to meet changes in demand.  
 
Based on the results of chapter 6, one can argue that the recent reform initiatives in 
the banking sector have led to more cautious credit policies, especially towards long-
term exposures such as mortgage credit. As a result, banks have become more risk 
averse  and  their  preference  for  less  risky  business  opportunities  has  increased 
accordingly. In this context, a larger share of banks‟ financial resources is used to 
invest in less risky assets, for example government securities. But it suggests that 
the  prospects  for  developing  a  network  of  mortgage  credit  intermediation  that 
includes key actors such as banks and housing co-operative societies remain very 
positive.  
 
7.2.3 Mortgage Credit Reach  
Affordability is a major factor contributing to the limited reach of mortgage credit in 
Egypt. The only mortgages available tend to be short-term, fixed-rate and with a low 
loan-to-value  (LTV)  ratio.  Values  in  Egypt  have  significantly  increased  in  recent 
years as a result of the increase in the cost of housing following the privatization of 
most  of  the  building  material  production  companies.  The  short-term  profile  of 
mortgages  is  due  to  the  high  real  interest  rates  prevailing  and  means  that  the 
monthly  mortgage  payments  are  high.  Rental  payments  are  lower  and  thus  the 
population tends to rent rather than buy. 
 
On the other hand, the reluctance of many financial intermediaries such as banks to 
extend the reach of their credit services in  sectors such as co-operative housing 329 
 
seems to be primarily the result of asymmetric information and the rise in NPLs, 
which in turn led banks to consider other factors before interest rates as the primary 
criterion used to approve new mortgage credit applications. As noted earlier (chapter 
6), at present banks tend to invest their excess liquidity in low risk assets. Since 
most of the external financing in Egypt largely relies on bank financing, the disruption 
to mortgage credit from the banking sector  has decreased credit lines to  the co-
operative housing sector, which, in turn, contribute to the limited access to housing 
for low- and moderate- income households at present. Further research based on 
econometric or macroeconomic approach would be necessary to study the impact of 
money supply on bank liquidity and the supply of mortgage finance in Egypt. 
 
The insights from bank interviews also imply that the lack of information regarding 
the financial standing of housing co-operative societies makes it difficult for banks to 
determine  their  creditworthiness.  Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  establish  credit 
bureaus for housing co-operative societies to keep track of their financial and credit 
history. Credit bureaus would certainly help banks improve their risk assessment by 
sharing information on housing co-operative societies. Because credit bureaus keep 
track of borrowers‟ records, it will be easier for banks to charge interest rates that 
reflect  each  housing  co-operative  society‟s  credit  history.  Currently,  there  is  no 
centralized credit database for housing co-operative societies that banks can use to 
screen credit applications and they must rely on their own records. 
 
In addition, some banks still rely on collateral requirements rather than cash flow and 
financial  viability  when  assessing  creditworthiness.  Countries  whose  banking 
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rank low as to ease of access to credit and doing business, compared to systems 
with transparent and accessible information and less reliance on collateral. When 
assessing  credit  applications,  risk  assessments  and  feasibility  studies  of  a  given 
project need to be given higher priority than collateral. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 also revealed that banks in Egypt, given their current risk aversion, 
like to provide mortgage credit that is mostly short-term. However, long-term funding 
is crucial for mortgage credit. To this end, integrating the contract saving schemes of 
the  Egyptian  co-operative  housing  sector  into  the  mortgage  credit  intermediation 
system should improve efficiency of the system and extend the term of mortgage 
credit. Also, issuing financial instruments in the capital market, such as co-operative 
housing  securities  and  bonds,  needs  to  be  explored  and  expanded.  These 
instruments  may  be  used  by  the  housing  co-operative  societies  as  a  source  of 
external long-term funding and by banks as alternative investments. 
 
7.2.4 Safety Net  
Egypt  remains  vulnerable  to  economic  and  financial  shocks.  To  mitigate  the 
vulnerability of the mortgage market to these shocks, it is crucial that the government 
maintains sound macroeconomic performance (chapter 3), as increased confidence 
in the country's economy will be a key factor in improving the country's financing 
conditions. Also, the government as a regulator has a role to play in improving the 
environment  for  doing  business  and,  therefore,  for  sending  positive  signals  and 
encouraging the key agents in the mortgage market.  
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It is crucial that the government should encourage the reform and development of 
the  existing  guarantee  schemes  to  cover  the  activities  of  community-based 
organizations  and  mortgage  institutions.  In  Chapter  3,  the  thesis  reviewed 
international examples such as the insured mortgage programs in the United States 
and Canada as well as the financial co-operative movement in India. The recently 
established Egyptian Mortgage Refinance Company (EMRC), which is geared to the 
United States Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac model, could play a role in guaranteeing 
the timely service and payment of mortgage loans extended to housing co-operative 
societies. In the  meantime,  the establishment of  co-operative  insurance  schemes 
can reduce the negative effect of past co-operative failures and support the solvency 
of serious housing co-operative societies. 
 
The potential for government support – systemic or other external support – can also 
improve  the  creditworthiness  of  housing  co-operative  societies;  however,  such 
support  remains  uncertain.  Although  there  is  no  insurance  scheme  in  place,  the 
Egyptian authorities have historically demonstrated both their willingness and their 
ability to intervene and prevent a default by any Egyptian institutions, irrespective of 
their legal status, size or relative importance to the system.  However, this notion 
should not prevent the establishment of a national co-operative guarantee fund to 
provide a safety net for beneficiaries and stakeholders.  
 
Each  co-operative  could  be  required  by  law  to  participate  in  a  contract  savings 
guarantee fund. The fund can then act with the regulatory bodies to develop a wide 
range  of  preventive  contingency  plans  to  be  at  their  disposal  should  a  crisis  be 
detected. As an example, the plans can include the provision of financial support if 332 
 
credit lines (zero interest) are required as part of a recovery plan or cover is needed 
to  balance  the  assets  and  liabilities  of  a  distressed  co-operative  society.  Such 
support,  together  with  the  generally  small  size  of  individual  housing  co-operative 
societies, can significantly limit the systemic destabilization risk from a crisis in any 
one co-operative.  
 
Among the other measures required to enhance the safety net is the reform of the 
regulatory  environment.  Although  the  housing  co-operative  societies  are  actually 
managing  public  funds  that  are  invested  in  the  housing  market,  they  are  not 
regulated or supervised by any financial watchdog to ensure that  they are at the 
heart  of financial  regulation. The  housing  co-operative  societies‟  contract  savings 
and home purchase plans will need to be monitored by the financial regulators that 
usually collect, analyse and test periodical financial data from financial institutions.  
 
These procedures can serve as an early warning system for financial stress in the 
co-operative housing sector. They can also play a crucial  role in developing and 
implementing  contingency  plans  for  the  recovery  and/or  liquidation  of  distressed 
housing  co-operative  societies.  These  plans  can  include  partnerships,  mergers, 
management  change,  asset  and  liability  acquisition  by  another  investors,  and 
support from a guarantee fund as a last resort.  
 
7.3 Contributions 
The thesis provides a multidisciplinary literature review of the main theoretical and 
empirical  issues  related  to  mortgage  market  development,  mortgage  credit 
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and mortgage markets for the under-served households. The thesis contributes a 
number of points to the research on Egypt‟s recently developed mortgage market. 
The starting point of the research is information constraints. There is a growing body 
of  literature  trying  to  address  the  problems  of  access  to  housing  and  mortgage 
markets  in  Egypt.  However,  limited  literature  is  available  on  exploring  ways  to 
address these problems.  
 
This  thesis  holds  that  many  previous  critiques  are  misleading  in  that  they  have 
overemphasized the potential impact of mortgage market development. The social 
economic  situation  does  not  grant  an  extended  reach  of  mortgage  credit  in  the 
country, as in most other transitional economies. It is the point of view of this thesis 
that the financial intermediation constraints in the mortgage market have also caused 
the problems. Therefore, this thesis highlights the importance of addressing these 
constraints through alternative policies and institutions.  
 
In line with the United Nations‟ call for policymakers to develop national policies and 
strategies  for  building  inclusive  financial  sectors,  this  thesis  provides  a  generic 
framework  to  explore  ways  for  establishing  an  inclusive  and  efficient  network  of 
mortgage  credit  intermediation  in  Egypt.  This  is  by  allowing  co-existence  and 
integration of various actors, such as banks and housing co-operative societies, in 
the network. The purpose of doing so is to emphasize the impacts of stakeholders‟ 
relationship to and co-operation on mortgage credit provision to the under-served 
households. 
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Further, emphasis is made of the importance of studying data at the micro level. This 
thesis tries to point out there are differences in the perceptions of stakeholders in the 
Egyptian  mortgage  market,  as  observed  during  the  field  study  and  the  review  of 
other  research.  Previous  analyses  based  on  societal  data  (macro  data)  almost 
ignored the significant connection between the intermediary role of different actors 
and  mortgage  market  development.  This  obviously  contradicts  the  common 
knowledge of the situation. Have the actors really played their potential intermediary 
roles? If not, why? This thesis tries to answer these questions.  
 
The results suggest that the immobility of resources among actors made it difficult to 
realize the desired outcome of recent reforms in the Egyptian mortgage market. The 
fact that previous research ignores the relationship between community participation 
and mortgage market development results from its disregard for the multidisciplinary 
approach to research and addressing problems outside normal subject boundaries, 
and  the  fact  that  researchers  are  usually  very  different  in  their  perceptions, 
capacities and resources.    
 
7.4 Limitations and Further Research 
There  are  factors  affecting  co-operative  performance  which  cannot  easily  be 
comprehended  by  pure  academic  research.  This  is  evident  in  many  of  the 
propositions put forward during interviews regarding the general causes of the failure 
or success of co-operative societies. But it is not simply lack of personal experience 
that  prevents  easy  comprehension  or  even  that  leads,  sometimes,  to 
miscomprehension. First, in the same way that private business organizations are 335 
 
reluctant  to  release  what  they  consider  to  be  sensitive  information,  many  co-
operative societies have also been reluctant to give out such information voluntarily.  
 
Second,  unlike  business  enterprises,  the  main  objectives  of  co-operative 
management decision making are not based primarily on profit-making criteria but, 
rather, on various other motives, most of which are socially and politically acceptable 
in official discourse but some may not be so publicly acceptable. Not only do such 
motives remain unrecorded but also hardly anyone is prepared to talk about them.  
 
Third, co-operators present themselves as good missionaries out to protect the low- 
and  moderate-income  households  from  the  inequalities  produced  by  the  system, 
capitalist or socialist. As such, some have convinced themselves that the rest of the 
society  is  out  to  get  them.  This  creates  a  certain  mistrust  of  all  outsiders  to  the 
movement, including research students. Such mistrust and a tendency for secrecy 
violate  one  of  the  most  fundamental  co-operative  principles,  that  of  democratic 
control. It is hard to imagine how research can be effectively conducted unless there 
is the greatest degree of transparency.  
 
To address these issues, this thesis employed a multi-methods approach to gain 
confidence that the study was addressing the most important issues and to enable 
triangulation  (to  be  exact  the  use  of  different  data  collection  methods  within  one 
study to cross examine the results) to take place. But such an approach has both 
advantages and drawbacks. A concern some may have in the design of this study is 
the extent to which the thesis results are generalizable, to be precise the results may 
be equally applicable to other research settings. This is in particular  because the 336 
 
study was conducted in a small number of organizations due to the issues noted 
earlier regarding undertaking this study (chapter 4). To address such a drawback, it 
is necessary to recapitulate that the main purpose of this study is not to produce a 
theory which is generalizable to all actors in the Egyptian mortgage market. The task 
is simply to try to explain what is going on and to test the robustness of the results 
and conclusions of the thesis by exposing them to other research settings in further 
future research.  
 
Based on the above, one can identify several possible directions for future research. 
Having  information  about  the  links  between  the  co-operative  housing  supply  and 
mortgage market development is the first step towards social housing liberalization. 
The second direction could involve rethinking the role of public and private housing 
developers.  At  present,  the  role  of  the  Egyptian  private  sector  is  identified  as  a 
critical  constraining  factor  in  limiting  the  responsiveness  to  demand.  Testing  the 
abilities of the Egyptian government to promote vigorous competition among other 
actors in the social housing market is also a major step. Another step is what to do 
about the existing stock of public and social housing – how to regularize it in a cost-
effective and cost-recoverable manner.  
 
7.5 Policy Recommendations  
The  present  thesis  clearly  points  to  the  importance  of  further  reforms  for  the 
development of an effective and sustainable mortgage market in Egypt. This would 
require the development of a network of mortgage credit institutions at the bottom 
end of the mortgage market. In today‟s competitive environment, there is also a need 
to understand how a partnership between different actors in the mortgage market 337 
 
can be developed. The thesis also highlights many possible recommendations, as 
briefly discussed below.  
 
Egypt  must  grant  special  attention  to  efforts  to  stabilize  and  grow  the  Egyptian 
economy. To secure macroeconomic stability will require the Egyptian government to 
co-ordinate its fiscal and monetary policies. Reform of pension and social security 
programmes  is  a  necessity  for  contract  savings  system  development.  Continued 
strategic privatization of inefficient public services is essential to increase productivity 
and reduce government deficits. Similarly, continued market liberalization is critical to 
the healthy expansion of the overall economy.  
 
Egypt has room to develop a comprehensive set of housing policies and strategies to 
ensure  expanded  mortgage  choices  for  its  citizens.  A  major  initiative  should  be 
undertaken  by  the  government,  in  concert  with  private  and  community-based 
organizations, to define long-term objectives and short- as well as intermediate-term 
strategies and programmes. Central to the effort should be the development of an 
innovative mortgage market and development of partnerships among and between 
all levels of government and these organizations. 
 
Egypt should make the establishment of an efficient mortgage market a key element 
in its effort to develop a comprehensive set of policies, strategies and programmes. 
Current  approaches  to  developing  mortgage  market  facilities  are  noteworthy  and 
deserve commendation. But they are far too tentative and incremental. While they 
will generate increased access to housing over time, the aggregate amount is likely 
to be minuscule in terms of need. 338 
 
 
The Egyptian government's recent banking sector reforms – such as discontinuing 
the system of administrative allocation of bank credit, the  liberalization of interest 
rates and foreign exchange markets, and the introduction of the new capital markets 
laws – have enhanced the allocated efficiency of the banking sector. Yet the task is 
not complete. Further deregulation measures need to be taken  such as reducing 
financial  repression,  relaxing  barriers  to  entry,  granting  autonomy  to  intermediary 
institutions, and creating a competitive, level playing field for all the players, including 
community-based  organizations  such  as  housing  co-operative  societies.  Such 
measures  will  advance  the  development  of  an  efficient,  diversified  and  solvent 
mortgage market that would be able to support access to housing for under-served 
households. 
 
Housing co-operative societies, as self help organisations, functioning without the 
motive of profit and endeavouring to provide homes to members on the best possible 
terms  certainly  merit  some  special  consideration,  especially  the  factors  that 
contribute to their success and failure. By mobilization of savings from their members 
to develop housing schemes, they are not only undertaking a very laudable housing 
object but also in the process generate funding opportunities for the mortgage credit 
sector. Housing co-operative societies help to supplement the efforts of government 
and private sector in the field of providing affordable housing and credit for low- and 
moderate- income households. In doing so, they take part in some measure towards 
the  general development  of the  country.  More  than  all  this, housing  co-operative 
societies  by  being  active  in  the  field  of  savings  mobilisation  and  housing 
development offer much needed competition to the public and private sectors and 339 
 
thus  help  to  regulate  and  enhance  best  practice  in  the  affordable  housing  and 
mortgage markets. It is for this purpose that the co-operative movement is accorded 
some  consideration  and  privileges  in  countries,  such  as  India.  The  co-operative 
movement in these two countries received great measure of support.  
 
Housing co-operative societies like any other institutions are supposed to serve their 
members with integrity and honesty. However, there are instances where housing 
co-operative societies because of mismanagement give cause for serious concern. It 
is always hoped that the misdeeds of such societies will not influence the authorities 
concerned to withdraw their  support to housing co-operative societies in general. 
Housing co-operative societies should realise their shortcomings and drawbacks by 
tightening the loop-holes which have been exploited in the past and to be on their 
guard to prevent opportunists and adventurers from infiltrating into management with 
the sole aim of enriching themselves at the expense of the members.  
 
The misdeeds, mishaps and shortcomings that have taken place in some cases in 
Egypt should open the eyes of the members that they too are watchful. If housing co-
operatives fade away due to lack of support of government, the private sector will 
have  good  reason  to  rejoice  at  the  removal  of  the  instrument  which  has  been 
providing  competition  to  them.  Furthermore,  the  ordinary  household  with  limited 
financial resources will lose one important avenue through which he could hope to 
access the housing and mortgage markets. Besides this, an important element of the 
co-operative  movement  will  be  eliminated  causing  the  removal  of  a  channel  into 
which the surplus funds of the movement could be invested on a long term basis 
enabling  co-operative  funds  to  work for the  betterment  of  housing  and  mortgage 340 
 
markets. With the absence of housing co-operative societies, surplus funds of the 
movement will tend to flow into such investments that are not necessarily socially 
responsible.  The  surplus  funds  will  enrich  and  strengthen  the  private  housing 
enterprises against which co-operatives have to compete with. Such a situation will 
be detrimental to the interest of the co-operative movement as a whole.  
 
The  future  growth  and  healthy  development  of  housing  co-operative  societies 
depend on several factors. It is important and necessary that there should be certain 
definite provisions in the housing and financial laws to regulate the operation and 
management of housing co-operative societies. The central and local governments 
should  allot  a  place  to  the  co-operative  sector  in  their  overall  plans  for  the 
development of housing and intermediation of mortgage credit in the country.  
 
The government should consider it a moral obligation to assist housing co-operative 
societies  with  finance  to  some  extent.  While  it  is  appreciated  that  housing  co-
operative societies should depend largely on their own financial resources and that 
of the other sectors of the co-operative movement together with whatever resources 
they could tap from private lending institutions on the strength of their creditability, it 
will be of great help if credit could be made available by government. If it is felt that 
public funds should be safeguarded and that risks of any sort should be eliminated, 
then it is suggested that funds be advanced only when the housing schemes are 
completed to the satisfaction of the municipalities or local authorities concerned and 
further  the  properties  developed  and  related  agreed  mortgages  are  available  as 
securities for the loan. 341 
 
Financial  institutions  which  come  into  possession  of  large  funds,  such  as  the 
provident funds and payroll-based saving systems, should consider it appropriate to 
invest a portion of its financial resources in housing co-operative societies provided 
of  course  adequate  securities  are  offered  for  the  investment.  Most  members  of 
housing  co-operative  societies  are  usually  contributors  to  provident  funds  and 
payroll-based  saving  systems  and  as  such  they  rightly  expect  support  to  their 
housing co-operative societies in return but sometimes to their dismay the provident 
funds and payroll-based saving systems feel it proper to invest in the development of 
housing and extending mortgage credit in general on commercial basis rather than in 
the affordable housing and mortgage markets.  
 
To  accommodate  housing  co-operative  societies  with  loans,  it  is  advocated  that 
steps  be  taken  to  bring  about  amendments  to  the  legislation  concerned.  For 
example, commercial banks are normally reluctant to invest on long term basis and 
as  such  their  investments  in  housing  are  comparatively  less.  The  housing  and 
mortgage markets will benefit immensely if the legislations are amended to provide 
incentives, such as tax exemptions, for commercial banks to substantially increase 
their  investments  in  community  based  organisation  such  as  housing  co-operative 
societies. 
 
Insurance  companies  should  be  directly,  by  legislation  if  necessary,  to  invest  a 
portion of their annual premium income in the development of housing and mortgage 
markets  for  low-  and  moderate-  income  households  through  their  housing 
cooperative societies. Their funds are normally available for investment on a long 
term basis and investment in affordable housing and mortgage markets will not only 342 
 
enable them to obtain an attractive return but also secure sound security. The funds 
of the insurance industry tend usually to grow rapidly with the rapid development of 
the industry due to the constant improvement in education and the standard of living 
of households. Investment in affordable housing and mortgage markets by insurance 
companies in a big way can therefore help to accelerate the development of housing 
both by the private sector and housing co-operative societies.  
 
It is also important to note that the growth and expansion of housing cooperative 
societies can be considered as a strategy to support the establishment of a new 
business sector, targeting at affordable housing, particularly rental housing as an 
alternative  tenure.  For  example,  housing  cooperative  societies  can  support  the 
establishment  of  Public-Private  Partnership  (PPP)  schemes  by  providing  stable 
management  and  long-term  financing.  At  present,  there  is  a  very  limited  recent 
studies of how states in the developing countries have sought to withdraw from direct 
provision  of  housing  services;  and  the  shift  in  responsibility  for  housing  service 
delivery from the public to the community sector represented by housing cooperative 
societies.     
 
Finally, the Egyptian financial services regulators need to shake up regulations in the 
mortgage  market  to  support  the  development  of  an  effective  and  sustainable 
mortgage  market.  Mortgage  intermediaries  should  have  a  sustainable  business 
models and maintain adequate liquidity levels. The regulatory regime should also be 
predictable,  clear  and  transparent  to  minimize  financial  crimes  involving  the 
community based organisations.  
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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE 
Co-operative Name:   
Address:    
Year of Foundation:   
Manager Name:   
Telephone Number:    
 
Please Answer the following (Quantitative) Questions: 
1. Please fill the following table:  
  2005  2006  2007  
Issued Capital (in EGP 000s)        
Number of Members        
Number of Co-operative Housing Units        
Number of Non Co-operative Housing Units       
Number of Units to be Developed in the Future        
Number of Buyers        
 
2. What are your main sources of finance and their development during the past 
three years?  
Source (in EGP 000s)  2005  2006  2007  
Members‟ Subscriptions        
Government Grants        
Grants from NGOs       
Subsidized  Loans  from  National  Investment 
Bank  
     
Non-Subsidized  Loans  from  Commercial  & 
Real Estate Banks 
     
Loans from Mortgage Finance Companies        344 
 
Supplier Facilities       
Other Sources, please specify ----------------------        
 
3.  Based  on  the  co-operative‟s  financial  statements,  please  fill  out  the  following 
tables (in EGP 000‟s)  
Assets:   2005  2006  2007 
Housing Units at Cost       
Housing Units at Market Price        
Other Fixed Assets        
Total Fixed Assets        
Gross Depreciation        
Total Current Assets        
Other Assets        
Total Assets        
 
Liabilities:  2005  2006  2007 
OVD & Loans repayable within 1 Year        
Current Portion of LMTD       
Supplier Facilities        
Other Current Liabilities        
Medium- & Long-Term Debt        
Other Medium- & Long-Term Liabilities        
Provisions        
Paid in Capital        
Reserves        
Accumulated Surplus (Deficit)       
Total Liabilities & Equity        345 
 
Income & Expenses Account:   2005  2006  2007 
Revenues        
Operating Costs        
Operating Surplus (Deficit)       
Sales, General and Administrative Expenses        
Bank Interest and Fees        
Other Expenses        
Other Income        
Surplus (Deficit) before Tax       
Tax       
Surplus (Deficit) for the Period        
 
4. Please fill out the following table (in EGP 000‟s):  
Item:   2005  2006  2007 
Gross Arrears        
Provision       
Net Arrears        
 
5.  Which  of  the  following  financial  institutions  does  your  co-operative  get  credit 
facilities from and how these facilities developed during the past three years? 
Institution (in EGP 000’s)   2005  2006  2007 
National Investment Bank       
Public Sector Banks         
Private Sector Banks        
Real Estate Banks       
Mortgage Finance Companies        
Other institutions, (please specify _________)        346 
 
 
6. Is it possible to contact you again regarding further enquiries and clarifications in 
relation to this questionnaire:  
Yes □            No □ 
N.B.: Please enclose copies of your financial statements if possible 
 
Please Answer the following (Qualitative) Questions: 
1. If your co-operative has been doing well during the past period, why? 
On a scale from 1 to 2, please rank the following reasons (1 = Important; 2 = Not 
Important).  
Factors   Important   Not Important  
Increasing demand       
Capital increase      
Additional credit facilities      
Business Expansion in the none co-operative 
housing sector 
   
Other factors, (Specify -----------------------------
-----------)  
   
 
2. If your co-operative has NOT been performing well over the past period, why? 
On a scale from 1 to 2, please rank the following reasons (1 = Important; 2 = Not 
Important).  
Reasons   Important   Not Important  
Decreasing demand       
Price increase      
Difficulty to obtain credit     
Competition from private sector     
High arrears      
Other obstacles, (please specify ----------------
-----------)  
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3. How long has your co-operative been dealing with financial institutions? 
Duration    
Less than 2 years     
2 to 5 years    
5 to 10 years    
More than 10 years    
 
4. Has your co-operative been facing any difficulty in obtaining credit facilities from 
the banking sector lately? 
    Route 
Yes     Go to No.5  
No    Go to No.6 
 
5. What are the key obstacles to obtain these credit facilities? 
  Important   Not Important  
Performance problem      
Inadequate collateral     
High interest rate      
Risk at your business sector      
Your  bank  is  just  limiting  credit  with  no 
obvious reason 
   
The association failed to satisfy the terms 
& conditions of an existing loan 
   
Change in the laws and regulations of the 
Co-operative housing sector 
   
Other obstacles, (Please specify -----------
---------------------------------------) 
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6. What were the alternative sources for additional funding? 
   Important   Not Important  
Own Fund     
Grants &/or Loans from NGOs     
Capital Market      
Supplier Facilities      
Government Facilities & Grants     
Mortgage Finance Companies      
Other Alternatives, (please specify:--------------------
------------) 
   
 
7. Does your co-operative currently find credit requirements tighter than they were 
three years ago? 
   
Yes    
No   
 
8. Has your bank been flexible in negotiating the following terms during the last three 
years?  
  Yes  No 
Interest rate      
Type & value of collateral      
Volume of loans & credit facilities     
Maturity of loans & credit facilities     
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9. What percentage of your co-operative's credit applications was approved by your 
bank over the last three years? 
%   
0-20   
21-40   
41-60   
61-80   
81-100   
 
10. What are the reasons for not preferring to apply for additional credit facilities from 
the banking sector? 
Reasons   Important   Not 
Important  
High interest rate       
Higher collateral value      
Long and tight procedures     
Tenor is too short      
Other reasons (please specify: --------------------------)      
 
11. What was the most important change that affected your co-operative over the 
last three years? 
  Important  Not 
Important 
New Real Estate Tax Law       
Decreasing Subsidy      
Changing Regulation & Supervision      
Increased Competition from the Private Sector      
Other Changes (please specify ---------------------------
--------) 
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12. Overall, our co-operative has no equal opportunity to obtain credit facilities from 
banks compared to the other housing developers in the market. 
   
Yes    
No   
 
13. Does your co-operative enjoy any of the incentives or support below? 
  Rank  
Tax incentives     
Interest rate subsidy   
Government grants    
Other incentives (please specify, --------------------------------------------)   
 
14. What is your evaluation of these incentives or support? 
  Important   Not Important  
Tax incentives       
Interest rate subsidy     
Government grants      
Other incentives (please specify, -------------------)     
 
15. How sufficient these incentives or support? 
  Enough   Not Enough  
Tax incentives       
Interest rate subsidy     
Government grants      
Other incentives (please specify, -------------------)     
-----------------------------------------------Many Thanks----------------------------------------------- 
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW AND KEY INFORMANTS  
Tag No.  Type   Summary Profile   
(1)  Government   Established in 2004, the Mortgage Finance Subsidy 
and Guarantee Fund, is intended to expand housing 
affordability  for  moderate  and  low  income  Egyptian 
households,  using  either  or  both  of  two  broad 
activities: 1) Guarantees for financial instruments &/or 
2)  Direct  subsidy  for  the  benefit  of  low-income 
households.  
(2)  Financial 
Institution  
Established in 1996, HC Brokerage is one of the top 
ten  brokerage  firms  in  Egypt.  The  firm‟s  research 
department covers the most active real estate stocks 
in the MENA region. 
(3)  Housing 
co-operative 
society 
Established in 1976, the housing co-operative society 
of the Engineers Union has more than 11 thousands 
members and manages 2,505 housing units.   
(4)  Government  The Ministry of Housing supervises all institutions in 
charge of providing housing services. 
(5)  Financial 
Institution  
Established by the government in 1979, Housing and 
Development Bank (HDB) is a specialized financial 
institution focusing on funding housing companies and 
projects.  
(6)  Regulator  The Co-operative Housing Union is a federation of 
housing  cooperatives  in  Egypt.  The  organization  is 
composed of 4,000 cooperative housing societies with 
over  15  million  members.  CHU  is  a  member  of  the 
International Co-operative Alliance. 
(7)  Housing 
co-operative 
society 
Established in 1982, the housing co-operative society 
of  the  National  Bank  has  more  than  12  thousands 
members and manages 819 housing units.   
(8)  Regulator  The Egyptian Financial Services Authority (EFSA) 
is  authorized  to  supervise  the  mortgage  finance 
affairs,  set  the  controls  ensuring  market  efficiency, 
follow up, control and development, and undertake all 
the  measures  that  maintain  the  rights  of  all  market 
intermediaries. 
(9)  Regulator  Same organization as (6) above.  
(10)  Regulator  Same organization as (6) above.  352 
 
(11)  Regulator  Same organization as (6) above.  
(12)  Housing 
co-operative 
society 
Established in 1978, the housing co-operative society 
of  the  Presidential  Administration  has  3,605 
members representing the current and retired officers 
of the Egyptian President Office. At the time of doing 
this study, the society was managing 2,855 housing 
units. 
(13)  Government  Same organization as (4) above. 
(14)  Housing 
co-operative 
society 
Established in 1992, the housing co-operative society 
of  the  Republican  Guards  has  1,596  members 
representing the current and retired officers of the elite 
troops of the Egyptian army directly reporting to the 
President. At the time of doing this study, the society 
was managing 481 housing units. 
(15)  Housing 
co-operative 
society 
Established in 1979, the housing co-operative society 
of the Nubian Sons has 1,561 members representing 
the  Egyptian  Nubians  who  were  forcibly  resettled to 
make room for Lake Nasser after the construction of 
the dams at Aswan. At the time of doing this study, the 
society  was  managing  374  housing  units  most  of 
which  are  located  in  the  Nubian  villages,  north  of 
Aswan on the west bank of the Nile. 
(16)  Government  Same organization as (4) above. 
(17)  Housing 
co-operative 
society 
Established in 1970, the housing co-operative society 
of the Central Bank has 5,700 members representing 
the current and retired officers of the Egyptian Central 
Bank. At the time of doing this study, the society was 
managing 1,890 housing units. 
(18)  Housing 
co-operative 
society 
Established in 1984, the housing co-operative society 
of  the  Telecom  Authority  has  611  members 
representing  the  current  and  retired  officers  of  the 
Egyptian Telecom Authority. At the time of doing this 
study, the society was managing 611 housing units.  
(19)  Housing 
co-operative 
society 
Established  in  1982,  6
th  of  October  for  Housing 
Development  is  one  of  the  largest  housing  co-
operative societies in Egypt. It has more than 30,000 
members representing some of the current and retired 
Egyptian  military  officers.  At  the  time  of  doing  this 
study, the society was managing 2640 housing units.       
(20)  Housing 
co-operative 
Established in 1970, Suez Gulf housing co-operative 
society was formed by some of the retired and current 353 
 
society  employees  of  Suez  Gulf  Petroleum  Co.,  one  of  the 
largest Egyptian oil and gas corporations. At the time 
of  doing  this study,  there  were  3,337  members and 
687 housing units under the society‟s management.     
(21)  Housing 
co-operative 
society 
Established in 1982, Education housing co-operative 
society was formed by some of the retired and current 
members  of  the  teachers  association  in  the  city  of 
Giza, Greater. At the time of doing this study, there 
were 1,737 members and 286 housing units under the 
society‟s management.     
(22)  Housing 
co-operative 
society 
Established  in  1982,  Cairo  Pharm  housing  co-
operative society was formed by some of the retired 
and current employees of Cairo Pharmaceuticals Co., 
a  major  public  sector  company  in  the  capital  city 
Cairo. At the time of doing this study, there were 570 
members and 463 housing units under  the society‟s 
management,  representing  the  small  and  medium 
sized entities in the housing cooperative sector.      
(23)  Financial 
Institution 
Established in 1898, National Bank of Egypt (NBE) 
is  the  largest  and  oldest  bank  in  Egypt,  with  total 
assets of approx. US$50billion, it is also one of the 
largest banks in Africa and the Middle East. NBE has 
been  used  by  the  Government  to  support  the 
development  of  many  sectors  in  Egypt  since  the 
nationalization  of  the  bank  in  late  1950‟s.  This 
included  extending  subsidized  loans  to  the  housing 
co-operative  societies  between  1980  to  the  late 
1990‟s. 
(24)  Financial 
Institution 
Housing  and  Development  Bank  (HDB)  is  an 
Egyptian  Joint  Stock  Company  established  by  the 
Egyptian government in 1979 for the purpose of the 
mobilization of the required financial resources to fund 
housing and reconstruction through granting long-term 
loans  to  companies,  co-operative  housing  societies 
and individuals with a view to build new apartments. 
(25)  Financial 
Institution 
Same organization as (23) above. 
(26)  Financial 
Institution 
Since  it  first  opened  for  business  in  1920,  Egypt‟s 
second  largest  bank  Banque  Misr  has  taken  a 
leading role in the economic and social development 
of the country as a state-owned bank. Today, the bank 
employs over 13,000 employees in over 440 branches 
nationwide and international branches and offers a full 
range of banking services, including housing loans. 354 
 
(27)  Financial 
Institution 
Concord International Investments was founded in 
1988  for  the  purpose  of  managing  the  wealth  of 
individuals, families, foundations and institutions. The 
company  manages  directly  and  through  its  affiliates 
investment portfolios and mutual funds amounting to 
approximately  US$1.64billion  worldwide,  of  which 
approximately US$1.34billion are currently invested in 
Egyptian  equities.  The  company  also  provides 
corporate  finance  advisory  services  and  real  estate 
investment advice.  
(28)  Regulator   Established  in  1961,  the  Central  Bank  of  Egypt 
(CBE)  is  an  autonomous  public  legal  person, 
assuming the authorities and powers Of regulating the 
banking  system  of  Egypt  and  formulating  and 
implementing Egypt's banking policy, monetary policy 
and credit policy, including bank credit in the housing 
market. 
(29)  Financial 
Institution 
Same organization as (23) above. 
(30)  Regulator  Same organization as (8) above. 
(31)  Financial 
Institution 
Established  in  1975,  Commercial  International 
Bank, or CIB, is an Egyptian bank headquartered in 
Cairo,  Egypt.  With  total  assets  of  approximately 
US$10billions,  the  bank  is  the  largest  private-sector 
lender  in  Egypt.  In  recent  years,  CIB  started  to  be 
active  lender  in  the  residential  property  market, 
offering a wide range of bank credit facilities for almost 
all  purposes  from  home  purchase  to  refurbishment 
and finishing. 
(32)  Regulator   Same organization as (28) above. 
(33)  Financial 
Institution 
Egyptian Mortgage Refinance Company (EMRC) is 
a non-depository and non-banking specialist mortgage 
institution  established  in  2006  for  the  purpose  of 
refinancing  its  shareholders,  almost  all  mortgage 
lenders in Egypt. Modeled similar to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie  Mac  in  the  USA,  EMRC‟s  activity  is  only 
limited to dealing with its shareholders for the purpose 
of  funding  mortgage  lending  through,  for  example, 
issuing  bonds  collateralized  by  its  assets.  The 
company  regulated  by  the  Egyptian  Financial 
Supervisory Authority (EFSA) (see 8 above).  
(34)  Financial 
Institution 
Same organization as (2) above. 355 
 
(35)  Financial 
Institution 
Same organization as (24) above. 
(36)  Public Listed 
Housing 
Developer    
Established  in  1906,  Heliopolis  Company  for 
Housing  and  Construction  is  a  subsidiary  of 
National Company for Construction and Development. 
It is a public listed company engaged in construction 
and  housing  projects.  The  Company‟s  operations 
include  land  reclamation  and  subdivision,  residential 
real estate development and management, real estate 
properties  purchase  and  sale,  real  estate  projects 
planning and supervising, as  well as constructing of 
houses,  hotels,  holiday  resorts,  and  hospitals 
properties. 
(37)  Public Listed 
Housing 
Developer    
Same organization as (36) above. 
(38)  Regulator  Same organization as (8) above. 
(39)  Regulator  Same organization as (8) above. 
(40)  Financial 
Institution 
Same organization as (24) above. 
(41)  Financial 
Institution 
Same organization as (33) above. 
(42)  Financial 
Institution 
Same organization as (33) above. 
(43)  Financial 
Institution 
Established in 1880, the Egyptian Arab Land Bank 
grew  to  become  a  prominent  financial  institution, 
serving as a source of financial support for the real 
estate  sector  throughout  the  Middle  East.  It  is  the 
second largest specialized real estate bank in Egypt.   
(44)  Financial 
Institution 
Same organization as (23) above. 
(45)  Regulator  Same organization as (8) above. 
(46)  Regulator  Same organization as (8) above. 
(47)  Regulator   Same organization as (28) above. 
(48)  Financial 
Institution 
Same organization as (43) above. 356 
 
(49)  Regulator  Same organization as (8) above. 
(50)  Financial 
Institution 
Same organization as (2) above. 
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